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1 Introduction 
1.1 'Institutions matter' 
'Institutions matter' became a motto among international organisations in the late 1990s, 
when it became clear that the so-called 'Washington Consensus' and its emphasis on 
markets was not generating the growth and development that was expected. The slogan 
was open to different interpretations. It sounded a note of disappointment for those liberalist 
reformers, sometimes jokingly called the 'marketeers', who promoted the generalised shift to 
market mechanisms and the pre-eminence of private actors in developing countries at the 
time of the development crisis of the 1980s. Giving more space to the market was perhaps a 
good idea from a theoretical point of view. Practically, however, it was another story. What 
the 'marketeers' had not realised was that a well-functioning market economy requires an 
institutional background, which most often was missing in the economies to be reformed, 
and that liberalising and privatising might in effect be counterproductive without concomitant 
institutional changes. 
The 'institutions matter' slogan today stands for a fundamental truth about development, 
which seems now to be widely accepted by the development community, including 
international organisations and the old marketeers, as well as academics. It now seems 
obvious that there is indeed complementarity between the market and the state. The 
economic efficiency to be expected from the former requires some intervention by the latter 
through adequate institutions or rules imposed on the various economic actors, including the 
state itself. Practically speaking, however, these rules are the product of history or specific 
circumstances, and are not necessarily well adapted to today's economic context or the 
specific circumstances of a country at a given point in its development process. This is 
precisely how 'institutions matter'. The debate is therefore not so much about this basic fact 
but about the way institutions should be reformed. This is where the old opposition between 
marketeers and state interventionists comes back into the picture, with, to simplify, the 
former most often pleading for rules that facilitate business and increase economic efficiency 
and the latter more attentive to promoting social welfare and protecting public goods. This is 
also where political economy plays a major role, as all economic and political actors try to 
bend the rules in their own interest. 
'Institutions matter' quite evidently to those academic economists who for a long time have 
emphasised the link between the process of economic development in a country, the nature 
of its institutions, i.e. the structure of political power and the norms and rules inherited from 
the past, and their joint evolution with economic development. As a matter of fact, 
institutional economics has a long history, from Karl Marx and Thorsten Veblen to the so- 
called New Institutional Economics, associated in its development component, in particular, 
with Douglass North. The New Institutional Economics borrowed from the other streams of 
institutional economics their extension of the neoclassical paradigm to a view in which 
economic institutions are seen a way to solve the inefficiencies arising from the existence of 
transaction costs, asymmetric information, and limited commitment capacity. Hence the 
emphasis put in that literature on institutions that aim to protect property rights and enforce 
contracts as positive factors of development. At the same time, such a view of the role of 
institutions in development is criticised by the Institutional Political Economy approach, which 
relies more on a socio-political view of institutions as having consequences for the 
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functioning of the economy than it does on a view of institutions as addressing sources of 
economic inefficiency. It is also fair to say that both schools of thought rely very much on a 
historical view of institutions and development, drawing their examples from, and grounding 
their case in, development history or observed contemporaneous differences between so-
called advanced countries and emerging or developing ones. 
1.2 How institutions matter in development policy today 
Faced with the disappointing performance of the 'Washington Consensus', international 
organisations and bilateral development agencies switched to what was called the 'post- 
Washington consensus', or what Stiglitz nicknamed the 'Washington Consensus plus'. This 
extended set of principles was seen as a way of compensating for the neglect of institutional 
considerations in the original consensus. Some recommendations about institutions were 
simply added to those about economic policy. Market reforms are not enough. They have to 
be accompanied by other reforms, including competition policy, the regulation of the financial 
sector, the improvement of government efficiency, and the improvement of human capital 
formation. The accent was also put on good governance as a necessary adjuvant to 
development, especially in its capacity to protect property rights and guarantee contract 
enforcement. With time, governance then became a key criterion among donors for 
allocating aid across low-income countries. 
A major difficulty with this 'new' approach to development policy is that there is no real theory 
behind this extended set of principles – to such an extent that Rodrik, commenting upon a 
volume reviewing the evolution of the economic thought of the World Bank over the 1990s, 
entitled his review with the question: 'Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington 
Confusion?'. In effect, the main difficulty of extending the former orthodox development 
paradigm to include institutions is that there is limited knowledge on the way institutions can 
be reformed. It is one thing to adopt rigorous fiscal and monetary policies, and to observe 
that badly governed countries tend to perform less well than others, but it is quite another 
thing to change institutions, i.e. to regulate private monopolies, to change the law on land 
rights, or to improve governance and fight corruption. The latter policies will most likely be 
opposed by part of the political or economic elite, so that their implementation – or lack of it – 
will depend on the structure of political and economic power. Identifying development 
obstacles in a country necessarily touches upon economic and institutional challenges, but 
addressing the latter requires dealing with a country’s political economy. 
In their best-selling book Why Nations Fail, Acemogulu and Robinson (2012)1 masterfully 
showed the role of institutions in several historical and contemporaneous developments, or 
experiences of development failure. They stressed, in particular, the key role of inclusive 
institutions as compared with predatory ones, and most importantly the role of politics in 
changing institutions and triggering development or, on the contrary, retarding it. If there is 
absolutely no doubt that institutions matter for development, the real issue is to know how 
they matter, how they should be reformed, and how such reforms could be implemented. 
                                               
1 Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Pbk. 
ed.), Crown Business, New York. 
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Despite intensive efforts over the last two decades or so, researchers have not gone very far 
in resolving these questions. 
1.3 Searching for evidence on the quality of institutions and 
development 
Three approaches have been developed to identify the institutional factors hindering 
development, or ways of remedying specific factors. All of them have their drawbacks, 
however. 
The first approach is historical case studies. Scholars have carried out in-depth studies of 
the history of successful, and unsuccessful, development processes, to identify the factors 
responsible for success or failure. The Glorious Revolution in Britain, the redistribution of 
land in Korea after the Japanese departure, the success of Maghribi traders in the 11th-
century Mediterranean basin, or the violent fight for the appropriation of natural resource 
rents in several post-independence African states are examples of the establishment of 
institutions that led in some cases to vigorous development headed by developmental states 
of diverse natures, or to underdevelopment under essentially predatory states. These 
studies are all of the utmost interest as they show the way in which institutions are 
transformed, often under the pressure of economic circumstances, and how this sometimes 
leads to fast development while at other times it prevents development from happening. The 
problem is that these experiences are rarely transferable in time or in space, and they are 
not necessarily very relevant for developing countries today. 
The second approach is the contemporaneous era cross-country analysis. This relies on 
indicators that describe the strength of a particular set of institutions in a country, e.g. 
property rights, legal regimes, the strength and nature of controls on the executive, extent of 
democracy, corruption etc., and that show whether there is a correlation with growth or other 
development indicators. These indicators are generally put together by asking experts in 
various areas to evaluate, on a comparative basis, countries on which they have specialised 
knowledge. Correlations between these various indicators and various economic 
development indicators, primarily GDP growth rates in the first instance, are then 
established. 
Results, which do not necessarily show the direction of causality, are sometimes significant. 
But the use that can be made of them is problematic. They essentially refer to an abstract 
'average country' and may be of little use for a specific country. Most importantly, they say 
nothing about causality and still less about the policy instruments that could improve 
particular institutions. Within such a macro approach, corruption is generally found to be bad 
for development, but in what direction does the causality go? Is it the case in all countries 
and all circumstances? What about the cases where corruption 'greases the wheels' and 
reintroduces economic efficiency in the presence of too stringent administrative constraints? 
Cross-country analysis is therefore a nice first approach but it has a long way to go to be of 
direct relevance for policy makers at the country level. 
Institutional weaknesses are also sometimes readily observable, as is sometimes the case in 
the delivery of public services in education or health. For instance, the absenteeism of 
teachers in public schools reveals a breach of contract between civil servants and their 
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employers, as well as a monitoring failure by supervisors. If there is no identification problem 
in that case, there is an issue in remedying this state of affairs. Numerous experiments, on 
the role of institution for economic development, have taken place in various community 
settings over the last two decades or so, which have been rigorously evaluated by 
randomised control trial (RCT) techniques. There is certainly something to be learned from a 
that fast expanding literature, even though the transfer of effective policy measures from one 
social context to another is not necessarily automatic. Moreover, this kind of approach to 
resolving institutional weaknesses refers to relatively simple cases. Experimentation and the 
use of RCT techniques may be much less easy in other situations. 
It is these limitations of the standard analysis of the relationship between institutional 
weaknesses and development that motivated the EDI research programme, the aim of which 
is precisely to provide better methods and tools for dealing with all kinds of institutional 
obstacles to development and, in the first place, to identify them. Within the EDI research 
programme, this identification is the main objective of the 'institutional diagnostic' research 
activity (Research Area 2 (RA2)). 
1.4 Institutional diagnostic as a new approach to institutions and 
development 
The 'institutional diagnostic' research activity aims to develop a framework that would permit 
the identification of major institutional obstacles to development in a specific country at a 
specific point in its development process, as well as possible lines of reform and the political 
economy issues associated with them. This is a country-centred approach that differs from 
the historical case studies mentioned above in the sense that the focus is not on a particular 
event or episode in a country but on the overall functioning of its economy. It is not a straight 
application of the econometric approach because the usual governance indicators used in 
cross- country analysis appear much too rough when dealing with a real economy. 
Institutional diagnostics bears an obvious resemblance to the 'growth diagnostics' approach 
developed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco to identify the binding economic constraints 
to growth. The resemblance is only semantic, however. Practically speaking, the growth 
diagnostics approach relies on a model of growth that is based on the accumulation of 
capital and its determinants among entrepreneurs, on the availability of infrastructure, on 
financial facilities, on the control of risk through appropriate insurance mechanisms, and on 
the development of human capital. Constraints in one of these dimensions should translate 
into a relative shadow price paid for that resource or that facility. No such implicit simple 
model is available in the case of institutions and there is no shadow price that is easily 
observable for the availability of a fair judiciary, an honest civil servant, or an effective 
regulatory agency. Another, more heuristic approach had to be developed. 
RA2 decided in a first stage not to choose diagnostic tools a priori and then to test their 
accuracy by applying them to various countries, but rather to proceed to in-depth studies of 
the relationship between the state of a large range of institutions and the nature of the 
development of a limited number of countries, and then to see whether these in-depth 
studies suggest common analytical tools to more systematically identify possible institutional 
obstacles to development. It was a requirement of the organisation funding EDI, the UK 
Department for International Development, to work on low- income and lower middle-income 
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countries. The first country selected for such a deep-dive study was Tanzania; the study of 
that country was released in September 2018. The second country selected, which is the 
focus of this volume, is Benin. The third and the fourth country studies are ongoing in 
Bangladesh and Mozambique, respectively.  
The main general definition of institutions within the EDI project derives from that of North 
(1990)2: 'Institutions (are defined) as rules, procedures or other human devices that 
constrain individual behaviour, either explicitly or implicitly, with a view to making individual 
expectations about others' behaviour converge and allowing individual actions to become 
coordinated'. It is that definition that is used in the institutional diagnostic research activity, 
even though it is very much restricted to economic and political-economic relations and 
frequently involves rules emanating from the public authority. 
Equipped with this definition, the procedure for establishing the in-depth review of possible 
obstacles to development in a given country comprises two steps. The first one is 
'mechanical'. It consists of asking various types of decision makers, top policymakers, and 
experts about their views on institutional obstacles in their country. This can be done by 
conducting a questionnaire survey or simply by carrying out qualitative interviews. The 
literature also has to be consulted and a complete survey of the economic and development 
performance and constraints faced by the country has to be established to see whether the 
most obvious 'binding economic constraints' are caused by clearly identified institutional 
factors. From such a direct and unbiased approach the goal is to select several thematic 
areas where critical institutional factors seem to be predominant. Some of these areas are 
obvious. For instance, various aspects of the functioning of the state have to be scrutinised, 
the same being true of the relationship between economic and political power or the nature 
of the political leadership. Other areas will be country-dependent. 
The second step consists of a thorough analysis of these critical areas in order to 
understand what it is that does not function on the institutional side, why, how things could 
be fixed, and what would be at stake in such reforms. Are the observed institutional 
weaknesses due to a lack of skills among civil servants, the fact that they shirk or are 
corrupt, that the law or administrative rules are too complicated and possibly inconsistent, or 
that the administration is badly organised? Why is it that reforms that seem adequate to 
remedy these weaknesses have not been undertaken? Who would be the gainers and the 
losers of such reforms, and therefore who would promote and who oppose them? 
Based on these detailed analyses of key thematic areas, the challenge is then to synthesise 
what has been learned into some basic institutional weaknesses common to various areas, 
their negative consequences for development and, most importantly, their causes, proximate 
or more distant, and the potential for remedies and reforms. This is the essence of the 
diagnostic that is delivered at the end of each case study, together with a list of all the 
potential reforms that have been suggested in the course of the thematic studies and the 
synthesis exercise as a possible remedy to a variety of institutional weaknesses. 
This whole approach should should deliver a diagnostic, not a reform agenda. Because 
there are gainers and losers in most reforms, political economy factors, as well as political 
                                               
2 North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
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and economic circumstances, will determine whether they can be undertaken or not. From 
the point of view of the diagnostic, the important contribution is to put squarely on the table 
the nature of the weaknesses, possible reforms, and what is at stake in them. In other 
words, it is to make sure that all decisive actors are aware of all that reforms would entail, 
collective gains, but also, occasionally, losses for various categories of agents. 
1.5 The Benin study 
Why has Benin been chosen, after Tanzania, as the second in-depth case study 
of the relationship between the quality of institutions and development? The first reason is 
the need to diversify the features of the economies to be studied. Diversity here is first 
geographical and historical. Tanzania is an East African country with a British colonial past. 
Benin is a West African country with a French colonial history. But diversity is also about 
economic endowments. Tanzania is a rather diversified economy, with both mineral and 
agricultural exports. Benin is officially a mono-agricultural export country, with cotton as it 
main resource. On top of this, Benin exploits its lengthy common border with Nigeria for 
profitable illegal cross-border trade, thus partly sharing the oil rent of its neighbour. Benin is 
thus much closer to the many resource rich sub-Saharan countries than Tanzania. Another 
key difference lies in the size of the two countries. Tanzania's population is approximately 
five times larger than that of Benin, which is more representative of the many 'small' sub-
Saharan countries. It is well-known that the development context of a country greatly 
depends on its size. Finally, it turns out that both countries were roughly at the same level of 
development, when measured by GDP per capita, in the early 1990s. Almost 30 years later, 
Benin lags behind Tanzania by some 25 percentage points in GDP per capita terms. Both 
countries thus also differ in their long-run growth performance.  
But there are also some features that are common to Benin and Tanzania, which as a matter 
of fact they share with several sub-Saharan African countries. They both went through a 
socialist episode after, or not long after, independence. These were the Ujamaa era 
launched by Nyerere in Tanzania and the Marxist-Leninist regime imposed under Kérékou's 
dictatorship in Benin. In both cases, the liberalisation and the transition to a market economy 
took place in the early 1990s, very much under the pressure of donors. Yet the trajectories 
have been quite different since then. If both countries behave according to democratic rules 
and are often praised for this, their political landscape is different and the relationship 
between politics and the economy takes very different forms today.  
The comparability or diversity of the two countries will matter at the final stage of the EDI 
institutional diagnostic project, when lessons from the various case studies will be put 
together. The present volume focuses exclusively on Benin and essentially tries to identify 
the institutional weaknesses, together with the political economy factors, that have prevented 
the country's GDP per capita from growing faster than 1.2% on average over the last 25 
years, that have prevented a fall in its poverty rate, and that have prevented a reduction in its 
dependency on foreign official resources – and all of this behind a peaceful democratic 
façade that has been praised by donors. The current version of this volume will be updated 
based on the comments we will receive during the official dissemination workshop in Benin 
planned later in 2019. 
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Overview 
This chapter, Chapter 1, constitutes the first part of a two-step overview of institutional and 
other constraints on the development of Benin. It looks at the context in which Benin’s 
development has taken place, including geography, historical legacies, and social and 
political characteristics. The second part, Chapter 2, provides a macro-picture of growth 
performances and their determinants, structural change, and social achievements since 
1960. Together, these two chapters contain many useful pieces of information required for a 
proper understanding of the background against which all the subsequent chapters should 
be read. To facilitate this understanding, the conclusion at the end of Chapter 2 summarises 
the main lessons drawn from both Chapters 1 and 2.  
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1 Geography 
Benin, shown in Map 1 below and formerly known as Dahomey (1890–1975), is a West 
African country located between Togo and Nigeria, with which it shares 600 and 700 km of 
border respectively. Currently, the country includes 12 administrative departments: Alibori, 
Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou, Collines, Couffo, Donga, Littoral, Mono, Ouémé, Plateau, and 
Zou. 
In 2016, Benin had a population of 10,822,298, living in an area of 112,760 km². Its gross 
domestic product (GDP) was estimated at US$ 8,583 billion. Benin is therefore a relatively 
small country, certainly compared to its giant neighbour to the east, Nigeria, which is 
currently Africa's largest economy in terms of GDP (US$ 404,653 billion) and population size 
(185,989,640). In addition, Benin possesses few natural resources except agricultural land, 
and its biggest geographic asset is its direct access to the sea. 
Map 1: Map of Benin 
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2 Deep historical legacies 
Benin is an extraordinarily varied mosaic of people and ethnic groups, as well as a place with 
a long legacy of all sorts of political entities, running from old kingdoms or empires (the 
Yoruba kingdoms, which centred on the Ife and Oyo, the Bight of Benin, the Allada kingdom, 
and its successor state the Dahomey kingdom, the Borgou kingdom) to principalities and 
microstates (possibly born of the breaking up of kingdoms or empires), also coexisting with 
stateless areas dominated by non-hierarchised families and clans (particularly among the 
peoples bordering Benin). Because over the last 10 centuries the country has been the locus 
of numerous waves of migration from neighbouring countries, it is a multi-national state with 
strong links to its neighbours, and has porous and flexible borders considered from the 
standpoint of human settlement. Relatedly, with its direct access to the sea in its southern 
part, Benin has long been a nexus of trade networks and routes actively engaged in regional 
and even external commerce. It is therefore not surprising that, although the kings of Benin 
seem to have been reluctant to supply either the quantity or the quality of slaves that the 
Portuguese wanted during the sixteenth century, Benin became an important basis for the 
transatlantic slave trade by the end of the seventeenth century when the demand for slaves 
intensified under the pressure of growing needs in the Americas (Fage, 2002, pp. 235, 266–
67; Iliffe, 2007, pp. 78–80).  
The kingdom of Dahomey was thus created in response to the Atlantic trade. It was first an 
offshoot of Allada, the then-chief polity among the Aja-Ewe people together with the Bight of 
Benin (late fifteenth century). When Allada tried to control the intensive trade in slaves and 
firearms that began at that time, the Dahomey king conquered it (in 1724) and became the 
dominant local power, although it remained tributary to Oyo state (in present-day Nigeria). A 
more efficiently authoritarian state than its predecessors, it was politically stable (until its 
dismantling by the French colonial power), partly because royal succession was largely 
determined by primogeniture, because it was closely administered through commoner chiefs 
and royal courts, and because of its strident militarism and cruel treatment of enemies (Iliffe, 
2007, pp. 148–49). 
The above account suggests that, in addition to the absence of mineral resources, present-
day Benin might suffer from two important problems: (i) a lack of cooperation due to strong 
ethnic diversity (along the line proposed by Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005); and (ii) a lack of 
interpersonal trust due to the traumatic experience of slavery (as argued in Nunn, 2007; 
2008). The situation nevertheless appears in a more positive light if two favourable elements 
of Benin’s legacy are emphasised: (iii) a tradition of centralised state organisations with the 
associated political and administrative skills; and (iv) long periods of active engagement in 
supra-local trade and commercial entrepreneurship.  
It is impossible to determine whether the net outcome of the above forces is positive or 
negative. In fact, it is not even clear how strong the effect of each of them is on the long-term 
development prospects of the country. We now elaborate upon the reasons behind our 
agnosticism, and this is done under a number of points corresponding to the above 
categorisation (plus a point concerning the availability of natural resources). 
The absence of natural resources, mineral and non-mineral, is not necessarily a 
disadvantage for economically poor countries where democracy is immature in the sense 
that institutions are weak and democratic habits not well ingrained. A widespread view 
argues, on the contrary, that abundant resources are liable to slow down development in 
these countries owing to the so-called ‘resource curse’: by creating easily appropriable rents, 
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resources that are highly valuable and physically concentrated tend to establish a narrow link 
between political power and economic gains, thereby encouraging political leaders to 
sacrifice the collective good for their own personal interests (see, for example, Mehlum et al., 
2006a; 2006b; Robinson et al., 2006). 
Turning to (i), two main points must be made. First, if ethnic fragmentation may ignite 
tensions between different ethnic groups in a competitive environment, it may yield 
favourable effects when the groups possess complementary skills. Second, even in the 
presence of competition, the existence of a large number of groups, such as is found in 
Benin (and Tanzania) is much less damaging than situations of ethnic polarisation, such as 
are found in Rwanda, Burundi, or Kenya (see Esteban and Ray, 1994; 2008; Duclos et al., 
2004). This matters especially in the sphere of politics where the possibility of different inter-
group coalitions and counter-coalitions may give rise to a spirit of cooperation more 
conducive to development than the ‘winner-takes-all’ approach that a polarised society 
typically fosters. More will be said about this when we turn to the political system. 
The idea that slavery has left deep scars in the societies where it prevailed, undermining 
trust among people, has gained ground following the aforementioned pioneering work of 
Nunn (see (ii) above). Unfortunately, there is no firm evidence of this long-term impact in the 
case of Benin, which requires that confounding effects (such as ethnic diversity) are duly 
controlled for. As a first approximation, we would expect measures of trust to be of lower 
value for Benin than for African countries that did not suffer from the slave trade, at least on a 
scale corresponding to modern transatlantic commerce. Just to get a rough and preliminary 
idea, we compare Benin to three African countries that did not experience slave trading: 
Lesotho, Malawi, and Kenya. Kenya is probably the best comparator because, like Benin, it 
suffers from strong ethno-regional antagonisms. Using data from the Afrobarometer (2011– 
2013 Round), we use several subjective indicators of trust and corruption, carefully 
distinguishing between interpersonal trust (Table 1) and trust in institutions (Table 2).  
Table 1: Cross-country comparison of interpersonal trust: 2011–2013 Round 
 Benin Lesotho Malawi Kenya 
1. Do you think that most people can be 
trusted? Proportion of affirmative answers 
32% 5% 20% 9% 
2. Do you think that one must be very 
careful when dealing with other people? 
Proportion of agreeing people 
68% 94% 80% 90% 
3. Do you think that you should have no or 
little trust in your neighbours? Proportion of 
agreeing people 
53% 54% 15% 38% 
4. Do you think that you should have no or 
little trust in other people whom you know 
(other than relatives and neighbours)? 
Proportion of agreeing people 
69% 67% 38% 45% 
Source: Afrobarometer. 
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Table 2: Cross-country comparison of trust in institutions: 2011–2013 Round 
 Benin Lesotho Malawi Kenya 
1. Do you have no or little trust in local 
government councils? Proportion of 
agreeing people* 
41% 
(76%) 
40% 
(53%) 
13% 
(43%) 
59% 
(75%) 
2. Do you have no or little trust in members 
of parliament? Proportion of agreeing 
people* 
48% 
(74%) 
32% 
(48%) 
31% 
(57%) 
47% 
(78%) 
3. Do you have no or little trust in courts of 
law? Proportion of agreeing people* 
39% 
(45%) 
28% 
(19%) 
16% 
(18%) 
36% 
(28%) 
4. Do you have no or little trust in police 
officers? Proportion of agreeing people* 
40% 
(70%) 
39% 
(65%) 
30% 
(69%) 
68% 
(63%) 
5. Do you think that all or most tax officers 
are involved in corruption? Proportion of 
agreeing people 
54% 19% 27% 40% 
* Between brackets are indicated the proportions of people who believe that all or most corresponding officers are 
corrupt.  
Source: Afrobarometer, World Value Survey. 
What are the messages emerging for these two tables? First, in terms of interpersonal trust, 
Benin does not fare unambiguously worse, or better, than the three other African countries 
considered. Moreover, when we compare Benin with the rest of Africa in a regression 
framework, the ambiguity persists. More precisely, based on individual data we compute 
regressions in which the dependent variable corresponds to each indicator, and the key 
explanatory variable is a dummy equal to one when the country is Benin and to zero when it 
is any other country belonging to the African continent. We also control for the gender, 
education, income, and residence (rural or urban) of the respondent. We then find that Benin 
exhibits relatively more interpersonal trust than other African countries when the first two 
questions mentioned in Table 1 are used as indicators, but relatively less trust when the last 
two questions are used.1 This indicates that when the question of interpersonal trust is raised 
in rather abstract or general terms, the people of Benin are more confident than other African 
people. But when the question is related to “concrete others” (neighbours, relatives ...), the 
opposite is true. There are two possible interpretations here. First, the regression results can 
be taken as evidence that the people of Benin have more generalized trust, but less 
particularized trust, than other people of Africa. Whether this is a superior outcome than the 
opposite situation is open to debate: if generalized trust is better for the operation of 
anonymous markets, particularized trust is critical for the smooth functioning of social 
networks that underlie many informal institutions in Africa. Second, and less advantageously, 
it could be said that the people of Benin profess more interpersonal trust when the question 
is raised in general terms, alludes to distant people, and refers to situations that have not 
been personally experienced, whereas they appear more suspicious as soon as the question 
makes concrete reference to known people and known situations. 
Second, as far as trust in institutions is concerned, Benin appears worst only regarding 
courts of law (the difference with the second worst-ranked country is only one percentage 
point regarding members of parliament). Third, Benin fares worst, and neatly so, when asked 
whether judges or magistrates are corrupt (see the figures between brackets in question 3 of 
                                               
1 We are thankful to Romain Houssa for having carried out the regression exercise. Results of the regressions are 
available upon request. 
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Table 2), or whether tax officials are corrupt (see question 5). Overall, Benin does not display 
a bright picture, but the situation is especially worrying with respect to the justice and the tax 
collection systems.2 Comparing Benin with the rest of Africa in a regression framework leads 
to the same conclusion in the sense that Benin’s people exhibit less trust in court magistrates 
and tax officials (questions 3 and 5 of Table 2). Yet, Benin performs relatively better if we 
look at trust in police officers (question 4). It also performs better if trust in institutions is 
measured by trust in local governments and parliament members (questions 1 and 2). 
The overall picture is therefore mixed. It appears bleaker, however, when the Afrobarometer 
data on trust are complemented by data from Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index, which ranks countries according to the degree of perceived corruption in 
government and politics (corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for personal gain). 
Out of 176 countries evaluated in 2016, Benin ranked 95th, behind Senegal. Examination of 
the dynamics in the ranking over the period 2012–2016 points to slow progress: Benin's 
score was 36 in both years while Senegal moved from 36 to 64. The picture is again 
confirmed by firm surveys: as many as 84% of companies consider corruption to be a major 
problem, with informal payments seemingly required for day-to-day operations such as 
requesting a telephone line and obtaining import documents or a trade licence (Benin, 2006; 
World Bank, 2016; UCF, 2012; Benin, 2016). 
Let us now turn to dimension (iii). Here, we would want to weigh the positive effect of a 
legacy of pre-colonial centralised state organisations against the negative effect of (French) 
colonisation. Under the former, Africans acquired some degree of administrative experience 
and skills in statehood, and it is a remarkable feat that the kingdom of Benin kept its polity 
intact until the very end of the nineteenth century. By then, the state formation process was 
already well advanced in Benin (Fage, 2002, pp. 99, 270). Since the existence of more layers 
of hierarchy prior to contact with Europeans has been shown to be robustly associated with 
greater development today (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 
2013; 2014), political history seems to favour development in the case of Benin. Under the 
latter, by contrast, Africans were submitted to a centralised and authoritarian system of 
government in which they became simple auxiliaries or, in the best cases, executive 
subordinates of French officers receiving their orders from a well-defined chain of command 
(pp. 410–12).3 It is only through assimilation, a formal process involving education in French 
schools, performing military service, formal forswearing of traditional and Muslim law and 
custom, and a minimum of French civilian employment, that locals could be elevated in the 
French colonial order. Only a tiny minority proved to be eligible. There is therefore ground to 
believe that French colonisation undermined positive legacies of pre-colonial states in Benin, 
the kingdom of Dahomey in particular. Note that this line of argument goes against the idea 
that, compared to the British rule, the legacy of French colonial rule is a positive asset for 
long-term development because the French colonial power encouraged state centralisation 
and strong bureaucracies, in addition to using French as a common official language and 
downplaying ethnic cleavages (Ali et al., 2018). 
                                               
2 We do not show the figures for trust in the President because they vary a lot from round to round. Nor do we 
show them for trust in the Prime Minister because there is no variance (100% of respondents believe the Prime 
Minister is corrupt). 
3 This chain of command led down from the Colonial Ministry in Paris, through the Governor-General in Dakar, to 
the governors of the individual colonies, and their provincial commissioners and commandants de cercle, the 
officers in charge of each district. It is only from district officers that village chiefs in West Africa could derive some 
authority (Fage, 2002, p. 411). 
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Factor (iv) is probably the most indisputable long-term legacy that Benin can benefit from 
today. For many centuries, the country has enjoyed a well-organised trading system easily 
accessible from the sea, and fruitful trading relationships were established with the interior 
and with earlier European traders on the coast (Fage, 2002, pp. 106, 270). At times, like 
under the Benin kingdom (15 and 16th centuries), the rulers felt so self-confident that they 
could choose to virtually cut the country off from contacts with Europe: ‘European trade was 
something it chose to do without’ (p. 236). A major impetus to trade came with successive 
waves of migrants from Yorubaland (in present-day Nigeria), particularly under the Ife and 
the Oyo empires during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. According to J.D. Fage, the 
Yoruba have developed a remarkably strong sense of identity and cultural specificity, aided 
in this, somewhat paradoxically, by the fact that they were open to Christian missions, and 
hence to western education, as early as the 1840s (p. 99). They became specialised in trade 
in the first part of the nineteenth century and quickly understood that an open society that 
fosters free competition and establishes links with the outside world can offer considerable 
opportunities for men of skill and initiative (p. 346). Moreover, the Yoruba have always 
provided an organic link to Nigeria, from which they originated, maintaining special 
relationships with the states of Kwara, Oyo, Ogun, and Lagos. (Other ethnic groups nurture 
persisting links with Niger, Burkina Faso, and Togo: the Maori with Niger, the Gourmantche 
of Northern Benin with the eastern part of Burkina Faso, and the Aja with Togo.) What bears 
emphasis is that Benin enjoys the presence of other groups than the Yorubas which have a 
well-established experience in trade and long-distance trade. Thus, the Waranga are 
caravan merchants from the Bariba northern group who have a long tradition in linking 
present-day Ghana and Burkina Faso to northern Benin. 
To end this overview of the historical legacies of Benin, it is important to note that a tight 
interrelationship between slavery, commerce, and strong political organisation has always 
existed in West Africa (and in other parts of the continent), so that it is meaningless to assess 
the impact of these three factors separately. The logic, which evokes the argument 
developed by Domar (1970) or Mathur (1991), has been succinctly put as follows by Fage 
(2002, pp. 268–70). People were scarce relative to land and other natural resources. 
Confronted with this situation, traditional village societies based on ties of kinship and 
subsistence agriculture were unable to take advantage of all the opportunities arising from 
growing external demands for scarce and valuable commodities such as gold, copper, or 
ivory. There were too few people to act as traders and carriers, as workers in the mines, to 
provide the political organisation and military force required for the safe transportation of 
goods, and to supply food and other support for those withdrawn from the subsistence sector 
to engage in these new activities. The solution lay in the creation of kings powerful enough to 
recruit labour and to extract tribute, and forced recruitment meant that ordinary men and 
women were converted into slaves, clients, or tributaries. In West Africa, some slaves were 
employed simply as agricultural labourers on the estates of kings and other Big Men. More 
generally, however, ‘they were regarded as additions to the social group headed by their 
master and, although they could never wholly escape the stigma of their slave origin, in 
course of time they and their descendants – especially if these came by marriage with a free 
member of the group – became integral parts of it, acquiring or inheriting property much like 
other members. At the lowest levels, then, they became members of the family unit. At the 
highest levels they could become trusted traders or soldiers or court officials’ (pp. 268–69). 
The latter, rather paradoxical situation occurred when old slaves were considered reliable 
agents by their masters: their slave origin indeed meant that their authority was solely a 
reflection of their master’s authority, which they could not therefore usurp for themselves.  
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The main function of slaves thus consisted of relaxing the labour constraint that prevented 
kinship groups or large families from seizing upon valuable economic opportunities. With the 
forced mobilisation of labour came the growth of political authority, and both processes 
largely pre-dated the expansion of transatlantic slave trading, the main effect of which was to 
intensify them.4 If slaves could be exchanged for the desirable goods brought by long-
distance travellers and even exported to distant lands in the Americas, the general pattern 
was different. They were less valued as traded goods than as a resource needed to produce 
goods for export, and to support the economic and political superstructures that trade 
required to flourish (p. 269). 
                                               
4 It is difficult to give a precise estimate of the number of captives deported to America from the coast of Dahomey 
during the entire period of the slave trade (1641–1850). Current South Benin had a big share of the 25% of the 
total volume (6,543,700) attributed by Professor Gayibor (1985) to the Ajatado slave trade (an area extending 
from Kéta to Gbadagry). In any way, that region was one of the most prolific slave producers in Africa. 
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3 Ethnicity  
As underlined in the previous subsection, ethnic diversity is a key feature of Benin’s socio-
historical landscape. Below, we elaborate on this feature by supplying population statistics 
that allow us to have an idea of the relative importance of the main ethnic groups forming 
Beninese society. Afterwards, we examine whether there is a match between these 
population shares and political representation. We will then be ready to look in more detail 
into the recent political history of the country. 
The Beninese population is made up of nearly 100 ethnic groups, the majority of which are 
found in the South and in the Atacora Mountains in the north-western parts of the country. 
During the 1961 demographic census, 47 ethnic subgroups were identified that were 
regrouped into 12 broad ethnic-families. However, subsequent national censuses (in 1979, 
1992, 2002, and 2013), although they counted around 56 ethnic subgroups, opted for a re-
organisation into nine broad families only: the Aja, Fon, Yoruba, Bariba, Dendi, Otamari, Yao, 
Fulani, and a residual category of other minority groups. Table 3 shows the evolution of 
population shares of Benin’s main ethnic groups between 1992 and 2013. The Fon (and 
related ethnic groups) clearly form the dominant group, followed by the Aja and the Yoruba, 
the two main migrant groups. In terms of dynamics, we see that the population share of the 
Fon has slightly decreased over the period considered whereas that of the Fulani has 
significantly increased. We must nevertheless worry about the reliability of statistical records 
since the Fulani are nomadic herders and it is quite possible that their movements in and out 
of the country may be very imperfectly measured, and that measuring problems have been 
(partly) corrected during recent years. 
It is worth noting that, among all the ethnic groups, three are widely distributed spatially: the 
Fon, the Yoruba, and the Aja are present in at least nine out of the 12 administrative 
departments into which the national territory has been divided. This means that major 
migrant groups are not heavily concentrated in some limited parts of the country. It is 
noteworthy, still, that in terms of population numbers the Yoruba are mostly present in the 
southern part of Benin, i.e. close to the coast. This is consistent with their aforementioned 
specialisation in trading. On the other hand, the Otamari, who are agriculturists, are an 
important group inhabiting the North. The fact that they represent much less than 10% of the 
total population reflects the low population density observed in that part of the country, as 
compared to the Centre and the South.  
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Table 3: Percentage distribution of the population by ethnic group and growth rates 
between 2002 and 2013 
  
Relative shares of ethnic groups in 
the total population 
(in percentages) 
Growth rates of 
the population 
of each group 
(in percentages) 
  1992 2002 2013 2002–2013 
Benin 
Size  4,873,963 6,769,914 10,008,749 3.52 
Ethnic groups 
Aja and related groups 15.7 15.2 15.1 3.42 
Fon and related groups  42.5 39.2 38.4 3.32 
Bariba and related groups 8.7 9.2 9.6 3.92 
Dendi and related groups 2.8 2.5 2.9 4.91 
Yoa and Lokpa and related groups 6.2 7.0 4.3 -0.74 
Fulani 3.8 4.0 8.6 10.81 
Gua or Otamari and related groups 6.2 6.1 6.1 3.59 
Yoruba and related groups 12.2 12.3 12.0 3.33 
Other ethnic groups 1.2 1.4 0.9 -0.16 
Foreign 0.7 2.1 1.9 2.57 
Not declared * 1.0 0.2 -10.81 
Total 100 100 100  
* = Percentage less than 0.1 
Source: INSAE, General Population and Housing Census (RGPH). 
Benin is characterised not only by ethnic but also by religious diversity. Catholicism and 
Islam are the two dominant religions and while Catholicism was the most important religion in 
the early 1990s, it was overtaken by Islam in 2013, probably as a result of higher fertility 
rates among Muslim populations. In 2013, about 53% of the Beninese population declared 
their adherence to one of these two big monotheistic religions. Another interesting dynamic 
observation is the rapid rise of evangelical and charismatic churches, mostly from Protestant 
affiliations, and the displacement of traditional religions (mostly Voodoo) they are causing. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, ethnicity and location, on the one hand, and religion, on the 
other hand, stand correlated. Most strikingly, people living in the North (the Otamari and the 
Fulani, in particular) tend to be Muslim, whereas those living in the South tend to be 
Christians of the traditional Catholic or the evangelical Protestant type. 
We have already mentioned, in general terms, the delicate issue as to how ethnic diversity 
bears upon cooperation practices among the people of Benin, emphasising politics in 
particular. We would therefore like to know how, in the specific case of Benin, politics is 
affected by ethnic diversity. Figure 1 shows how key political functions, head of the executive 
and ministerial jobs, have been apportioned to different ethnic groups over a 46-year period 
subdivided into two subperiods, 1960–1989 and 1990–2006. The overall picture is that of a 
rather fair representation of the main ethnic groups and the main regions at the highest levels 
of power. The dominant group, the Fon, is under-represented at the level of the Presidency 
but is well represented at the level of ministerial jobs. The Otamari, a group that is 
comparatively small nationwide but important in the North, has a disproportionate share of 
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the allocations of the highest executive position. Finally, the Aja and the Yoruba, the two 
groups that are numerically dominant behind the Fon, are well represented among 
government members.  
Figure 1: Political representation of main ethnic groups 
 
 
  
Sources: Constructed from data presented in Tossou (2010). An update of the data is underway to cover the 
governments from 2006 onwards.  
The question now is whether this situation reflects a political arrangement devised to ensure 
‘ethnic peace’ and political stability in the country. That Benin is widely regarded as a pioneer 
democracy in Africa (see, for example, Fage, 2002, p. 536) could be related to a sense of 
compromise and respect for diversity as epitomised in the distribution of power among 
dominant ethnic groups. An alternative interpretation of the facts is nevertheless possible: the 
distribution of power does not result from constitutional rule or an informal, non-official 
mechanism of power rotation, but is the outcome of a fierce struggle for power among 
contenders whose levels of strength are not too different and are variable over time. A 
careful look into the recent political history of Benin suggests that, unfortunately, the second 
interpretation is probably the closest to the truth. The need for alternance has typically been 
brought to bear by political showdowns and secret dealings rather than through a transparent 
and well-accepted mechanism. 
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Before going into the details of the political history of Benin, an important remark deserves to 
be made. In spite of the appearance of a huge ethnic diversity, the socio-political life of Benin 
is structured around essentially four groups: the Adja-Fon, the Bariba, the Yoruba, and the 
people from the Atacora. However, and contrary to what this categorization might suggest, it 
is not the tensions between those four groups that cause the most serious problems for a 
harmonious social fabric in the country. What creates instability are the strong and deep-
rooted divisions inside a single ethno-linguistic family, namely the Adja-Fon. More 
specifically, there is persisting hostility between the Fon of Abomey, the Goun of Porto-Novo, 
and the Mina-Adja coming from Mono.5 Sometimes, the opposition dates back to the colonial 
period. This is witnessed by the antagonism between the first two sub-groups: the people of 
Abomey have never forgotten the treason of their “brothers” from Porto-Novo who joined with 
the French colonial forces to conquer Abomey in the late nineteenth century.6 The internal 
divisions of the Adja-Fon group are reflected on the political level. Thus, the political 
configuration prevailing in southern Benin is determined by the fierce struggles between the 
three above groups: PRD-Porto-Novo, Renaissance du Benin-Abomey, and PSD-Mono, 
which are themselves the scions of old parties –the PRD of Apithy in Porto Novo, the UDD of 
Ahonmandégbé in Abomey, and the Mono movement directed by Adrien Dégbéh. How the 
tensions between these three branches of the same family have been settled politically since 
the time of independence, whether in an authoritarian or a democratic setting, depends on 
the key refereeing role played by the other three ethnic groups.  
                                               
5 I am greatly indebted to John Igue for having drawn my attention to this important point. 
6 Romain Houssa has kindly provided this historical piece of information. 
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4 Landmarks in the post-1944 political history  
To have a good grasp of the interactions between political institutions and economic 
development in Benin, three key periods in the country's political and economic history need 
to be distinguished. Chronic political instability was the hallmark of the years 1944–1972, a 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary regime ruled during the period 1972–1989, and, finally, the 
period from 1990 to the present has been characterised by a democratic renewal that soon 
became perverted by narrow links between state power and business interests. 
4.1 Political instability before and after independence: 1944 to 
1972 
Dahomeans began to take an active role in the modern political life of the country around 
1944, around the time of the Brazzaville conference when France ruled out colonial self-
government and instead decided that each colony would be given electoral representation in 
the French Assembly in Paris (Iliffe, 2007, p. 242). The first Beninese intellectuals, educated 
in French schools and universities (in Dakar and France), were assuming leadership in a 
national movement that was tainted by ethno-regionalism from the very start. The multi-party 
political system in place was highly unstable owing to intense personal rivalries between 
strong figureheads representing three main regions and their associated political legacies: 
the North (around Parakou) led by Hubert Maga, the Centre (around Abomey) led by Justin 
Ahomadégbé, and the Southeast (around Port-Novo) led by Sourou Apithy. It is in this 
context dominated by personal confrontations and fragmented identities that the Republic of 
Dahomey was proclaimed in December 1958, the elections to the first National Assembly 
took place in April 1959 (where no party won a majority), the first presidential election was 
organised in July 1960, and the country's independence was declared on 1 August of the 
same year after some 70 years of French colonisation. The newly elected president was 
Hubert Maga from the northern region, who obtained the support of the party standing for the 
Central region. 
As was the case in other newly independent French-speaking countries, the early rules 
governing elections ensured that nationalism took a predominantly constitutional form, and 
the transfer of power from France to its ex-colonies took place peacefully. This is in contrast 
to East Africa, where violence played a crucial role, and to Congo, where the Belgians did 
not build representative institutions or governmental training before granting independence 
(Iliffe, 2007, pp. 255–56). In West Africa in general, and in Benin in particular, the new 
political elite thus chose to introduce a system of liberal democracy in line with the model 
used in France. The new constitution, adopted in 1959, was largely inspired by the French 
Constitution of 1958. It provided for a parliamentary system with a president at the head of 
the country but also with a prime minister responsible to the parliament. Moreover, it set out 
fundamental rights for citizens, such as freedom of expression, association, and the press.  
Unfortunately, the country's first 12 years of independence were turbulent, marked as they 
were by a frequent alternation of military and civilian regimes. In fact, during the period 
between 1960 and 1972, Benin was the stage of intense ethnic and regional tensions, social 
movements of varying levels of intensity, abuses of power of all kinds, political intrigues, and 
incessant disputes between the country's three regional leaders. Unlike several newly 
independent countries in Africa, the Republic of Benin did not witness the emergence of a 
charismatic leader able to dominate the national political scene. Genuine Beninese 
citizenship hardly existed as voting behaviour was primarily driven by powerful patron–client 
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networks that were large based on ethno-regional identity. Fragmented loyalties, adroitly 
manipulated by the political leaders, had the effect of fuelling instability and, in some cases, 
fostering violence. 
Worker and student unions could perhaps have improved the situation by helping to 
transcend traditional identity feelings in the name of cross-cutting social interests. In practice, 
however, many union leaders were easily seduced or co-opted by the political Big Men, and 
unions gradually became convenient platforms from which ambitious people could 
opportunistically rise to positions of political responsibility inside the ethnically defined party 
machines. Any other tactic was met with harsh repression meted out by public authorities 
fearful of demonstrations that lay outside of their control. In the end, the co-option tactic 
prevailed and trade unions largely ceased to be independent bodies in the country’s political 
landscape. 
These were not ideal conditions in which to design and implement public policies to promote 
national development. The instability of political rule made long-term planning impossible 
while the existence of various centres of state power and the quasi-absolute control 
exercised by the three regional leaders over entire areas of the country complicated 
cooperation, coordination, and control. As a consequence, political decisions related to 
development strategic choices and investments were often deferred and the state apparatus 
was often unable to function. Discouraged by these malfunctionings of the political system, 
civilians were sometimes prompted to call on men in uniform to restore order.  
For much of the period, the doctrine of socialism/collectivism was the official political 
ideology, thus laying the ground for the subsequent regime. An important element of socialist 
politics was the introduction of ‘collective fields’ in the early 1960s. Like in Nyerere’s ujamaa 
communities in Tanzania, a collective field was defined as the field of a village community 
managed under the responsibility of the village council and under the supervision of the rural 
departmental committee. This implied that the proceeds from crop sales accrue to the village 
budget (Akindès, 2016). We know little about how effectively this doctrine was translated into 
facts, and whether it was equally endorsed by the three regional bigwigs. However, we can 
surmise that the simple fear or anticipation of its implementation should have discouraged 
private investment in agriculture.  
4.2 A Marxist-Leninist Revolution: 1972–1990 
On 26 October 1972, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu Kérékou, from the northern region, 
undertook the sixth military state coup in Benin. Two years later, he became the new 
President of the Republic, and officially opted for scientific socialism based on Marxism-
Leninism as the political doctrine to guide the country’s development. This involved the 
nationalisation of production units and the development of collectivism, the creation of a 
single political party (the Parti de la Révolution Populaire au Benin, or PRPB), the creation of 
a single workers' organisation (UNSTB), a single women's and a single youth organisation, 
and a change of the national flag. This period also saw the introduction of Marxist tenets into 
public discourse and official documents, with special emphasis on the leading role of the 
Party, democratic centralism, and state economic interventionism, particularly in the 
agricultural sector where massive investments were to be made in order to create food self-
sufficiency. Fundamental freedoms were restricted and a new constitution establishing the 
People's Republic of Benin was drafted and adopted.  
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It is only when compared to the first 12 years of independence that the revolutionary period 
(between 1972 and 1989) can be said to have promoted relative political stability. There 
were, indeed, numerous attempts to overthrow the government, sometimes coming from 
military quarters themselves (January 1977). The turmoil was not surprising given the poor 
economic performance of the new regime, coupled with its propensity to nurture corruption 
and rent-seeking. Thus, a series of investigations into parastatal organisations revealed the 
same problem of top-down corruption and widespread inefficiency. According to Chris Allen: 
‘The institutions were found to be hierarchical, authoritarian and highly bureaucratic, leading 
to failure to perform essential tasks, to waste and inefficiency. The personnel, apart from 
being in many cases unqualified or ill-qualified, tended to be idle, undisciplined, arrogant and 
above all corrupt’ (cited in Meredith, 2005, p. 278). Fraud was especially pervasive in the 
banking sector, with dramatic consequences for the whole economy. In the words of 
Meredith (2005):  
Mathieu Kérékou and his cronies had looted the state-owned banking system so 
thoroughly that nothing was left to pay the salaries of teachers and civil servants, 
some of whom were owed as much as twelve months’ back pay. Three state-owned 
banks had collapsed in 1988 as a result of large unsecured loans awarded to 
members of Kérékou’s inner circle and the bogus companies they had set up. […] His 
closest adviser, Mohammed Cissé, a Malian marabout, it was subsequently 
discovered, had been in the habit of sitting in the manager’s office at the Commercial 
Bank, transferring millions of dollars by telex to his bank accounts in Europe and the 
United States. […] With the entire state banking and credit system drained of all liquid 
funds, normal business activity ground to a halt; companies could not operate, traders 
could neither sell nor buy (pp. 387–88). 
Groups of citizens, civil society organisations, trade unions, and underground political parties 
started to express growing frustrations about the suppression of freedoms, corruption, 
months of salary arrears, and deteriorating living conditions in the country. In January 1989, 
a student protest over unpaid grants triggered a general mobilisation against Kérékou’s 
regime that involved teachers, civil servants, workers, and church groups. The army did not 
keep quiet and was bubbling with plots. Unpaid soldiers did not hesitate to hijack shipments 
of banknotes sent in from abroad to alleviate the general economic crisis. Only Kérékou’s 
elite Presidential Guard, drawn exclusively from his northern ethnic group, remained loyal to 
the regime (Meredith, 2005, p. 388).  
The regime was thus compelled to open up, especially so because to the internal 
demonstrations were added external pressures from international financial institutions and 
donors in a context of relaxed geo-political relations at the world level (around the end of the 
Cold War). When Kérékou asked for western aid to pay salary arrears, he was turned down. 
Under these mounting pressures, he abandoned Marxism-Leninism as an official ideology 
and, still expecting to manipulate events, proposed a national ‘Conférence des Forces Vives 
de la Nation’ to find a solution to the deadlock. That solution was to take the form of a 
constitutional reform. Lasting nine days from 19 February 1990, the National Conference 
brought together 488 participants from all walks of life (business, professional, religious, 
labour, and political groups), including the so-called enemies of the revolution living in exile 
at the time.  
Against Kérékou’s expectations, the conference proceedings, broadcast live on radio and 
television, consisted of a severe indictment of the venality and corruption of his regime. In a 
dramatic turn of events, ‘the delegates, presided over by Archbishop Isodore de Souza, 
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declared themselves to hold sovereign power, suspended the constitution, dissolved the 
National Assembly, appointed a former World Bank official, Nicéphore Soglo, as prime 
minister of an interim government and laid down a schedule for elections’ (Meredith, 2005, p. 
389). The National Conference adopted a new Constitution on 11 December 1990, which re-
established liberal democracy and the market economy in Benin. In 1991, in a presidential 
election considered free and fair by international observers, Kérékou – who had stayed on as 
an interim president – was decisively defeated by Soglo. Unlike what his military background 
might have led us to expect, Kérékou accepted the voting verdict and ceded power to his 
political rival. As a result, Benin ‘became the first African state in which the army was forced 
from power by civilians and the first in which an incumbent president was defeated at the 
polls’ (p. 389).  
4.3 Democratic Renewal: 1990 to the present 
As soon as the Renouveau Démocratique (Democratic Renewal) was initiated, a series of 
intense and protracted struggles for power broke out between Africa’s Big Men and 
opposition groups determined to oust them. The rules of the old game were quickly restored 
and key figures of the opposition, former ministers, and members of the elite were motivated 
less by democratic ideals than by their determination ‘to get their own turn at the trough of 
public power and money’ (Meredith, 2005, p. 389). Many Big Men were able to 
outmanoeuvre the opposition and remain in power, resulting in the disillusionment of many 
ordinary people with the Democratic Renewal, and the oft-heard complaint that it had not 
changed political life in the country. Although there was certainly less repression and more 
possibilities existed to express dissent, the same elites (the ‘crooks’) were still in control (p. 
390). 
In this old game, all sides continued to rely heavily on erstwhile loyalties for support, as 
attested by the fact that, in the 1991 election, northerners voted massively for Kérékou while 
a very large majority of southerners voted for Soglo. Thus, neither ideology nor policy nor 
class mattered at election time. In the words of Meredith again: ‘After seventeen years of 
‘northern’ rule [under Kérékou], what many southerners had in mind was not so much the 
notion of renouveau démocratique as the need for alternance – a political changeover: their 
turn was due’. As for people in the North, Democratic Renewal meant that ‘hated southerners 
were in charge’ (pp. 389–90). It is both puzzling and revealing that Kérékou’s discomfiture in 
the 1991 election proved temporary. Five years later, on the occasion of the 1996 
presidential election, the people expressed their discontent with the austerity measures 
adopted by Soglo by voting the former dictator back into office (Fage, 2002, p. 536). 
Looking over three decades of Democratic Renewal (1990–2017), and comparing that period 
with the years 1960–1972, there is no doubt that Benin has succeeded in creating a good 
measure of political stability in the sense that, until recently, state power has changed hands 
in a relatively smooth and peaceful manner (with a power shift occurring in half of the 
presidential elections). Regular elections (six presidential elections, seven legislative 
elections, and three local and municipal elections) have been held according to the 
constitution, even though their organisation sometimes suffers delays. Also, fundamental 
freedoms are well protected, and democratic institutions laid out in the constitution have 
been gradually put in place.  
Behind the democratic institutions, however, an unhealthy game is played in which Big Men 
or political patrons exploit identity politics and use their network-based leverage to promote 
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their own economic and political interests. Because the patron–client networks do not strictly 
coincide with ethno-regional boundaries, and probably less so than before, the North–South 
divide is not the only fighting line around which the sharing of political spoils is decided. The 
fact of the matter is that powerful informal actors on the political scene are the leaders of 
subgroups of their own regional and ethnic entity, which often means clans or sub-clans. In 
vying for political influence, they seek alliances with other Big Men with whom they can 
define common interests, at least in the short of medium term. Political competition of a 
factional nature thereby ensures that coalitions made of different ethno-regional identities 
come to form the ruling government or the opposition. 
In the following section, we elaborate on the characteristics of the post-Marxist political 
system of Benin, stressing the tight links between business and politics that lie at its heart. 
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5 Characterising the political system of Benin: 
Patrimonialism with multiple oligarchs 
5.1 General considerations 
Patrimonialism means that state power and private business interests are tightly 
interpenetrated, implying that a large portion of state resources are privately appropriated 
and rent capture is the main objective of political contenders. Accumulation of wealth is 
largely conditional upon access to political power. In the purest form of patrimonialism, the 
ruler does not make any distinction between the state budget and his private purse, which 
are merged for all practical purposes. In more common forms, he uses any possible 
stratagem to embezzle public money, distort public contracting, extort money and assets 
from private agents, and appropriate national resources or the rents flowing from them. 
Patrimonial power may be conferred according to some pre-determined rule (such as a 
dynastic rule) or through fierce competitive struggles. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, as 
many political scientists have pointed out, these struggles oppose Big Men who are heads of 
factions mobilised around ‘natural groups’ (clan, tribe, ethnicity, common birthplace, etc.) or 
networks formed in the course of schooling, professional, or other significant life experiences. 
In order to accede to supreme power, a Big Man needs to buy or co-opt leaders of at least 
some other factions or cliques, especially in contexts of strong ethnic fragmentation. This 
requires him to be wealthy enough to finance the related expenses, which come on top of the 
demands of the people at various levels of his own patronage network. Unless he satisfies 
these demands, he risks losing clients or supporters to rival factions or networks (see, in 
particular, Sklar, 1979; Bates, 1983; Bayart, 1986; 1989; Booth, 1987; Kennedy, 1988; 
Boone, 1992; 1994; Dool, 1998; Platteau, 2009; De Waal, 2015). 
What must now be added to this conventional analysis of the African state is the role of 
business. In the unregulated set-ups of weak states, in which there are no established (and 
well enforced) rules constraining the behaviour of Big Men, business people are eager to 
control key power-holders up to the highest level (i.e. the presidency). The former want to be 
able to exert pressure on the latter so that they enact decisions aligned with their particular 
private interests. Because they are typically reluctant to occupy the front stage of politics, 
which carries all the risks associated with visibility and publicness, they favour more discreet 
positions. Their preferred tactic consists of financing the costs of the political career of a Big 
Man (or two) considered to be reliable, and in return they expect to be granted exclusionary 
privileges and other advantages that can be used to promote the expansion of their business 
ventures. Only if this tactic appears too risky, as a result of great political instability or high 
unpredictability of political outcomes, do they opt for a more direct pre-emption of state 
power that may lead them to themselves apply for the highest political responsibility. 
Two additional points deserve to be made. First, in a context of weak governance, the control 
of the state apparatus requires the placement of many loyal men at key positions. A system 
based on vertical but highly personalised relationships follows from this requirement, as aptly 
described by Young (1986): 
Abstract bureaucratic jurisprudence no longer sufficed after independence. Hostile 
cliques and conspiracies had to be pre-empted by ensuring placement of personnel 
at critical points in the state apparatus whose fidelity to the ruler was not simply 
formal, but immediate and personal. Thus rulers constructed an inner layer of control 
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– key political operatives, top elements in the security forces, top technocrats in the 
financial institutions – whose fidelity was guaranteed by personal fealty as well as by 
hierarchical subordination. The surest basis for such fidelity is affinity of community or 
kinship. […] Beyond and often in addition to affinity, personal interest is the most 
reliable collateral for loyalty. Accordingly, rulers must reward generously and impose 
severe sanctions for any weakening of zeal. Thus public resources become a pool of 
benefits and prebends, while dismissal from office, confiscation of goods, and 
prosecution face those who show slackness in their personal fidelity. Holders of high 
office individually tend to become clients of the ruler and collectively a service class 
(p. 38). 
Second, in most instances, there are several Big Men or oligarchs interested in capturing 
state power. As suggested above, coalitions between two or more oligarchs are possible 
since the payment of compensatory transfers is common practice in the kind of political 
system considered. Nonetheless, as shown by Shapley and Shubik (1969) in a celebrated 
paper, as soon as there are more than two players the feasibility of such (Coasian) transfers 
does not guarantee the existence of a stable cooperative equilibrium. In fact, a coalition may 
well be succeeded by a counter-coalition, itself followed by a counter-counter-coalition so 
that an infinite sequence of unstable agreements unfolds. This is true even when a number 
of (quite restrictive) conditions that the Coasion approach requires are fulfilled: zero 
transactions costs, credibility of promises, symmetric information about the gains and costs 
of feasible coalitions, etc. We therefore have solid ground to argue that political instability is 
an expected outcome when access to state power is managed in a purely decentralised 
manner, that is, with no superior rule of the game applying to the contenders. If the number 
of contenders is two, instability is still likely but will then certainly result from the violation of at 
least some of the aforementioned restrictive conditions. 
5.2 The case of Benin 
The case of Benin fits remarkably well with the above characterisation. We now explain why 
in more detail.  
There are several successful businessmen competing for the control of state power in 
order to advance their particularised interests. They strike alliances that nevertheless 
appear to be continuously shifting, as a result of which politics is highly unstable and 
accusations of treason and corruption are commonplace.  
Thus, on the occasion of the 2006 presidential election, Patrice Talon, until then quite a 
discreet businessman, chose to support Thomas Boni Yayi, who had been governor of the 
West African Bank for Development, at the expense of Nicéphore Soglo, previously a World 
Bank official. This choice was made despite his tight links with the Soglo family. His 
calculation was presumably that Boni’s chances of winning the election were higher, 
therefore providing a more secure way to expand his control over the cotton sector (he 
became known as the ‘king of cotton’ among the people). The plan worked very well, since 
several competitors (foremost among whom was Sefou Fagbohoun) were eliminated at the 
behest of the newly elected president.  
In the meantime, Sébastien Ajavon, another outsized businessman who accumulated wealth 
in the cross-border trade with Nigeria, threw his weight behind Adrien Houngbédji, the natural 
leader of the rich Ouémé region, who was defeated by Yayi. Ajavon nonetheless succeeded 
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in becoming the president of the powerful employers’ association (Association du Patronat), 
which made him the most prominent rival of Talon.  
The next presidential campaign, in 2011, created the stage for an apparent about-turn on the 
part of Talon. The stake seems to have been the management and control of the juicy rent 
opportunities opened up by the new Programme for the Inspection of Imports (Programme 
de Vérification des Importations, or PVI). Talon made an approach to Ajavon and 
Houngbédji, thus betraying his alliance with Yayi, at least upon a first reading of the event. 
His tactic was more subtle, though, as it consisted of playing off Yayi against Houngbédji in 
order to extract from the former the concession that he was seeking. Once more, his political 
stratagem paid off, as he was awarded the contracts of Bénin Control (the new name of the 
PVI) as well as other highly profitable business deals. The big loser was Ajavon, who was 
indicted by Yayi for alleged tax evasion. 
Surprisingly, only one year after the election, disagreements about the way of sharing the 
spoils of state power led Talon into a poisonous conflict with President Yayi (Yayi actually 
accused Talon of having attempted to poison him), following which he was forced into exile in 
France. In essence, Yayi found Talon too greedy. In this way, even though it was Talon who 
bankrolled two successful campaigns for Yayi, the two men became involved in what has 
been called ‘one of the more bizarre falling-outs in West African politics in recent years’ 
(Corey-Boulet, 2019). 
Talon did not give up, however. He clinched a deal with Dossou, a businessman with 
interests in the railways, and with his old enemy Ajavon. Determined to return to his country 
and to retrieve his business privileges, he discreetly prepared his campaign for the 
presidential election of 2016. This move did not please Ajavon and Dossou, who considered 
it a violation of their tacit agreement according to which the supreme state power should 
remain in the hands of politicians. In reaction, Ajavon decided to himself apply as a candidate 
for the presidency. As a result, Benin’s two highest net worth individuals started to confront 
each other openly on the political terrain. The saga did not end there because, upon 
reflection, the two men understood that the priority lay in breaking Yayi’s system. Talon took 
the lead over Ajavon but gave up heavy concessions that included the reimbursement of all 
the state debts toward Ajavon’s commercial companies. Talon became president but quickly 
came to the conclusion that the demands of his partner-rival were impossible to meet. Ajavon 
responded angrily and in due course became the number one enemy of the regime.7  
The end result of this succession of political moves and counter-moves is a triangular 
struggle between three Big Men or oligarchs: Yayi, Talon, and Ajavon. This struggle, 
which has come into the open through political contests, is devastating for the long-
term development of the country not least because it reinforces the idea that, behind 
the façade of parliamentary democracy, the key operators think only of lining their 
pockets rather than promoting national progress. Not surprisingly, any attempt to 
combat corruption is viewed as a partisan move by its initiator to crush political 
enemies and business rivals.  
For instance, critics blamed president Talon for being selective and overzealous in his anti-
corruption campaign. This applies to his initiative of creating the Court for the Punishment of 
Economic and Terrorism Infractions (the CRIET by its French acronym), which has been 
                                               
7 This discussion is largely based on: https://beninwebtv.com/2018/10/benin-talon-vs-ajavon-retour-sur-10-ans-
de-rivalite-economique-devenu-conflit-politique/. 
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used to prosecute figures like Ajavon (sentenced to 20 years in prison on drug-trafficking 
charges). It is therefore not surprising that the Court stands accused by the opposition of 
using trumped-up charges driven by political motives (Corey-Boulet, 2019). More generally, it 
is striking that, when scandals are exposed, and when the government demands audits that 
ultimately point at the responsibility of ministers and high-level public servants, those persons 
are barely punished and the money embezzled or unduly appropriated is not repaid.8 Such 
visible impunity provides an important reason for the lack of trust of the people of Benin in 
their judiciary system. 
According to expectations, Benin has been characterised by ‘anarchic multipartism’, 
as reflected in a proliferation of political parties. The number of political parties 
reached 200 in 2015 while it was only 36 about 25 years earlier. Combined with the rule 
of proportional representation, this situation has led to an unprecedented atomisation 
of the country’s political landscape. The question then arises as to how such ethno-
political fragmentation squares with the aforementioned system of patrimonialism 
with multiple oligarchs. Two main points need to be made here.  
First, the growing practice of ‘cross-party transhumance’ indicates that ethnic affiliation was 
not a rigidly defined, overwhelming criterion conditioning access to a particular political party. 
Joining a party or a political faction is obviously motivated by considerations from which self-
interest is not absent and in which the personal qualities and winning chances of the leader 
play a non-negligible role.  
Second, political parties tend to be regrouped into large federations for the purpose of 
supporting a particular candidate. Thus, the FCBE (Forces Cauris pour un Benin Emergent) 
is a collection of about 40 small parties determined to back President Yayi. The UN (l’Union 
fait la Nation), created in 2008, has attracted his opponents and gave its support to Adrien 
Houngbédji in the course of the 2011 presidential election. Alliance Soleil (Sun Alliance) 
regroups parties from the North, with the exception of those allied with Yayi. The party of 
Ajavon (the Union Sociale Libérale) is anchored in the Ouémé region, which forms his 
electoral basis. As for Talon, he eventually consolidated all his support bases into two major 
blocs. These blocs were the only ones sanctioned by the electoral commission on the 
occasion of the 2019 parliamentary election, a decision that Talon justified by the need to 
avoid political fragmentation. The important point is that political alliances struck in the 
form of confederations of parties continuously evolve according to the interests of the 
Big Men at their helm. If regional and ethnic affiliations play an undoubted role in the 
prevailing political alignments, then, it is important to note they are not the only factor 
at play.   
                                               
8 There is a long list of such scandals. Among others, we can pinpoint the scandal surrounding construction works 
for the summit of the Community of Sahelian-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in Cotonou (2008); the tax evasion 
scandals involving Ajavon (2009–2012 and 2014–2016); the over-invoicing scandal regarding the purchase of 
agricultural machinery within the framework of the Programme de Promotion de la Mécanisation Agricole 
(Promotion Programme for Agricultural Mechanisation) in 2010; the corruption detected in the construction of the 
new building intended for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Benin in Porto-Novo (2009–2011); the 
embezzlements at the level of the Ministry of Youth and Sports on the occasion of the organisation of the African 
athletics championship (2012); the scandal around the attribution of the PVI (2011–2012); the scandal related to 
the Maria Gleta electricity project (2013); the so-called affair of the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (National 
Social Security Fund), which came into the open in 2013 following a report submitted by Ajavon (who himself 
managed the fund between December 2009 and March 2013); embezzlements in connection with the 
construction of the Parliament building (2006–2015); and, finally, the corruption around the Programme 
Pluriannuel d’Appui au Secteur de l’Eau et de l’Assainissement (Multiyear Program in Support of the Water Sector 
and Water Purification, PPEA 2), a project financed by the Dutch government (2015). For more details, see 
Adoun and Awoudo, 2008, 2015; https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/benin/05208.pdf. 
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6 Conclusion 
There are four main lessons to draw from the above overview.  
First, Benin has a historical legacy marked by the existence of a succession of pre-colonial 
kingdoms and ministates. Often, several political units co-existed inside the country’s 
present-day territory, and they were typically stretched over neighbouring countries, Nigeria 
in particular. According to some recent research, this legacy of centralised polities should 
have a positive impact on Benin’s long-term development. 
Second, Benin is characterised by the presence of multiple ethnic groups, some of which 
also live beyond the country’s borders. Ethnic fragmentation is not necessarily an 
impediment to development, especially if it helps escape situations of persisting opposition 
between two antagonistic groups, such as been found in Rwanda and Burundi. If in the past 
politics has been largely defined by the North–South divide, today it appears to be the locus 
of competition between multiple factions that enter into shifting alliances. As a consequence, 
political power does not belong to one group at the definite expense of the other groups. 
However, the fact that the contending factions tend to take a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach to 
power has the effect of raising the stakes of elections and promoting particularised privileges 
instead of policies aimed at the country’s long-term economic development. 
Third, Benin has a long history of regional trade facilitated by direct access to the sea. Some 
ethnic groups, the Yoruba in particular, have over time developed skills and experience in all 
sorts of trading businesses and their approach to life gives primacy to education and 
openness to the outside world. In a free market environment where ethnic antagonisms are 
not fuelled by cynical political leaders, the presence of entrepreneurial and outward-looking 
groups of people would act as a powerful driver of development. 
Fourth, there definitely seems to be a critical problem with the justice and the tax collection 
systems in Benin. People’s level of trust in the courts and the judges or magistrates is very 
low, and they tend to believe that the latter are often corrupt. People also tend to believe that 
tax officials are corrupt. These worrying findings should mitigate the optimism of those who 
praise Benin’s democratic system since the Democratic Renewal took place. In fact, a careful 
analysis of the way this system works in practice reveals that it operates as a patrimonial 
system with multiple Big Men or oligarchs, most of whom have accumulated big fortunes and 
see state power as an instrument to advance their economic interests. Impunity for 
embezzlement or undue appropriation of public assets or money, as well as the partisan 
character of accusations, nurture popular discontent and anger against power-holders. 
Moreover, the coalitions and counter-coalitions they form in pursuit of the control of state 
positions, whether vicariously or not, create a great political instability that further undermines 
long-term national development.  
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1 Benin’s economic development from 1960  
This chapter is the second part of the overview of institutional and other constraints on the 
development of Benin. While the first chapter focused on the geographical, historical, social, 
and political characteristics shaping the environment in which Benin’s development is set, 
this chapter looks more closely into the country’s economic performance and social 
achievements. This macro picture provides in Section 1 a close-up on growth and structural 
change and on key aspects of internal and external equilibrium. Section 2 focuses on 
poverty, inequality, educational, and health achievement. Section 3 summarises the main 
lessons drawn from these first two sections.  
1.1 Economic growth (aggregate)   
Considering the whole period since independence, Benin’s growth performance has been 
relatively modest. With an estimated US$ 2,010 GDP per capita (at 2011 international 
prices) in 2016, Benin ranks among the world’s poorest countries (just a bit higher than the 
world country ranking’s lowest decile). While its GDP per capita is 72% higher in 2018 than 
in 1960, this only reflects a weak annual growth rate of 0.94%. Moreover, the high population 
growth rate Benin has experienced over this 56-year period (an average of 2.85% per year) 
requires a relatively high GDP growth to significantly raise per capita income levels. This 
clearly continues to be an important challenge for the country as the population’s current 
annual growth remains close to this long period average, and close also to that of the 
average sub-Saharan African (SSA) country. This challenge will remain quite acute for the 
coming decade as demographic projections forecast an annual growth rate of Benin’s 
population that only slowly declines, to reach 2.50% per year in 2030.1 
Benin’s growth performance from independence in 1960 to the current period closely 
matches the major changes in economic policy the country has witnessed under its 
successive political regimes. One can accordingly distinguish three main sub-periods  
(Figure 1): 
i) The 1960–1972 sub-period, during which political instability went hand in hand 
with a very volatile and on average low growth rate: GDP per capita grew during 
this period by 1% per annum, less than the average SSA country (2.26%). This 
post-colonial period was marked by a continuing focus on exports of agricultural 
products – mostly seed cotton, whose output grew tenfold between 1965 and 
1972 – and imports of manufactured products, with France as the country’s main 
trading partner (Dossou and Sinzogan, 2007, p. 90). 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Source: United Nations (2019). The data reported in the text for Benin are those of the medium variant of the 
projections. For 2030, the high variant population growth rate is 2.77% per year and 2.21% for the low variant.
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Figure 1: Benin's GDP per capita: levels, absolute and relative to SSA (1960=100) and 
growth rates, 1960–2016 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI). 
ii) The 1973–1989 sub-period, during which the Marxist and military regime 
managed the economy through state control and central planning. In this period, 
the major industries and banks were nationalised. Public involvement in the 
agricultural sector became important through government-owned enterprises 
active in agricultural production, transformation, and distribution, supervised by 
the newly founded SONAPRA (Société Nationale pour la Promotion Agricole). 
New public enterprises were set up in most sectors of the economy, with heavy 
public investment in three large projects: a cement plant in Onigbolo, planting and 
processing of sugarcane units in Savè, and the exploitation and refining of 
offshore oil in Semè. Economic growth was quite uneven during this period, 
affected by counteracting factors of domestic or of foreign origin. Growth was 
weak in the early years (1973–1976) of the period, with a big drop in 1975 as a 
result of the oil crisis and a poor performance in the cotton sector. It then picked 
up, under the pull of the large public investments and of strong demand from 
Nigeria. Growth per capita averaged a hefty 3.3% per annum from 1977 to 1981.  
However, it plunged quickly again after 1981 as major disequilibria became 
apparent (World Bank, 1984): i) an increasing external deficit, stemming from low 
export performance, partly due to the reversal of external demand and depressed 
terms of trade, as well as from huge imports of capital goods, an immediate 
consequence of the large public investment projects. Accordingly, the trade 
balance deficit reached its maximum (close to 30% of GDP) in 1982; ii) an 
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increasing pressure on public finances as a result of a decline of import duties, of 
lossmaking public enterprises, of increased government consumption (mostly on 
wages), and high costs and lows returns on poorly targeted and inefficiently 
executed public investments. The overall budget deficit reached 14% of GDP in 
1984 (World Bank, 1998). As a consequence of these twin deficits, external 
public debt expanded rapidly, to reach a ratio to 320% of exports (75% of GDP) in 
1985. Public debt problems also involved the banking system, which had lent 
massively to finance the public enterprises and had refinanced themselves with 
the BCEAO, the central bank of the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU). When the public enterprises fell into insolvency, the government had 
to step in and guarantee the bank’s debt to the BCEAO. It became clear that full 
service of total government debt could no longer be guaranteed. Arrears on 
external and domestic debt were building up. The banking system collapsed in 
early 1989. Deposits were frozen, which for many years undermined public 
confidence in the formal banking system. Having piled up a ratio of 80% of non-
performing loans, the three government-owned commercial banks had to be 
liquidated.  
Amidst the financial crisis, Benin had to request debt relief from its creditors and 
new external financing. In 1989, a Structural Adjustment financing was set up by 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other multilateral and 
bilateral donors. The adjustment part of the package, effective in 1989–1990, 
intended to tackle the twin deficits aimed at reducing absorption (e.g. through the 
downsizing of the civil service and liquidation of public enterprises). Given Benin’s 
fixed exchange rate commitment within WAEMU, adjustment could not count on 
the increased external competitiveness a devaluation might have achieved. The 
structural part of the package proposed a wide-ranging reform programme and 
was designed to be implemented over several years. 
The financial crisis, the ensuing socio-political crisis, and the growth-reducing 
short-term effects of adjustment measures interacted to result in a dismal 
performance of Benin’s economy during the 1982–1989 period: real GDP per 
capita decreased annually on average by 1.3% during this seven-year period. It 
must be noted that Benin’s performance was not atypical for the region: many 
other SSA countries faced similar adverse external shocks and domestic failures 
in managing the economy and experienced similar macroeconomic adjustment 
policies. Indeed, GDP per capita also declined in the whole region during this 
seven-year period, on average by an annual rate of 1.4%. 
Considering the whole 16-year sub-period, which ended with Benin’s biggest 
macroeconomic crisis yet, it appears that Benin did not succeed in growing 
sufficiently to improve per capita income, which was in 1989 approximately at the 
same level as in 1972.  
iii) The sub-period after 1990, during which Benin launched important economic 
reforms in parallel with its political reforms based on a new democratic 
consensus. The wide-ranging economic reforms initiated in 1989 were designed 
and sponsored under Benin’s first Structural Adjustment programme (which 
covered the period 1989–1992) and by two successive Enhanced Structural 
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Adjustment Facility programmes (covering the 1993–1999 period). The economic 
reforms aimed at liberalising trade, lifting domestic regulations (tax reform and 
revised labour and commercial legislation), improving the performance of a down-
sized public sector, privatising government-owned industrial and commercial 
enterprises, developing a more favourable investment climate (via a new 
investment code), and restructuring the banking system. 
After the 1989 drop in GDP, growth picked up again in 1990 and has remained in 
positive territory since. Real GDP per capita rose at an annual rate of 1.2% 
(4.2%) over the whole 1990–2016 period. It was also much less variable than 
during the two previous periods. Growth was not fully synchronised with the 
average SSA country, however, with Benin growing more rapidly from 1990 to 
2002 and less systematically so afterwards. Indeed, growth was more dynamic 
during these first 12 years: GDP per capita grew at 1.4% per annum (GDP at 
4.6% per annum), with only a relatively minor setback from the shock of the 
devaluation of 1994 of the West African CFA franc and from concomitant 
adjustment measures. External competitiveness was actually boosted by the 
devaluation. 
It is difficult to assess to what extent the liberalisation of the economy contributed 
to this growth performance. An indication may be found in the cotton sector, 
which forms the basis of the rural and agro-industrial economy and represents 
70% of exports (see Section 1.3.1): production was boosted (it increased 
threefold between the 1985/86 and 1997/98 seasons) and yields improved. Also, 
foreign direct investment, quasi nil before 1990, reached 4% to 6% of GDP in the 
early 1990s. But external factors have also played a major role, notably the pull of 
Nigerian growth.2 Benin has also benefited during this period of solid support and 
high confidence from bilateral and multilateral donors (including HIPC debt relief 
on its external debt in 2000–2003). This put strong pressure on the country to 
implement the large array of reforms sponsored by donors.  
However, growth became more variable after 2002, and slightly lower. From 2003 
to 2016, growth of GDP per capita averaged 1.1% per annum (4% per annum for 
GDP). Reforms were often not implemented with the necessary efficiency, as in 
the case of cotton sector reform, where organisational problems led to a sharp 
drop in cotton production (a drop by half between 2004 and 2010, reaching again 
its 2004 level only in 20143). Foreign direct investment dropped again after 2000 
to minimal levels until picking up in 2011. Growth failed to be sufficiently inclusive. 
The poverty headcount ratio at US$ 1.90 a day4 stood at 48.8 in 2003 and at 49.6 
in 2015. 
                                               
2 The contemporaneous correlation coefficient between Benin and Nigerian GDP growth rates is particularly high 
during this 1990–2002 period: 0.36 versus 0.19 for 1972–1989 and only 0.01 for 2003–2017. Only the 1990–
2002 correlation coefficient is significantly positive. Note that contemporaneous correlations between the two 
annual growth rates can only be indicative of short-term effects of Nigeria’s GDP on Benin’s GDP, and cannot 
measure the longer term, structural relationship between the two countries’ growth performance (see also 
Section 1.3.1). 
3 Data from www.indexmundi.com. See also Section 1.3.1. 
4 WDI data, threshold at 2011 PPP (purchase parity power) level. 
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1.2 Growth and structural change 
We briefly present the production structure of the Beninese economy as shown by the official 
national account statistics published by INSAE and the Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
We consider only the most recent period (1999–2015). National account data are actually 
available since 1990 but they rest on a methodology, especially a classification of industries 
and activities, which was profoundly overhauled in the early 2000s. The national account 
data under this new methodology are only available since 1999, while the publication of 
those following the old methodology was discontinued after 2012. The methodological 
changes in the sectoral classification are too important to allow combining the data to cover 
the full 1990–2017 period. We therefore limit our analysis to the 1999–2017 period.5 
Sectoral employment data are also not readily available. To study the effects of sectoral 
reallocations of activity on labour productivity, we therefore rely on a recent study by Haile 
(2018) covering the 2006–2015 period.6 
Table 1 shows that Benin's economy is structurally dominated by the primary and tertiary 
sectors, which account for about 26% and 47% of GDP at factor cost respectively, on 
average over the reported period. The period average for the size of the secondary sector is 
27% of GDP. The primary sector is heavily dominated by rain-fed agriculture, in which cotton 
plays a dominant role (see Section 1.3.1). Its share in GDP has been on a slightly 
decreasing trend. The secondary sector is dominated by small-scale processing units for 
agricultural products and by construction activities. Its share in GDP has also been on a 
decreasing trend, quite significantly so over the 1999–2013 period. The tertiary sector is the 
largest one, currently representing more than the half of GDP. It regroups transport, 
telecommunications, banking, and insurance as well as trade, catering, and hospitality 
services. It also includes public administration and public services in education, health, and 
social security. A key component in this sector is dominated by the activities of the Cotonou 
Autonomous Port, which is one of the main ports in the sub-region due to its transit role for 
the region's landlocked countries (Burkina, Niger, and Mali). It plays a central role in Benin's 
economy (see Section 1.3.1). It is this sector that has seen its share in GDP increase from 
an average of 42% in 1999–2003 to an average of 52% in the most recent sub-period 
(2014–2017), at the detriment of both the primary and secondary sectors. Within the tertiary 
sector, the most dynamic subsectors have been transport and communications (from 4.5% 
to 11.2% of GDP at factor costs between 1999 and 2017) and public administration and 
social security (from 6.4% to 9.4%). 
Table 1 also reports the large role played by the informal sector in Benin: two-thirds of GDP 
originates in the informal sector. The ratio is highest in the primary sector, where all activity 
is recorded as informal. The ratio stands at 66% in the secondary sector and 46% in the 
tertiary sector. 
                                               
5 Note also that the national accounting system has recently been overhauled, providing for a larger use of 
survey data. As a consequence, there have been, for the year 2015, some moderate changes in the three 
sectors’ shares (with the tertiary sector increasing its share in GDP by 2.9%). More spectacular is, for 2015, the 
36.7% increase in nominal GDP, from the old to the new national account system. See INSAE (2019). 
6 Haile (2018) combines Beninese national account data with employment data taken from three waves of 
surveys of household living conditions (ECOMICoV 2007, 2011, and 2015) and complemented with the World 
Bank’s International Income Distribution Data Set (I2D2). 
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Table 1: Sector-based structure of GDP (% of value-added at current factor prices)  
Source: INSAE for 1999–2015 data and Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances (2017) for 2016/17 provisional 
data.  
Remaining at the aggregate sector level, one observes that the share of the primary sector 
decreases, by about 2 percentage points after 1999, mostly to the benefit of the tertiary 
sector (+2.8 percentage points). There is also a significant and regular decrease in the share 
of government services. 
A more disaggregated sectoral growth analysis is provided by Haile (2018) for the most 
recent period (2006–2015). Table 2 reports the gross value-added at 2007 constant prices 
(GVA), employment (Emp.), and labour productivity per worker (LP). 
Table 2: Gross value-added, employment, and labour productivity by sector (%) 
 2006 2010 2015 
 GVA Emp. LP GVA Emp. LP GVA Emp. LP 
Agriculture 26.9 59.4 0.41 26.1 45 0.51 22.3 42.1 0.52 
Mining 0.5 0.1 5.31 0.4 0.1 4.12 0.4 0.1 4.47 
Manufacturing 20.1 7.3 2.51 14.7 7.6 1.71 14.7 7.8 1.86 
Utilities 0.4 0.2 2.33 0.6 0.2 2.98 1.1 0.2 5.95 
Construction 7.8 2.3 3.16 7.9 2.6 2.7 8 2.7 2.93 
Commerce 13.5 19.1 0.64 12.5 27.7 0.39 13.5 28.7 0.46 
Transport 7.7 3.3 2.12 9.6 4.3 1.97 10 4.5 2.19 
Finance 1.5 0.2 6.76 3.6 0.3 11.16 5.6 0.2 24.7 
Other 
services 
21.4 8.2 2.37 24.5 12.4 1.73 24.3 13.7 1.75 
Total 100 100 0.91 100 100 0.88 100 100 0.98 
Source: Haile (2018) - Excerpts from Appendix Tables 1, 2, and 3 (p. 18). The category ‘Other services’ includes 
public administration, education, health, real estate, renting and business activities, and community, social, and 
personal services. The data for GVA and Emp. are in %, and for LP in million CFA franc. 
Agriculture is a sector that has seen its share in both GVA and in employment decline, the 
latter more significantly so. Its productivity has thereby somewhat increased, while remaining 
one of the lowest sectors. This probably reflects the fact that the sector has shed its lowest 
productivity or surplus workers. Manufacturing has kept a stable share in total employment, 
but has seen is productivity decline by some 20%, so that its share in total GVA decreased 
  1999–2003 2004–2008 2009–2013 2014–2017 Average 
Primary 26.0  27.7  25.5  23.9  25.8  
of which informal 25.9  27.8  25.4  24.5 25.9  
Secondary 32.4  28.7 24.1 24.3  27.4  
of which informal 21.5  19.8  16.2  14.4  18.0  
Tertiary 41.6  43.6  50.4  51.9  46.9  
of which informal 17.9  19.1  22.5  23.1 20.6  
GDP (factor costs) 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
of which informal 65.3  66.7  64.1  62.0  64.5  
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by 5 percentage points. This could be explained by labour hoarding in the face of a decrease 
of demand for the sector’s output. ‘Commerce’ and ‘Other services’ make up more than one-
third of total GVA and have slightly increased their share (by 3 percentage points). Both 
sectors have at the same time raised their joint share in total employment from 27.3% to 
42.4% – an increase of 15 percentage points – and witnessed a decrease of productivity of 
some 27%. None of these structural changes allows one to characterise either of these most 
important sectors as a potential ‘engine of growth’. On the other hand, the (relatively) fastest-
growing sectors (finance and transport) are small in terms of employment and GVA, and not 
in a position to pull growth significantly. The increase in the share of finance in GVA is 
mainly driven by higher value-added per employee, probably mostly reflecting a general 
upward trend in the salary scale within this sector. On the whole, total productivity has 
increased by close to 1% per year on average between 2006 and 2015, but this hides two 
diverging episodes: a decrease in productivity of a yearly rate of 0.8% from 2006 to 2010, 
followed by an increase at a yearly rate of 2.2%.  
Table 3, which is based on Haile (2018), helps us to better understand which sectoral shifts 
in employment combine with inter-sectoral differences in productivity to generate the 
economy’s changes in global productivity. The table features the decomposition of growth of 
overall labour productivity into its sectoral contributions (col. 3 -Total).7 Each sectoral 
contribution is the sum of two components: i) a structural component, obtained by multiplying 
the change in the sector’s share in total employment by its reference productivity level8 
(col. 1); and ii) a ‘within-sector productivity change’ component, obtained by multiplying the 
change in the sector’s productivity by its reference share in total employment (col. 2). 
Table 3: Sectoral decomposition of labour productivity growth, 2006–2015 
  Annualised % changes  
  
Structural change (inter-
sectoral) 
Productivity within 
sector 
Total  
Agriculture 1.02 0.69 1.71 
Mining 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Utilities 0.01 0.08 0.09 
Manufacturing 0.07 -0.60 -0.53 
Construction 0.11 -0.07 0.04 
Commerce -0.47 -0.53 -1.00 
Transport 0.18 0.03 0.21 
Finance 0.04 0.47 0.51 
Other services 0.75 -0.83 -0.08 
Total 1.73 -0.77 0.96 
Source: Haile (2018). Excerpts from Table 3, p. 18. 
Globally, labour reallocation across sectors would have increased global productivity by 
1.7% yearly if each worker had retained his/her productivity constant at the reference level. 
                                               
7 The technique applied is the standard Shapley decomposition method (Haile, 2018, p. 10), which is used for 
computing the contributions of all the factors that determine growth of per capita GDP. We report only here the 
part concerning changes in productivity.  
8 A sector’s reference productivity level (employment share) is defined as the average of its 2006 and 2015 
productivity (employment share).  
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However, productivity has not remained constant and changes in sectoral productivity have, 
at constant shares in total employment, led to a decrease of global productivity, at an 
annualised rate of 0.77%. The major combined contributions (col. 3) to the change in global 
productivity come, on the positive side, from agriculture, finance, and transport, and on the 
negative side from commerce and manufacturing.  
It thus seems that the major driving force of changes in global productivity over the 2006–
2015 period is the reallocation of labour, away from the agricultural sector, initially the one 
with the lowest productivity. This helped increase average productivity on two counts: by the 
movement of labour out of agriculture and into somewhat more productive sectors, also by 
increasing the sector’s apparent productivity over the period. The sectors that are at the 
receiving end of labour reallocation were, however, not able to transform this influx into 
higher growth. Labour did not move to high productivity sectors, on the contrary. Commerce, 
with a productivity rate even lower than in agriculture in 2015, and Other services (for a large 
part government services) ranking as the third lowest productive sector, depressed 
productivity growth over the period. When also considering the underperformance of 
manufacturing, where one could have expected higher productivity fostered by higher 
sectoral capital intensity and technology transfers from abroad, we are led to raise the 
question of sustainability. What is the long-term sustainability of structural changes that 
follow an agriculture-cum-service model, featuring mostly non-traded goods and primary 
commodities as outputs? 
The low rate of productivity growth has to be considered together with the other two factors 
that contribute to per capita income growth: the share of working age population in total 
population and the employment rate. Over the 2006–2015 period, gross value-added per 
capita grew annually by 1.07%. Most of this growth came from productivity, with the two 
other factors having opposite effects: the positive effect of the decrease in the dependency 
rate was largely compensated for by a decrease in the employment rate of the working 
population (Haile, 2018). Therefore, the challenge for raising per capita income in Benin 
clearly lies in improving productivity across sectors and, simultaneously, in increasing the 
employment rate. 
The broad picture that emerges, therefore, is that Benin is still lacking a powerful and 
sustainable engine of growth. Cotton and cross-border trade with Nigeria are considered the 
two leading sectors for the Beninese economy (see Section 1.3.1). Activities in the cotton 
sector span both the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, both of which display a weak 
productivity performance. In addition, there is a high level of variability in export revenues 
from these activities and they only weakly correlate with real GDP growth.9 Concerning 
cross-border trade with Nigeria, a large part of which is illegal and informal, its development 
has surely contributed to the observed growth in the shares of the commerce and transport 
sectors. Again, however, average productivity has decreased in the former and only 
moderately increased in the latter. In addition, the sustainability of a strategy relying on this 
sector as a growth engine is clearly very questionable.  
                                               
9 The annual growth rate of real exports of agricultural raw materials and manufactured products combined has a 
range of [-32%; +87%]. Exports of these goods have a share in total exports that varies between 70% and 80% 
over the 1994–2017 period. The correlation coefficient between their annual growth rates and those of real GDP 
is 0.29 (Source: WDI – data in USD converted into local currency units and deflated by the GDP deflator). 
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With agriculture playing such a large role in the economy, both in employment and value-
added, an important institutional issue relates to property rights in land. The question as to 
whether property rights in land are sufficiently secure comes up as a natural concern as far 
as productivity improvements in the agricultural sector are concerned. How secure land 
rights are best achieved is a tricky issue. Does the state need to intervene in a big way to 
establish formal land rights through cadastral surveys and land titling, or can it rely on 
informal rights and support rather than replace them? This also raises the question as to 
which agency is competent to deal with land conflicts, including assignment problems and 
issues of repossession of land by banks when the land is used as collateral: state courts or 
informal agencies possibly regulated by the state? 
The case of Benin is especially interesting because in 2013 the state embarked upon a 
pioneering land titling reform undertaken in the framework of the MCA programme financed 
by the US development agency (other African countries are now following the same route). 
In the process, it has created a special agency in charge of surveying villages, mapping their 
lands and registering local land claims, and implementing the formalisation process (the 
Agence Nationale du Domaine Foncier). The impact of this programme has been recently 
evaluated with the help of a randomised controlled trial methodology, offering a unique 
opportunity to assess the experience (Goldstein et al., 2018). Also, a new law establishing 
full-fledged (freehold) land rights supported by formal titles was passed in 2016.  
Clearly, serious problems have been encountered in the designing and the enforcement of 
the 2013 law. There are several possible sources of these problems: (i) the individualisation 
of land rights in the context of traditional collective or communal land tenure; (ii) the mapping 
of customary land rights via the Plans Fonciers Ruraux (Rural Land Maps); and (iii) the 
mechanisms of rights’ enforcement and dispute settlement. Also, in a country where mobility 
is high and ethnic diversity large, how migrants’ rights are transformed as a result of the 
formalisation of land rights is a crucial issue. Finally, did the fact that only temporary tenure 
rights were granted under a first phase of the reform (lasting five years) create disincentives 
for firms to invest and for banks to accept land as collateral? How were conflicting land 
claims adjudicated during that transitory period? How well accepted were the conflict-
settlement procedures? 
1.3 Specific structural characteristics 
This subsection concentrates on two specific structural features of Benin’s economy, 
allowing us to better understand the aggregate performance presented in the previous 
subsection. Analysis includes the discussion on leading real sectors (Section 1.3.1) and the 
financial system (Section 1.3.2). 
1.3.1 Leading real sectors 
An overview 
Benin is dependent on the activities of two main real sectors: cotton and cross-border trade. 
Cotton is produced in Benin and mainly exported abroad to Asia and Europe, whereas 
cross-border trade involves the importations of goods from Asia and Europe through the 
harbour of Cotonou and later re-exported to neighbour countries through informal channels. 
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These two activities account, on average, for more than 70% of Benin’s total exports. Figure 
2 below reports data on real exports of cotton and re-exports of goods (gross flows) over the 
1991–2017 period. The data highlights two important issues Benin’s economy is facing as 
regards these two sectors.  
First, re-export activities have played a dominant role in Benin’s economy. The available 
estimates suggest that cotton and cross-border trade account for about 13% and 20% of 
Benin’s GDP, respectively.10 The latter estimate is, however, open to some discussion, as 
we explain below. Nigeria is the main recipient country of cross-border trade, accounting for 
more than 90% of Benin’s re-export activities. On the other hand, cotton is mainly exported 
to Asia, Europe, and the US. As such, there is a fundamental difference between these two 
activities. In particular, cross-border trade entails a loss of foreign exchange reserves for 
Benin whereas cotton contributes to official export earnings. In the same way, re-export 
activities compete with the agro-industrial sector. However, the incentive of Benin’s 
authorities for tolerating cross-border trade derives from the fact that it generates customs 
and VAT revenues for the country. Below we elaborate on cross-border trade and discuss 
spillover from Nigeria to Benin. Figure 2 shows that re-exports strongly increased from 2007 
on and peaked in 2014. As there was simultaneously a marked increase in cotton exports, it 
is not surprising that the growth rate of GDP per capita also significantly picked up (see 
Figure 1), confirming the leading role of these two sectors for the Beninese economy. 
Second, the data in Figure 2 shows that export of cotton has been performing poorly for a 
long period since 1996. This disappointing trend coincides with a number of institutional 
changes that occurred in the sector over the past years. The institutional changes have most 
to do with the liberalisation of activities as well as the privatisation of the state enterprise 
involved in the sector. We discuss these issues and other challenges facing the cotton 
sector below.  
                                               
10 These estimates are obtained from MAEP (2008) and Golub (2012a; 2012b) for cotton and cross-border trade, 
respectively. 
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Figure 2: Exports of cotton and re-export of goods, in real terms (billions CFA francs 
deflated by the consumer price index) 
 
Sources: BCEAO (https://edenpub.bceao.int/ and various annual reports) 
Cross-border trade and spillovers from Nigeria 
Activities related to cross-border trade between Benin and Nigeria largely stem from 
differential (trade, taxation, and exchange rate) policies in the two countries (Igué and Soulé, 
1992). Nigeria uses tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect domestic industries in a number of 
economic sectors (e.g. Igué and Soulé, 1992; De Melo and Ugarte, 2013; Golub, 2012), 
including cars, textiles, cigarettes, and food items (such as rice, vegetable oil, and poultry). 
In 1973, the military regime in Benin introduced lower import tariffs than in Nigeria, with the 
aim of extracting rents from re-export activities. This happened in the context of the first oil 
shock, which generated a boom in Nigeria. Togo also implemented similar import tariff cuts 
in 1973 in order to compete with Benin on the re-export market. 
The aim of extracting rents from re-export activities in order to benefit from the pent-up 
demand in the huge domestic market in Nigeria has been a constant strategy pursued by the 
Beninese authorities. Benin was therefore very early on labelled an ‘entrepôt state’ (‘Etat 
entrepôt’), a term coined by Igué and Soulé (1992). The BCEAO (2017) data for re-exports 
(see Figure 2) imply that these represented an average of 61% of Benin’s total exports over 
the 2007–2017 period. The competition with Togo in terms of tariffs, import taxes, port 
duties, and import valuation systems (Golub, 2012b) has also to be interpreted in terms of a 
strategy to maximise Benin’s share in the fallout of the Nigerian oil rent. 
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Most of the re-export activities are aimed at the Nigerian market. They are organised under 
an official status as well as under an unofficial one (Golub, 2012a). Official activities include 
imported goods declared for re-export or for transit to Nigeria. The unofficial part of the re-
export activity has two facets: i) imported goods that are declared for transit to neighbouring 
landlocked countries, thereby benefiting from low customs duties and taxes, but that are 
later diverted to Nigeria via a network of informal intermediaries; and ii) imported goods that 
are declared as goods for the domestic market, but are then also shipped to the Nigerian 
border through the same informal network. Concerning the latter category of unofficial re-
exports, IMF (2017, p. 8) notes that Beninese customs do not process goods in transit if 
these goods are subject to an import ban by Nigeria. Imports of such goods (like frozen 
poultry or vegetable oil and, at times, specific types of used cars) have then to be declared 
for domestic consumption and are subject to VAT.  
It is to be noted that the import process of the goods intended for the Nigerian market is itself 
fully formal and legal. It is operated by formal firms, which trade with local and international 
contractors, borrow from formal banks, and pay income taxes. Related infrastructure, both 
public (port, customs) and private (parking lots for used cars, warehouses for other 
products), have been set up in an open and regular way. The unofficial (illegal) aspect of 
cross-border trade with Nigeria occurs when customs rules are bent to, as noted above, 
switch from Niger to Nigeria as the final destination for transit goods, when an imported good 
is declared for domestic use but sent to Nigeria, or when the imported goods are being 
deliberately undervalued to benefit from lower custom duties and taxes. Or, in addition, when 
imported goods are falsely declared as coming from Togo, or another member of the West 
African Monetary Union, to benefit from tariff exemptions.11 The trade flows become also 
illegal, obviously, at the border with Nigeria, when these goods have to be smuggled in. 
Because rules need to be bent and controls evaded, which is done on a systematic and 
large scale, bribing and corruption becomes an integral part of this fraudulent cross-border 
trade. In addition, organising the dispatching of goods from their entry port to their Nigerian 
border destination cannot in general occur via formal traders and intermediaries once trade 
in these goods has become unofficial. This organisation is therefore handled by a well-
organised network of operators and intermediaries active in the informal sector (Golub, 
2012a). Unofficial trade thus breeds informality. The scale at which the unofficial cross-
border trade is organised and the weakness with which it is controlled also necessarily 
implies high-level political connections on the part of the bigger operators, presumably in 
both countries. Such a permanent tolerance, instead of repression, of fraudulent activities 
certainly does not contribute to improving the general business climate in Benin. More 
importantly, it raises the risks of political capture, as evidenced by political infighting 
involving big players in the unofficial trade business with Nigeria12 (see Chapter 1). 
                                               
11 Bensassia et al. (2019) report that this practice is documented by the observed discrepancy between exports 
from Togo to Benin and Benin’s imports from Togo. The latter are about five times larger than the former. 
12 A telling example is the rivalry, both in the political and the business spheres, of two of Benin’s famous as well 
as richest businessmen: Sebastien Ajavon and Patrice Talon. The former made his fortune in the agro-business, 
the latter in the cotton sector. Ajavon is a leading importer of frozen poultry from France, where he has invested 
in chicken farming, into Benin. His firm COMON S.A. is also the major player in the unofficial cross-border trade 
of poultry into Nigeria, where this product is officially banned. Both Ajavon and Talon have pushed their ambition 
into politics, financing the campaigns of politicians close to their interests. Both initially allied against the acting 
president, Yayi Boni, to foster their respective interests. However, they quickly entered into conflict and both ran 
as candidates in the 2016 presidential election. Talon won. Ajavon then started his own party but had to face 
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Unofficial cross-border trade with Benin is not limited to re-export activities. Benin also 
benefits from the Nigerian oil rent when the latter takes the form of oil price subsidies for its 
citizens. A significant part of Benin’s petroleum imports is smuggled from Nigeria into Benin. 
Other consumer and capital goods are also imported unofficially on a significant scale, 
evading import duties and domestic taxes. This illicit cross-border trade also benefits from an 
efficient network of informal operators, which functions, like that set up for unofficial re-export 
activities, with bribes and side-payments to officials on both sides of the border (Golub, 
2012b). 
Illicit cross-border trade brings benefits to both countries. The Nigerian middle and upper 
classes have the opportunity to buy goods from Benin that are not available or too expensive 
on their domestic market because of the country’s protectionist trade policy. More 
importantly perhaps, the authorities of Nigeria may value the political leverage they have on 
Benin because of the strong dependence of the Beninese economy on Nigeria’s policies 
relating to trade, the exchange rate, and public price subsidies.  
For Benin, the benefits are exclusively economic ones, in terms of economic activity, 
employment, and tax receipts. Estimating these effects is not a simple task, given the 
unofficial nature of these flows. For the effects of unofficial cross-border trade on GDP, the 
most frequently cited estimate is that of Golub (2012a). Based on an earlier study on the 
unofficial trade in used cars, which represents a large part of the total unofficial re-export 
trade to Nigeria, and extrapolating from these data to the whole trade, Golub (2012a, p. 215; 
2012b, p. 1159) estimates the contribution to be about 20% of GDP. He also estimates that 
about 50 000 people are directly involved in this trade. Such an estimated contribution to 
GDP is huge. The estimation on employment is relatively lower, as it represents for the year 
of estimation (2005) about 9% of employed workers in the three sectors susceptible to 
contribute to this trade, i.e. commerce, transport, and finance, and 2% of total employment in 
the economy. To assess the consistency between the GDP and employment estimates, we 
reason in the following way. Estimated tax receipts from cross-border trade are about 30% of 
tax receipts (World Bank, 2009), which translates into an average of 4.5% of GDP. Using 
2006 data, we net-out this share of GDP from the global contribution to GDP and compute 
the net contribution in terms of gross value-added at factor costs. The resulting ratio is 17%. 
We assume that this net contribution to value-added at factor costs originates from 65% in 
the commerce sector, 30% in the transport sector, and 5% in the finance sector. Using the 
respective productivity data reported in Table 2 of Section 1.2 (source: Haile, 2018), we 
obtain an effect on employment amounting to 450,000 individuals, or 18% of total 
employment in the economy. This huge effect on employment reflects to a large extent the 
low productivity in the commerce sector, which was noted in Section 1.2. It actually implies 
that about 80% or people employed in this sector are supposed to be involved in cross-
border trade. As one does not really see why this scenario would grossly overestimate the 
employment effects (e.g. increasing the proportion of commerce in the value-added 
                                               
multiple judicial troubles. He had to defend himself against accusations of fiscal fraud and drug trafficking, was 
sentenced to heavy fines and long prison terms. However, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
recently (2019) asked Benin’s courts to annul the sentence. Ajavon has sought and obtained refugee status in 
France. See Chapter 1 and www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/08/28/au-benin-le-roi-du-poulet-ne-veut-pas-se-
faire-plumer-par-le-fisc_5177538_3212.html ; https://beninwebtv.com/2018/10/benin-talon-vs-ajavon-retour-sur-
10-ans-de-rivalite-economique-devenu-conflit-politique/ 
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generated would only enhance the employment effects),13 one is led to conclude that the 
figure of 20% of GDP appears to be somewhat excessive. As an alternative, we can use the 
same approach, based on sectoral productivities, and reverse it. We explore a scenario in 
which we start from a specific hypothesis on sectoral employment in unofficial cross-border 
trade. We arbitrarily assume that 25% of workers in commerce, 20% in transport, and 5% in 
finance are active in unofficial cross-border trade, this representing about 150,000 workers 
and 5.5% of total employment in 2006. We obtain, under this hypothesis, a total contribution 
of unofficial cross-border trade to GDP (i.e. indirect tax receipts included) of about 9% in 
2006. Repeating the exercise for 2015 we get 10%. These simple calculations are tentative 
and are not intended to minimise the importance of unofficial cross-border trade for Benin. 
However, they clearly point to the need for further research to assess more precisely the 
impact of unofficial cross-border trade on aggregate value-added.  
Although the unofficial cross-border trade with Nigeria is in many aspects very lucrative for 
the Beninese economy, there are definite downsides. A key one is that Benin is very 
vulnerable to changes in economic conditions and trade protection policies in Nigeria. First, 
Nigeria has often changed import tariffs on protected goods, generating substitution between 
re-exports from Benin and direct imports from the rest of the world (Asia, Europe, and the 
US) to Nigeria. In 1995 and 1996, for instance, the Nigerian government lowered import 
tariffs on rice from 100 to 50%. These changes led to an increase of rice imports from Asia 
to Nigeria and a decrease in re-exports from Cotonou. Likewise, the discontinuation of 
prohibitions on textile imports in 1997 led to similar substitution effects.14  
Second, Nigeria is very much exposed to global shocks given the dominant role it plays in 
the world oil market. As such, the country plays an important role in the transmission of 
global shocks to Benin. During the recent global financial crisis and great recession that 
started in 2007, for instance, Benin suffered from re-exported activities especially in the car 
sector. In the same way, Nigeria recently devalued its currency in 2016 as a result of 
persistent negative oil price shocks in 2015/16. 
There are several channels through which these adverse shocks from Nigeria could spill 
over to Benin. First, because they imply cuts in Benin’s government’s tax revenue, they 
compromise its ability to finance public infrastructure and other expenditures. Second, they 
impact negatively on the activities of the harbour of Cotonou and other service sectors 
including commerce, transport, telecommunications, insurance, and banking that are related 
to re-export activities. Third, proceedings from re-exports largely accrue to the informal 
sector and have often been used to import intermediate and capital goods from Nigeria (Igué 
and Soulé, 1992), which generates positive supply effects in Benin.15 Fourth, external 
shocks improve the activities of the domestic agro-industry sector.  
It is difficult to provide a reliable estimate on the impact of re-export shocks given that they 
run through the informal sector. Attempts to provide quantitative estimates of their effects 
use static general equilibrium models (e.g. Medenou, 2016; Gautier, 2000; Balaro et al., 
                                               
13 Similarly, using 2015 data for the same scenario implies that the 20% of GDP contribution of cross-border 
trade represents an employment effect of 27% of total employment (87% of employment in the commerce 
sector). Again, the decrease in productivity in the commerce sector between 2006 and 2015 explains this 
difference. 
14 Nigeria has also sometimes unilaterally closed its borders with Benin for political reasons. These happened for 
instance in 1996 and 2003 and generated similar negative effects on re-exports.  
15 In particular, Benin depends for 80% of oil imports from Nigeria.  
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2013; Paquet and Savard, 2009). For instance, the estimate recently reported by Medenou 
(2017) indicates that a 10% increase in re-export demand from Nigeria in textile and food 
items would generate a 2.3% increase in customs revenues and a 0.3% acceleration of real 
GDP growth in Benin. Based on this estimate and the observed decrease of about 25% of 
re-exports between 2014 and 2015 (Figure 2), this would imply a growth contraction of about 
0.75% in Benin. 
An alternative way to quantify the short-run relationship between Nigeria and Benin is to look 
at household consumption in Nigeria as a driving factor for Benin’s growth, using national 
account aggregate.16 Nigeria’s household consumption is better suited than Nigeria’s GDP 
as a driving factor, as a large part of cross-border trade of Benin with Nigeria originates in 
Nigerian domestic consumption spending, as indicated above. We accordingly run a 
regression between Benin’s GDP growth and the growth of household consumption in 
Nigeria over the 1980–2017 period (data on household consumption are not available for 
Nigeria before 1980 in the WDI Database). The regression includes one lag of each variable. 
The estimated coefficient of contemporaneous Nigerian household consumption is 0.08 and 
is significant at the 1% level. Although significant, the coefficient appears to be small in 
economic terms. However, one needs to take into account that the volatility of household 
consumption growth in Nigeria is much higher that the volatility of Benin’s GDP: their 
respective standard errors for the 1980–2017 period are 16.0% and 2.9%. A representative 
one standard error positive shock in Nigerian household consumption would thus increase 
Benin’s GDP by 1.3%, an estimate with a 95% confidence band of 0.4% and 2.2%. This 
economically significant effect is confirmed by a variance decomposition analysis performed 
with a bi-variate structural vector auto-regression model with the same two variables and 
over the same period. It attributes about 22% of the variance of the model’s forecast error for 
Benin’s GDP growth to shocks in Nigerian household consumption. 
Another downside is the distortions that the unofficial cross-border trade with Nigeria may 
entail for the structure of Benin’s economy and for its development. It may hamper the 
development of regional trade relationships. Some locally produced goods, like textiles and 
possibly rice, that Benin could legally export to Nigeria at regionally competitive prices face 
unfair competition from low-cost goods imported from, say, China and illegally shipped to 
Nigeria. This will occur if the cost difference between local and imported goods is not fully 
compensated by tax and custom dues.  
Finally, as already discussed, the organisation of the illegal re-export and import activities to 
and from Nigeria nurture not only informality but also corruption, tax evasion, and possibly 
political capture. These negative characteristics may spill over to other sectors by setting low 
standards for honesty, compliance with the rule of law, and respect for the country’s 
                                               
16 Note that estimating the empirical relationship between growth in Nigeria and growth in Benin using the two 
countries’ national account data leads to statistically contrasting results. Only annual data are available. 
Regressing Benin’s GDP growth on Nigeria’s growth over the whole period 1961–2017 with or without additional 
control variables (e.g. changes in oil and cotton prices, growth of Eurozone GDP, etc.) and with the appropriate 
lag structure never leads to a significant effect of Nigeria’s GDP on Benin’s GDP. This can possibly be explained 
by the fact that the national accounts of both countries only very imperfectly capture the value-added embedded 
in the largely informal transactions between the two countries. It may also reflect structural shifts over time in the 
relationship between the two countries. Indeed, performing cross-correlations between contemporaneous growth 
rates of Benin and Nigeria over a rolling 20-year window, one observes that the correlation coefficient is only 
significant for the periods ending in 2001 and 2002. For this 1981–2002 period, which includes Benin’s 1990–
2002 dynamic growth period (see Section 1.1), it reaches 0.5, before returning to lower, non-significant values. 
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institutions. Upholding a strategy that selects unofficial re-export trade as a pillar of Benin’s 
economy has hidden costs. They limit major improvements in the business climate and 
make harder the fight against corruption and in favour of better functioning institutions. 
The cotton sector 
In Benin, cotton plays a major economic role, accounting for about 60% of export revenue 
(excluding re-exports) and 45% of tax revenue (excluding customs revenue). It provides 
livelihoods for about one-third of the total population of 10.7 million and the basis for 60% of 
the industrial sector (19 ginning factories, four textile industries, and two agro-food industries 
for vegetable oil extraction), where it generates about 3,500 paid jobs (MAEP, 2008). In the 
same way, cotton contributes to activities in the services sector (e.g. transport and 
construction) and also plays a socio-political role in rural development (e.g. Kpadé, 2011).  
In light of this importance, any problem in the cotton sector would severely affect Benin’s 
development. Figure 3 reports the performance of the cotton sector in Benin and its 
francophone neighbouring countries (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali), on the basis of 
the production of seed cotton, yields, and cultivated area over the 1961–2016 period. First, 
the data shows contrasting performance in Benin’s production in 1973–1992 and since the 
early 2000s. On the contrary, Benin slightly outperformed its neighbours in 1993–1997. 
Second, production moved hand in hand with cultivated land area, suggesting that yield 
improvement was not the main driver of cotton production increases in the country. Indeed, 
Benin’s yield is volatile, and its value lags behind that of other countries (the average gap is 
about 4 basis points). More worryingly, in recent years the cotton yield in Benin has come 
down to the level where it was in the 1970s.  
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Figure 3: Performance of the cotton sector in Benin and West Africa 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT). Benin’s data over 
the period 2016-2017 is obtained from the Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (INSAE) 
and the Association Interprofessionnelle de Coton au Bénin (AIC) and is being updated in the FAOSTAT 
database. Note: West Africa (WA) is a simple average of data from Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali. 
Production is in tonnes, Area in hectares, and Yield is in percentage relative to the value of average yield in the 
other WA countries.  
Domestic and external factors are responsible for Benin’s performance (see Bourdet, 2004; 
AIC, 2008; Ahohounkpanzon et al., 2002; Cabinet Afrique Décision Optimale, 2010; 
Gergery, 2009; Kpadé, 2011; Saizonou, 2008; and Yérima, 2005).17 Domestic factors 
include political forces and institutional arrangements in the cotton sector, whereas external 
factors relate to forces that drive the domestic currency value of the world cotton price as 
well as export demand for cotton. We start with the latter and then turn to the former. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 In addition to these two factors, rainfall shocks also affect cotton supply. 
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Figure 4: World cotton price and the CFA franc/US dollar exchange rate (1996=100) 
 
Source: IMF commodity database and IMF internal financial statistics. Note: After the CFA/kg was constructed all 
series were transformed in indices with base year 1996 as a normalised factor. 
Figure 4 displays monthly data on world cotton prices in US dollar and CFA franc together 
with the CFA franc/US dollar nominal exchange rate over the period 1980–2017. The data 
shows that variations in both the nominal exchange rate18 and the dollar value of the world 
cotton price19 have caused great fluctuations in the CFA franc value of the cotton price. In 
the period 2004–2009, for instance, the dollar value of the cotton price showed a declining 
trend, which was amplified by a persistent appreciation of the CFA franc. Following this drop 
in price, we see a contraction in production and land cultivated both in Benin and in the other 
countries. However, Benin displayed a much larger negative response, suggesting that 
country-specific factors may also have explained the behaviour of cotton supply.20 During 
the years 1984–1993, the persistent appreciation of the CFA also contributed to low cotton 
prices, yet this did not prevent the cotton supply from rising perceptibly not only in Benin but 
also in the other producing countries of the region. This again suggests that factors other 
than producer prices have been at work. Finally, cotton supply increased sharply in Benin 
                                               
18 Except for the 1994 devaluation in the CFA franc, the variations in the currency mainly reflect movement in the 
French franc (prior to 1999) and the Euro (after 1999), to which the currency has been pegged.  
19 Fluctuations in world dollar price of cotton are due to both demand and supply factors (e.g. Janzen et al., 
2018). The impact of world supply on cotton price is due to subsidies in some leading cotton-producing countries, 
of which the US plays an important role.  
20 Alia et al. (2017) provides recent evidence for the role of cotton price for cotton supply in the Benin context 
using data on local price paid to producers.  
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and other countries following a strong increase in the dollar price and the devaluation of the 
CFA franc in 1994.  
We can now turn to the domestic factors impeding cotton production. They are largely of an 
institutional or organisational kind and are therefore of special interest to us. Five groups of 
actors have been involved in the cotton sector: i) small-scale producers; ii) importers and 
distributors of inputs; iii) ginning industries; iv) the government; and v) international donors 
(of which France and the World Bank are the major players). The roles of each of these 
actors have evolved over time depending on the political regime and the institutional 
arrangements that were put in place in the cotton sector. Five sub-periods can be 
distinguished: 1961–1971; 1972–1981; 1982–1990; 1991–1999; and 2000–present. First, 
prior to 1972, two French companies (Compagnie Française de Développement des Fibres 
et Textiles (CFDT) and the Société d'Assistance Technique et de Coopération (SATEC)21) 
were responsible for the main operations in the sector of Benin: provision and distribution of 
inputs, commercialisation and ginning of cotton, and exporting abroad. This vertically 
integrated system was also introduced in the other West African francophone countries. 
During this period, the level of cotton production was very similar in Benin and these other 
countries (as shown in Figure 3).  
Second, from 1972 to the late 1970s, when the Marxist-Leninist regime of Kérékou was in 
power and created a number of parastatals to manage the agricultural sector, Benin started 
to underperform. In addition, the new regime encouraged subsistence agriculture at the 
expense of cotton, and French companies withdrew from the cotton sector. The regime also 
promoted community-level farmer associations, known as Groupement Revolutionnaire a 
Vocation Cooperative (GRVC) in addition to the existing Groupements Villageois (GV). Both 
the GVs and GRVCs organised joint input credit and primary marketing of seed cotton. They 
also pooled their resources in order to build local infrastructure, such as schools and health 
centres. One main difference between these two farmer organisations is that GRVC promote 
production in block of the members’ plots and a high degree of centralisation of extension 
services.22 Following these changes, Benin’s cotton production substantially diverged from 
production in neighbouring countries. Third, in the early 1980s the government took a 
renewed interest in cotton and a new parastatal (Société Nationale pour la Promotion 
Agricole: SONAPRA) was created in 1983 to stimulate cotton production and enhance the 
efficiency of the sector. Nevertheless, its mode of operation continued to be vertically 
integrated. An additional source of change came from external donors supporting 
development projects in Benin’s cotton sector. As a result, SONAPRA came to acquire 10 
ginneries. Following such changes, yields and the cultivated area improved considerably in 
the 1980s (Figure 3). In the period 1985–1987, however, SONAPRA faced a debt crisis 
because of low international cotton prices and its limited ginning capacity to absorb the total 
amount of cotton production as well as poor financial management of government agencies 
in the cotton sector.  
Fourth, in the early 1990s the government embarked upon a new policy consisting of the 
liberalisation of the cotton sector and the privatisation of SONAPRA with the support of the 
two main donors. Moreover, a minimum price guarantee and input subsidies were 
                                               
21 The production of cotton dates back to the pre-colonial period (Manning, 1982) but the two companies 
introduced new varieties that boosted the yield of cotton production. They independently developed their 
activities: CFDT in the North and SATEC in Central Benin. 
22 See Chapter 5 for more details. 
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introduced. These reforms were gradually implemented. Thus, the Fédération des 
producteurs du Bénin (FUPRO-Bénin) was created in 1994 to federate the GVs and 80% of 
the importation and distribution of inputs was liberalised over the years 1992–1995. In the 
subsequent years, from 1995 to 1998, the liberalisation of the ginning industry was initiated 
and eight privately owned ginneries started to operate in addition to the 10 belonging to 
SONAPRA. Limited cotton production, however, caused the total capacity of the 18 ginning 
firms to be under-utilised. Note that, throughout all the above changes, SONAPRA remained 
the main operator in the sector. Thus, it continued to organise the allocation of inputs across 
the GVs and it later started to also allocate cotton seeds between the private ginning firms. 
Following the reforms, which were combined with the devaluation of the CFA franc, cotton 
production increased considerably and for the first time Benin’s production outperformed the 
other countries over the years 1993–1997.  
Fifth, in 1998–2000 additional professional associations were created: the Association 
Professionnelle des Egraineurs du Bénin (APEB) for ginners, the Coopérative 
d'Approvisionnement et de Gestion des Intrants Agricoles (CAGIA) for the management of 
input quotas between private firms, the Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton (AIC) for 
the management of the whole supply chain, with a special emphasis on the allocation of 
cotton seeds between ginneries, and the Centrale de Sécurisation des Paiements et de 
Recouvrement (CSPR), a key institutional regulatory body created to achieve the recovery of 
input loans to farmers and the payment of cotton seeds purchased by ginners. A number of 
administrated rules were also put in place such as fixed prices for inputs and cotton seeds 
across the whole country. When these bodies were established, SONAPRA stopped 
operating the sector but continued to manage its ginneries. It is striking that this period of 
intense organisational change did not witness any effect on cotton. Moreover, conflicts 
emerged among the actors starting from 2002/03. For instance, farmers complained about 
expensive input prices. In the same way, a number of private firms contested the outcomes 
of the input procurement procedure, whereas some ginneries found fault with the quotas of 
cotton seeds. As a result, they boycotted the AIC-CSPR-GARCIA system and started 
parallel activities. For instance, the dissident distributors attracted some farmers by 
proposing lower prices than those the official system was offering. However, the quality of 
the output delivered was not properly monitored. Likewise, the quality of privately supplied 
inputs could not be guaranteed and producers frequently complained that they were cheated 
in this regard. The ground was laid for a genuine crisis in the cotton sector. In particular, a lot 
of confusion was generated by the plurality of input sources and output outlets, and a 
number of farmers and ginners became severely indebted as the CSPR could no longer 
track their activities. As a consequence, the system encountered delays in payments, which 
discouraged farmers. Many of them turned away from cotton production, which was 
depressed in 2005. The government’s reaction consisted in stepping in to finance the debt 
shortfall. Moreover, it adopted a framework agreement (Accord-cadre) with AIC, but this had 
no effect. In 2007, the new elected president (Yayi Boni) dissolved the agreement with AIC 
and an ad hoc Commission Nationale was established to manage cotton inputs.  
In 2008, the industrial assets of SONAPRA were privatised and a new group, known as 
Société de Développement du Coton (SODECO), was soon created to take over assets after 
several problems in procurement management became manifest in 2006/07. Once again, 
however, the new organisational changes failed to improve the situation in Benin’s cotton 
sector. Yields and the cultivated area remained low. In 2009, a new framework agreement 
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was signed between the government and AIC. But, following a now familiar scenario, the 
problems persisted and in 2012 AIC was suspended by the government. Nonetheless, the 
new government that assumed power in 2016 re-established AIC. Thereafter, yield, acreage 
and production have been improving over the last three years (2016-2018). 
Overall, the liberalisation of the cotton sector did not succeed in improving its functioning and 
enhancing its efficiency, although some positive effects could be observed in the early stage. 
The causes of the failure are several. First, political actors controlled the whole reform 
process and thereby made reforms vulnerable to regime changes. Second, liberalisation did 
not lead to competition as officially intended, in particular because the allocation of seed 
cotton was administratively decided and the procurement of seed cotton was not 
transparent. Third, there were no clear enforcement mechanisms against those who violated 
the rules, with the result that these rules were not considered credible by the actors 
concerned. Finally, to a very large extent, the reforms were undertaken under pressure (at 
the behest of) from two donors and were therefore not appropriated or owned by the local 
authorities. The usual outcome in this type of situation is that reforms are circumvented, and 
official rules and procedures are manipulated by powerful interests that tend to act behind 
the scenes. These powerful interests are based on narrow links between politics and 
business, between political actors occupying critical positions in the government or the high 
administration, on the one hand, and Big Men, powerful patrons or oligarchs operating in the 
cotton sector in collusion with the former, on the other hand. 
1.3.2 The financial system 
In Benin, the financial sector is characterised by a dual system where formal and informal 
institutions coexist.23 The formal system operates under the supervision of WAEMU. It 
includes three categories of institutions: commercial banks, microfinance institutions, and 
other financial institutions (e.g. pension funds and insurance companies). Banks play a 
dominant role.  
During the Marxist-Leninist regime of Kérékou, private banks were nationalised into three 
state-owned banks: the Banque Béninoise de Developpement (BBD), founded in 1974 to 
finance the industrial sector, the Banque Commerciale du Benin (BCB), founded in 1975 for 
commerce, and the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA), founded in 1975 for 
agriculture. Due to poor management and especially excessive credit extensions to state 
enterprises and political supporters in the 1970s and 1980s, all these banks collapsed in a 
banking crisis that occurred in 1989.  
In the 1990s, the banking sector was reformed in the framework of the Structural Adjustment 
programmes and new private banks have since then been operating in the country. 
Following these reforms, the banking sector developed significantly. Some challenges 
remain, however. In comparison with other countries in WEAMU and SSA, Benin’s banking 
sector is less developed, and it also displays several vulnerabilities (IMF, 2016; 2018; 
Commision Bancaire de l’UEMOA, 2016). For instance, the data reported in Figure 5 below 
indicate that Benin is lagging behind in many dimensions, including regulatory capital ratios, 
liquidity, returns on assets and equity, and non-performing loans (NPLs). As a result, 
difficulty obtaining external financing is the top structural constraint facing private firms in the 
                                               
23 The informal financial sector is not discussed here. For information see, for instance, Tomety (1999). 
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country. From Figure 6, we can see that these constraints have increased in recent years 
(from 2009 to 2016). Other major constraints on businesses in Benin include electricity 
supply problems, informal sector competitors, and problems arising from taxation as well as 
corruption inside the public administration.  
Figure 5: Performance indicators of the banking system in Benin and selected other 
African countries 
 
Sources: IMF (2018); Note: (1) data for the period 2013–2015. 
A number of structural factors are responsible for the underperformance of the banking 
sector. From the demand side these include: a poor business environment (Figure 6); a low 
quality of credit demand applications resulting from the poor quality of firm managers (MCA, 
2012); and a large informal sector that implies a low base for financial intermediaries in the 
official sector and concentration risks.  
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In order to understand the role of information in access to finance, we distinguish firms that 
apply for loans from those that did not. The data in Figure 7 show that, in the majority of 
cases (68%), firms did not apply for loans; this suggests that demand factors may be 
explaining the poor access to finance. We further distinguish between firms that are 
voluntarily versus involuntarily excluded from external financing. The data shows that among 
the 34% of the firms that were involuntarily excluded from applying for loans, more than one-
third (13%) attributed the problem to a lack of proper collateral and about one-fifth (6%) to 
the complexity of application procedures. These figures hint at serious problems on the 
supply side of credit markets.  
Figure 6: Access to finance as the major constraint to private firms in Benin 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey (2016), Country highlights. 
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Figure 7: Understanding access to finance in Benin (2016) 
 
Sources: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2016 on 150 formal firms (80 manufacturing and 70 services). 
The poor quality of collaterals thus stands out as one key problem that constrains the use of 
bank credit in Benin. This reflects the poor quality of property titles, especially over land 
assets due to uncertain status, long delays in registration, and the high cost of verifying 
property titles. As pointed out earlier, Benin has embarked upon a pioneering land titling 
reform undertaken in the framework of the MCA programme financed by the US 
development agency.  
A second constraint arises from the poor management of information asymmetry. A credit 
centralisation initiative was started by banks in 2013 to exchange information on borrowers 
but this system does not function well.24 Private credit bureaus have recently been 
authorised as part of reforms by WAEMU and the related law was passed in 2017 in Benin. 
Nonetheless, here too the system is not yet functioning.  
Third, there are serious flaws in the judiciary system, including low capacity in handling 
financial issues and complex and long litigation procedures that have the effect of 
complicating contract enforcement and discouraging access to credit for certain categories 
of borrowers.  
Fourth, there are weaknesses in banking supervision and regulations that undermine risk 
management in financial intermediaries and their performance (IMF, 2016). In some cases, 
long delays in banking resolutions (due to corruption or bureaucratic issues, for example) 
allow underperforming financial intermediaries to stay open for long periods of time, wasting 
resources in operating costs and undermining credit supply. For instance, credit is 
                                               
24 One explanation could be the concentration of the banking sector. The banking system is concentrated on four 
banks, which account for about 80% of credit and capital of the system. 
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structurally concentrated on a very small number of large business groups and, in particular, 
on the commercial sector (with a majority of activities linked to Nigeria). As a result, negative 
shocks in the trading sector, often originating in Nigeria, cause an important rise in the share 
of NPLs. Moreover, important bottlenecks in supervision and regulation about concentration 
risks and NPLs constrain the quality of financial intermediaries.25 In addition to long judiciary 
litigation procedures about NPLs and the obligation of regulators to keep NPLs in the 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries until the end of these procedures, concentration 
risk is a major challenge facing the banking system in the country.  
Fifth, Benin’s banks have a strong exposure to the government, which affects credit risks 
and poses a major constraint on the supply of credit to the private sector. The banking 
sector, and the whole economy, are thus negatively affected by the government’s structural 
propensity to delay honouring its payment engagements with banks but also with private 
firms. In the same way, banks have recently invested relatively more in government 
securities. As a member of WAEMU, Benin has access to the regional bond market of 
francophone countries. Starting from early 2000 there has been a number of reforms 
encouraging the issuing of government securities to finance the public deficit. As a 
consequence, banks have been investing in these securities, which they perceive as less 
risky than loans to private firms.26 Their large exposure to government financing increases 
their vulnerability, however: in 2012, for instance, Benin’s banks holding securities on Cote 
d’Ivoire were negatively impacted by debt restructuring in that country.  
1.4 The structure of aggregate spending 
Figure 8 shows how total expenditures (absorption) by domestic agents, relative to GDP, 
have evolved since 1968. Total expenditures are the sum of domestic household 
consumption, of government final consumption, and of total, private and public, gross capital 
formation (investment). 
A first striking observation is that total domestic absorption has always exceeded GDP. This 
indicates that Benin has relied during the whole period on foreign resources to finance its 
total expenditures. The extent of the use of foreign resources, either through transfers or 
through borrowing from abroad, was on average 13% of GDP over the period, with a 
maximum of 28% in 1981 and a minimum of 3% in 1996. Absorption particularly rose during 
the early years (1973–1981) of Benin’s centralised economy experience, nourished by the 
large public investment programme and by a rise in household consumption, possibly 
induced by the former. Absorption plunged, in the context of decreasing growth during the 
years leading up to the 1988/89 economic and financial crisis. Dependence on external 
resources came to their lowest level when the first phase (1989–1999) of the donor-
supported adjustment programmes ended. When Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
                                               
25 The issue of regulation and supervision is even more pertinent for microfinance institutions (MFIs). Among the 
721 MFIs, only 226 were regulated. This large unregulated MFI sector is a potential source of risks that could 
spread to the banking system and further limit credit supply to the private sector. In 2010/11 a crisis erupted in 
the sector following a Ponzi scheme and the loss of deposits is still unsolved (Investment Consultancy and 
Computing Services). See IMF (2013). 
26 The accommodated policy of the central bank that facilitates refinancing of banks at low interest rates (about 
2.5%) creates the opportunity for banks to invest in these securities at about 6%. 
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and multilateral concessional lending in support of ongoing structural reforms rose again, 
from the mid-2000s on, absorption also increased again. It reached 114% in 2016, averaging 
112% for the 2000–2016 period. This raise in absorption can largely be explained by the 
concomitant higher rate of capital formation, mostly of private origin, which can be observed 
since 1999 (see below) and which has not been compensated by an equivalent decrease in 
combined public and private consumption. 
Figure 8: Structure of absorption, 1968–2016 
Source: WDI 
A second feature of the absorption picture is the progressive and persistent fall in the share 
of household consumption after 1981. It quickly fell from 103% in 1981 to an average of 87% 
for the period 1983–1989 leading up to the 1989 crisis, before dropping again and levelling 
out at 75%, with an occasional drop to 68% (2013–2015).27 One can probably largely 
attribute the drop in the household consumption ratio over the crisis period and the 
subsequent period of structural adjustment to the hardship brought about by the crisis and, 
later, by the deflationary effects of domestic adjustment measures biased against 
consumers. The continuing slide of the ratio after 2002 is, however, more difficult to 
understand. Several specific factors can be mentioned: i) a progressive adjustment of 
household consumption to a lower growth per capita and to its increased variability; ii) a fall 
in the employment rate; iii) output shocks biased toward subsistence workers in the 
agricultural sector; iv) price shocks on items with a significant weight in the household 
consumption basket (e.g. the reduction in gas subsidies in Nigeria, which generated a 50% 
increase in fuel prices in Benin between 2011 and 201228); and v) increasing income 
                                               
27 There seems to be a methodological break in the WDI National Account series in 1981/82. The observed 
consumption ratio falls from 103.2% in 1981 to 84% in 1982, a 19 percentage point drop, while capital formation 
has a share that rises from 15.6 to 27.6 over these two years. It is prudent to somewhat discount the data from 
these two years and focus on observations before 1981 and after 1982. 
28 See World Bank (2014). This price shock in Benin is the result of Benin’s huge dependency on illegal imports 
of fuel for its domestic consumption. Such a price shock would curtail consumption volume but would also 
increase the relative price of private consumption relative to GDP. The net effect on the reported share of 
(nominal) household consumption in (nominal) GDP could thus go either way, depending on the movement in 
GDP prices. The ratio between the consumer price index and the GDP deflator (source: WDI) actually declined 
somewhat (2%) between 2010 and 2014, which is consistent with the observed decline in the share of household 
consumption in GDP. 
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inequality. A country comparison indicates that the Beninese consumption ratio has in 
general been higher than in an average SSA country and is presently (as at 2016) close to it.  
 
To gain additional insights into the factors behind the decline of the share of household final 
consumption it is interesting to compare national account data with available household 
survey data. Four rounds of EMICoV surveys 29 are available, for 2007, 2009, 2011, and 
2015. The surveys report a sizable decline of per capita household consumption: the latter 
declined, in real terms, by 14.2% from 2007 to 2009, by 2% from 2009 to 2011, and by an 
additional decline of 1.8% from 2011 to 2015. The strong decline in 2009 was the direct 
result of international increase in food and fuel prices and of the concomitant recession 
(GDP per capita decreased by 0.5% in 2009). The total decline of 17.7% of per capita 
consumption observed from 2007 to 2015 in survey data could explain the receding of the 
share of household consumption in GDP, from 74.3% to 68.3%, that is observed in national 
account data over the same period. However, if one takes into account that GDP per capita 
grew over the same period by 10%, one would have expected an even stronger decline in 
the share of household consumption, actually from 74.3% to 55.5%.  
 
This discrepancy between survey and national account data is the consequence of 
fundamental differences in methodology. In most SSA countries, household final 
consumption is computed as a residual (IMF, 2018, p. 14), i.e. as the difference between the 
sum of aggregate value-added and imports on the one hand and the other components of 
aggregate demand (exports, government final consumption, and private and public 
investment) on the other hand. This is the case for Benin, at least for the period under 
discussion.30 The methodological differences result in significant differences between per 
capita real consumption reported by national account data and those reported by survey 
data. The observed ratios between the former and the latter are 1.07 for 2007, 1.24 in 2009 
and 2011, and 1.33 in 2015. The differences observed since 2009 are particularly important. 
A possible explanation is the following. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, cross-border trade 
with Nigeria is quite sizable and for a large part informal and fraudulent. A feature of this 
trade is that some goods that have Nigeria as their final destination are channelled through 
Benin’s customs not as goods in transit or for re-export but as goods for the domestic 
market. Imports of these goods are thus included in domestic expenditures, even if they 
should be considered as exports.31 Moreover, if household consumption is computed as a 
residual aggregate when national accounts are established, imports of all these goods will 
be included in household consumption. It is difficult to get reliable estimates of such flows of 
goods falsely declared for domestic expenditures because of their fraudulent nature, let 
alone assess the extent to which they imply an overestimation of household consumption in 
national account data. One can, however, point to some indirect evidence of their 
importance. Indeed, it is interesting to note that it is during the period when the difference 
between the national accounts and the survey data was the highest (2009–2015) that re-
                                               
29 See INSAE (2015). The 2013 survey report is only focused on poverty issues and does not report data on 
aggregate household consumption spending. 
30 As already mentioned, a new national account system has recently been introduced by Benin (INSAE, 2019). 
The new system integrates the 2015 EMICoV household survey data. 
31 Note that informal cross-border trade with Nigeria can also result in some underestimation of household 
consumption in national account data. Informal imports (mostly of fuel) of Benin from Nigeria will not be included 
in national account imports, nor in household consumption. Survey data on household consumption will, 
however, include them.  
A review of present economic and social challenges 
© Economic Development & Institutions  28 
export activity was also the largest (see Figure 2 in Section 1.3.1). It was also during this 
period that the share of imports in GDP strongly rose (see Figure 8).  
 
The share of government consumption in GDP increased from some 9% in the 1960s to 
16% in 1990, before being trimmed by the Structural Adjustment programmes to some 12% 
in 2004, progressively increasing again to reach a new high of 17% after 2010, slightly 
above that of the average SSA country.  
The share of gross capital formation in GDP closely matched government spending policy 
until the end of the centralised economy experience in 1989, accelerating until 1982, and 
has been retreating thereafter. When the liberalisation of the economy started in the early 
1990s, private investment progressively picked up. This mostly accounts for the rise in the 
ratio of gross capital formation to GDP during the 1990s. Total investment in the economy 
has averaged 21.3% since the move to a market economy in 1990. More recently it reached 
even 27%. Such a period average level is close to that of a typical low-income country 
(19.2%), but is well below that of East Asia and Pacific IDA/IRBD countries (38.2%).  
Figure 9: Capital formation, public and private 
 
Source: WDI  
Figure 9 decomposes for the period after 198732 the share of gross capital formation into its 
two components, private and public investment. The share of private investment in total 
investment has progressively risen, to represent since the early 2000s about 70%. Public 
investment has averaged 6.5% of GDP over the 1990–2016 period, and private investment 
14.7%. For the average IDA/IRBD SSA country, the respective shares for the same periods 
were 3.7% and 13.9%.  
Given the significant structural changes Benin is confronted with, a sustained level of both 
public and private investment is a sine qua non for improving growth performance through 
increased productivity. However, efforts in raising public investment, as in the period 2005–
                                               
32 WDI data for private capital formation only start in 1987. 
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2007, have rarely been sufficiently persistent.33 This may of course be the result of domestic 
financing difficulties or of some reluctance from donors, who finance a large part of public 
investment spending. Regardless, besides its size, the efficiency of public investment is also 
cause for worry in Benin. The country lags in this respect, relative to other comparator 
countries, on two counts (IMF, 2018a, p. 29ss): it has larger infrastructure gaps (concerning 
roads, public health, and education infrastructure) and the quality of its public services 
(electricity supply, roads, railways, etc.) is lower. Closing these infrastructure gaps and 
improving investment quality could eradicate crucial growth bottlenecks, in the shorter term 
(electricity and roads) as well as in the medium term (education). Moreover, it could attract 
continued support from donors and mobilise additional private investment. In a market 
economy, the latter is a crucial factor of economic dynamism. It is also very sensitive to initial 
conditions and to future growth prospects and risks. This is especially true when a significant 
part of domestic private investment is financed from abroad, through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which can have catalysing effects. Indeed, the share of private investment 
in GDP and FDI inflows have followed similar patterns over the period in Benin: a rise at the 
beginning of economic liberalisation, a retrenchment after several years of lower growth and 
a weakened pace of reforms, and again a significant increase since 2007.34 
1.5 External trade 
A word of caution is necessary before discussing external trade data for Benin. As noted 
above, economic activity in Benin is characterised by a large degree of informality. This is 
also true for international trade, especially so when one considers the extent of smuggling 
and illegal trade between Benin and Nigeria (see Section 1.3.1). A significant part of import 
and/or export transactions can thus remain unrecorded, to an extent that may vary from year 
to year, depending on the strength of the incentives behind these illegal activities. Prudence 
is advisable, but one should nevertheless be able to detect in the available data the major 
trends and the specific features of external trade in Benin. 
                                               
33 IMF (2010, p. 11) puts the target for public investment at about 9% of GDP over the medium term, as 
‘consistent with the country’s development needs and absorption capacity constraints’. 
34 FDI reached 4% of GDP in 1992, then declined progressively. It started recovering in 2006 and reached 4% 
again in 2014.  
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Figure 10: Foreign trade and terms of trade, 1960–2016 
Source: WDI 
The patterns of external trade of Benin over the 1960–2018 period are, similarly to what has 
been discussed for the structure of aggregate spending (see Section 1.4), broadly in line 
with the major changes in governmental economic policy Benin has experienced. During the 
post-colonial period (1960–1972), one observes a rise both in the GDP shares of exports 
and of imports, mostly with France as destination and origin, respectively for agricultural and 
manufactured products (Dossou and Sinzogan, 2007, p. 90). The period of Marxist-Leninist-
inspired economic policy (1973–1989) sees the export share stagnate and the import share 
further increase, at a quick pace until 1981, then decrease. This corresponds to the 
observed patterns in household consumption and investment shares in GDP (see Section 
1.4). During this period, the terms of trade evolved in a strongly negative way, falling by 42% 
from 1968 to 1981, similarly to the experience in the whole of WAEMU. This put a drag on 
real incomes that the government tried to counteract by profligate government expenditures. 
As a result of adverse evolution in exports, imports, and terms of trade, the trade balance 
deteriorated sharply, reaching a deficit of 28% of GDP in 1981.  
With the transition to a market economy after 1990, the export share in GDP rose again, 
from 13% of GDP in 1981 to 28% in 1994, before dropping to 19% in 2006, then rising 
regularly to 30% in 2014–2016. Given the importance of cotton in Benin’s economy (see 
Section 1.3.1), it is not surprising to observe that the export share cycles closely match the 
cycles observed for cotton production. The latter started from very low levels in the early 
1980s, peaked in 1995–2001, then progressively fell by more than half, before recovering 
slowly after 2010 and reaching its earlier peak again in 2014.35 
Terms of trade recovered from 2002 to 2010, before deteriorating again. Given the rise in 
import shares, which has paralleled the rise in export shares since 1990, the trade balance 
remained in deficit after 1990, at a sizeable level of 10% of GDP, not much below its 1960–
                                               
35 Data from www.indexmundi.com/agriculture. 
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2016 average (12%). This persistent and high level of deficit is not necessarily worrying, 
provided it finds its origin in imports of growth-enhancing capital goods and can thus easily 
be financed by non-debt-creating FDI flows or concessional financing (see Section 1.6). 
The global parallelism observed between export and import shares reflects two features of 
the Beninese economic context: i) many structural reforms have been designed to favour 
public and private investment in the export-oriented cotton and manufacturing sector, 
implying increased imports of capital goods; and ii) importing goods for re-export to Nigeria 
and landlocked Niger and Burkina Faso, an important trade activity for Benin, leads to a 
parallel recording of these goods as both imports and exports, at least for the official side of 
this trade. As noted earlier, a significant amount of imports is declared at customs for 
domestic destination, although these goods are later illegally re-exported to Nigeria. The 
recorded official imports are thus overestimated by the amount of this diverted flow of 
imported goods. The latter obviously are unrecorded in the official exports, which implies that 
the trade balance is biased downwards. The amount of this bias is difficult to assess, 
however. 
A crucial question is whether exports can be identified as an engine of growth for Benin. The 
years from 2005 to 2014 were the most recent period of continuous high growth in export 
volumes, with exports growing at an annualised rate of 7.8%. With an average share of 25% 
of GDP during this period, exports thus contributed directly to about 2% of annual GDP 
growth, close to half the observed GDP growth over this nine-year period. While this indeed 
suggests that exports have a major role to play in pushing growth, a qualifying argument is 
necessary. As already mentioned, growth in exports was paralleled by growth in imports. 
The latter grew more rapidly, at an annualised rate of 13.4%, implying a deterioration of the 
trade balance. Strong export growth was thus not sufficient to lead to an improvement of 
Benin’s external constraint.36 In addition, episodes of high export growth are prone to being 
reversed, as was the case in 2015/16 when the export volume decreased by 43%, relative to 
its 2014 level. To be a reliable and sustainable engine of growth, exports would thus need to 
have a sufficiently high domestic value-added content and grow at a high and steady pace. 
An analysis of the composition of exports helps to understand why the contribution of 
exports to growth is still not satisfactory. Figure 11 shows the composition of merchandise 
exports since 1998. Raw materials (mostly agricultural products such as cotton seeds, palm 
nuts, cashew nuts, and the like), which are particularly exposed to the hazard of climate and 
of fluctuations in international prices, are on a decreasing trend but still represent more than 
half of total merchandise exports. The shares of intermediate goods and of consumer goods 
are on the rise, each representing in the most recent years around 20% of merchandise 
exports. Both include mostly transformed agricultural products. The share of capital goods – 
the more sophisticated part of manufacturing – stands at less than 5%. There is no 
significant trend but some unusually large shares are sometimes observed, which is 
probably due to particularly high re-export activities during these years. WTO (2017) 
aggregates merchandise exports into three broad categories: agriculture, manufacturing, 
and extractive industries (including gold). In 2016, the respective shares of these three 
categories were 71.6% (down from 80.7% in 2009), 18.5% (18.6% in 2009), and 9.9% (up 
                                               
36 To more precisely assess the net effect of exports of growth and on the trade balance one would need to take 
into account, beyond the direct content of imports in exports, the multiplier effects of exports on the whole 
economy and the volume of imports. 
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from 0.7% in 2009). These figures confirm the strong link between exports and the 
performance of the agricultural sector as well as the relatively low contribution of 
manufacturing to export dynamism. They also point to a weak degree of product 
diversification of Beninese exports.  
The destination countries of merchandise exports37 are the neighbouring African countries 
and Asia (India, Bangladesh, and China), well ahead of Europe. The share of Asian 
countries has increased, from 36% in 2009 to 54% in 2016, with the share of the African 
countries dropping over the same period from 58% to 28%. Despite this reorientation of 
trade toward fast-growing countries, the diversification of partner countries remains, like the 
diversification of products, weak and below the average of African and Asian comparator 
countries, according to a recent IMF (2018) study. 
Figure 11: Structure of merchandise exports  
Source: World Bank UNCTAD WITS Database 
The share of services in total exports of goods and services is significant, although on a 
decreasing trend, from 35% in 1990 to 17% in 2016. Tourism has the largest share in 
service activities (in general more than 40%) and even now accounts for about 2% of GDP. 
Transport is the other important component of export services, and predominantly reflects 
the activities of the Port of Cotonou. 
Concerning the composition of merchandise imports (Figure 12), one notes the high and 
relatively constant share of consumer goods and the lower and declining share of 
intermediate products. Capital goods have been on an increasing trend since 2006. Of 
course, part of these goods is for re-export to Nigeria and other landlocked countries, so that 
a more detailed analysis would be necessary in order to draw relevant conclusions about the 
implications of these evolutions for the patterns of domestic expenditures and growth. 
Europe (especially France) remains an important source of merchandise imports, followed 
by India, Thailand, and China (WTO, 2017, Table A1.4).  
                                               
37 WTO (2017) Table A1.3. 
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Figure 12: Structure of merchandise imports 
Source: World Bank UNCTAD WITS Database. 
A last external trade issue that merits discussion is competitiveness. Although there are 
many facets to competitiveness, we focus on the relative price component38 and use the real 
exchange rate as indicator.39 As a member of WAEMU, Benin is on a fixed peg with respect 
to the Euro (the French Franc before 1999). The peg has only been changed once since 
1948. This was the case in January 1994 when the CFA franc was devalued by 50%. Figure 
13 shows the evolution in Benin’s nominal and real effective exchange rates since 1994. The 
low level of the real effective exchange rate observed immediately after the 1994 devaluation 
(compared to 2010, the base level year of the index) reflects the correction of the important 
overvaluation that had been built up over the preceding years. This large gain in 
competitiveness was progressively eroded, as domestic currency import prices and later 
domestic wages and prices rose. Inflation went up to 39% in 1994 and was still 14% in 1995, 
before falling again below 5%. After 1998, the real exchange rate closely followed the 
nominal exchange rate, with Benin managing to keep the inflation rate at levels close to 
those observed in trade partner countries.40 Benin still has close trade links with France and 
other Eurozone countries as well as with other WAEMU and CEMAC African countries 
whose currency is also pegged to the Euro. The nominal effective exchange rate has 
therefore largely followed the trend in the French Franc/Euro exchange rate against the US 
dollar. As a result, Benin gained some competitiveness from 1998 to 2000, then faced a 
                                               
38 Two other components are the quality of products and trade policy. Concerning the former aspect, IMF (2018a, 
p. 18) reports that ‘the product quality of Benin exports has remained relatively mediocre over time’. We do not 
discuss the latter issue, given its complexity. Benin has applied the ECOWAS common external tariff since 2015. 
39 The reported real effective exchange rate indicator is based on consumer prices. Using producer prices would 
have been preferable, but this is not possible due to data limitations. For a small open economy like Benin the 
ratio of prices of non-traded goods to traded goods (the internal real exchange rate) would also provide useful 
indications about competitiveness. A study by IMF (2004) of the evolution of real exchange rate movements over 
the 1993–2004 period (before and after the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc) reveals that both measures of the 
exchange broadly show similar evolutions. 
40 And broadly complying with WAEMU convergence criteria, which include an inflation rate lower than 3% per 
annum in every member country. 
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cumulative loss of about 20% from 2000 to 2008. Starting in 2010, the real exchange rate 
depreciated again by some 19%, even by more than the nominal rate, with inflation in Benin 
falling below that of its trading partners.  
Figure 13: Nominal and effective exchange rates 
Source: International Monetary Fund data: for 1991–2003 from various issues of IMF Country Reports; for 2004–
2017 data retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis data bank. 
The changes in the real exchange rate discussed above only give broad indications of 
Benin’s competitiveness, for at least two reasons. First, Benin is exclusively a price-taking 
economy, with a tradable sector producing a weakly diversified array of goods. Producer 
prices in domestic currency are thus determined by international prices and by the exchange 
rate.  This implies that it is domestic costs (mostly unit wage costs, which encompass both 
nominal wage and productivity differentials) that determine producers’ profit margins and 
therefore the sector’s medium to long term competitiveness and development prospects. 
Real exchange rates based on relative consumer price indices only imperfectly reflect this 
cost competition aspect. Second, the reported effective nominal and real exchange rates are 
based on official exchange rates. However, a significant part of international trade between 
Benin and Nigeria is informal. Transactions on these informal markets are channelled 
through the parallel exchange market of the naira, where the exchange rate is usually 
depreciated relative to its official exchange rate. Real exchange rates computed at official 
rates thus underestimate the actual degree of overvaluation.41 However, even if the reported 
competitiveness indicator is imperfect, one can nevertheless conclude that real exchange 
rate shocks have been sizable during the last 25 years and that they have been very much 
outside the control of the Beninese authorities. Indeed, as a member of a monetary union 
whose external exchange rate is a hard peg, the only option for Benin to have some control 
on the competitiveness of its tradable goods is to keep in check the evolution of its nominal 
domestic prices and wages. Given that in low-income countries wages in the public sector 
often play a leading role in the dynamics of wages and prices in the private sector, public 
                                               
41 Premia between the parallel and the official rate were often huge for prolonged periods, e.g. from 1993 to 1998 
when they reached 300% (data on premia from Reinhard, 2018), although they fell to more moderate levels after 
the 1998 devaluation of the naira. Levels around 50% have again been observed in 2015, up to the 2016 
devaluation of the naira.  
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wage policy may be one of only a limited number of instruments that the authorities can 
resort to. 
1.6 Financing of the economy 
Establishing a developing economy’s financial accounts, including its transactions with the 
rest of the world, is a challenging statistical task, especially if the degree of informality in this 
economy is high. Figure 14 combines national account data from INSAE with balance of 
payments data from WDI to assess the financing needs of the economy and the ways the 
latter have been covered by foreign financing. Using two different sources of data raises 
inevitable consistency issues and invites to caution. Nevertheless, imperfect as they are, the 
data still offer an interesting look into the major trends characterising the domestic and 
external financial flows of Benin. Due to data availability, we start our analysis in 2002. 
Figure 14: Financing flows of Benin’s economy, 2002–2014 
 
Source of Data: INSAE (for domestic flows) and WDI (for foreign financing). 
A first observation is that domestic savings are systematically lower than domestic 
investment, resulting in a persistent need for external funding. This savings deficit, relative to 
investment, is significant, with an average of 9.6% of GDP for the whole period, and it shows 
no sign of abating. Both the private and public sectors have a savings rate that is insufficient 
to cover their expenditures for capital accumulation. The private savings rate decreased from 
2002 to 2006 before recovering again, a trend that coincides with the patterns of growth in 
per capita income. The significant deceleration in per capita growth in the period 2000–2006 
led consumers to decrease their savings rate so as to preserve their consumption level, 
while firm profits also presumably came under stress. The opposite evolution is observed for 
the 2009–2014 period. The savings rate of the public sector stands at the low period 
average rate of 2.3% of GDP. This reflects difficulties in mobilising more domestic fiscal 
revenue. Government consumption thus largely exhausts government revenue, leaving only 
% of GDP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Domestic Flows
Gross domestic savings 12.4 13.0 14.5 10.0 10.3 11.5 9.6 10.8 14.1 15.9 13.7 18.4 17.1
Private sector 9.2 12.3 12.8 9.3 8.3 6.4 6.7 11.7 10.5 13.6 10.3 15.8 14.6
Public  sector 3.2 0.6 1.7 0.8 2.0 5.0 2.9 -0.9 3.6 2.3 3.4 2.6 2.5
Gross domesting Investment 21.8 22.2 22.1 17.8 19.0 24.1 20.4 21.9 23.1 24.1 22.6 27.8 28.6
Private sector 16.7 16.6 17.1 12.7 14.4 16.4 14.2 15.9 16.7 17.8 16.9 21.7 23.2
Public  sector 5.1 5.6 5.0 5.1 4.5 7.6 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.6 6.1 5.3
Need for funding 9.4 9.2 7.6 7.8 8.7 12.6 10.8 11.1 9.1 8.2 8.8 9.4 11.5
Private sector 7.5 4.2 4.4 3.4 6.2 10.0 7.6 4.1 6.2 4.2 6.6 5.9 8.7
Government  deficit 
excluding foreign grants 
1.9 5.0 3.3 4.4 2.5 2.6 3.2 7.0 2.9 4.0 2.2 3.5 2.8
Foreign financing 10.9 8.7 9.0 10.1 12.0 14.0 12.9 11.2 12.1 12.3 11.3 13.2 12.7
Net primary and secondary 
income from abroad
4.3 0.7 1.2 3.1 4.4 3.7 3.3 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.4
Official development 
assistance (net flows)
7.3 7.7 8.7 7.3 7.8 8.0 8.9 9.5 9.9 8.6 6.2 7.2 6.2
Foreign Direct Investment 
(net inflows)
-0.6 0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 2.3 0.7 -0.3 0.8 2.1 3.5 3.9 4.2
Memo:
Outstanding external debt 44.2 36.7 34.6 36.3 9.8 10.5 13.0 13.8 16.9 16.6 15.3 16.7 19.8
Government  deficit 
including foreign grants 
1.4 3.2 0.9 2.5 0.8 -0.4 1.6 4.0 1.5 1.7 0.4 2.6 1.9
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a small space for financing investment out of domestic public resources or even no space at 
all, as was the case in 2009. 
As the low rate of public saving goes back to a low mobilisation of domestic revenue, it is 
interesting to briefly discuss the structure of government revenues and their evolution over 
the recent period. 
Figure 15: Government revenue, 2002–2016 
 
Sources: IMF, Government Financial Statistics up to 2013; 2014–2016 UNU-WIDER data set on government 
revenue. 
As shown in Figure 15, tax revenues are in the range of 14–15% of GDP, globally constant 
over the 2002–2016 period, and with a recent decline. The tax effort is below that of SSA 
countries (excluding high-income countries), which averaged 18.9% over the 2013–2016 
period (Source: WDI). It is also well below the 20% target assigned by WAEMU to its 
members, though this is still the case for all of them except Togo (UEOMA, 2018, p. 88). 
Non-tax revenues are in general low, except during the most recent years, while grants are 
decreasing. Direct taxes on firms and individuals and social contributions amount to less 
than 4% of GDP. This is essentially the consequence of the large degree of informality of the 
Beninese economy. Indirect taxes therefore constitute the bulk of domestic revenue 
mobilisation. Benin was among the first SSA countries to adopt VAT, as early as 1991. VAT 
provides the largest part of indirect fiscal revenue over the 2002–2013 period,42 immediately 
followed by taxes on international trade. The data reported in Figure 15 for taxes on 
international trade exclusively concern customs and other duties on imports for the domestic 
market and for re-exports. Other exports are mostly not taxed or only moderately so (WTO, 
2017, p. 113). 
The sizable contribution of taxes on international trade to total taxes mostly reflects the 
importance of re-export activities that characterises Benin (see Section 1.3.1). This appears 
more clearly so when one compares Benin with other average SSA countries (excluding 
                                               
42 VAT is collected both by customs and by the tax administration. While published data for total customs 
revenues are available for the period after 2013, their decomposition into trade taxes and VAT is not available.  
% of GDP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
  Direct taxes 3.8 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.1
Indirect taxes 10.7 10.7 11.0 10.3 10.8 12.1 12.5 11.6 12.3 11.5 11.4 12.2
of which: VAT 6.0 5.7 6.2 5.8 6.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.6
                              of which: Taxes 
on International Trade
3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.4 3.5 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.3 7.5 7.0 5.7
Total Taxes 14.4 14.3 14.6 13.8 14.2 15.7 16.1 15.0 15.5 14.8 14.4 15.4 14.1 14.0 12.1
Social Contributions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Non-Tax revenue 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 2.8 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.7 2.2 2.1
Grants 0.5 1.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.8 1.7 2.4 1.5 2.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.5
Total Revenu 15.8 16.9 17.8 16.7 17.1 21.8 19.1 18.9 18.8 18.4 16.9 17.8 17.2 17.3 15.2
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high-income countries), whose taxes on international trade only amount to about 2% of GDP 
over the 2013–2016 period (Source: WDI). Also, the contribution of trade taxes significantly 
increased during the 2013–2015 period, which coincides with the period when re-export 
activities peaked (see Figure 2). Note, finally, that the reported share of international trade 
taxes underestimates the total amount of taxes Benin derives from its re-export activities. 
Indeed, as noted in Section 1.3.1, part of the imports declared at customs as intended for the 
domestic market, and therefore subject to VAT, are in fact unofficially re-exported to Nigeria. 
VAT collected on these re-routed goods also significantly contributes to the fiscal benefits 
derived from the re-export trade, although to an extent that is difficult to assess. 
Taxes are collected in Benin by two separate bodies: the customs administration and the tax 
administration. Taxes collected by customs represented over the 2013–2016 period a share 
of total tax revenues varying from a high of 56% in 2013 to a low of 45% in 2016. Also, VAT 
collected by customs represented over the same period a share of indirect taxes (the sum of 
those collected by the fiscal administration and of the customs VAT revenues) varying from a 
high of 51% in 2013 to a low of 36% in 2016 (Ministère de l’économie et des finances, 2017). 
Both statistics again give a clear indication of the major role played by cross-border trade in 
Benin. 
Given the crucial role of customs in the tax collection process, much effort has been 
devoted, with the help of technical assistance from donors, to improving revenue collection, 
with the additional aim of improving and strengthening the competitiveness of Cotonou, the 
country’s main entry point for imports. A recent evaluation of the performance of Benin’s 
customs administration by the World Bank (2015b) has singled out several remaining 
operational inefficiencies, such as lack of transparency, insufficient control procedures for 
the enforcement of customs regulations, incomplete and irregular transmission of data 
between customs and the port administration, and limited controls at land borders. The 
evaluation also indicated that the customs administration’s governance remained 
problematic: the low risk of sanctions implies that incentives for operators and customs 
officials to comply with the law and the administrative rules are low, so that fraud and 
corruption are still common within the customs administration. The performance of the 
customs administration has also been undermined by the back and forth of the government 
in privatising crucial tasks of customs control: in 2011, the Programme de Vérification des 
Importations (PVI), designed to improve the procedures for assessing the correct value of 
imported goods and applying the correct tariff and tax rates, was tendered to a private 
Beninese firm, Benin Control, despite strong opposition by customs agents and private 
operators (IMF, 2013, p. 9). The privatisation was politically motivated and tainted by 
conflicts of interest. Subsequently, the PVI was suspended in 2012 because Benin Control 
and its foreign subcontractor performed badly and charged excessive prices for their 
services. This brought about severe disruptions in the traffic at the port of Cotonou and 
threatened its competitiveness. In 2017, however, Benin Control was reinstated by the 
government to perform the same tasks, again indicating strong political interference and 
suggesting major underlying conflicts of interest (see Chapter 1).43 
                                               
43 The 2011 deal involved the government of President Yayi Boni and the major businessman Patrice Talon, at 
that time a strong supporter of Yayi Boni. Talon’s firm, Benin Control, was awarded the PVI contract. Some time 
later, Talon had a fall-out with Yayi Boni, whose government suspended the PVI in 2012 (see Chapter 1). Talon 
became himself Benin’s president in 2016. In 2017, Benin Control was reinstated by Talon’s government to 
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Gross domestic investment has averaged 22.7% of GDP over the 2002–2014 period, with 
somewhat higher investment rates after 2006 that are largely the result of the dynamism of 
private investment during this period. Indeed, as already mentioned in Section 1.4, the 
largest part of domestic investment is private (75% over the period). Public and private 
investments are in principle complementary,44 especially so when there is a public 
infrastructure gap that discourages private investment, be it domestic or foreign. Indeed, 
both public and private investments are necessary for sustainable growth. A level of 22.7% 
is quite close to the average rate observed in low-income countries. However, the efficiency 
of a given investment rate is also a crucial issue. An indication of how efficiently investment 
translates into growth is given by the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR). World Bank 
(2014) reports that Benin’s average ICOR over the 2004–2013 period has been around 5 
and thus significantly higher than for comparator countries. With an ICOR of 5, the increase 
of 9 percentage points in the rate of investment to GDP, which is the increase that has been 
observed between 2006 and 2014 in Benin, would have contributed, if maintained, to an 
additional annual GDP growth of 1.8%. Had Benin’s ICOR instead been 3.8, the value 
observed for Bangladesh, a comparator country in the World Bank study, the same increase 
in the investment rate would have contributed to 2.4% additional annual GDP growth, a 
significant difference of 0.6%.45 
Given the relative differences in savings and in the investment rates of the private and the 
public sectors, it appears that the need for external funding mainly originates in the private 
sector.  
Turning to the foreign funding that has been made available to the economy, it should first 
be noted that the supply of foreign financing appears to be larger than the total needs. This 
is unfortunately the consequence of the inconsistencies that arise from putting together two 
different statistical frameworks (national accounts and balance of payments), both with their 
own reporting difficulties. In addition, accounting practices for ODA are particular, as not all 
ODA is linked to disbursement of external funds. This is especially important for our period of 
analysis, during which Benin has benefited from different mechanisms of debt relief.46 
                                               
perform the same tasks under a new contract (Programme de Vérification des Importations de Nouvelle 
generation). The opacity about the task involved in the contract and the extent of fiscal exonerations it contained 
raised some outrage in the Beninese press in 2017 and even prompted a leader of an opposition party to address 
a letter concerning this matter to the IMF. See https://lanouvelletribune.info/2017/07/pvi-ng-remunerations-
exorbitantes-bc/; www.ccdb- www.banouto.info/article/economie/20170914-bnin-fmi-alert-otage-conomie-talon/  
44 IMF (2018b, p. 65) indicates that infrastructure-focused public investment can be complementary to private 
investment when it raises the productivity of private capital; it can, however, also crowd out private investment 
when it is financed through increased taxes that discourage private investment, or by domestic borrowing that 
rations the financing available for firms, or by unsustainable foreign borrowing.  
45 As discussed in IMF (2018a), efficiency of public investment is directly linked to the quality of the governance 
of the country. The study reports results from a cross-country analysis. Public investment efficiency is measured 
by efficiency scores relative to a peer group. Efficiency scores are based on physical indicators (e.g. access to 
water, length of roads, etc.) and indicators of infrastructure quality. They are computed through a data 
envelopment analysis. The results show that Benin lags all comparator groups. With this methodology, it is 
estimated that Benin could improve the efficiency of its public investment by 55% 
46 Benin qualified in 2000 for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative and reached its 
completion point in 2003. It also qualified in 2006 for the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) when a large 
part of its multilateral debt was written off. Starting in 2000, these debt reduction operations had an impact on 
reported ODA flow, as parts of these debt reductions were considered as ODA. 
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A significant part of the external funding needs of the private sector is covered by FDI, 
especially in more recent years. Another part is covered by private transfers (net primary and 
secondary income from abroad, which includes workers’ remittances), which are not 
negligible, with a period average of 2.4%, although on a declining trend. The remaining part 
of the external funding needs of the private sector is either covered by ODA flows benefiting 
the private sector or by debt financing. As domestic firms have only a very limited direct 
access to foreign borrowing,47 the external funding is ultimately intermediated through the 
domestic banking system.  
The government’s need for external funding is met by ODA grants, which are, however, 
insufficient to fully finance the difference between public savings and public investment. The 
government’s balance after taking grants into account is still a deficit (see Figure 16). The 
latter has to be financed either by soft ODA loans or by non-concessional debt, external or 
domestic.  
Figure 16: Financing of the external balance of goods and services, 1990–2016 
 
Source of data: WDI. 
Looking at ODA flows in light of Benin’s persistent and large need for external funding, one 
has to conclude that the economy is strongly dependent on aid flows. Indeed, ODA 
represents the largest part of Benin’s external funding. Averaging 8.2% over the period, its 
share in total external funding is about 70%. The importance of ODA grants and loans for 
closing the gap between domestic savings and domestic investment is also illustrated in 
Figure 14, for a more extended period (1990–2016). The figure displays the deficit of the 
external balance on goods and services and its financing by ODA and FDI (shown as the 
                                               
47 The international debt statistics database does not report any long-term non-guaranteed private debt. 
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difference between the two lines ODA+FDI and ODA). The dominant role of ODA clearly 
appears. Before 1999, ODA even exceeded the trade balance deficit.48 After 2000, ODA and 
FDI flows no longer finance the trade deficit completely. However, when one also takes net 
income flows from aboard of about 2% of GDP into account, the gap is more or less closed, 
although not always. In the latter case, there is accumulation of external non-concessional 
external debt.  
A key question is therefore the sustainability of this strong dependence of Benin’s economy 
on ODA financing. Should ODA significantly decline, Benin’s development would be 
seriously hampered unless additional FDI financing could be attracted. If the latter did not 
materialise, the temptation could be to replace ODA financing by scaling up borrowing of 
external debt at market rates. Debt distress could then loom again in the future. 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that external debt levels have already been on the raise 
again (see Figure 14), after the large HIPC and MDRI debt write-offs Benin benefited from in 
the early 2000s.49 
1.7 Physical infrastructure 
A key problem that shackles Benin’s economic development is the dearth and low quality of 
electricity, transport, and telecommunications infrastructure. Below, we provide some 
evidence documenting this crucial deficiency. 
Let us begin with energy. The structural deficit of electrical energy infrastructure can be 
grasped on the levels of access, cost, and quality (UCF, 2012; Ianchovichina, 2008; Benin, 
2006; World Bank, 2015b; Ghilardi and Sola, 2015). Costs of production factors (electricity, 
telecommunications, etc.) are generally higher than those of other African countries,50 which 
themselves are higher than those in other regions of the world. As for the quality of electricity 
and telecommunications services, it is often mediocre (Benin, 2006). Finally, together with 
the problem of costs, access to electricity is the constraint on the development of firms most 
cited by economic operators: 60.4% of Beninese firms identify it as such (see Figure 17). 
This is confirmed by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2016), which ranks Benin 
179th of 189 economies for access to electricity. When there is a significant constraint, 
agents look for alternative workarounds (Hausmann et al., 2008). In this particular sub-
sector, to circumvent the constraint, companies can resort to private production sources 
such as their own generators. This can be seen clearly in Figure 17 since, with the exception 
of Nigeria (where energy is not such a constraint), it is Benin that has the highest proportion 
of companies with electricity generators, with about 60% of firms, compared to about 5% in 
Senegal and 43% in Tanzania. 
                                               
48 This could be the result of the changes in the composition of external debt, with ODA debt replacing non-ODA 
external liabilities, or of an accumulation of reserves. ODA commitments may also have been particularly 
important in the wake of the 1994 CFA franc devaluation.  
49 Most of the new external debt is with multilateral creditors (e.g. the 2016 extended credit facility arranged with 
the IMF). Disbursements are, for this type of debt, conditioned on performance in putting into effect 
recommended growth-facilitating policies.  
50 See Report on the Diagnostic Study Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Update (World Bank, 2015b).  
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Figure 17: Electricity supply constraints in Benin and comparator countries 
 
Source: Enterprise Surveys: www.entreprisesurvey.org  
The development of roads, water, and telecommunications is another critical factor for the 
competitiveness and growth of an economy. By effectively connecting businesses to the 
input, output, and technology markets, this infrastructure can reduce production costs and 
improve competitiveness in both the domestic and international markets. The lack of road 
infrastructure, in rural areas in particular, causes difficulties in accessing the local and sub-
regional markets while the lack of rail transport infrastructure has serious congestion effects 
on the road network (Nigeria) (Ianchovichina, 2008; UCF, 2012; Gnimassoun, 2016). The 
logistic performance index assesses the level of transport and trade infrastructure over the 
2007–2016 period. On a scale of 5, the index for Benin rose from 1.89 in 2007 to 2.39 in 
2016, thus showing progress. Overall, the quality of trade and transport infrastructure in 
Benin remains close to the average for SSA (estimated at 2.29) but is far below the best 
quality level, which is observed for Tanzania. 
A study by Ianchovichina (2008) notes that, while the state of infrastructure in Benin is 
generally poor, in some subsectors the constraint is less severe: thus, among a group of 30 
African countries, Benin is performing well in terms of access to drinking water. On the other 
hand, if 40% of the firms identify telecommunications and transport infrastructure as a strong 
constraint on economic activities, the low quality and the high cost of infrastructure services 
constitutes even more severe constraints. Gnimassoun (2016) reaches the same conclusion: 
while he identifies several factors as impeding the competitiveness of the Beninese 
economy, he considers infrastructure as one of the most severe problems. This diagnosis 
has recently been confirmed by the aforementioned IMF study (2018a), which reports results 
from a cross-country study based on efficiency scores measured relative to a peer group 
and computed through a data envelopment analysis. The results show that Benin lags all 
comparator groups for indicators of infrastructure quality (see Section 1.7). 
Evidence from the INSAE study (p. 19) shows the presence of considerable geographical 
disparities. For example, in terms of access to electricity, the three departments ranking 
highest in terms of access to electricity are Littoral (84.1%), Ouémé (43.7%), and Atlantic 
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(39.2%), all located in the Southern part of the country. At the other end of the spectrum, two 
of the three departments with the worst supply – Alibori (10.8%) and Atacora (13.5%) – are 
in the North. The third one, Kouffo (15.6%), belongs to the Centre. In terms of access to 
drinking water, of the three departments with the best supply – Littoral (97.4%), Borgou 
(58.9%), and Ouémé (55.5%) – only one is in the North, while of the three departments with 
the worst access, only one does not belong to the North.51 
Lack of telecommunications infrastructures is expected to prevent innovation efforts 
(Ianchovichina, 2008). Both the supply and use of the Internet remain fairly low in Benin 
compared to other countries, with only 6.79% of the population using the Internet in 2015 
compared to 22.39% in SSA. Moreover, progress in the adoption of ICT in Benin turns out to 
be remarkably slow, in contrast to other African countries where it is very high: the adoption 
rate was 0.23% in 2000, compared to neighbouring Nigeria where, starting from an even 
lower base than Benin (0.06% in 2000), the rate rose up to 47.44% in 2015. In Senegal, 
progress was from 0.40% in 2000 to almost 22% in 2015. The low use of Internet services in 
Benin is partly due to the lack of telecommunications infrastructure and new technologies, 
and partly to the cost of the various services involved. In addition to use, other factors to 
consider are the quality of the connection and related services. The low availability and 
accessibility of good low-cost connections clearly reduce the scope for economic gains from 
the Internet in the case of Benin. 
We can finally point out that the Enterprise Survey, which assesses the extent of the 
infrastructure challenge along two dimensions – adequacy of the physical infrastructure and 
institutional capacity in each sub-sector – concludes that management and governance 
problems in the transport public sector of Benin are pervasive and unsettled.  
                                               
51 ‘Access’ means access to SONEB running water at home, SONEB water elsewhere, standpipe or public tap, 
village pump, or well equipped with a human-operated pump. 
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2 Social indicators 
We are fortunate to have available a quite recent Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Report by the World Bank for the period 2011–2015 (World Bank, 2015a). This report 
contains a lot of useful data about poverty, inequality, education, and health that the reader 
can easily refer to. Another useful report is the Note sur la pauvreté au Bénin en 2015, 
published by the INSAE (2015) and part of the ‘Enquête Modulaire Intégrée sur les 
Conditions de Vie des Ménages’, second edition. In what follows, we will use information 
contained in these two reports as well as more recent data extracted from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. 
2.1 Poverty incidence and inequality 
2.1.1 Poverty incidence 
With a Human Development Index score of 0.427, Benin was ranked 167th out of 187 
countries in the 2011 Human Development Report. The incidence of poverty at the national 
level is high too: the poverty headcount ratio was estimated to be 40% in 2015. More 
worryingly still, there is no discernible tendency for this ratio to decrease: it was 37.5% in 
2006. This worsening tendency is confirmed by other evidence: the poverty gap has also 
increased (especially in rural areas) and the same holds true of inequality among the poor. 
As expected, poverty is more widespread in rural than in urban areas, although the 
difference is not significant (only a few percentage points). It also bears emphasis that 
poverty as measured by the headcount ratio has recently increased in all the departments of 
the country except along the coast, where it was already much lower than in the rest of the 
country. As for the poverty gap and inequality among the poor, they have increased in all 
departments over the years 2011–2015.  
A second approach to measuring poverty consists of looking at non-income poverty, as 
assessed on the basis of a composite index that is a linear combination of dichotomous 
variables of household living conditions and property or assets. In the case of Benin, the 
headcount of non-monetary poverty is significantly smaller than the headcount of monetary 
poverty, and it has slightly decreased over the years 2011–2015. 
Given the ethno-regional polarisation of the country underlined in Chapter 1, it is important to 
say more about the inter-departmental variations in the incidence of poverty. Here below we 
display the headcount poverty ratios for all the departments regrouped by broad region, as 
they have been estimated for 2015 (extracted from INSAE, 2015). Figures are presented in 
the order of department names:  
 Southern, or coastal departments (Littoral, Ouémé, Atlantique, and Mono): 26%, 28%, 
41%, and 47%. 
 Central departments (Plateau, Zou, Collines, and Kouffo): 37%, 43%, 47%, and 49%.  
 Northern departments (Borgou, Alibori, Donga, and Atakora): 39%, 40%, 42%, and 42%. 
We see that by far the lowest rates of (monetary) poverty are observed in two Southern, 
coastal departments: Littoral, where the capital city of Cotonou lies, and Ouémé, which 
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includes the old and thriving city of Porto Novo. Departments in the other two broad regions, 
Central and Northern, show very high rates running from 37 to 49%. It is surprising to see 
that in the Southern, coastal region, two departments have very high poverty rates (47–
49%), contrasting with the low rates of their immediate neighbours along the coastline. The 
highest poverty rate in the country is found in Kouffo (Central region), closely followed by 
Mono (Southern region) and Collines (Central region). 
We now repeat the same exercise for non-monetary poverty: 
 Southern, or coastal departments (Littoral, Ouémé, Atlantique, and Mono): 21.5%, 17%, 
17%, and 40%. 
 Central departments (Plateau, Zou, Collines, and Kouffo): 31.5%, 34%, 24%, and 44%.  
 Northern departments (Borgou, Alibori, Donga, and Atakora): 30%, 35%, 19%, and 47%. 
Clearly, the correlation between the two measures of poverty is far from perfect. The lowest 
rates of non-monetary poverty are found in three (out of four) departments in the Southern 
region (Ouémé, Atlantique, and Littoral), in one department in the Central region (Collines), 
and in one department in the Northern region (Donga). The highest rates are observed in 
one department in the Northern region (Atakora) and in one department in the Central region 
(Kouffo). The general pattern is therefore only partly confirming expectations: if the incidence 
of poverty (whether monetary or non-monetary) is comparatively small in the Southern, 
coastal departments, there is strong heterogeneity inside the coastal region itself. This is so 
much so that a Southern department, Mono, is one of the three worst achievers in the 
country, whether the monetary or the non-monetary measure is used. In fact, prosperity in 
Benin is centred on the clusters around Cotonou and Porto Novo, which cover only part of 
the country’s coastline. 
A third approach is based on an assessment of subjective poverty, that is, on whether 
people consider themselves to be poor and the manner in which they assess their living 
conditions. Results here are roughly consonant with those of the second approach: 
subjective poverty is smaller than the headcount of monetary poverty, and it has perceptibly 
decreased over the years 2011–2015.  
A final approach rests on a combination of the first three approaches. It looks at hardcore 
poverty defined as the set of people who cumulate all the symptoms of poverty 
simultaneously. The proportion of this group of multidimensionally poor people in the total 
population has been estimated at 15.3% in 2015, as against 13.6% in 2011. This points to a 
deterioration of the poverty situation seen from the angle of these especially disadvantaged 
people. 
Turning now to the individual characteristics of poor people, the following findings deserve 
emphasis. First, individuals belonging to households headed by persons who have at least 
completed primary-level schooling are less affected by both monetary and non-monetary 
poverty. Second, and more surprisingly, the incidence of monetary poverty is higher in male-
headed than in female-headed households (but the opposite is true for non-monetary 
poverty). Third, a similar non-convergence is observed when the effect of household size is 
examined: while monetary poverty is more important in relatively large households, non-
monetary poverty exhibits the inverse relationship (i.e. it is larger in smaller households). 
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A key factor behind the recent rise of (monetary) poverty in Benin is that the country does 
not have well-established safety net systems that can be rapidly activated in times of crisis. 
In recent years, Benin has been hit by global shocks, such as the food, fuel, and financial 
crises that began in 2008, and by domestic shocks, such as the floods of 2010 and 2012. All 
these crises have revealed important shortcomings in Benin’s safety net systems. Spending 
on safety nets amounted to 0.3% of GDP between 2005 and 2009, which is well below the 
SSA average of 2.3%. Strengthening Benin’s safety net system – particularly in the form of 
cash transfers for the chronic poor combined with labour-intensive public works for 
households with available labour – is essential to break the cycle of chronic poverty and to 
allow for a more effective, targeted, and timely response to future shocks (see World Bank, 
2013).  
2.1.2 Inequality 
The Gini coefficient for income inequality in Benin is both high and increasing: at 0.39 in 
2003, it rose to 0.46 in 2011, and close to 0.48 in 2015. Spatial disparities also appear as a 
critical feature of income inequality in Benin (INSAE, 2015). 
Here, we give the Gini coefficients for all the departments regrouped by broad region (for the 
year 2015):  
 Southern, or coastal departments (Littoral, Ouémé, Atlantique, and Mono): 0.405, 0.485, 
0.345, and 0.401. 
 Central departments (Plateau, Zou, Collines, and Kouffo): 0.371, 0.477, 0.460, and 
0.408.  
 Northern departments (Borgou, Alibori, Donga, and Atakora): 0.499, 0.394, 0.414, and 
0.436. 
No clear pattern emerges from this department-wise differentiation of Gini inequality 
measures. If the lowest inequality is found in a Southern department (Atlantique), it is in 
another department from the same region (Ouémé) that we observe one of the highest 
department-level inequality rates in the country (in fact, the second-highest coefficient after 
Borgou in the Northern region). 
Note finally that the worsening of income inequality at country level, as reflected in the Gini 
coefficient, is also confirmed by other statistics such as the share of the lowest income 
decile, or the two lowest deciles, in aggregate income. Thus, the share of the poorest 10% of 
the population has declined from 2.9% in 2003 to 2.5% in 2011 and 1.0% in 2015. As for the 
share of the poorest 20%, this has declined from 7.0% in 2003 to 6.1% in 2011 and to 3.2% 
in 2015. 
2.2 Education 
2.2.1 Literacy 
Benin has a catastrophic record of literacy achievements, ranking among the worst 
performers in the world. As Table 4 shows, literacy rates in Benin are much lower than those 
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estimated for SSA (excluding high-income countries). It is true that they have increased 
significantly over the last three decades (despite a regression between 2002 and 2006), but 
not by enough to even fill the gap with other SSA countries in general. 
Table 4: Literacy rates in Benin and SSA (excluding high-income countries), 1979–
2012 
 
Adult 
males 
(>14) 
Benin 
Adult 
males 
(>14) SSA 
Young 
females 
(15–24) 
Benin 
Young 
females 
(15–24) 
SSA 
Youth total 
(males and 
females) 
Benin 
Youth total 
(males and 
females) 
SSA 
1979* 25.19 60.331 18.255 54.677 29.787 63.182 
1992 39.903 63.644 26.69 59.055 39.877 65.98 
2002 47.866 67.773 33.238 61.609 45.31 68.10 
2006 40.616 68.088 30.787 62.252 42.363 68.423 
2012 44.96 70.057 40.938 68.068 52.492 72.795 
*year 1984 or 1983 for SSA.  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 
2.2.2 Primary education 
The situation regarding primary school gross enrolment differs from the situation for literacy: 
in this case, although Benin had initially (in the early 1970s) much lower rates than SSA, it 
succeeded in overtaking the latter during the 1990s (see Figure 18). This is so much so that 
in 2015 Benin’s gross enrolment rate in primary schools exceeded that of SSA by a wide 
margin (132% as against 97% for SSA). 
Figure 18: Primary school enrolment (gross), Benin and SSA (excluding high-income 
countries), 1971–2015  
 
Source: WDI. 
This performance is explained by remarkable progress related to the gross admission rates. 
The question must nevertheless be raised as to whether rapid growth in admission rates has 
been obtained at the price of a deterioration in the quality of schooling. One way to answer 
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that question is by looking at primary school completion rates, as we do below in Figure 19. 
What we find here is encouraging, since Benin again appears to have not only made up for 
the initial gap with the rest of SSA but also to have (recently) overtaken the latter. Another 
clue can be obtained from the evolution of the pupil–teacher ratio for primary schools. We do 
not show the figures here because they are oddly and suspiciously erratic: the ratio 
considerably improved (decreased) between 1980 and 1990 (from 54.6 to 30.5) only to rise 
abruptly to reach 62.2 in 2003, from which year the ratio starts again to continuously 
improve. In 2015, it stood at 45.0, in comparison to 37.5 for SSA as a whole, where the 
evolution has been rather steady (displaying a slow but regular decline over the years). As 
for the proportion of repeaters among enrolled primary school pupils, the main finding can be 
easily summarised: a peak was reached in 1985 after a regular deterioration in the years 
before, and then, following that peak, a steady decline in the ratio occurred to bring Benin 
closer and closer to the value observed for SSA (about 11% in Benin compared to 8% in 
SSA). 
Our last indicator to assess the quality of primary schooling is the most appropriate because 
it measures it through learning outcomes rather than indirectly through inputs (as the pupil–
teacher ratio does) or through outcomes liable to reflect levelling-down effects (like 
completion rates and repeater ratios). Unfortunately, the findings are quite worrying when we 
turn to this more reliable indicator: learning outcomes in primary education show no 
significant improvements since 2005. An assessment carried out in 2011 on a sample of 167 
public primary schools and three private primary schools showed that: (i) only 28% of second 
grade students (CP) from public schools and 43% from private schools were literate while 
18% and 47%, respectively, had mastered the curriculum in mathematics; (ii) only 12% of 
fifth grade (CM1) students from public schools and 42% from private schools were literate, 
while 11% and 38%, respectively, had mastered the curriculum in mathematics (World Bank, 
2015). These findings seem to match the aforementioned poor literacy performances of 
Benin. 
Figure 19: Primary school completion rates, Benin and SSA (excluding high-income 
countries), 1971–2015  
 
Source: WDI. 
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2.2.3 Post-primary education 
The data available for secondary school (gross) enrolment are much scattered than for 
primary school. From Table 5 below, however, we can see that enrolment in secondary 
schools has considerably increased: starting from a lower initial base in 1971, Benin rapidly 
caught up with SSA in the mid-1980s to largely exceed the latter’s achievement in 2015.  
Table 5: Secondary school enrolment (gross), Benin and SSA (excluding high-income 
countries), 1971–2015 
 Benin SSA 
1971 4.31% 13.05% 
1983 21.22% 22.3% 
2000 21.8% 25.8% 
2011 49.1% 40.6% 
2015 58.8% 42.5% 
Source: World Bank Indicators. 
There is an increasing number of students who are completing basic education and they 
exert pressure for higher enrolments in secondary, vocational and tertiary education. The 
problem is that the gender gap widens as students move up the education ladder: girls' 
enrolment is consistently lower that of boys. Moreover, rapid expansion of educational 
enrolment strains resources and negatively affects the quality of education and the 
relevance of the curriculum, in tertiary education in particular. There is, therefore, an urgent 
need to reform the education system so as to avoid further declines in its quality (World 
Bank, 2015a). This requirement is especially critical because “Benin does not benefit from 
extractive resources like many of its neighbours, its development must be more knowledge 
intensive. Higher investment in human capital will enable the country to move up the 
technological ladder and diversify into higher value, knowledge- and research-intensive 
activities which promise better returns and are less subject to competitive pressures when 
compared to the raw agricultural products on which Benin has been largely relying to date” 
(ibid). 
Achievements in tertiary education enrolment are easily summarised on the basis of World 
Bank data: the ratio was just 2% as recently as 1996, and then it gradually went up to reach 
16% in 2013. Since then, however, it has started to decline (13% in 2016). The comparison 
with SSA (excluding high-income countries) shows that Benin has made more progress 
since about 2000: for SSA, the values of the ratio are 3.9% in 1996, 8.6% in 2013, and 8.8% 
in 2016. 
2.3 Health 
Starting with life expectancy at birth, Figure 20 shows that there is no big difference between 
Benin and SSA and, in 2016, both units had reached about the same value: 60.9 years for 
Benin and 60.4 years for SSA. The curves and outcomes for total mortality rates are broadly 
similar to those displayed in the figure below. An important factor behind the fall of mortality 
in Benin has been the decrease in malaria-related mortality, most likely thanks to the 
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massive distribution of bed nets. Thus, the proportion of children sleeping under a bed net 
increased from 20% in 2006 to 76% in 2011 (DHS, 2011).  
Figure 20: Life expectancy at birth, Benin and SSA, 1960–2016  
 
Source: WDI. 
A look at comparative evolutions of neonatal mortality rates in Benin and SSA (not shown) 
essentially shows that, while the statistic was identical in the two observation units in 2007 
(at 34.5 per 1,000 live births), progress became slower in Benin in the following years. In 
2016, the neonatal mortality rate was 32.5 in Benin as against 27.7 in SSA. The same 
situation is obtained for infant mortality rates: 63.1 per 1,000 live births in Benin as against 
53.3 in SSA in 2016 (although Benin was doing better than SSA during the period 1990–
2005).  
What about the incidence of malnutrition measured by the proportion of children under five 
who are underweight (in terms of weight for age)? Data from the World Bank Indicators 
indicate that it has steadily declined in Benin: from 26.2% in 1996, to 21.5% in 2001, 20.2% 
in 2006, and 18.0% in 2014 (data for SSA are not available). The picture emerging from 
DHS (2011) data is less encouraging, however: malnutrition among children under five not 
only remains high but has worsened over the past 10 years. Moreover, Benin’s malnutrition 
rates of the order of 45% for stunting and 16% for wasting stand above the average of West 
and Central Africa. As expected, stunting and wasting are of greater concern in rural areas, 
yet prevalence is marginally lower among female children compared to males. The 
aforementioned World Bank Report (2015a) notes that the government’s food and nutrition 
reform programme has suffered from weak institutional arrangements, reflected in various 
disjointed, small-scale sectoral components housed in the Agriculture, Health, and Family 
Affairs ministries. The overall quality and efficiency of health care delivery systems clearly 
need to be improved. 
Finally, we display the comparative evolutions of crude birth rates (per 1,000 people) since 
1960 in Figure 21. It is evident that these evolutions do not differ much between Benin and 
SSA, and the birth rates in 2016 are close: 36.3 for Benin and 37.43 for SSA. 
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Figure 21: Crude birth rates (per 1,000 people) for Benin and SSA, 1960–2016  
 
Source: WDI. 
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3 Binding constraints on Benin’s economic 
development 
This concluding section integrates the central lessons of both chapters 1 and 2 as they relate 
to the binding constraints on the country’s development. 
Because Benin is not a country with abundant extractive resources, its development must be 
more knowledge intensive. This means that its economy has to diversify into higher value, 
knowledge- and research-intensive activities that offer better returns than traditional activities 
based on raw agricultural products. This reorientation of the economic development strategy 
necessitates that huge investments are made in human capital so as to allow the country to 
move up the technological ladder. Over the last few decades, Benin has actually made 
noticeable progress on the educational front and this is a step in the right direction. 
Nonetheless, two mitigating remarks need to be made here. First, Benin started from a very 
low base, and even today its achievements in terms of the literacy level of the population 
remain very disappointing. Second, much of the educational progress is in the form of rising 
gross enrolment in primary (and post-primary) schooling. The quality of education, however, 
has not been raised and has probably deteriorated during the period of increasing 
admissions into the schooling system. This is worrying inasmuch as quality education is a 
fundamental requirement for sustained increases in income per capita. The task is especially 
challenging because of high population growth rates in the recent past. 
Although Benin does not possess mineral or non-mineral resources, it benefits from its direct 
access to the sea. Moreover, it has a long legacy of regional trade in which some ethnic 
groups, the Yoruba in particular, have played an important role over centuries. The coastal 
cities of Porto Novo and Cotonou, and their hinterland, constitute the growth pole of Benin’s 
economy. It is in their tiny departments that poverty is kept under control – unlike in many 
other parts of the country, where it remains intolerably high. Development in Benin thus 
appears to be unbalanced and to be marked by large spatial disparities. 
Benin suffers from ethno-regional polarisation deeply rooted in the historical past. It did not 
result, however, in one party monopolising political and economic power. Instead, power 
shifted from North to South and vice-versa, not according to some well-institutionalised rule 
but following the play of competitive politics. A ‘winner-take-all’ approach has tended to 
prevail, with poisonous effects on the political environment and the approach to power. This 
has meant that the comparatively poor Northern part of the country has not been 
consistently deprived of the levers of political power; however, effective public investments in 
critical assets such as transport and communications infrastructure have not been made, 
and opportunities to change the course of lopsided spatial development have been 
essentially wasted.  
The fact of the matter is that power did not accrue to men equipped with a vision of the 
requirements of their country’s or their region’s long-term development and the 
determination to implement them. Rather, it accrued to Big Men who follow a patronage logic 
that obeys particularistic interests. Even under a so-called Marxist regime, general long-term 
interests did not prevail; instead, key sectors of the economy – banks and financial 
institutions in particular – were simply appropriated by President Kérékou and his clique and 
used for their own short-term benefit. Albeit under more subtle forms, this kleptocratic 
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system survived through the ensuing Democratic Renewal period, as can be seen in the 
continuing meddling of politicians in the economy: the oligarchs acting behind the screen of 
formally democratic institutions make key decisions in and appear to be the effective owners 
of parastatals and formally independent private corporations. This is especially pertinent in 
the case of the privatised cotton sector.  
No democracy can function well if the judiciary is subject to interference from the executive 
power, and if people do not believe that judges act impartially. In this respect, the situation in 
Benin is worrying: trust in the courts and in judges and magistrates is very low, and people 
tend to believe that the latter are often corrupt. Low trust is also expressed toward important 
sectors of the public administration, particularly tax collectors. Plausibly, these negative 
evaluations of the public sector and the court system reflect the widespread idea that 
magistrates and officials are there to serve the interests of the Big Men and their clients or 
allies. Corruption in public administration remains a major constraint on private sector 
development, investment, and economic growth. Informal payments and rent-seeking in the 
administrative bureaucracy have been sources of inefficiency and productivity losses for 
many firms, especially those belonging to the formal sector. In addition, these symptoms of 
weak governance seriously affect the business climate and tend to deter FDI. This is 
especially damaging because it goes hand in hand with a low investment in public 
infrastructure, which plays a critical role in improving global productivity.  
Benin not only trades through the sea but also across its border with its giant neighbour, 
Nigeria. Because Benin is part of the WAEMU while Nigeria is not, it is particularly 
vulnerable to swings in bilateral exchange rates and to Nigeria’s exchange rate and trade 
policies. This situation creates strong incentives for illicit trading and the concomitant 
expansion of the informal trading sector. 
One of the most pressing concerns regarding the development pattern of Benin is its 
sustainability in the medium and long term. As it stands, the economy remains heavily 
dependent on external financial flows, and on ODA in particular. The ongoing structural 
transformation of the Beninese economy does not hold promises for a foreseeable reduction 
in such dependence on external financing. Indeed, the significant decrease in the share of 
agriculture in domestic value-added has not been associated with a corresponding increase 
in the share of tradable manufactured goods, but rather with a rapid increase in the share of 
non-tradable services. Directly related to this weakness is the low diversification in export 
goods: the economy remains heavily dependent on the export of a few raw agricultural 
products (among which cotton stands foremost) that are highly vulnerable to climatic 
hazards and swings in international commodity prices.  
Because they compound the above effects, the low rates of labour productivity growth in all 
the sectors of the economy are a major concern. Inefficiencies in the manufacturing and 
tertiary sectors combine with stagnant yields in agriculture to determine slow progress in per 
capita income. Whereas in the informal segment of these sectors, which is substantial, low 
labour productivity is caused by a lack of capital, in the formal segment it stems from a low 
productivity of capital, itself the result of low capacity utilisation, inefficient organisation, etc. 
In the agricultural sector, an additional issue is the level of land tenure security. Although the 
government has recently made attempts at reinforcing this security by allowing formal 
individualisation of land rights, the results have been disappointing. One possible reason for 
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this is that the reforms have stopped short of more radical individualisation, or that they have 
created more ambiguity in land rights than existed under the pre-reform situation. 
There are several critical constraints on Benin’s economic development that emerge from 
the above diagnosis and deserve further in-depth analysis:  
1. The intermeshing of business interests and politics; 
2. The management and organisation of the cotton sector;  
3. The weak governance of public sector institutions; 
4. Land rights and tenure security; and 
5. The economic relationship between Benin and Nigeria. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the institutional areas that most constrain Benin’s economic 
development, relying on expert opinion as it appears in databases that provide international 
comparisons of institutional and related indicators, or as can be gathered locally through a 
dedicated survey. The first section of this chapter is devoted to systematic comparisons of 
Benin with other countries, based on available governance-related indicators. The second 
section describes the survey carried out for the present study with a selected sample of 
decision makers in various areas and occupations. The final section synthesises the main 
lessons to be drawn from the preceding exercises and examines their degree of consistency 
with the conclusions of several growth diagnostic studies recently conducted on Benin.  
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2 Benin’s institutional quality in an international 
perspective  
Three international databases will be used to compare Benin's institutional quality with that 
of other countries. The first is the Quality of Government (QoG) database (Teorell et al., 
2018). This is probably the most complete database available related to institutions. It 
comprises more than 2,000 indicators from more than 100 sources. Many fewer indicators 
are systematically available for low-income or lower middle-income countries – which are 
those that can be used as meaningful comparators for Benin. Nevertheless, there are still 
close to 200 indicators for such countries. In a previous use of that database1, a clustering 
analysis has been used to summarise this set of indicators into six synthetic indicators, 
based on the proximity of the inter-country profile of the original indicators they comprise. It 
is those synthetic indicators that are used in the present section.   
The second database is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). This also relies on a 
wide collection of original databases. Instead of using a statistical method to aggregate all 
the individual indicators present in those databases, the aggregation is done a priori by 
broad governance areas and then the first principal component is extracted from country 
observations, which makes it possible to summarise the differences across countries in a 
single indicator of the quality of governance in that area – see Kaufmann et al. (2010). Six 
indicators covering different governance areas are derived in that way.   
The third database is simply the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
indicators gathered annually by the World Bank staff, re-aggregated in five broad clusters2.  
Other well-known databases like Transparency International or Polity IV could have been 
used independently of the preceding sources but there would have been some redundancy 
in doing so, as they are already included in the QoG and WGI databases.   
Benin’s institutional quality, as described by these three sets of synthesised indicators, is 
compared against two groups of developing countries: neighbouring countries in Central and 
West Africa, and a group of countries that have performed better than Benin in terms of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the past decades despite being initially at a 
comparable level3. Ideally, the comparison of institutional quality should refer to that initial 
stage, to see whether countries that initially had better governance overall did better in a 
subsequent period. Such a historical comparison is possible (although somewhat 
problematic) with the WGI database, but not with the others. 
2.1 Benchmarking Benin against neighbouring countries  
Benin shares direct borders with four countries, namely Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, and 
Nigeria. We were, however, unable to include Niger and Togo in our comparison due to lack 
of data. We instead included other countries in the same geographical area: Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. Figure 1 compares the institutional performance of Benin and its 
                                               
1 Bourguignon and Libois (2018). 
2 Out of the 12 basic ratings appearing in the World Development Indicators. 
3 Analysis could also have included countries that were poorer than Benin before 1990 but that have now become richer (e.g. 
Botswana and China). Another comparator group could be defined to include countries with income levels comparable to that of 
Benin in 2016 (the most recent year for which data that allow international comparison are available). It turns out they would not 
have delivered different conclusions for Benin.  
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neighbouring countries using the three databases described above, and at different points of 
time for WGI and the CPIA.  
Figure 1: Governance synthetic indicators: Benin and its neighbours 
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Even though the synthesised indicators constructed based on the three databases often 
have similar names, as can be seen in Figure 1, they do not necessarily cover the same 
concepts. This would be the case for the indicator entitled 'control of corruption'. In the QoG 
database, this indicator is combined with the equal implementation of the law, which is part 
of the 'rule of the law' in the WGI and the CPIA. Likewise, human rights in the QoG refers to 
personal liberties but also to the provision of public services to individuals, including 
education, healthcare, or social assistance, something that is behind the 'people' label in the 
CPIA database. Other indicators are conceptually closer to each other even though they 
have not been given the same name. This is the case of 'business environment' (CPIA), 
'regulatory quality' (WGI), or 'private sector competitiveness' (QoG). This is also the case of 
'government effectiveness' (WGI), 'administrative capacity' (QoG), and 'public management' 
(CPIA). The same can be said of 'democratisation' (QoG) and 'voice and accountability' 
(WGI).  
With the precaution required by this heterogeneity of indicators attached to different 
databases, we now examine the kind of differences in the quality of institutions they suggest 
exist between Benin and neighbouring countries.  
The convergence across databases is stronger may be apparent at first sight. Three 
synthetic indicators appear at least twice as relative weaknesses in the 2015–16 data: 
business environment (QoG and CPIA); government effectiveness (QoG, CPIA); and the 
control of corruption (QoG and WGI). On the side of the relative strengths of Benin, voice 
and accountability or human rights are unanimously better than in the comparator countries, 
the same being true of 'political stability' in WGI or the absence of conflict and violence in the 
QoG.  
The lack of full convergence in areas that seem to be well defined across the three 
databases may seem surprising. As mentioned earlier, however, the concepts behind the 
corresponding synthetic indicators may differ. For instance, new policies to control corruption 
may be praised in the CPIA corruption indicator, whereas other databases focus on the fact 
that the level of corruption remains unchanged. Likewise, some indicators may stress 
structural obstacles in 'doing business', like insufficient infrastructure, whereas others will put 
more emphasis on the government’s attitude towards business. The cost of relying on 
synthetic indicators is precisely that it is not possible to get into this kind of detail, this being 
the reason why an institutional diagnostic must necessarily go beyond this kind of aggregate 
analysis.   
The comparability over time of the WGI indicators is somewhat uncertain because the 
number of databases used to build them has substantially expanded over the last two 
decades. Yet the relative position of countries along the various indicators should not be too 
greatly affected by this problem. From that point of view, no noticeable change in the ranking 
of Benin took place over these two decades, except for 'regulatory quality' (i.e. business 
environment), where Benin tends to progressively lag behind Ghana and Burkina Faso over 
time.  
The comparability over time of the CPIA governance quality indicators is probably better 
than for WGI because they are supposedly based on a homogeneous methodology. There, 
the most noticeable change is again the worsening of the business environment both in 
absolute terms and relatively to neighbour countries.  
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Overall, the appraisal of the quality of institutions in Benin through aggregate indicators and 
the comparison with neighbour countries points to three weaknesses: the control of 
corruption, the business environment, and public management. Benin does not exhibit the 
worst performance in these areas at any point in time, as Cameroon and Nigeria most often 
lie behind. However, it is generally the case that Benin does not do as well as Ghana, which 
dominates all the other countries in 2015–16 according the WGI indicators, or as well as 
Burkina Faso. Over time, moreover, it would seem that regress rather than progress is 
observed in the business environment.  
2.2 Benchmarking Benin against better-performing developing 
countries 
We now compare Benin with five developing countries whose level of economic 
development was similar to Benin in the early 1990s but that have had higher per capita 
GDP growth rates over the past 25 years and have now become substantially richer than 
Benin. These are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao, Vietnam, and Tanzania. Figure 2 presents 
the comparison using the same three sets of indicators in the same periods as in the 
preceding figure. Of course, the profile of Benin in all radar charts is the same. What matters 
now is how Benin compares to those countries which were able to grow faster, both today 
and in the past at a time when all of the countries were at a comparable level of GDP per 
capita.   
Figure 2: Governance synthetic indicators: Benin vs. better-performing countries 
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Legend: Bangladesh (full black-), Cambodia (dashed red), Benin (blue), Laos (magenta), Vietnam (dotted black), 
Tanzania (dashed green) Looking first at the three radar charts in the left-hand column of the figure, the common 
feature is that, in comparison to these better-performing countries, Benin does not do well in public management 
and private sector competitiveness. Except for this, Benin turns out to be quite comparable to the other countries 
when considering the WGI indicators. It even performs relatively well on corruption. The latter advantage is still 
more pronounced with respect to the CPIA indicators. Overall, it would thus seem that, paradoxically, better-
performing countries do systematically worse than Benin on that account.      
Things are a bit different with the QoG database. There, Benin's control of corruption 
appears to be among the worst. In the QoG database neighouring countries’ control of 
corruption are also worse than they appear according to the WGI and CPIA indicators, 
confirming the different understandings of the concept of 'corruption control' in the various 
databases. The same is true of business environment in the QoG database, where Benin 
performs rather worse than comparator countries, whereas it ranks at or close to the median 
in the other databases.  
Another somewhat surprising result is the under-performance of Benin according to the 
'people' indicator in the CPIA database. The point here is that, under the general heading of 
social inclusion and equity, that indicator puts a great weight on education. The interpretation 
to be given to the gap observed for Benin is therefore that fewer or lower quality public 
efforts are devoted to human capital accumulation. Better-performing countries have 
invested more than Benin in that institutional aspect of development. This was not 
systematically the case when the comparison was with neighbouring countries.   
Looking now at the radar charts for earlier periods, Benin’s human capital gap is fully 
confirmed on the CPIA for 2005. It is also noticeable that over the last decade or so Benin 
has lost the comparative advantage it initially enjoyed in its business environment relative to 
better-performing countries. This finding raises the issue of whether initial institutional 
advantages, as measured by the kind of synthetic indicator used here, are responsible for 
the faster development of these countries, or whether it is their development that created 
such advantages.  
One reaches the same conclusion when looking at the three WGI charts. Clearly, Benin was, 
roughly speaking, doing better than other countries in 1996. In particular, its radar profile 
dominated that of Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Tanzania in all areas. If it had not been for 
corruption, it would also have dominated Lao and Vietnam. Paradoxically, however, all of 
these countries grew much faster than Benin in the subsequent 20 years.  
2.3 Conclusion on international comparison 
What lessons may be drawn from this review of available international governance and 
institutional synthetic indicators? The first must be the lack of convergence of indicators from 
different databases that are nevertheless supposed to cover comparable areas. This 
discrepancy can only be explained by heterogeneous conceptual definitions, but it also casts 
some doubt on the true meaning of any single synthetic indicator of the type so frequently 
used in the cross-country development literature. Being analytically more rigorous would 
require using much more precise indicators, but this would increase the number of indicators 
to be used and would add to the inconclusiveness of the analysis.  
Second, concerning Benin, the three potential sources of institutional weakness revealed by 
the analysis are: the control of corruption, a business environment that is possibly less 
favourable than that in other countries, and efficiency issues in public management 
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(although cross-country differences were rather small on that latter account). Another 
important weakness seems to lie in the public investment in 'people', most likely due to an 
under-performing educational system.  
These are extremely general conclusions and, therefore, of limited use for policymakers. 
Remedying this would require getting into more detail to try to identify what is exactly making 
the business environment unfavourable or public management ineffective. As mentioned 
earlier, however, multiplying the number of dimensions of this type of international 
comparison would quickly render any results impossible to interpret. Other approaches must 
be developed to make use of the general indications delivered by the preceding analysis.  
Such approaches are pursued in the rest of this chapter and the accompanying chapters of 
the diagnostic.  
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3 A survey of experts' opinions on Benin’s institutional 
quality 
The goal of this section is to derive further insights about the quality of institutions in Benin 
on the basis of opinions obtained from decision makers in the private and public sectors, as 
well as from the civil society, who are directly exposed to these institutions. An opinion 
survey has been conducted with a sample of such people. The questionnaire was adapted 
from the one applied in a similar study in Tanzania to fit the reality of Benin. In the following 
paragraphs we first describe in some detail the methodology of this survey, before analysing 
its results and then underlining the lessons to be drawn in terms of institutional strengths and 
weaknesses of development in Benin.  
3.1 Methodology  
The survey of experts’ opinions about Benin’s institutional performance was developed in 
collaboration with Analysis for Economic Decisions, a Belgian consultancy, and a local team 
led by the director of Benin’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis, under 
the close supervision of the authors of the present chapter. The methodology included three 
main steps: questionnaire; sampling; and survey implementation.  
The format of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire was adapted from a similar survey carried out in Tanzania – see 
Bourguignon and Libois (2019), after translation into French and modifications required by 
the Benin context. Questions that were irrelevant to Benin were excluded, and new 
questions were added based on insights from the first chapters of this volume and a 
workshop with key decision makers that took place in August 2017 in Cotonou. A number of 
questions were also reformatted so as to facilitate communication during interviews. Finally, 
the questionnaire was coded into Survey CTO, allowing it to be implemented on tablets.  
The format of the questionnaire is somewhat original. It was initially conceived to cover most 
economic, political, and social institutional issues. As it was too long for a single respondent, 
and because all respondents would not be knowledgeable in all areas, a flexible format was 
adopted, where respondents would choose the areas they would focus upon. By doing so, 
however, they would reveal at the same time their opinion about the strength of the 
institutional constraints on development in the various areas they could choose from. 
Practically, the questionnaire consists of 10 subsets of questions, each one corresponding to 
a broad institutional area: political institutions, law and order, ease of doing business, public 
administration, etc. The list of areas appears in Table 1 below. First, respondents were 
asked to indicate which three of the 10 institutional areas they saw as including the most 
constraining factors for Benin’s economic development. Second, they were asked to give a 
relative weight to these three critical institutional domains, where a high value assigned to an 
area indicated that it is more detrimental to Benin’s economic development. Then, 
respondents had to answer those questions in the questionnaire that came under each of 
their three critical area headings, plus a fourth area chosen randomly in order to make sure 
that all questions in the questionnaire would be answered a minimum number of times.   
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Sampling 
The survey team developed a sampling strategy that relied on a demand-side/supply-side 
approach to analysing institutions. First, public or private entities – firms, public 
administrations, agencies, political parties, trade unions, etc. – were identified, some of them 
being involved in setting or managing institutions, whereas others were simple users of 
those institutions in their customary activities. Then, respondents were selected within these 
entities, preferably among senior managers or deputies.  
Table 1: Overview of the sample 
Category No. % Category No. % 
Public sector: total 131 33 Members of parliament 23 6 
Public administration  92 23 
Members of other constitutional 
bodies (supreme court, auditor 
general, ...) 
27 7 
Agriculture, commerce, industry 19 5 Trade-unionists 3 1 
Energy, water, mining 6 2 Donors 9 2 
Economy, finance, development 19 5 Civil society 24 6 
Education 11 3 Academics  10 3 
Health 9 2 
Think tanks and charitable 
organisations 
4 1 
Infrastructure, transport, 
communications 
14 4 Media 10 3 
Sport, culture, tourism 8 2 Private sector 170 43 
Foreign relations 6 2 Formal private firms 82 21 
Law and order 15 4 Large firms and their associations 49 12 
Judiciary 7 2 Medium firms 10 3 
Military 4 1 Small firms 6 2 
Police 4 1 Micro firms 17 4 
Other administrations  24 6 Finance 12 3 
Executive 7 2 Banks and their associations 6 2 
Retired ministers 11 3 Microfinance institutions 6 2 
Local administrations 
(départements) 
6 2 Informal firms 76 19 
Political institutions 62 16 Total 396 10
0 
Local politicians (communes) 9 2    
 
The sample comprises 396 respondents across five key groups of entities/experts, 
summarised in Table 1: public administration; judiciary; executive and legislative bodies; 
donors; civil society; and the private sector. Each group was further divided into subgroups 
with possibly a different relationship to similar institutions. For instance, the private sector 
group includes three subgroups: formal firms, informal firms, and financial institutions, and 
public administration includes sectors like education, health, or utilities.   
Two methods were used to select entities in each subgroup: an arbitrary selection and a 
random sampling approach. Arbitrary selection was used to select entities in official sectors, 
i.e. public administration, political institutions, civil society, or donors. Geographical diversity 
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('départements' and communes)  was also taken into account as much as possible4. A 
random sampling approach was implemented to select entities within the private sector 
subgroups – except for the financial sector, where specific executives were arbitrarily 
selected, for the same reason as in public sectors: that is, the reduced number of entities to 
be considered.  
Two specific strategies were used to randomly select formal and informal private firms. On 
the one hand, a database (Déclarations Statistiques et Fiscales, which includes 5,361 firms) 
was used to randomly select around 80 formal firms according to firm size, after stratifying 
the universe by size, but irrespectively of economic sector of activity. On the other hand, 75 
informal firms were randomly selected after stratifying by sector of activity and geographical 
area. The random selection was made by enumerators who had been assigned a location 
and a field of activity.  
Survey implementation 
The survey was implemented between December 2017 and early February 2018. Figure 3 
shows maps that display the locations of respondents’ entities (left panel).  
Figure 3  Geographical origins of respondents’ entities and distribution of the 
population 
 
 
Source for Figure 3, right panel: INSAE, General Population and Housing Census (RGPH) 2013. 
                                               
4 The 'département' is the highest-level administrative unit in Benin, followed by commune, arrondissement, and village. Benin 
has 12 départements and 77 communes. 
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The maps above show that respondents are spread across the country. However, it turns out 
that the Atacora department is not represented in the sample. Also, there is an over-
concentration of respondents in the southern (Ouémé, Atlantique, and Littoral) and north-
eastern (Borgou) parts of Benin – the departments where most of the arbitrarily selected 
entities are located. In particular, the city of Cotonou in the department of Littoral is home to 
many of the firms and governmental entities. It must be kept in mind, however, that the 
objective of the survey is not to poll the Beninese population but people with some 
knowledge and experience of the way various types of institutions function in Benin.  
The stratification by type of occupation and geographical areas reflecting this choice does 
not necessarily fit the geographical distribution of the population. Table 2 shows that, indeed, 
the sample of respondents is not representative of the Beninese population. 84% have a 
university degree and 27% have studied abroad. They are in their mid-40s on average, and 
most of them have a family. Perhaps because of the education bias, Christians are over-
represented in comparison with the whole population. If there is no strong bias in terms of 
ethnicity, there is in terms of gender: the sample is strongly dominated by males (82%). This 
feature reflects the gender distribution among senior managers in Benin. As a matter of fact, 
the only sector where a gender balance holds is among respondents operating in the 
informal sector.  
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Table 2: Main characteristics of respondents 
 Number % 
Demographic characteristics   
Beninese nationality 379 96 
African nationality (including Beninese) 384 97 
Age (average) 46  
Female 72 18 
Have a child 366 92 
Married (monogamous) 331 84 
Education   
Studied abroad 108 27 
University degree 331 84 
Main religions   
Catholic 231 58 
Muslim 62 16 
Evangelist 36 9 
Traditional 11 3 
Dominant Beninese ethnicities   
Fon 154 41 
Yoruba 71 19 
Goun 55 15 
Adja 53 14 
Bariba and Dendi 29 8 
3.2 Empirical results  
This section summarises the information derived from the expert opinion survey. This is 
done into two steps. First, we analyse responses to the question which three broad 
institutional areas, among the 10 areas listed in Table 3 and defined in more detail in Table 7 
in the appendix, are the most constraining for the development of Benin overall. Second, we 
gain a deeper understanding of the reasons behind those choices by analysing the 
responses to the specific questions that come under each broad area heading.  
Perceived institutional constraints by broad areas functioning of institutions  
The 'total' row in Table 3 reports the number of times each broad institutional area appeared 
among the three most critical areas for Benin's development mentioned by respondents. 
Two areas strongly dominate the others: the functioning of public administration, followed by 
the functioning of political institutions. Together, they account for one-third of all opinions. 
Some way after them comes a group of four other areas that each account for about 10–
11% of the total choices: law and order, justice, and security; ease of doing business; land 
rights; and social cohesion, protection, and solidarity. The four remaining areas – market 
regulation, long-term and strategic planning, security of transactions and contracts, and 
relations with the rest of the world – seem to be less critical. This may be because they are 
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seen as corresponding to more technical aspects of institutions, and therefore were probably 
more distant from the preoccupations of respondents.  
Table 3: Broad institutional areas by perceived weakness 
  
  
 Total  
First 
choice 
Second 
choice 
Third 
choice 
No. % Rank No. % No. % No. % 
A. Political institutions 201 16.9 2 170 42.9 17 4.3 14 3.5 
B. Law and order, justice, and 
security 
126 10.6 4 40 10.1 63 15.9 23 5.8 
C. Public administration 230 19.4 1 76 19.2 110 27.8 44 11.1 
D. Ease of doing business 133 11.2 3 32 8.1 53 13.4 48 12.1 
E. Dealing with land rights 127 10.7 4 29 7.3 48 12.1 50 12.6 
F. Long-term and strategic 
planning 
85 7.2 7 12 3.0 38 9.6 35 8.8 
G. Market regulation 83 7.0 7 15 3.8 39 9.9 29 7.3 
H. Security of transactions and 
contracts 
21 1.8 10 2 0.5 8 2.0 11 2.8 
I. Relations with the rest of the 
world 
63 5.3 9 6 1.5 9 2.3 48 12.1 
J. Social cohesion, protection, 
and solidarity 
119 10.0 6 14 3.5 11 2.8 94 23.7 
Total 1188 100  396 100 396 100 396 100 
 
Equally interesting is the order of appearance of each institutional area in the choice of three 
areas by the respondents. It can be seen in the preceding table that political institutions was 
mentioned by 43% of the respondents as their first choice, followed by public administration, 
which also dominates the second choice. The third choice is dominated by social cohesion, 
protection, and solidarity. This result must be interpreted negatively, though. Indeed, that 
area (social cohesion, protection, and solidarity) appears to be of lesser importance in 
comparison with areas (e.g. areas B, D and E) that have more or less the same total number 
of mentions but that were mentioned more frequently as the first and second choice.  
As can be seen in Figure 4, the preceding ranking is changed only marginally when the 
weights respondents associated with the institutional areas they selected are accounted for. 
Political institutions and public administration remain strongly dominant. As a matter of fact, 
the right-hand panel in the figure shows that the average weight given to the institutional 
areas by those respondents who mentioned them as an obstacle to development is quite 
uniform, except, interestingly, for political institutions, which again dominates the others. The 
same results were obtained when respondents were asked to reveal their willingness to pay 
for improving those institutions, they found most critical for development.  
  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  14 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
Relative weight of institutional fields (average)
A: Political institutions B: Law & order, justice and security
C: Public administration D: Ease of doing business
E: Dealing with land rights F: Long-term and strategic plannig
G: Market regulation H: Security of transaction and contracts
I: Relation with the rest of the world J: Social cohesion & protection, solidarity
Figure 4: Weights assigned to broad institutional areas 
 
 
Respondents are expected to have heterogeneous views about institutional weaknesses. In 
order to gain insights into this issue a number of mechanical regressions were run where a 
dummy variable defined by whether a broad institutional area was seen as critical or not was 
regressed on some characteristics of respondents, namely: being a Beninese national; being 
a woman; managing a large, medium, or small firm; and being employed in a financial 
institution.   
These regressions are shown in Table 8 in the appendix. Among the noteworthy results is 
the fact that large and formal firm operators tend to have less distrust than other 
respondents with respect to political institutions – perhaps because they know better how to 
deal with them. The other side of the coin is that, more than others, they find that the 
business environment, including market regulation or the security of contracts, is an 
impediment to development. This attitude is still more prevalent among respondents working 
in financial institutions. More surprisingly, women also share this view, i.e. they place less 
emphasis on political institutions and more emphasis on business, possibly because they 
tend to be over-represented among small and micro entrepreneurs. As far as nationality is 
concerned, it is not clear that the distinction is meaningful given the tiny minority of 
foreigners in the sample. Not surprisingly, foreigners overvalue the business environment 
whereas nationals give more importance to land rights.     
Interactions between formal and informal institutions  
In a society where tradition very much matters, it was considered interesting to ask 
respondents about whether traditional institutions could be a good substitute for imperfectly 
working formal institutions, particularly those institutions dealing with business relationships, 
for instance security of contracts (Dhillon and Rigolini, 2011). In this regard, respondents had 
to choose out of five informal institutions those they considered to be a good substitute for 
imperfectly working formal institutions: religious leaders, traditional authorities, networks, 
other personal relations, and cultural masking traditions established during the precolonial 
period and backed by spiritual forces5.  
The responses suggest that the dominant informal response to institutional weaknesses are 
not the traditions inherited from precolonial times, but essentially private networks and, to a 
                                               
5 Zangbeto, Guelede, and Egoun. Given their spiritual nature, we would expect these traditions to play important roles in 
conflict resolution and mediation. 
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lesser extent, traditional and religious leaders. This result was not unexpected given the 
rather high average educational level of the sample. Yet, the fact that a significant proportion 
of respondents mentioned traditional and religious leaders is evidence that formal institutions 
regulating interpersonal economic relationships are not fully established in the Beninese 
society, possibly because of the survival of traditional means of solving this kind of problem.  
Figure 5: The role of traditional institutions in Benin in solving interpersonal or inter-
business problems (%) 
 
In-depth perceptions of the quality of institutions in Benin 
We now go one step further by exploiting the detailed questions asked of the respondents in 
connection with the three broad areas they chose, and a randomly selected one. The full list 
of questions may be found online6. For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall not deal 
with these questions directly. We shall rather list the main lessons that can be learned from 
the answers. Before doing so, however, we must address some methodological issues in the 
identification of weaknesses and strengths revealed by the answers to the questionnaire.  
The response to all questions was coded on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 4: 0 defined as 
‘not at all’; 1 as ‘little/low importance’; 2 as ‘neutral’; 3 as ‘a lot’; 4 as ‘extremely’. In addition, 
respondents were allowed to reply with ‘I do not know’ when they could not provide relevant 
answers to a question. Note that some questions were asked in a negative way – for 
example, ‘To what extent does corruption constrain business?’ – whereas others were asked 
in a positive way – for example, ‘How well do you think local communities understand 
aspects of the land law that concern them?’. To make responses comparable across the 
questions, the answers were re-coded to the negative, so that all low response values can 
be interpreted as institutional weaknesses, and high values as strengths.  
The full questionnaire is very rich, as it includes more than 400 questions – even though the 
typical respondent had to answer roughly half of them, i.e. the areas he/she chose. To 
synthesise the answers, a number of methodological choices have to be made.  
Weaknesses and strengths are defined by average Likert scores below 1.5 for the former 
and above 2.5 for the latter. These cut-offs were defined on the basis of the distribution of 
average scores across all questions shown in Figure 6, which exhibits discontinuities at 
these values. Note, however, that relying on average scores raises the issue of how to 
                                               
6 https://researchportal.unamur.be/fr/persons/romain-houssa 
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interpret responses with neutral opinions, i.e. those with scores equal to 2? 7 Is it a truly 
'neutral' response or a quick way to get rid of a question one cannot really answer? To take 
this ambiguity into account, questions were ranked in accordance to both their average 
score and that score after eliminating the 2-scores. However, the difference between the two 
rankings was marginal. The same was found when considering only the proportion of scores 
strictly below 2 for weaknesses and strictly above 2 for strengths. 
Figure 6: Distribution of average Likert score across questions in the overall 
questionnaire  
 
A first consistency check of this methodology of handling the answers to the various 
questions of the questionnaire consists of checking whether the scores of the questions 
under the heading of the 10 broad institutional areas fit the average ranking made by 
respondents in the first part of the interview. This is done in Figure 7. 
The first block on the left-hand side of that figure simply shows the relative frequency of 
questions across broad institutional areas in the questionnaire. For instance, 30% of all 
questions fall under the heading of 'political institutions'. However, it must be kept in mind 
that some questions appear under various headings. For instance, a question on the 
corruption of tax collectors would appear both under public management and ease of doing 
business.   
The two other blocks of Figure 7 are more interesting. They show the same frequencies but 
now restricting the universe to questions whose average score is below 1.5 (i.e. 
weaknesses) in the middle block and above 2.5 (strengths) in the right-hand block. What is 
interesting here is that the relative weakness of the broad areas is now slightly modified in 
comparison with the direct ranking operated by the population of respondents.  
It is still the case that public management is considered to be the weakest area since the 
frequency of questions with an average score below 1.5 is higher than the frequency of all 
questions in that area – and of course the frequency of questions with scores above 2.5 is 
lower. Yet the second weakest area now appears to be the ease of doing business, for 
which the same pattern holds. By contrast, political institutions, which were considered 
practically as bad as public management in the direct ranking (i.e. when no detail was given 
to the respondents about what precise issue this area was covering), now would be more on 
                                               
7 The response ‘no opinion’, i.e. responses with a score value of 99, were removed before the average values were estimated. 
We report the number of cases where the value of 99 was used.  
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the positive side: this area shows relatively more questions with high scores and less with 
low scores. This means that asking people about institutional weaknesses and strengths 
without first making them aware of what each area actually covers may be misleading. In the 
case of Benin, there are of course severe weaknesses in the way the political institutions 
work but respondents also point to very positive aspects, so that, overall, their opinion is 
certainly not as negative as when asked whether ‘political institutions work well or badly’ 
without further detail. This is not true, however, of public management and doing business, 
which are still considered to be major institutional weaknesses.  
Three other areas show some reversal of opinion when detailed aspects of the institutional 
area are given to respondents. The first is social cohesion, protection, and solidarity, where 
questions with high scores strongly dominate, and long-term planning, where the opposite is 
the case. In the former case, the problem may come from the fact that the title of the area 
comprises different concepts and it is not clear which one dominated in the mind of 
respondents when first confronted with it. It is possible, for instance, that they may have put 
more emphasis on social protection, which they consider to be weakness, and then realised 
when faced with the detailed questions that this area was also about traditional solidarity 
among people, which they considered to be a strength. For 'long-term and strategic planning' 
it is also probable that the understanding of that label was modified when respondents 
realised what it referred to. The third area that appears weaker than it was initially is land 
rights, where the frequency of low-score questions is twice that of questions about land 
rights overall.  
Figure 7: Frequency of questions under the headings of broad institutional areas by 
average score levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, the more detailed questionnaire showed some change in the ranking of broad 
institutional areas by relative weakness or strength. The main weaknesses revealed by the 
questionnaire are public management and ease of doing business, but, of course, it is now 
necessary to obtain deeper insights by focusing on individual questions and examining in 
more detail those with the lowest and highest scores. This is done in the next sections, 
which look successively at the revealed institutional weaknesses and strengths.   
3.1.1 Perceived weaknesses of institutions  
Instead of analysing one by one all the questions in the questionnaire that received an 
average score of less than 1.5, we list in what follows the main lessons that can be learned 
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from them. Because the questions address a large range of issues, this approach allows for 
a more detailed diagnostic of institutional weaknesses than simply ranking broad institutional 
areas, as was done earlier. 
Without doubt, corruption is the theme that appears most frequently among the questions 
that obtained the lowest average scores among respondents. It affects practically all aspects 
of political and economic life in Benin: the political system, the relationship between business 
and the public administration (rigged procurement) or the judiciary system, the electoral 
system (vote buying), land rights, or complicity between politicians and the media.  
Corruption is seen as responsible for several key dysfunctions in the political, judicial, and 
economic spheres.  
Another problem that is frequently mentioned, which also relates to corruption, or more 
exactly the difficulty of controlling it, is that the official rules of the political game, namely the 
constitutional rules, may be violated without the entities supposed to punish such behaviour 
taking action. The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Haute Cour de Justice, 
whose jurisdiction is the illegal behaviour of the executive, are generally found to be 
permissive or passive, the same being true of the parliament. It is quite possible, however, 
that this opinion among the respondents was strongly influenced by the debate at the time 
the survey was taken about several decisions by the incoming president, which some felt 
were in contradiction with the constitution8.  
The lack of transparency of state decisions and state action is another theme that attracts 
low scores. For instance, the criticism is made that no public discussion takes place about 
the execution of the budget or National Accounts, that the financial results of public and 
semi-public companies are not made public and not debated, that most decisions by the 
executive are taken in an opaque way, and that few evaluations are made of policies.  
A theme that is of importance is the understanding that citizens have of the law and the rules 
of the game. There was a single question addressing this issue in the questionnaire and it 
referred to land law. The general opinion in this respect was that local communities have a 
poor understanding of the law and cannot use it to protect themselves against illegal 
practices that would take the control of some land away from them.  
Concerning state-owned companies, their efficiency and management were severely 
criticised by respondents. This was especially the case for the company responsible for the 
production and distribution of electricity.  
Two additional points that are apparent in the responses to the questionnaire are worth 
stressing. The first is the low average score for the question about whether poverty reduction 
could be considered as the main objective of policymaking in Benin. The second is the view 
that dissensions do exist within the executive itself. Here again, however, it may be the case 
that the low score for that question was influenced by some specific event that took place 
during the time of the survey or a little before – despite the fact that respondents were 
explicitly asked to base their answers on the way they saw politics, economics, or the 
working of the administration over the 10 years preceding the survey, rather than basing it 
on current events and debates.    
                                               
8 See for instance https://lanouvelletribune.info/2017/12/benin-cour-resiste-talon-resiste/  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  19 
Reported development bottlenecks also include: the dominant informal sector, Benin’s 
dependency on Nigeria, labour market nominal wage rigidity, and the frequent strikes in the 
public sector. All these constraints generate high costs for businesses and undermine 
competitiveness. However, it is not clear that they refer to institutional weaknesses strictly 
speaking.  
Table 4: Selected examples of detailed institutional weaknesses (low-score questions) 
Question9 Score10 
To what extent is corruption an obstacle to business development? 0.73 
Do you think the Haute Cour de Justice is able to impose the respect of the 
constitution? 
0.76 
What is the degree of corruption linking the media and politicians?  0.82 
What is the degree of political corruption (vote buying, illegal campaign funding, 
bribes)?  
0.83 
Does the government discuss the budget seriously with the civil society?  0.87 
To what extent do land transactions involve corruption in local communities?  0.90 
How much would you say the press and the media are independent from political 
influence?  
0.96 
Do you trust the Haute Cour de Justice to impose the legal rules of the game on 
the main political and economic actors?  
0.98 
To what extent are public procurement procedures fair and transparent?  0.98 
In your view, is poverty reduction a priority for political parties?  0.99 
What is the degree of corruption in the relationship between public 
administrations and Beninese companies?  
1.00 
To what extent is the reliability of economic aggregates like GDP growth, the 
current account balance, or inflation discussed in parliament, in the media, and in 
the civil society?  
1.15 
How seriously are public accounts audited?  1.18 
To what extent are political dissensions obstacles to the implementation of public 
policies and reforms?  
1.22 
3.1.2 Perceived strengths of institutions 
Strengths are supposed to be revealed by questions with a score above 2.5, i.e. a majority of 
respondents having selected the top value on the Likert scale. The main points that arise 
from reviewing these questions are the following.  
High levels of respondent satisfaction mostly centre on five domains, which are not always 
fully consistent with perceived institutional weaknesses. These are: i) civil liberties; ii) a 
                                               
9 Recall that scores are redefined depending on the question so that a low score denotes an institutional 
weakness. For instance, if the answer to the first question ‘To what extent is corruption an obstacle to business 
development?’ is ‘very much so’, and thus a Likert score of 4 is applied, it is redefined as 0 in agreement with the 
fact that this denotes a major obstacle to development. 
10 The reported score is the average 0/4 Likert scores after eliminating scores equal to 2. 
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sense that the state enjoys some autonomy in policymaking; iii) some trust in recent reforms; 
iv) a feeling of improvement in the ease of doing business; and v) national pride. 
On civil liberties, respondents expressed satisfaction with respect to the freedom given to 
people to form associations in practically all areas, from religion to politics. Equally important 
was the feeling of limited religious, ethnic, and political discrimination in recruitment and 
wage practices in the private sector. The lack of discrimination in the access to public 
services – schools, health facilities, justice, or security – was also highly valued. Consistent 
with these civil liberties, the lack of state repression was also stressed by respondents.  
The autonomy that respondents feel the Beninese state enjoys with respect to social, 
traditional, ethnic, and religious norms, or with respect to the army and the police, is certainly 
an advantage over some other countries. Yet this feeling may not be fully consistent with the 
importance of corruption so strongly emphasised among key institutional weaknesses. In 
other words, autonomy does exist with respect to some norms and some specific actors but 
it is probably more limited when dealing with big business or some other vested interests. 
The prevalence of corruption among the perceived institutional weaknesses of Benin was 
such that it is somewhat surprising that respondents tend to trust announced anti-corruption 
reforms. Or is it precisely because corruption has reached such a critical level that experts 
tend to agree on the need to fight it effectively? The confidence expressed in the positive 
impact of aid, or at least on the absence of the crowding-out effect of aid on domestic 
savings, is also unexpected at a time when aid effectiveness is increasingly open to doubt. 
Yet one may understand why such a point of view prevails in an economy where aid 
represents between 6% and 8% of gross national income. 
Table 5: Selected examples of detailed institutional strengths (high-score questions)11 
Question Score 
Does the state discriminate among citizens in regard to accessing: administrative 
services, justice, security, public school, healthcare centres, etc..  
3.60 
To what extent is the army or the police involved in politics?  3.29 
In your opinion, is wage discrimination with respect to religion or ethnicity 
frequent in the private sector?  
3.17 
How free do you feel people are to form associations of a religious, ethnic, 
professional, or political nature? 
3.11 
Did the one-stop shop policy recently implemented in public administration 
improve doing business?  
2.91 
In view of religious, traditional, or ethical norms, how free is the Benin state 
about policies and reforms in education, health, social services, and economic 
policy?  
2.90 
How strong is the national sentiment in Benin?  2.87 
Are traditional solidarity links effective in supporting people in need in rural 
areas?  
2.80 
How repressive do you feel the Benin state is?  2.74 
Do you think that present reforms in the anti-corruption policy will lift constraints 
on development?  
2.70 
 
 
                                               
11 Score is average 0/4 Likert scores after eliminating scores equal to 2. 
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Recent reforms seem to have improved the way business feels about the business 
environment, even though it was seen earlier that there were still many causes of 
dissatisfaction. The one-stop window for formalities and the shortening of registration delays 
were a source of satisfaction for business-oriented people among the respondents. The low 
probability of violent events or worker strikes in the private sector were also felt to be positive 
aspects of the business environment.  
Finally, the feel of belonging to a national community may not be easily related to the broad 
institutional areas that have been discussed in this paper. That it appears with a strong score 
in the questionnaires despite the ethnic diversity of the country is a positive sign: the 
probably of conflict and violence is therefore reduced, which should be favourable to 
business and long-term public planning.  
3.1.3 Perceived opinion on recent reforms 
Several reforms were recently initiated by the Talon administration, some of them with the 
ambition of improving the institutional framework of Benin's development. Respondents were 
initially asked to answer questions based on their knowledge and experience over the 
preceding 10 years, which is mostly before the Talon administration came to power. This 
was done in order to have a picture of expert opinion on Beninese institutions that would not 
be biased by the debate about the most recent reforms. Because of this, it seemed 
interesting to ask the experts briefly about these reforms, to check whether their views would 
differ.  
Four types of reform were launched by the new administration. The first consisted of moving 
activities initially under the responsibility of civil services to agencies formally outside the 
public sector. Their mission is the same, but they escape some of the constraints from 
operating in the public sector, thus making them potentially more effective. For instance, 
agencies were created to manage the construction of schools and health centres, and others 
were created to replace the public company, SONAPRA, which was responsible for 
agricultural promotion and rural development and price stabilisation; another agency was 
created to manage water projects, etc. These are potentially major reforms. It is of course 
too early to evaluate the reforms’ impact, but it is interesting to note that survey respondents 
were essentially either neutral or ambivalent with respect to them. Indeed, the average score 
for the questions about these reforms was very close to 2, and roughly 40% of respondents 
reported either 2 or did not answer the question. 12 
On a more positive side is the recent law that strengthens the land reform undertaken over 
recent years, and in particular the land titling operation launched in 2013 within the help of 
the US Millennium Challenge Account programme. One problem with the ongoing reform, 
however, is that a land title does not provide a definitive right until after five years, and it may 
be contested during this entire period. Indeed, several such contestations have taken place, 
and financial institutions that use land for collateral have experienced losses. As a result, 
they have become reluctant to accept land with temporary rights as collateral. To address 
this issue, the Talon administration passed a new law in late 2016 that gave landowners 
definitive rights. Survey respondents supported this reform, more strongly it should be said 
than they considered land rights to be an obstacle to development.  
                                               
12 That proportion is generally below 25% for the questions reported in the preceding tables.  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  22 
The present administration is implementing several actions against corruption. With an 
average score above 2.5 – and with less than 25% neutral or undecided responses – 
respondents perceived these actions to potentially have a positive impact. Such an attitude 
is fully consistent with the emphasis put by respondents on the very negative influence of 
corruption on development.  
Another action that gathered approval among the survey respondents was the reform of the 
power sector and the likely unbundling of the activity of the state monopoly in this area, 
Société Béninoise d'Energie Electrique. This, again, is in agreement with the negative 
opinion of respondents about the management of state-owned companies.    
3.1.4 Response heterogeneity 
To complete the analysis, we now examine whether average scores in the population of 
respondents hide strong differences across specific groups, in which case the conclusions 
obtained above should be somewhat qualified. The way to proceed is simple. It consists of 
testing the statistical difference between the answers of different groups of respondents. To 
be consistent with the strategy used earlier, the emphasis is put on those cases where 
strengths and weaknesses, as defined by an average score, respectively, above 2.5 or 
below 1.5, are present in particular groups of respondents but disappear when considering 
the whole population. This analysis is performed on three subgroups: women vs. men, 
formal firm managers vs other respondents, and financial managers vs other respondents.  
Table 6 illustrates the procedure for the women/men dichotomy. Questions appearing there 
are ranked according to the degree of statistical significance of the difference in average 
scores between the two groups. Two situations arise. The first case is where men are 
strongly positive in their answer and women much less so, so that the general average 
scores are in the neutral interval (1.5, 2.5). This is the case for the confidence that men 
seem to have in political institutions like the Supreme Court or in the discussion of the 
budget in the parliament. The other case is women being strongly negative but men being 
neutral, so that, again, the overall average score is in the neutral interval. This occurs for the 
question on the autonomy of trade unions, for instance, or the question on the 
constitutionality of some government actions. Of course, there are also cases where the 
difference between men and women is significant but on the same side, so that the overall 
average score is little affected. This is the case for the question on familiarity with land laws, 
for which both men and women were negative but to varying degrees.  
The question does arise as to why opinions may differ between men and women on such 
crucial issues as whether political actors behave according to constitutional rules. A possible 
explanation is that many women in the sample of respondents operate in the informal sector 
of the economy and may not have the same familiarity with this kind of issue. Also, they may 
not have the same level of education as other respondents. If this explanation is correct, 
then the constitutionality of political action in Benin should be added to the list of the 
country’s institutional strengths.  
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Table 6: Top issues with significant differences between men and women 
Question 
Av. score 
for women 
Av. score 
for men 
T-stat 
How truthfully and seriously is economic policy (e.g. 
fiscal policy, taxation, trade etc.) debated within the 
government and in parliament?  
1.97 2.73 3.87 
To what extent do you think that the Haute Cour de 
Justice, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme 
Court effectively enforce compliance with the formal 
rules of the constitution? 
1.53 2.57 3.73 
How reliable (in terms of realism, consistency, 
coverage, degree of detail, coherence) is the budget?  
1.35 2.19 3.28 
To what extent do you share the view that foreign aid 
improves the quality of economic policy  
0.96 1.74 3.22 
To what extent are trade unions autonomous vis-à-vis 
majority political parties?  
0.83 2.00 3.16 
How familiar are you with Beninese land law, i.e. the 
Land Acts? 
0.92 1.50 3.13 
To what extent do parliament and the executive 
function according to the constitution? 
1.32 2.21 2.97 
 
The same analysis with respect to formal firm or financial institution managers also reveals 
clear differences in information sets. For instance, financial managers had more concerns 
than other respondents about issues related to land and involving formal companies in urban 
areas, or about the ability of the judiciary system to resolve corruption problems. Not 
surprisingly, they were more satisfied with banking regulation. Formal firm managers, on 
their side, were more sensitive to the lack of government transparency on subjects related to 
economic policies and the budget. Except for this, differences with other respondents were 
more a matter of intensity than direction, the same being true of financial managers.   
3.2 The main lessons from the opinion survey: summary 
Although corruption cannot be considered an 'institutional area', it clearly appears in the 
opinion of the respondents as a major cause of institutional weaknesses across the board.  It 
is certainly behind the low opinion expressed in the survey about public management, the 
dissatisfaction with the business environment, and the doubts expressed about the 
functioning of the political system. Corruption is felt to be present everywhere in the 
economic and political system.  
This emphasis on corruption illustrates the fact that the kind of opinion survey undertaken for 
this study of Benin's institutions, like the international comparisons based on synthetic 
indicators in a preceding section of this chapter, provides more information on what people 
and experts feel works well or not so well, than on the dysfunctions or the positive role of 
institutions per se. Corruption is certainly a plague in Benin, but its effects are not 
necessarily well identified.  
Concerning the broad institutional areas, public administration is found to be the weakest link 
in the functioning of the Beninese economy and society, without it being completely clear 
what does not work there, except for the deleterious effect of corruption. For instance, no 
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strong opinion was expressed on civil servants – except for their frequent strikes – or the 
organisation of the whole sector. What is clear, however, is the way this perceived weakness 
of the public administration is behind the dissatisfaction with the business environment, 
which is another strong message of the survey. As far as political institutions are concerned, 
answers to the questionnaire show some ambivalence, with respondents expressing some 
confidence in the way the system works and in current reforms, while at the same time, here 
again, pointing to the harm done by corruption.  
Other weaknesses stressed by the opinion survey include the lack of transparency in regard 
to state actions. This may be the reason why no clear view about the state’s dysfunctions 
were expressed in the survey responses. Opacity makes evaluation difficult, except perhaps 
when results are directly apparent, as is the case with state-owned companies—in the power 
sector in particular.   
On the positive side, there was a broad agreement on civil liberties and the state being free 
of the influence of religion or traditional culture. Such circumstances doubtlessly should be 
favourable to private initiative and unbiased policymaking. Yet there is some lack of 
consistency here between this perceived autonomy of the state, on the one hand, and the 
sense of the detrimental effect of corruption, on the other.  
Overall, the expert opinion survey is a bit disappointing in the sense that it does not point to 
well defined obstacles to development arising from the working of institutions in Benin. A 
possible reason for this may lie in the heterogeneity of opinions depending, on where 
respondents stand in the working of the economic and political system. This is apparent 
when comparing the answers of formal firm or financial organisation managers and those of 
other respondents. Strong perceptions in opposite directions by different groups of 
respondents may tend to neutralise each other. Table 8 in the appendix illustrates that 
heterogeneity by showing how the direct choice of critical broad institutional areas in the first 
stage of the survey differed across selected groups of respondents.     
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4 Institutional implications of ‘growth diagnostics’ and 
similar exercises 
To end this review of insights into the way institutions in Benin may create obstacles to the 
country’s development, we now briefly review the potential institutional implications of 
'growth diagnostics' exercises that have been conducted in Benin in the spirit of the 
Hausmann et al. (2005) methodology over the recent years.  
Two studies of this type have been completed over the last 10 years or so: the first by 
Ianchovichina (2008) for the World Bank and the second for the International Monetary Fund 
by Barhoumi et al. (2016). The former is rather complete but a bit old, as it essentially refers 
to the period 1996–2006. The latter is more recent, but less complete. A related report was 
released more recently by the World Bank (2017a); this presented a Systematic Country 
Diagnostic for Benin built upon a different methodology than growth diagnostics. We 
summarise the main findings of these studies in the following paragraphs, insisting on the 
points that are directly related to the working of institutions. We also complement them with 
some of the results of the World Bank Enterprise Survey – World Bank (2009, 2016), based 
on a sample of firms operating in Benin, as these provide further interesting evidence on 
some of the points raised in the preceding studies. 
• The World Bank 2008 growth diagnostic 
The growth diagnostic approach relies on a simple model of optimal growth leading to a set 
of key determinants of growth performance. Considering these determinants one by one, the 
objective is then to determine the extent to which they are constraining the development of a 
country in a given time period. 
Referring to the decade ending in the mid-2000s, Ianchovichina (2008) identifies three sets 
of binding constraints:  
o Poor quality of infrastructure 
As at 2008, Benin displayed infrastructure deficiencies in different areas. Notably, power 
supply (in quantity and quality) was the leading constraint on business, as most firms had to 
bear the cost of installing their own power-generation capacity. In the same way, poor 
services in railway and roads undermined Benin’s geographical advantage to serve 
landlocked countries (Burkina Faso and Niger) to its north. Moreover, lack of adequate rural 
roads, poor logistics in transport and storage facilities, as well as deficiencies in water 
management and irrigation impeded progress in agriculture and the agrobusiness industry.  
o High risks on return appropriation: the tax issue  
In the Investment Climate Assessment of 2004, used in the World Bank growth di agnostic, 
firms reported difficult challenges in dealing with the tax administration: a complex tax 
system coupled with high tax rates, heavy bureaucratic burden, and corruption. In the same 
way, they reported serious problems in the judicial administration: long and costly litigation 
procedures in resolving conflicts, especially in land and financial markets, and, there too, a 
high level of corruption. These were considered as strong deterrents to business dynamism.  
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o Poor quality of human capital 
Although the availability of skilled labour did not appear to be a binding constraint in 2008, it 
was noted that Benin was lagging in term of the quality of education, so that it was felt that 
human capital could become a constraint in the future. This is still the case today. A recent 
comparative analysis among 10 francophone African countries13 shows that primary school 
pupils in Benin are performing worse in reading and mathematics than those in peer 
countries (PASEC, 2014) 14. Moreover, significantly low learning competencies are found for 
children in rural areas, as well as those from poor families. This limits inclusive growth and 
has certainly contributed to the rising of inequality over the past years.  
The World Bank 2008 growth diagnostic also noted that, by 2005, the pressure on land was 
mounting. If the utilisation rate of land was still quite below full capacity in the north of the 
country, this was not the case in the south. For instance, the utilisation rate of cultivable land 
in the département of Ouémé was reported to be 96%.  
As can be seen, several of these binding – or potentially binding – constraints identified in 
2008 are related to institutional issues which have been mentioned in the opinion survey 
completed for the present study.  
• The 2016 IMF growth diagnostic  
The Barhoumi et al. (2016) study, completed 10 years later, is not as comprehensive. It 
focuses on the way investment may be scaled up in Benin. The binding constraints that it 
identifies echo those identified by Ianchovichina (2017) and the opinion survey analysed 
above. Of special importance in that study is the infrastructure constraint, especially in the 
power sector, and the tax system, which is seen as being responsible for lower tax revenues 
and therefore an impediment to the scaling up of investment. Concerning the tax system, the 
diagnostic insists both on the complexity of the system, but also on the inefficiency of the tax 
collection apparatus, which leads to many firms simply not paying taxes, either legally 
through loopholes or illegally through corrupt practices. The reason why the tax/GDP ratio of 
Benin is comparable to that in other sub-Saharan African countries is essentially because of 
the relative importance of custom duties on re-exports in the direction of Nigeria.  
• The World Bank 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic 
The Systematic Country Diagnostic (World Bank, 2017a) replaced the old Country 
Assistance Strategy documents in the relationship between the World Bank and low-income 
countries. It is the analytical background document for the preparation of the Country 
Partnership Framework (CPF). In the case of Benin, the last CPF was signed in 2018, for the 
2019–23 period.    
The Systematic Country Diagnostic 2017 identified the following areas of weakness for the 
development of Benin, and therefore pathways of action within the CPF: infrastructure, with 
emphasis this time on transport and logistics in order to capitalise on the Port of Cotonou; 
informality, caused by the illegal nature of cross-border trade with Nigeria; service delivery, 
especially in the education sector; and the need for developing more effective social safety 
                                               
13 Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Chad, Togo, and Niger. 
14 Poor development of learning outcomes at higher education levels, especially at university, was also highlighted during the 
workshop with the decision makers. 
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nets. In addition, the Government of Benin committed in the final version of the CPF to 
enhancing its efforts in improving public management, and governance more generally15.  
Again, several of these areas match some of the conclusions derived from the opinion 
survey carried out for the present study, especially those concerned with public 
management, infrastructure, and, implicitly, corruption, since this is what is behind the 
commitment to better 'governance'.  From that point of view the Systematic Country 
Diagnostic and CPF are quite clear – it is said in the opening remarks: 
The political economy [of Benin] is characterized by a concentration of powerful 
interests and a resulting uneven playing field, weak institutions, poor governance, 
and incidents of corruption. As elaborated in the SCD [Systematic Country 
Diagnostic], Benin’s potential for achieving the twin goals [i.e. poverty reduction and 
shared prosperity] has faltered for several reasons, including those related to political 
economy: low levels of trust between economic agents, weak institutions, and poor 
governance. (CPF, page 3) 
If such an official document, endorsed by the government, is so clear, it may be surprising 
that the respondents to the survey analysed in the preceding section were shyer in their 
evaluation of Benin's institutions. The reason has probably to be found in the mechanical 
format of the questionnaire, which in some cases did not allow respondents to express their 
deep convictions.  
• The 2009–2016 World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
Although there was no diagnostic attached to them, it seems interesting to check the 
Enterprise Surveys carried out by the World Bank, to see whether their findings match the 
binding constraints identified by the preceding growth diagnostics. The answer is that they 
do. In the various types of information collected by these surveys, the largest difference 
between Beninese firms and firms in other sub-Saharan African countries appear under the 
following headings. Corruption: bribery incidence has declined between 2009 and 2016 and 
is lower in Benin than in other sub-Saharan African countries, but Benin very much 
dominates other countries in terms of gifts given to get government contracts, construction 
permits, or a favourable judgement in court. Infrastructure: power supply is much lower and 
outages are more frequent in Benin than in other sub-Saharan African countries; moreover, 
the situation has been getting worse since 2009. Informality: seen as a major source of 
unfair competition by formal firms, again more in Benin than in the rest of sub-Saharan 
African. The same applies to tax rates and the tax administration. 
Summing up, the growth diagnostic exercises conducted in relation to Benin over the last 
decade or so are rather convergent in pointing to several key weaknesses that have clear 
institutional roots: intense corruption, inefficient public management (including infrastructure, 
service delivery and, especially, the tax administration), and a high level of informality.  
                                               
15 See tables 2–4 in World Bank (2018). 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed expert opinions on the quality of institutions in Benin and the way this 
could affect the country’s development performance. Three types of evidence were 
considered: synthetic indicators available in cross-country databases; a specific opinion 
survey carried out among local decision makers of different types and engaged in different 
activities; and analysis of the institutional implications of binding economic constraints 
identified in several recent growth diagnostic exercises. These various sources converge in 
pointing out several institutional weaknesses that impede an acceleration of development in 
Benin, even though they may not always agree on the severity of these institutional 
constraints. 
Corruption is unanimously seen as the most serious impediment to the good functioning of 
institutions and a favourable development context. Corruption is found to affect practically all 
sectors of the economy at all levels of responsibility. This is recognised by both the 
respondents to the opinion survey and the authors of growth diagnostic exercises. 
Comparison with other countries in the region or countries that have out-performed Benin 
over the last decades is less conclusive. If Enterprise Surveys find that, from the point of 
view of business, the situation in Benin is substantially worse than in the average sub-
Saharan African country, country-by-country comparison leads to different conclusions. The 
degree of corruption in Benin, as can be appraised through synthetic indicators, turns out to 
be roughly comparable to that in neighbour countries. Corruption might be even less serious 
than in several countries that grew faster than Benin over the last 20 years, this being true 
today as well as 10 or 20 years ago. Such findings may reflect the conceptual imprecision of 
synthetic corruption indicators, but they also call for a more nuanced analysis of the effects 
of corruption on the development of a specific country.  
Weak public management is the second unanimously recognised source of hindrance in the 
process of development. Of course, this may partly be the consequence of corruption. Here 
too, the cross-country difference in synthetic indicators of the quality of public management 
across countries is not strongly unfavourable to Benin. Yet some sectors are singled out as 
particularly weak by survey respondents and analysts. Three of them are repeatedly singled 
out. The tax system is found to be complex and the tax administration grossly inefficient in 
collecting tax revenues, with clear adverse consequences for the dependency of Benin on 
foreign finance. The power sector, run by a state-owned monopoly, is found to perform badly 
due to weak or ineffective regulation. Finally, if the delivery of social services, especially 
education, is found to have made progress in quantity, this is not the case for quality. Benin 
underperforms in relation to other sub-Saharan African countries by a wide margin and, from 
that point of view, lags very much behind the countries that grew faster, from roughly the 
same initial level of income, over the last 20 years.  
The opacity of government policymaking to the public, very much stressed by survey 
respondents, is probably to be imputed to weak public management, but it is also a sign of 
deficient political institutions, generally regarded as weaker than in other sub-Saharan 
African countries. From that point of view, however, survey respondents are somewhat 
ambivalent. On the one hand, many of them tend to trust constitutional institutions and are 
confident of the success of some current reforms. On the other hand, most also agree that 
the whole system is deeply corrupt and, because of this, often dysfunctional. Such a severe 
judgement even appears in the opening remarks of the official CPF, a document signed 
between the Government of Benin and the World Bank.    
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Available statistics show that informality is more developed in Benin than in the average sub-
Saharan African country. Growth diagnostic analyses suggest that informality has a cost in 
terms of tax revenues, job precariousness, and lack of control over the economy. This is not 
a point that appears strongly in the opinion survey, perhaps because of the presence of a 
substantial group of informal firm managers in the sample. It is not a dimension of institutions 
that appears explicitly in the synthetic indicators provided by international databases. Yet the 
reason why informality is more developed in Benin is clear: it is more the result of the 
importance of the illegal cross-border trade with Nigeria than it is the result of some specific 
institutional failure. However, its consequences for the functioning of institutions are serious.  
A last area deserves mention, even though it was not prominent as such in the opinion 
survey and was not explicitly covered by the synthetic indicators: it is the way land allocation 
is managed. One of the growth diagnostic studies mentions that land is becoming scarce in 
the southern part of the country, so that managing it efficiently will become more and more 
crucial in the future.  As in other sub-Saharan African countries, land operations raise 
difficulties in Benin because of the uncertain status of ownership and the legacy of 
customary practices. A reform was passed in 2013, which, according to the opinion survey, 
is complex and does not really resolve the sources of land conflict. Land laws and their 
implementation reveal institutional weaknesses whose economic consequences may be 
considerable in the future, especially in a country with a comparative advantage in 
agriculture.  
  
  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  30 
References 
Barhoumi, K., Cui, K., Dieterich, C., End, N., Ghilardi, M., Raabe, A. and Sola, S. (2016) 
‘Make Investment Scaling-Up Work in Benin: a Macro-fiscal Analysis’, International 
Monetary Fund, The African Department. 
Briones Alonso, E., Houssa, R., and Verpoorten, M. (2016) ‘Voodoo versus fishing 
committees: The role of traditional and contemporary institutions in fisheries 
management’, Ecological Economics 122, pp. 61–70.  
Bourguignon, F. and Libois, F. (2018) ‘Collecting insights for an institutional diagnostic of 
development’, in Bourguignon, F. and S. Wangwe (eds.), An Institutional Diagnostic of 
Tanzania, https://edi.opml.co.uk/research/tanzania-institutional-diagnostic/  
de Vries, G.J., Timmer, M.P., and de Vries, K. (2015) ‘Structural Transformation in Africa: 
Static gains, dynamic losses’, Journal of Development Studies, 51(6). 
Dhillon, A. and Rigolini, J. (2011) ‘Development and the interaction of enforcement 
institutions’, Journal of Public Economics 95 (1–2), pp. 79–87. 
Dossou A. S., Sinzogan, J.-Y., and Mensah, S. (2008) ‘Economic growth in Benin: Lost 
Opportunities’, In Ndulu, Benno J., O’Connell, S.A., Bates, R.H. et al. (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000, Volume 2: Countries Case Studies, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, S. 101–119. 
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D., and Velasco, A. (2005) ‘Growth diagnostics’, Harvard Kennedy 
School Working Paper, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School. 
International Monetary Fund (2012) ‘Maintaining Growth in an Uncertain World: IMF Outlook 
for Sub-Saharan Africa’, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Ianchovichina, E. (2008) ‘What are the Binding Constraints to Growth in Benin?’, In Benin 
Constraints to Growth and Potential for Diversification and Innovation, Country Economic 
Memorandum (June 2009), World Bank, PREM 4, Africa Region, Chapter 1, pp. 1-37. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) ‘Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators 1996–2009’, Policy Research Working Paper 4978, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Programme d’analyse des systèmes éducatifs de la Conférence des ministres de l'Éducation 
des Etats et gouvernements de la Francophonie (CONFEMEN) – PASEC (2014). 
‘Competencies and learning factors in primary education’, PASEC2014. 
République du Bénin (2007) ‘La corruption et la gouvernance au Bénin: Rapport des 
résultats de l’enquête diagnostique’.  
République du Bénin, Présidence de la République du Bénin (2016) Bénin Révélé – Le 
Nouveau Départ : Programme d’Actions du Gouvernement – PAG 2016–2021. 
Unité de Coordination de la Formulation du 2e Programme et du Suivi des Réformes de 
MCA-Bénin (2012) ‘Analyse des Contraintes à la Croissance Economique au Benin’, 
Etude préparatoire au second compact MCA2. 
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Alvarado Pachon, N., and Svensson, 
R. (2018) ‘The Quality of Government Standard Dataset’, Version Jan18. Gothenburg: 
University of Gothenburg, Quality of Government Institute. doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan18. 
Whiteley, P. (2000) ‘Economic growth and social capital’, Political Studies, 48, pp. 443–466. 
World Bank (2017) ‘World Development Indicators’, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2017a) ‘Priorities for ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity: Systematic 
Country Diagnostic’. 
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  31 
World Bank (2018) ‘Country Partnership Framework for the period 2019-2023, Report No. 
123031-BJ’. 
World Bank (2016) ‘Enterprise Surveys: Benin’, 
www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2016/benin
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  32 
Appendix 
Table 7: Overview of the 10 broad institutional areas 
Cluster code Broad institutional area Areas covered 
A Political institutions 
Functioning of political institutions and political life; popular participation; civil liberties; 
transparency and accountability; corruption; state capacity; interference of non-state organisations 
in policymaking; recruitment of politicians 
B Law and order, justice, and security 
Rule of law; functioning of judicial system; protection of civil liberties; control of violence; 
supervision of public companies; business law and its implementation 
C Functioning of public administration 
State capacity; transparency of economic policy and reporting; corruption; public procurement; 
supervision of public companies; geographical coverage of public services; relationship with 
business sector; regulation; decentralisation 
D Ease of doing business 
Relationship with public administration; privatisation, public procurement; price controls; 
competition regulation; foreign direct investments; functioning of credit and capital markets; 
litigation procedures; labour market regulation; role of trade unions; recruitment of business 
leaders 
E Dealing with land rights  
Access to land for business purposes (urban and rural); role of local communities; role of public 
administration; security of property rights (or equivalent in view of state property principle); conflict 
settlement and functioning of land courts 
F Long-term and strategic planning 
Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of policy; communication on economic policy; capacity to 
coordinate stakeholders; long-run and strategic vision of development; obstacles to public action; 
decentralisation  
G Market regulation 
Capacity to regulate market competition; regulation of utilities; regulation of foreign direct 
investments; regulation of financial sector; regulation of labour market; quality of system of 
information on firms 
H Security of transactions and contracts 
Security of contracts and property rights; insolvency law; litigation procedures; business laws and 
business courts 
I Relations with the rest of the world  
Trade openness; financial openness; relations with neighbouring countries; attitude towards 
foreign direct investments; ease of starting a business; land tenure security; relations with donors 
J 
Social cohesion, social protection, 
and solidarity 
Popular participation in policy debates; civil liberties; access to justice system; sense of national 
identity; discriminatory practices; geographical coverage of public services; instruments of social 
protection; traditional solidarity  
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Table 8: Institutional choices across selected groups 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Groups A B C D E F G H I J 
Beninese nationality 
0.100 -0.159 0.177 -0.325*** 0.335*** -0.0216 -0.150 -0.00605 -0.203** 0.253** 
(0.124) (0.115) (0.122) (0.116) (0.115) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0557) (0.0903) (0.113) 
Female 
-0.162** -0.0664 -0.0988 0.167*** 0.0154 -0.0586 0.100* 0.00309 0.0941** 0.00617 
(0.0648) (0.0607) (0.0643) (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0535) (0.0529) (0.0293) (0.0475) (0.0599) 
Formal firms 
-0.117* -0.109* -0.0558 0.176*** -0.00458 -0.0861* 0.0894* 0.102*** 0.0762* -0.0714 
(0.0619) (0.0576) (0.0613) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0509) (0.0504) (0.0274) (0.0453) (0.0569) 
Large 
-0.160** 0.00953 -0.0573 0.199*** -0.0632 -0.0586 0.0869 0.0792** 0.0281 -0.0635 
(0.0761) (0.0713) (0.0754) (0.0716) (0.0713) (0.0627) (0.0621) (0.0341) (0.0559) (0.0701) 
Medium 
-0.00777 -0.224 -0.0829 0.168 -0.0212 -0.0150 0.298** -0.0544 0.0420 -0.103 
(0.161) (0.149) (0.158) (0.151) (0.150) (0.132) (0.130) (0.0719) (0.117) (0.147) 
Small and micro 
-0.0311 -0.245** -0.0166 0.0589 0.121 -0.136 -0.0379 0.174*** 0.154** -0.0421 
(0.153) (0.143) (0.150) (0.142) (0.140) (0.126) (0.124) (0.0689) (0.113) (0.142) 
Financial institutions 
-0.266* 0.0156 -0.255* -0.0885 0.185 0.122 0.214* 0.0313 0.00781 0.0339 
(0.146) (0.137) (0.144) (0.139) (0.137) (0.121) (0.119) (0.0658) (0.107) (0.135) 
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9: Institutional choices across selected groups 
Coefficients of a regression of a dummy variable defined by whether a broad institutional area is considered as critical by the respondent or not over some characteristics of 
respondents. Stars reflect the statistical significance of the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Groups A B C D E F G H I J 
Financial institution managers -0.262* 0.00330 -0.228 -0.130 0.236* 0.132 0.179 0.0272 -0.0116 0.0528 
Retired civil servants 0.125 0.0336 -0.0156 -0.198 0.191 0.0714 -0.238* -0.0561 0.00360 0.0831 
Agriculture, commerce, and 
industry operators 
-0.143 -0.225** 0.0705 0.0941 0.262** 0.167* -0.132 -0.0561 -0.126 0.0879 
Local politicians  0.266 -0.219 0.106 -0.380** 0.292* 0.0209 -0.0154 -0.0561 -0.178 0.164 
Other constitutional bodies -0.0671 0.0774 0.254** -0.268*** 0.254*** -0.0902 -0.201** 0.0180 -0.0671 0.0898 
Teachers and professors  0.0339 -0.148 0.257* -0.289** 0.372*** 0.0714 -0.238* -0.0561 -0.0873 0.0831 
Trade unions and civil society 0.488* 0.170 -0.311 -0.380 -0.264 0.299 0.0124 0.194* -0.178 -0.0305 
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Abstract 
This chapter uses a novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, 
political brokers, and businessmen in Benin to investigate the way the nature of these 
arrangements depends on the level of political competition. We find that firms provide 
financial support to local and national politicians in exchange for policy concessions, direct 
budget support, ‘favourable’ procurement auctions (bid-rigging), and various forms of state 
capture. In addition, while bid-rigging features constantly in politician–firm contracts, 
increased electoral uncertainty is associated with less demand for policy concession and 
stronger preference for direct forms of state capture, i.e. the appointment of firms’ agents or 
cronies to key government positions. In other words, electoral uncertainty could 
simultaneously contribute to democratic consolidation through political turnover, and to the 
worse forms of corruption through state capture by business elites. 
JEL: D72, D78, H5 
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1 Introduction 
A large number of studies show that patron–client relationships between politicians and voters 
deter democratisation and development (Wantchekon 2003; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2017; Robinson and Verdier 2013; Gallego, Li and Wantchekon 
2018). However, while most studies focus on the interaction between politicians and voters, 
and more recently on the role of political brokers,1 most fail to characterise the influence of 
interest groups on political distortions. 
In developing countries, where government budgets are limited, the costs of clientelistic 
contracts are borne by politicians who, for the most part, are paid by corporations in return for 
control of government actions and policy concessions. As a result, corporations become 
underlying patrons of the politician–voter contract. The role of firms is even stronger when no 
public funding is provided for campaigns, or where politicians need to sustain clientelistic 
contracts far beyond electoral campaign time periods. 
The consequences of leaving aside the role of firms in studies of patron–client relationships 
between politicians and voters are twofold. First, by assuming that sponsoring interests and 
vote-buying political parties are unified actors that hold the same incentive structure, studies 
fail to recognise the role played by firms themselves as political actors, and how clientelistic 
contracts between politicians, political brokers, and voters are endogenous to private 
preferences and actions. 
Second, the clientelism literature has understudied firms’ strategic decision-making when faced 
by shocks from the political system and have thus missed an important democratic paradox: 
interest groups may seek to undermine democratic consolidation – which thrives with electoral 
uncertainty – through increasing levels of intervention, corruption, and capture. In other words, 
democracy thrives with electoral uncertainty through political turnover. However, electoral 
uncertainty also leads to higher financial risk by sponsoring firms – particularly in settings 
where winning margins are close – and/or higher bribing/sponsoring costs as the number of 
political candidates increases. 
We can identify the mechanisms of this paradox from the supply viewpoint of sponsoring 
interests or looking at the demand side of politicians’ bargaining power. From the former, as 
electoral uncertainty increases so does the incentive for firms to mitigate financial risk through 
the appointment of cronies to key government positions, making politicians irrelevant to policy 
implementation. In other words, increasing risk leads firms to arrange contracts with candidates 
that replace political intermediaries with direct patrons. Patrons then act as electoral risk 
mitigating tools for special interests. 
From the latter, demand-side viewpoint, as electoral uncertainty increases (e.g. with smaller 
winning margins or a vast number of candidates contending for office) politicians’ electoral 
power diminishes vis-à-vis other political contenders, decreasing their bargaining power at the 
politician–firm contractual arrangement phase, allowing stronger forms of private intervention 
and capture. Notice, importantly, that electoral uncertainty surges not from bad or good 
politicians who engage with voters through a cheap-talk game to hide their type, but from the 
political environment and electoral institutional design.   
                                               
1  See Gallego, Li, and Wantchekon (2018), for example, on how brokers are crucial but were also neglected by the 
clientelism literature until more recent theoretical (Stokes et al. 2013; Gingerich and Medina 2013; Camp, Dixit, and 
Stokes 2014) and empirical work (Baldwin 2014; Koter 2016; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubín 2016; Larreguy, 
Montiel, and Querubín 2017; Kadt and Larreguy 2018). 
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In that regard, this chapter uses a novel database on contractual arrangements between 
politicians, political brokers, and businessmen in Benin to investigate the way the nature of 
these arrangements depends on the level of political competition. To do so, the chapter 
pursues four objectives. 
First, we propose a reconfiguration of the clientelism and political distortion literature by 
bringing it together with the elite capture and special interest group literatures. The cronyism 
and special interests and lobbying literatures have moved separately from the clientelism 
literature and have focused on showing, among other things, that political distortions from 
clientelism are ‘fundamentally different in nature from elite capture’ (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2012, p. 2). With regards to distributional politics, for instance, clientelism is typically 
progressive, as poor voters are willing to sell their votes at a lower ‘price’. Capture is 
regressive, as richer interest groups are willing/able to pay more. Moreover, clientelism 
decreases public good allocation by favouring private use of public resources, while the 
implications of capture for public goods remains ambiguous and highly dependent on interest 
groups preference and type. In other words, the special interest literature has stressed that 
while clientelism and capture represent important forms of political distortion and institutional 
weakness, especially in developing countries, they are qualitatively different. However, by 
doing so they have overlooked what politicians do with the financial and non-financial 
resources provided by firms, and thus they have theoretically mis-specified their utility function, 
and the effect of electoral constraints on firms’ investment maximisation problem. Consider, for 
instance, that politicians’ strategies of voter mobilisation have to be financed. Thus, campaign 
finance affects the decision to choose one mobilisation strategy over another2. 
Second, we characterise empirically the existent firm–politician–broker–voter contractual 
arrangement, focusing mainly on the relationship between the gifts/resources given to 
politicians and the different payback demands established by corporations. The chapter uses a 
novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers, and (local 
and foreign) businessmen in Benin to investigate the nature of these arrangements and their 
dependence on the degree of electoral competition. Obtaining information on the underlying 
‘sponsoring system’ is difficult, and to our knowledge no study has tried to depict the bilateral 
relation in terms of resources and paychecks between firms and national and local politicians. 
To do this, we carried out structured interviews with key political actors to build a contractual-
level dataset covering Benin’s 12 departments and 24 electoral districts from 1991 to 2018, for 
legislative and municipal-level elections. The results allow us to construct national- and local-
level contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers, and firms, including both 
the financial amounts given to politicians as well as specific concessions granted to interest 
groups. 
Thirdly, we look at determinants of the form of firm–politician contracts. To do so, we consider 
two alternatives. First, we estimate the effect of political competition as proxied by municipal-
level winning margins on firms’ strategic decision-making at the local level, controlling for 
various cross-municipal socio-demographic differences, surveyor, and municipal fixed effects. 
To push forth causal identification we provide placebo tests on legislative-level elections. 
Elections for Members of Parliament (MPs) in Benin provides an ideal placebo since they do 
not hold control over national or regional level procurement and budgeting, and they have no 
say on national or regional bureaucratic positions. Contrary to other settings, MPs are not 
allocated to relevant committees in the parliament in charge of budgeting but rely on party and 
executive lines for general voting patterns in the assembly. Thus, electoral shocks that modify 
                                               
2  Additionally, the literature has wrongly viewed interest groups as actors on the demand side of the cronyism 
market, when actually they act as financial suppliers for politicians who need extra-governmental resources to 
advance their political careers through elections, giving institutional concessions as payment. 
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the overall electoral uncertainty faced by MPs should not lead to firms’ stronger preference 
towards more direct forms of state capture or the appointment of cronies to key government 
positions. Second, we exploit a quasi-exogenous shock introduced by the 2018 electoral 
reform that –among other features – collapsed the existent multi-party system to a two-party 
block competition3. The reform allows us to compare those communes and electoral districts 
with multiple parties competing for office and suddenly collapsed to one of the two proposed 
party blocks, decreasing electoral competition (our treatment group), to those districts that were 
already under a de facto two-party system (our control). Our expectation, later confirmed 
empirically, is that those districts that experience a decrease in electoral uncertainty experience 
a decrease in firms’ preference for direct forms of state capture. Both empirical strategies then 
allow us to observe the existent simultaneity of democratic consolidation – which thrives with 
electoral uncertainty through political turnover – and special interests’ state capture. 
Finally, the fourth objective of the chapter is to contribute to the study of institutional reforms 
that aim to reduce the influence of interest groups and the negative effects of clientelism in 
developing countries. In particular, we pinpoint the need for multi-level reforms to prevent 
business interference, limit bureaucratic capture by brokers, promote transparent appointment 
processes, and strengthen accountability through the promotion of voter civic engagement in 
Benin. 
In fact, since the democratic renewal of Benin in 1991, political actors initiated reforms aiming 
to reduce the cost of campaigning. However, the reforms yield mixed results. The attempts 
include the following. First, the imposition of campaign spending caps per election type 
(presidential, parliamentary and local). However, the caps have not been respected or 
enforced. Furthermore, by 1998, a provision in the electoral code removed the Supreme 
Court’s verification capacity -the institution in charge of the control of campaign spending of 
candidates and parties-.  By 1999 a new electoral restriction was introduced forbidding the 
distribution of campaign gadgets (T-Shirts, Caps, Pens, etc.) with parties and candidates’ logos 
within 6 Months from national elections (presidential and parliamentarian). The electoral 
change had mixed results, with parties and candidates utilizing specific colors for branding 
instead of logos. Lastly, a limitation of campaign period to 2 weeks was established (contrary to 
countries where there is no limitation at all like Ghana or where the campaign period is long 
such as Nigeria of 3 months). This restriction is supposed to contribute to the reduction of 
campaign costs. Except for the incumbent, this measure has seemed to be by and large 
successful.  
It is important to note that Benin has three traits that make it an ideal setting in which to study 
the relationship between economic and electoral risk and firms’ state capture strategies. First, 
the dynamics of electoral competition and economic power vary substantially across the 
country’s 77 communes and 12 departments. Figure 1 shows the winning margin and the 
Herfnidhal-Hirschman Index of vote share concentration by political party for the commune-
level 2015 elections. As noted, not only are winning margins substantially low, but Benin can 
be characterised as a low concentrated party system in terms of vote share. Moreover, 
between communes and within communes across time we notice large variability in the actions 
taken by influence groups to achieve their desired outcomes. Second, Benin provides a case of 
thriving democratisation mixed with poor governance and various degrees of local state 
capacity, an important mediator to consider when studying politician–private sector contracts. 
                                               
3 The electoral reform introduced various other changes, including a higher deposit required for candidates to 
contend for the presidential election; a reduction in the amount of state resources to finance local, communal, and 
municipal elections, which decreased by 50% from Central African Franc (CFA) 20,000 to CFA 10,000; the 
introduction of campaign caps; and restrictions on former customs officers and forest agents running for legislative 
seats unless they resigned one year prior to the election, among others. 
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Lastly, a pseudo decentralised political system allows for local politicians to have substantial 
freedom to shape local campaigns and agree to different contractual arrangements with their 
financial sponsors. 
Our results show three main findings. First, around 34% of mayors and city councils competing 
for municipal-level positions, and deputies competing for legislative seats, face budget 
constraints in regard to developing their political campaigns. This creates a need to negotiate 
their budget deficit with businessmen in order to run for elections, allowing for contracts 
through narrow commitment over policies. Second, the most recurrent policy concessions 
made by businessmen are public procurement arrangements (71% of contracts include such 
concession), followed by policy commitments related to firms’ interests (46% of cases), and the 
direct appointment of businessmen’s relatives to public positions (39% of cases). In part, this 
rank ordering is due to the fact that public procurement allows for firms to cash in and for 
politicians to keep a share of the procurement (a minimum of 10% in Benin’s case). Note that 
policy concessions add more than a 100% which implies that contracts contain more than one 
concession petition. 
Most interesting are firms’ strategic decisions when faced with political uncertainty. If 
incumbents do not comply with the contract with firms, the latter may finance riots against the 
former to increase economic concessions and payment. Moreover, firms seek to support 
challengers with contracts that are characterised by higher concessions, increasing the overall 
control of firms over local governments and national politics. Regarding the estimation of the 
effect of winning margins on firms’ capture preferences, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in winning margin decreases the reliance on more direct forms of state capture by -
0.1684 standard deviations for municipal-level elections, a result that is significant to the 1% 
level and robust to surveyor and municipal fixed effects and socio-demographic controls. 
However, interestingly, positive and non-significant results are found for MPs elections, 
showing that electoral shocks only have an effect on firms’ capture preferences when political 
actors are relevant for electoral risk management. 
Relative to the status quo concession benchmark, when elections become more uncertain due 
to the introduction of more challengers, firms modify their demands in relation to incumbents. In 
particular, they rely more heavily on demanding that incumbents’ platform commitments are 
similar to firms’ interests during the electoral campaign (a prevalence of 68%), while 
decreasing the proportion of public procurement petitions to 67%, holding the second place, 
followed by an increase in pushing forward the political careers of businessmen’s 
acquaintances, which reaches an occurrence of 64%. Moreover, in this case of higher electoral 
uncertainty the influence and control over the recruitment in all public sectors increases from 
17% to 51%. Lastly, in the absence of what firms consider a ‘good’ candidate to fund, firms 
increase their participation in elections by running for election themselves. 
These results are tied to those on the effect of Benin’s 2018 electoral reform on party collapse 
in that electoral uncertainty drives firms’ capture preference. In particular, multi-party districts 
affected by the reform show a decrease of -0.259 standard deviations on firms’ capture 
preferences in the current 2019 commune-level elections. In other words, as the number of 
candidates decreases – and thus the cost of bribes – firms rely less heavily on more direct 
forms of state capture, such as the appointment of firms’ agents or cronies to key government 
positions. Specifically, firms decrease their use of patronage to move forward the political 
careers of friends and family members (decrease of -0.437 standard deviations), they decrease 
their use of patronage of members from the company (-0.436), and they reduce the demands 
on bureaucratic recruitment control (-0.606). The results are robust to including controls on 
politician-level characteristics, as well as commune fixed effects. Moreover, we show that the 
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sample of politicians used show a balance on multiple covariates between districts that hold 
multi-party competition in the 2015 elections (the treatment), to those with a de facto two-party 
competition (the control). While this balance does not rule out commune- and firm-level 
differences between treatment and control, they show that the results are not driven by sample 
selection bias. As with the effect of winning margins on firms’ capture preferences, we also find 
positive and non-significant effects for legislative-level elections, which provides an important 
placebo to take into consideration. 
We believe differentiating sponsoring interest groups, politicians, and voters will lead to 
interesting developments in the clientelism literature. First, this chapter provides an explanation 
of the coordination between politicians and private interests in order to marginalise poor voters, 
especially in the face of increasing demands for redistribution. Second, it makes it possible to 
explain the paradoxical result of stronger degrees of direct involvement of interest groups 
through personal nominations in highly democratised (i.e. highly uncertain) settings. Thirdly, 
the chapter helps increase our understanding of the variation in strategic decision-making of 
interest groups between different levels of uncertainty across time and space, either caused by 
variation in electoral risk or interest groups’ risk. In the spirit of Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), 
where politicians prefer to use clientelism when they can predict voters’ electoral conduct and 
elasticity, interest groups prefer to rely on direct capture strategies when uncertainty is high, 
and they rely on sponsoring political campaigns only when politicians can predict voters’ 
behaviour well. This point is closely related to the literature on the link between economic and 
political structural conditions and strategic choices made by firms to mobilise citizens 
(Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni, 2016). 
This chapter is closely related to work on mapping de facto institutions. Starting with Dahl’s (1961)  
description of the power structure in New Haven and moving to more recent literature on family 
networks and politicians (for example, Cruz, Labonne, and Querubin 2017; Querubin 2016), there 
has been a need to characterise the full power dynamics affecting electoral politics. Moreover, 
this chapter speaks directly to the large literature on interest groups and cronyism. The crony 
governance literature focuses on systems in which economic policies are chosen with the goal of 
benefiting connected actors (Klor, Saiegh, and Satyanath 2017). Our study, in contrast, focuses 
on showing how interest groups develop crony networks in local institutions as the degree of 
uncertainty increases. Most importantly, this chapter connects the seemingly distant but actually 
highly related literatures of clientelism and cronyism, showing that electoral risk encountered in 
clientelism settings affects firms’ (sponsors’) strategic decisions to create and fund networks in 
high-level bureaucratic and political positions. 
This chapter is more closely related to the literature on elite capture of local institutions in 
developing countries. Ch et al. (2018), for example, show that illegal armed interest groups in 
Colombia – both left-wing guerrilla forces and right-wing paramilitary groups – shaped policy 
outcomes by influencing local officials who implemented the groups’ policy preferences. 
Likewise, Sanchez-Talanquer (2018) and Pardelli (2018) find that landowners transform local 
institutions in their favour by appointments to key local bureaucracy and political positions, which 
result in pushing forward beneficial policies in terms of taxes, property rights, and property land 
values, and  which increase the relative power of local governments vis-à-vis higher levels of 
government. This chapter shows how firms use various strategies to control local institutions, and 
not only promote policy change through violence (as in the case of Colombia), policy change, 
political campaign sponsoring, or direct appointments to bureaucratic positions. 
Campaign Finance and State Capture 
© Economic Development & Institutions  7 
2 Theory and testable hypotheses 
Consider Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal’s (2015) clientelistic relationship analysis in India, 
where elite minorities can undermine policies that push forward redistribution in favour of the 
poor majority. In this case, the capture mechanism runs through land ownership dominance and 
the use of cultural hierarchies to achieve political control. However, while empirical evidence 
shows that elites undermine democracy even in a non-coerced setting, the existent strategic 
relationship between firms and politicians is not clearly described and is actually not 
considered. There could be at least two possible type of relationships between firms and 
politicians, depending on the source of uncertainty. First, politicians could renege on delivering 
investments to sponsors. Under this setting firms face uncertainty due to politicians’ type, which 
allows a cheap-talk strategic setting: politicians act as agents that hold a private information 
advantage in respect to their sponsors or the principal, and ‘bad’ politician types renege on their 
contractual arrangement or benefit from their advantageous information standpoint. Second, 
firms might face uncertainty coming not from politicians’ type but from the political environment 
and institutional design. From a supply-side standpoint, i.e. from the perspective of political 
sponsors like firms, high electoral competition leads to high risk on campaign financial 
investments. As a response to higher financial risk, firms increase their demand for more direct 
forms of capture, moving from procurement demands to requesting political appointments and 
recruitment bureaucratic control. Cronies are then selected to such positions, bypassing 
politicians entirely. 
From a demand-side standpoint, high electoral competition implies politicians’ bargaining 
power is weaker at the time of negotiating the terms and clauses of the contractual 
arrangement with firms. Not only is there at least one other candidate with similar electoral strength 
that could compete for funding, but electoral competition increases both the marginal cost of a 
vote as well as total campaign costs. The result is needy politicians facing risk-averse firms who 
move to stronger preferences for direct forms of state capture through the appointment of key 
government positions. 
What does the contract look like? Sponsors fund politicians in order to receive a payback. The 
payback takes a wide range of forms, running from more indirect to more direct forms of state 
hijacking: refunds on financial investment; policies and platform changes; public procurement; 
control of budget lines; patronage; and bureaucratic recruitment control. 
We hypothesise that variation in electoral uncertainty will relate strongly with variation in firms’ 
preferences for more direct forms of state capture. Specifically, from a sponsor viewpoint, the 
testable hypotheses of the project are as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: More political competition implies higher electoral uncertainty, then firms will 
prefer government control. 
 Hypothesis 2: Less political competition implies lower electoral uncertainty, then firms will 
prefer policy concessions. 
Note that the two hypotheses depict a democratic paradox: business interest may undermine 
democratic consolidation, which thrives with electoral uncertainty. In other words, business 
interest explains part of the democratic backsliding seen across the world, as business interests 
prefer to capture government when faced with strong democratic uncertainty. 
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3 Data and methodology 
To test how political competition affects firms’ uncertainty and modifies their preference for 
more direct forms of state capture, we study the relationship between international and 
domestic companies and electoral politics at various levels of aggregation – national and local 
– in Benin, covering all elections from 1991 to 2019. Benin exemplifies a thriving nascent 
democracy, with poor governance and economic performance. While being what has been 
labelled as a successful democracy, Benin has been characterised by a high level of corporate 
capture of local and national politics. As noted by Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013), the 
country’s institutional development has allowed for clientelistic promises to narrow groups of 
citizens and has favoured private use of local government resources. Benin contains over 
3,000 villages (called quartiers) in 77 communes, and they vary widely in the type of productive 
activities carried out, as well as in the political competition in a multi-party system. 
Our methodology exploits two sources of variation. First, variation in firms’ political investment 
or contractual choice. To measure this, we rely on a novel database on contractual 
arrangements between politicians, political brokers, and firms in Benin. In particular, we carried 
out structured interviews with key players, including campaign managers, CEOs of politically 
connected firms, local brokers, and politicians and candidates, among others4. The result is a 
dataset with a sample of more than 300 Beninese politicians (deputies, ministries, mayors, 
etc.), as well as political brokers, covering Benin’s 12 departments and 77 communes. 
The data collection took place in Beninese constituencies with targeted populations from 6 
February to 21 February 2019. Given the difficulty in identifying potential subjects to survey, a 
snowball sampling technique (or chain-referral sampling) was used. This is a non-probability 
sampling technique where existing politicians surveyed recruited future subjects from among 
their acquaintances. Prior to the interviews, the controller -in charge of coordinating interviews- 
arranged an appointment with the politician via phone call to establish the contact between the 
latter and his enumerators to prepare the interview. Then, enumerators met the politician alone, 
or in a team of two or three, depending on the category (national or local) and/or the agenda of 
the latter to conduct the interviews. Overall, 311 political actors and brokers were surveyed: 
256 politicians, including 191 local politicians (mayors, councillors, etc.), and 83 national 
politicians (deputies, ministries, cabinets staff, etc.), with 18 who have run for both local and 
national positions, and 55 brokers (18% of the full sample). Given that elections were 
scheduled for March and April 2019, we were able to acquire information on contemporary 
campaigns as well as past ones since 1991. Of the full sample, 76% were running as candidate 
for the next elections. This dataset allowed us to depict existent politician–firm contracts (such 
as funding amounts and sources, for instance), and contract types, ranging from those that 
demand policy and procurement concessions from politicians, to those that seek to influence 
political platforms during campaign periods, and those that seek to influence direct 
appointments of firms’ acquaintances, or direct intervention through control of budget lines or 
key bureaucratic positions. 
It is important to note some overall characteristics of the politicians in the database. First, 54% 
of the 215 surveyed individuals who were running for the next election were running for 
municipal-level elections, while the rest were competing for legislative ones. On average, 
individuals have 47 years of age and hold a high variety of education degrees, especially high-
level ones, with the majority having either undergraduate or graduate degrees. Moreover, as 
noted in Table 1, only 27% are first-time runners and those who have recurrently participated in 
elections in the past have participated in a large number of different type of elections, from 
                                               
4 These were conducted by the Institute of Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE). 
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commune- to presidential-level ones. It is important to note that Benin is characterised as a 
highly dynamic electoral setting: more than half of the surveyed politicians have switched 
political parties. A wide majority have switched not due to opposition to their former political 
parties, but in opposition to party platform changes. In other words, the highly dynamic party 
system hides a seemingly conservative underlying ideology spectrum. Noteworthy, additionally, 
is the fact that almost all politicians and political brokers (87%) are members of a political party. 
Lastly, it is important to see that of the full sample, 36% say they have held private positions in 
the past. 
The second source of variation we exploit is national and local variation in electoral uncertainty. 
We rely on two measures of electoral uncertainty: first, the use of winning margins; second, the 
number of political candidates contending for office. We believe the former constitutes a 
benchmark measure of electoral competition, given that winning margins are positively related 
to a candidate’s likelihood of winning office or the risk associated with a candidate losing. 
Related to the latter, as the number of political candidates increases, so does the total amount 
of bribes that firms need to allocate in order to achieve their desired policy preference. In other 
words, the number of candidates represents a cost of contractual arrangements. Both the costs 
and electoral competition form part of what we define as electoral uncertainty in this particular 
setting. As an example, the highest level of electoral uncertainty will be that where low winning 
margins coincide with a plethora of political candidates running for office with relatively equal 
electoral strength. 
For identification we rely on two empirical tests, given these two sources of variation, firms’ 
preferences for direct capture and electoral uncertainty. First, we analyse the relationship 
between winning margins and firms’ state capture preferences as stated in contractual 
arrangements. In particular, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification: 
yd = α + γd + βWinning Margind + ΦXd + ΘWi + sd (1) 
 
where yd is either a dummy of any of the preferences for state capture or intervention pushed 
by firms on politicians, including: demanding a refund of resources,  and demanding policy and 
programme modification during a campaign; demanding support for future candidates close to 
firms; demanding a local budget line; demanding public procurement; patronage both for close 
family members and friends or members from the firm; and taking control of bureaucratic 
recruitment control in a district d; Winning Margind is a continuous variable on the winning 
margin of the incumbent relative to the second runner for the 2015 commune-level elections; 
Xd is a vector of commune- level control variables;5 Wi is a vector of politician-level 
characteristics, listed in Table 8, including age, education, title, former occupation, political 
experience, a dummy to account for party switch and reasons for such a switch, and electoral 
political experience as candidates in different types of elections; we also include a district fixed 
effect, γd, to account for any district-level time-invariant heterogeneity. Thus, our estimates 
account for the change in firms’ preferences for direct forms of state capture in districts that 
have experienced high electoral uncertainty, as proxied by smaller winning margins. We report 
robust standard errors throughout, clustered at the electoral district level.6  
                                               
5  GDP, poverty, and 2015 electoral measures, including number of candidates, and Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of 
party vote share concentration. 
6 We believe this to be a conservative approach. If we simply use robust standard errors all results become 
somewhat stronger statistically. 
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Note, however, that this specification does not allow us to rule out time-variant and other 
sources of potential endogeneity. To push forth identification we estimate equation (1) for 
municipal-level elections and run a placebo test on legislative-level elections. Elections for MPs 
in Benin provide an ideal placebo since MPs do not exercise control over national- or regional-
level procurement and budgeting, and they have no say on national or regional bureaucratic 
positions. Contrary to other settings, MPs are not allocated to relevant committees in 
parliament in charge of budgeting but rather they rely on party and executive lines for general 
voting patterns in the assembly. Thus, electoral shocks that modify the overall electoral 
uncertainty faced by MPs should not lead to firms’ stronger preference for more direct forms of 
state capture or the appointment of cronies to key government positions. 
As a second identification strategy, we use quasi-exogenous variation introduced by the 
electoral reform in Benin in 2018, which collapsed the multi-party system to an effective two-
party block competition. The reform allows for the existence of multiple parties but forces 
parties to join a block to compete, and no more than two blocks can contend for any political 
position in the country. The reform allows us to compare those communes (or seats) that had 
multiple parties competing for office and higher degrees of electoral competition and suddenly 
were affected by the reform (our treatment group) to those communes that already had an 
effective two-party system (our control). The expectation is that communes affected by the 
electoral reform reduce the number of effective political parties and thus candidates, 
decreasing the overall financial costs of bribery faced by sponsoring firms, making them less 
desirous of more direct forms of state intervention. Interestingly, the number of candidates is 
highly negatively correlated with the winning margin, and positively correlated with voter turnout 
for the commune-level 2015 elections (see Figure 5). Thus, while we believe the effective 
number of parties (and candidates) acts as a proxy for capture costs of firms, it also represents 
an indirect measure of electoral competition, and thus electoral uncertainty. In short, for the 
identification of the effect of contract type we will rely on cross-municipal competition variation 
triggered by quasi-exogenous shocks in electoral competition. Specifically, we estimate an 
OLS specification at the electoral district level, for commune level-elections on the effect of the 
electoral reform as a quasi-exogenous shock to electoral uncertainty on firms’ strategic capture 
of government in the current 2019 elections: 
yd = α + γd + βElectoral Reformd + ΦXd + ΘWi + sd (2) 
 
where yd is either a dummy of any of the demands pushed by firms on politicians, including: 
demanding a refund of resources; demanding policy and programme modification during the 
campaign; demanding support for future candidates close to firms; demanding control over the 
local budget line; demanding control over public procurement; demanding patronage both for 
close family members and friends or members from the firm; and taking control of bureaucratic 
recruitment control in a district d; Electoral Reformd is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a 
commune-level electoral district had more than 2.5 effective number of parties, as measured by 
a Molinar Index for the 2015 commune-level elections, and 0 otherwise7; Xd is a vector of 
commune-level control variables;8 Wi is a vector of politician-level characteristics, listed in 
Table 8, including age, education, title, former occupation, political experience, a dummy to 
account for party switch and reasons for such a switch, and electoral political experience as 
candidates in different types of elections; we also include the district fixed effect, γd, to account 
for any district-level time-invariant heterogeneity. We are thus working with between-electoral 
                                               
7 The results do not change if we modify the threshold for the effective number of parties up to three or down to two. 
The results are robust to using Laasko-Taagepera effective number of parties. 
8 GDP, poverty, and 2015 electoral measures, including winning margin, and Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of party 
vote share concentration. 
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district variation in firms’ government capture, controlling for a range of district- and politician-
level characteristics. Hence, our estimates account for the change in firms’ strategies in 
districts that experienced less electoral uncertainty than the electoral districts mean. We report 
robust standard errors throughout, clustered at the electoral district level, as done with equation 
(1) 9.  
For both equation (1) and (2) we construct a firm capture index with all available demands 
made by firms in their contractual arrangements with politicians. The index ranges from 0 to 6, 
with 6 being the highest degree of capture. In particular, capture demands are categorised in 
the following way: financial refunds get a value of 0; policies and programme changes a value 
of 1; support for future candidates close to firms’ interests a value of 2; control of a budget line 
a value of 3; public procurement a value of 4; patronage 5; and, lastly, bureaucratic recruitment 
control a value of 6. We believe this ordering fits well the notion of increasing capture in firms’ 
actions as depicted in the Beninese study case. 
Our identifying assumption with this approach is that electoral uncertainty variation occurs due 
to a quasi-exogenous shock conditionally independent from future firms’ capture demands. Our 
controls tease out district-level dynamics, especially pre-treatment competition levels. One 
concern, however, is that this approach could simply pick enduring cross-sectional within-
electoral district differences, correlated both with electoral uncertainty and firms’ demands.  To 
rule this out we include a set of regressions controlling for firms’ demands in the 2015 election, 
and identify whether pre-treatment demand differences between control and treatment districts 
are non-existent.10 Furthermore, we show that sampled politicians in treatment and control 
districts do not have statistically different characteristics, as noted by Table 811. This gives high 
confidence regarding avoiding sample selection bias, as well as treatment and control 
similarity. Lastly, as done with the estimation of equation (1), we use MPs’ elections as a 
placebo test. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics on campaign funding 
In this section, we provide a short description of the data, based on the preliminary descriptive 
statistics related to the central tendency of key variables of the study. This is followed by a 
short discussion. At a first glance at the data we notice that businessmen invested, on 
aggregate, a total of CFA franc 7,567,560,000 ($13,080,443.46) in the recent electoral 
campaigns as financial support to politicians, according to the 189 who responded to this 
question. On average, the former invested, all elections combined, an amount of CFA franc 
40,040,000 ($69,252.750) in the campaigns of a candidate. Considering the type of elections 
and the location, the financial package is about CFA franc 10,900,000 ($18,838.524) and CFA 
franc 47,600,000 ($82,288.818) for municipal elections, respectively, in rural and urban areas. 
These figures are higher according to the importance of elections. For instance, CFA franc 
37,300,000 ($64,470.847) and CFA franc 67,600,000 ($116,842.61) are invested in legislative 
campaigns of a candidate, respectively, in rural and urban locations. 
While political parties’ charters predict CFA franc 1,500,000 ($2,592.661) and CFA franc 
30,000,000 ($51,853.789) for municipal and legislative campaigns, out of the 27% of those 
who really know these amounts, 34% find it insufficient for the corresponding elections, 
including those who ran or will run for commune and legislative elections. Note, however, in 
                                               
9 We believe this to be a conservative approach. If we simply use robust standard errors all results become 
somewhat stronger statistically. 
10 Results available upon request. 
11 Only three indicators are statistically different (all related to education degrees), something expected with a 10% 
significance level over 27 indicators. 
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Figure 2 that those that believe politicians have a “reasonable amount of funding” or “more than 
needed” highly surpass the campaign costs from those that believe funds are insufficient. 
Actually, as noted in Figure 3, we see that those who believe that “campaign funds are 
reasonable or more than needed” believe that campaign costs should be decreased 
substantially, especially in commune-level elections. Subsequently, on average, they reported 
CFA franc 115,000,000 ($198,772.858) and CFA franc 163,000,000 ($281,691.912) as the 
amount necessary for legislatives in rural and urban constituencies, respectively. 
Furthermore, business monetary involvement in electoral campaigns is substantial. Figure 4 
shows a striking result: for commune-level elections, firms account for 54.3% of the total 
campaign costs on average. More impressive is the fact that 15.7% get funding from 
businesses that surpass the total campaign costs, sometimes holding budgets up to three to 
four times more than needed. These results are even greater for legislative-level elections, with 
firms accounting for 76.3% of total campaign costs.12 In other words, as we move up the 
federalist ladder in Benin we notice more business intervention in monetary terms. 
                                               
12 In the case of legislative elections, 28.2% get funding from firms that surpasses their total campaign costs. 
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4 Results 
The former evidence points to the high intervention of businessmen in elections at different 
levels. However, the actual proportion of politicians affiliated with firms suffers from social 
desirability bias and thus politicians might not truthfully answer sensitive questions, creating a 
measurement challenge. Moreover, given the complexity of businessmen’s interest it is difficult 
to capture such dynamics either observationally or through surveys. 
A way to address such challenges is the use of a list experiment. As noted by Blair and Imai 
(2012) and a large range of studies (Jamison et al., 2013; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Kane et al. 
2004; Gonzalez-Ocanto et al., 2010; Biemer et al., 2005) this methodology protects 
respondents’ confidentiality, allowing them to reveal sensitive information. The underlying 
mechanism in a list experiment is to compare two groups: a treatment and a control group. The 
control group is asked to report the number of non-sensitive items called a short list, while the 
treatment group is asked to report the number on that same short list plus an additional 
sensitive item. The average response for each group is estimated and differenced out. The 
difference in means represents the proportion of the population for whom the sensitive item 
applies. Design effects are tested, as well as ceiling and floor effects, to validate the list 
experiment estimate13.  
Specifically, the list experiment question tested to measure politicians’ affiliation to business 
interests was the following: 
How many of the following five individuals or groups do you consider yourself politically 
affiliated with? Please indicate HOW MANY in total: I don’t want to know which ones, only how 
many of them. [ENUMERATOR: READ CHOICES AND SHOW THEM ON A PIECE OF 
PAPER] 
The list of answers that the control groups received included: 
 the mayor of this commune; 
 a member of the communal council; 
 the prefect of this department; 
 the MP; and 
 the President/President’s political party. 
The list that the treatment group received included the following sensitive item (in the sixth 
position on the list): 
 national or local businessman/firm/business group. 
In order to separate respondents into the treatment and control group we used their birthday 
months. Those born in January, March, May, July, September, and November were assigned 
to the control group, while those born in February, April, June, August, October, and December 
made up the treatment group. 
Table 2 shows the balance between the treatment and control group of the list experiment 
across a wide range of covariates on politician characteristics. Out of 38 covariates we notice 
significant difference in 4, giving us confidence regarding the balance to the 10% level. 
                                               
13 Results in appendix. 
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Table 3 shows the results of the list experiment by running a t-test comparing the treatment 
and control means on politicians’ affiliation with firms’ interests. The difference shows a 
prevalence of firms’ interests of 48.1%, a difference significant to the 1% level. In other words, 
almost half of politicians and political brokers in Benin are affiliated with either local or national 
business interests. 
If we distinguish by election type, we notice that business affiliation is higher in commune- 
municipal elections, with a proportion of 83%, significant to the 1% level. Legislative elections 
show a lower proportion, of 45.6%, with a significance barely reaching the 10%. In other words, 
as we move up the administrative ladder, we notice a decrease in business intervention. A 
plausible explanation to explore in the future is that business interference might be higher at 
lower administrative levels due to national government lack of monitoring and state capacity. 
It is important to compare these results with those shown in Table 4. This table presents a list 
of different sources of funding provided to politicians for commune and legislative elections. 
Numbers represent the percentage of funds coming from a particular source. Related to 
business interests we note that firms, local and national, account for 16% of total funding at the 
commune level and 17% for legislative elections. Both estimates contrast significantly with the 
results of the list experiment, showing the effect of social desirability bias.14  
4.1 Contracts between firms and politicians 
A wide variety of types of funding types characterise the contract between firms and politicians 
in Benin. As noted in Table 4, firms hold a wide range of resources available for politicians. 
Besides the primacy of financial instruments and non-pecuniary goods and services provided 
by firms, politicians utilise advisers and labour to support their political campaigns. A large 
proportion of politicians (45% for commune elections and 46% for legislative ones) also utilise 
space provided by firms for their political campaigns. 
Most interestingly, the results show that public procurement arrangements have a prevalence 
in firms-politicians contracts of  71%, followed by policies commitment narrowed down to 
businessmen’s interests with a proportion of 46%. In third place comes the appointment to 
public positions of businessmen’s relatives or people they suggest. Depending on the type of 
elections, this appointment could be in the local administration as an office head or as a 
member of the central government (ministry, cabinet chiefs, etc.), with a proportion of 39%. 
These are the most preferred means for businessmen to recover what they have invested in 
candidates’ electoral campaigns and to ensure their control over the implementation of policies. 
In other words, these numbers should be considered the country’s baseline actions by firms. 
According to the respondents, businessmen prefer public procurement overall, because of the 
direct cash flows it generates. Interestingly, they place it in first place because it is also a 
means for incumbents to make money as they find a way to keep a minimum of 10% of the 
total amount for themselves, in agreement with the businessmen. It is worth emphasising that 
the amounts of these public procurements are sometime tenfold greater or even more than the 
money invested by the businessmen, and it may happen that they execute more than three to 
five projects during their tenure. 
                                               
14 While we only run a list experiment in regard to politicians’ affiliation with firms and find biased results, we do not 
do so with other survey questions. While social desirability bias might be a concern in such settings there are two 
important takeaways: first, all estimates on survey questions may downwardly bias the actual existence of firms’ 
direct capture preferences, a problem that does not affect identification as much as the total effect; second, even in 
the case of a setting with strong political transparency from politicians to surveyors, social desirability bias is an 
important feature for which estimates must be adjusted. 
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A good illustration of procurement and how effective it is for both actors is the recent scandal 
involving the building of a new national assembly in Benin: between two offers, one from a 
Chinese company that is accredited and well recognised for its insight and expertise in the 
domain, with a value of CFA franc 14,000,000,000 ($24,194,397.328), and another one from a 
national company affiliated with government officials, with a value of CFA franc 18,000,000,000 
($31,107,082.278), the government attributed the procurement to the latter, representing an 
over-spend of  CFA franc 4,000,000,000 ($6,914,643.019), which is twice the amount invested 
by the businessman to support the presidency of the Beninese former President Yayi Boni. 
Interestingly, this represents tenfold the money (CFA franc 400,000,000, so $691,464.302) the 
same businessman invested to support the legislative campaigns of a candidate. From these 
examples it appears clear why businessmen prefer public procurement over the narrow 
implementation of policies and the appointment of relatives, which might take a bit longer to 
yield the expected results. 
4.2 Contracts between politicians and voters 
On the contracts between politicians and voters, politicians apply a wide range of strategies to 
increase public support. As Table 4 shows, a large proportion of politicians and political brokers 
use non-programmatic strategies: half of politicians in commune-level elections utilise vote-
buying attempts, while 38% rely on promising political appointments, and 24% use non-
conditional transfers to citizens. For legislative elections these numbers increase to 53% for 
vote-buying attempts, 42% for political appointment promises, and 38% for non-conditional 
transfers. In the context of Benin, the use of ethnic strategies surges as an important strategy 
for promoting voter support. Ethnic strategies mostly target promoting policies that benefit the 
in-group instead of the out-group.  
4.3 Political uncertainty and firms’ strategic decision-making 
If it happens that incumbents do not comply with the deal they have made with businessmen, 
the latter may finance riots against the former. Sometimes aided by state institutions, firms’ 
actions affect politicians’ political careers by either causing them to lose future elections or 
reducing their winning margin. The most noted strategy utilised by businessmen if politicians do 
not comply with what was specified in the contract is to support challengers who allow for more 
concessions than the previous politicians, increasing firms’ state capture. In this regard, when 
the number of candidates increases, businessmen support all potential candidates to avoid 
wasting money, and to ensure the sustainability of their particular interest. 
With more challengers, businessmen’s preferred state capture strategy order changes: 
modification of incumbents’ platform commitments to align with businessmen’s interests during 
the electoral campaign, with a proportion of 68%, ranks first, instead of public procurement, 
which comes in the second place, with a proportion of 67%, followed by the promotion of 
political careers of the relatives of businessmen, with a proportion of 64%. It is also important to 
emphasise that from a proportion of 17%, influence and control over recruitment in all public 
sectors related to the economy increases to 51%, one of the strongest strategies, if not the 
strongest, of state capture at the local and national level. 
Table 6 tests the change in the use of capture strategies of firms for commune/municipal 
elections. The table reports a t-test on the difference in means between the strategies used 
under a high electoral competition setting, as proxied by a hypothetical increase in the number 
of candidates contending (the treatment group), to the strategies used under a low electoral 
competition scenario with few candidates contending for office (the control group). While 
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results should be interpreted only as simple correlations, they show interesting dynamics. As 
noted before, procurement increases dramatically, with an increase of 10.9% significant to the 
1% level, while other forms of lower capture value decrease, particularly the demand for 
political programme changes, which falls 7.7%, significant to the 1% level. While non-
significant, we see a positive increase in all those strategies involving high degrees of state 
capture, including patronage (increase of 16%), bureaucratic recruitment (10%), and the 
demand to control the budget line (0.6%). We also note an overall decrease in all the strategies 
associated with low degrees of state capture or with a null effect on state capture, with a 
decrease in policy demands (-2.3%), demanding support for a candidate supported by the firm 
in the future (-1.6%), or asking for a refund on what was invested in the politician (-2.9%). 
We construct an index of firms’ state capture ranking strategies in the following order, from the 
weakest to the strongest form of state capture: refund=0; policy and programme change 
demands=1; support to firms’ candidates in the future=2; control over the budget line=3; public 
procurement demands=4; patronage=5; and, lastly, control of the bureaucratic recruitment 
process=6. While non-significant, the results show that under a hypothetical high competition 
setting the firms’ capture index is higher than in low competition ones. 
Thus, in short, the higher the electoral uncertainty, the stronger and more enforceable are the 
forms of commitment businessmen prefer. Interestingly, in the absence of a good candidate to 
fund, respondents say that businessmen are more likely to run for elections themselves. In this 
respect, about 60% of respondents say that businessmen involvement has become a 
phenomenon in recent years; most of them run directly for elections. 
A good example of the change in frequencies in firms capture preferences is the relationship 
between the former Beninese President Yayi Boni and the current President Patrice Talon, the 
richest businessman in the country. According to a respondent very close to the former, the 
latter used to finance politicians’ electoral campaigns, from presidents to local mayors. After 
supporting both the 2006 and 2011 Yayi presidential campaigns, Talon negotiated the biggest 
public procurement in Benin’s history. Thereafter, Yayi decided to end the collaboration, 
presumably due to the power imbalance that the procurement granted Talon. What followed 
was a clash between both actors, leading to a highly uncertain political environment. As a 
result, Talon firstly financed the campaign of the national assembly president, the second 
personality after the president. However, it seems that, given his experience with President 
Yayi and given the highly uncertain competitive electoral environment, Talon decided to run for 
president himself. He won the election on 6 April 2016. 
Table 7 introduced the estimates of equation 1, i.e. the effect of electoral competition measured 
by winning margins on firms’ preference for direct capture for both municipal- and legislative-
level elections. The first column shows that when the winning margin increases – that is, when 
electoral competition decreases by one standard deviation – firms decrease their preference 
for more direct forms of state capture by -0.1684 standard deviations, a result that is significant 
to the 1% level. Contrast this to the placebo test shown in the second column: winning margins 
hold a positive and non-significant effect for MPs. As noted before, MPs do not have a say on 
national or local-level bureaucracy and thus would have no effect on firms’ strategies to 
mitigate electoral uncertainty. In this regard, Figure 6 provides an example of the asymmetric 
relationship between winning margins and firms’ capture index by election type, with a negative 
relationship for municipal-/commune-level elections and a positive one for legislative-level 
ones. 
Moving forward, Table 8 presents the estimates of equation (2), i.e. the effect of the electoral 
reform that collapsed the party system into a two-party block competition, decreasing electoral 
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risk of firms’ strategic decision-making to capture government. Results are expressed in 
standardised beta coefficients. As seen in the last column, the effect of a decrease in electoral 
uncertainty decreases the firm capture index by -0.259 standard deviations, significant to the 
1% level. This result is robust to the inclusion of district and politician characteristics, and 
district fixed effects. If we dissect the index, we notice that demands characterised by high 
degrees of capture are decreasing, especially patronage for family members, friends (-0.4374), 
and members from the firm (-0.4365), and bureaucratic recruitment control. Meanwhile, less 
direct forms of capture increase or have negligible and non-significant effects, including 
refunds, support for candidates in the future that are supported by the firm, or demands for 
public goods procurement. Note, for instance, that there is actually a positive effect on budget 
line demand. Policies and programme modifications are negative and significant, showing that 
in settings of low electoral risk firms also decrease the use of such demands towards 
politicians. 
Table 10 moves forward to test the effect of the decrease of electoral uncertainty due to the 
introduction of the electoral reform on the use of non-programmatic politics and other actions 
by politicians at the district and commune level. We notice two important results. On the one 
hand, in a more certain setting, politicians increase the use of non-conditional transfers to 
voters by 0.7186 standard deviations, with the result significant to the 1% level, and they 
decrease the use of other types of expenses, including pork-barrel and non-visible expenses, 
such as expenditure on water and sewage infrastructure. In other words, as backed 
substantively by the clientelism literature, under conditions of certainty politicians rely heavily 
on non-programmatic politics and use non-conditional transfers to attempt to increase citizen 
electoral support. 
On the other hand, and most important for this chapter, politicians under situations of low 
electoral risk increase dramatically their transfers to firms, an increase of 0.4834 standard 
deviations, significant to the 1% level. This result goes hand in hand with the previous results: 
as electoral certainty rises, firms under-use high demands of government capture, in part due 
to an increase in politicians’ transfers. 
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
A wide literature has shown the pernicious effects of business interests in institutional and 
democratic development. However, there has been little study of the underlying mechanisms 
by which firms deter democracy, especially in the context of weak states. This chapter provides 
evidence on the relationship between business interests and clientelistic contracts, and by 
doing so brings together two seemingly unrelated literatures: interest groups and state capture 
and clientelism. By doing so it provides, for the case of Benin, concrete evidence on the 
demand set applied by firms to politicians in exchange for firms’ support for electoral 
campaigns. More importantly, we show that more than half of Benin’s politicians are politically 
affiliated with firms, and that such affiliation affects the underlying base structure within which 
clientelist contracts with citizens take place. 
We provide evidence that firms’ strategic interactions with politicians change as electoral 
uncertainty changes. In particular, in the most striking result of this chapter, we show that as 
electoral uncertainty decreases firms rely less heavily on more direct forms of government 
capture, including patronage or the control of local bureaucratic recruitment processes. In 
positive terms, paradoxically, this implies that democratic consolidation, which thrives with 
electoral uncertainty, is undermined by business interests. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, politicians’ characteristics 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Politician’s socio-demographics 
Title: politician (=1) or broker (=0) 0.82 0.38 0 1 311 
Deputy 0.05 0.23 0 1 311 
Minister 0.00 0.06 0 1 311 
Mayor 0.05 0.22 0 1 311 
Municipal council member 0.32 0.47 0 1 311 
Cabinet director 0.01 0.11 0 1 311 
Other 0.55 0.50 0 1 311 
Age 47.66 11.02 24 73 311 
Years living in region 37.61 17.23 0 73 311 
No education 0.02 0.13 0 1 311 
Elementary 0.03 0.18 0 1 311 
College 1st cycle 0.12 0.32 0 1 311 
College 2nd cycle 0.14 0.35 0 1 311 
University 1st cycle 0.16 0.37 0 1 311 
University 2nd cycle 0.29 0.45 0 1 311 
Graduate 0.24 0.43 0 1 311 
Politician’s political participation 
Member political party 0.97 0.17 0 1 311 
Participated in elections as candidate 0.72 0.45 0 1 311 
Participated in commune-level elections 0.87 0.33 0 1 223 
Participated in  legislative-level elections 0.37 0.48 0 1 223 
Participated in presidential-level elections 0.01 0.12 0 1 223 
Num. participations in commune elections 1.48 0.85 0 3 223 
Num. participations in legislative elections 0.59 0.94 0 5 223 
Num. participations in presidential elections 0.02 0.28 0 4 223 
Party switch 0.52 0.88 0 2 302 
Party switch 2 0.72 0.96 0 2 223 
Ideology reason 0.49 0.50 0 1 222 
Poor project definition 0.32 0.47 0 1 222 
Personal interest 0.50 0.50 0 1 222 
Opposition to movement 0.55 0.50 0 1 222 
Movement towards opposition 0.15 0.36 0 1 222 
Running for next elections (2019) 0.69 0.46 0 1 311 
Running for commune elections (2019) 0.71 0.46 0 1 215 
Running for legislative elections  (2019) 0.45 0.50 0 1 215 
Running for presidential elections (2019) 0.01 0.10 0 1 215 
First-time runner 0.27 0.44 0 1 215 
Hold political position 0.76 0.43 0 1 311 
Hold private position 0.36 0.48 0 1 311 
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Table 2: Balance table, list experiment on politicians’ affiliation with firms  
 
Mean 
control 
Mean 
treatment 
Diff Diff. S.E. p 
Title:  politician (=1) or broker (=0) 0.836 0.796 0.040 0.047 0.395 
Deputy 0.047 0.071 -0.024 0.028 0.379 
Minister 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.498 
Mayor 0.066 0.020 0.045 0.027 0.093 
Municipal  council member 0.333 0.306 0.027 0.057 0.635 
Cabinet director 0.005 0.031 -0.026 0.014 0.060 
Other 0.545 0.571 -0.027 0.061 0.660 
Age 49.286 44.122 5.164 1.314 0.000 
Years living in region 38.756 35.122 3.633 2.096 0.084 
No education 0.019 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.578 
Elementary 0.038 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.427 
College 1st cycle 0.150 0.041 0.109 0.039 0.005 
College 2nd cycle 0.155 0.122 0.032 0.043 0.451 
University 1st cycle 0.169 0.153 0.016 0.045 0.725 
University 2nd cycle 0.254 0.367 -0.114 0.055 0.040 
Graduate 0.216 0.286 -0.070 0.052 0.181 
Member of political party 0.967 0.980 -0.012 0.021 0.544 
Participated in elections as 
candidate 
0.751 0.643 0.108 0.055 0.049 
Participated in commune-level 
elections 
0.881 0.857 0.024 0.049 0.627 
Participated in legislative-level 
elections 
0.362 0.397 -0.034 0.072 0.635 
Participated in presidential-level 
elections 
0.013 0.016 -0.003 0.017 0.845 
Num. of participations in 
commune elections 
1.500 1.429 0.071 0.127 0.575 
Num. of participations in 
legislative elections 
0.562 0.651 -0.088 0.141 0.531 
Num. of participations in 
presidential elections 
0.006 0.063 -0.057 0.041 0.163 
Party switch 0.476 0.625 -0.149 0.109 0.170 
Party switch 2 0.739 0.667 0.072 0.141 0.610 
Ideology reason 0.439 0.595 -0.155 0.071 0.029 
Poor project definition 0.291 0.365 -0.074 0.066 0.263 
Personal interest 0.534 0.432 0.101 0.071 0.156 
Opposition to movement 0.568 0.514 0.054 0.071 0.448 
Movement towards opposition 0.149 0.149 0.000 0.051 1.000 
Running for next elections (2019) 1.319 1.286 0.034 0.057 0.554 
Running for commune elections  
(2019) 
0.724 0.671 0.053 0.066 0.429 
Running for legislative elections 
(2019) 
0.414 0.514 -0.100 0.072 0.166 
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Table 3: List experiment: Politicians’ affiliation with local and national business interests 
 
Mean 
control 
Mean 
treatment 
Diff Diff. S.E. p 
Affiliation with firm/business  interest 3.540 4.020 -0.481 0.167 0.004 
Commune/municipal  elections: 
Affiliation with firm/business  interest 
3.576 4.406 -0.830 0.275 0.003 
Legislative elections: 
Affiliation with firm/business  interest 
3.683 4.139 -0.456 0.281 0.109 
 
Table 4: Clientelist contracts – descriptive statistics  
Running for presidential elections 
(2019) 
0.000 0.029 -0.029 0.014 0.041 
First-time runner 0.255 0.300 -0.045 0.065 0.490 
Hold political position 0.779 0.724 0.055 0.052 0.293 
Hold private position 0.352 0.388 -0.036 0.059 0.545 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Firm–politician contract  
Sources of funding: Commune level 
National funding 0.01 0.04 0 0 117 
Department funding 0.00 0.02 0 0 117 
Party/party coalition funding 0.31 0.26 0 1 117 
President/president’s party funding 0.21 0.27 0 1 117 
Local firms funding 0.10 0.11 0 0 117 
National firms funding 0.06 0.10 0 0 117 
Local politicians funding 0.05 0.12 0 1 117 
Local/national  unions funding 0.01 0.02 0 0 117 
Percentage coming from others 0.39 0.26 0 1 75 
Sources of funding: Legislative level 
National funding 0.04 0.12 0 1 96 
Department funding 0.00 0.01 0 0 96 
Party/party coalition funding 0.31 0.24 0 1 96 
President/president’s party  funding 0.20 0.20 0 1 96 
Local firms funding 0.09 0.11 0 1 96 
National firms funding 0.08 0.10 0 0 96 
Local politicians funding 0.03 0.06 0 0 96 
Local/national  unions funding 0.00 0.02 0 0 96 
Percentage coming from others 0.38 0.27 0 1 63 
Types of funding: Commune level 
Financial instruments 0.78 0.42 0 1 117 
Goods/non-financial services 0.56 0.50 0 1 117 
Economic/political advisers 0.23 0.42 0 1 117 
Labour for campaign 0.35 0.48 0 1 117 
Provision of space 0.45 0.50 0 1 117 
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Support for advertisement 0.49 0.50 0 1 117 
Other forms of financing 0.02 0.13 0 1 117 
Types of funding: Legislative level 
Financial instruments 0.82 0.38 0 1 96 
Goods/non-financial services 0.65 0.48 0 1 96 
Economic/political advisers 0.25 0.44 0 1 96 
Labour for campaign 0.48 0.50 0 1 96 
Provision of space 0.46 0.50 0 1 96 
Support for advertisement 0.44 0.50 0 1 96 
Other forms of financing 0.02 0.14 0 1 96 
Firm–politician contract  
Payback time: Commune level (=1 after election, 0=before)  
Policies 0.71 0.46 0 1 49 
Public procurement 0.63 0.49 0 1 91 
Patronage 0.55 0.50 0 1 47 
Patronage from firm 0.33 0.48 0 1 45 
Support future candidate 0.47 0.51 0 1 17 
Programme modification 0.50 0.52 0 1 12 
Refund 1.00 0.00 1 1 3 
Recruitment control 0.26 0.45 0 1 19 
Budget line 0.40 0.55 0 1 5 
Payback time: Legislative level (=1 after election, 0=before) 
Policies 0.79 0.42 0 1 42 
Public procurement 0.68 0.47 0 1 73 
Patronage 0.62 0.49 0 1 37 
Patronage from firm 0.47 0.51 0 1 40 
Support future candidate 0.58 0.51 0 1 19 
Programme modification 1.00 0.00 1 1 8 
Refund 0.33 0.52 0 1 6 
Recruitment control 0.33 0.49 0 1 12 
Budget line 0.50 0.55 0 1 6 
Politician–voter contract 
Commune level 
Mass com. policy and agenda 0.95 0.22 0 1 117 
Political appointments 0.38 0.49 0 1 117 
Vote-buying attempt 0.50 0.50 0 1 117 
Non-conditional transfer (NCT) 0.24 0.43 0 1 117 
Ethnic strategy 0.44 0.50 0 1 117 
Legislative level 
Mass com. policy and agenda 0.90 0.31 0 1 96 
Political appointments 0.42 0.50 0 1 96 
Vote-buying attempt 0.53 0.50 0 1 96 
Non-conditional transfer (NCT) 0.38 0.49 0 1 96 
Ethnic strategy 0.40 0.49 0 1 96 
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Table 5: Electoral competition (uncertainty) and firms’ strategies (capture) in local 
elections in Benin 
 
Mean 
treatment 
Mean 
control 
Diff Diff. S.E. p 
Demand policies 0.466 0.489 -0.023 0.040 0.575 
Procurement 0.714 0.605 0.109 0.038 0.004 
Patronage (from and not from firm) 0.386 0.370 0.016 0.039 0.680 
Patronage (from firm) 0.392 0.379 0.013 0.039 0.742 
Support candidate (future) 0.161 0.177 -0.016 0.030 0.593 
Change in pol. programme 0.087 0.164 -0.077 0.026 0.004 
Refund 0.042 0.071 -0.029 0.018 0.118 
Bureaucracy recruitment control 0.177 0.167 0.010 0.030 0.750 
Demand budget line 0.064 0.058 0.006 0.019 0.738 
Firm capture index 4.450 4.318 0.132 0.117 0.258 
Firm capture index (standardised) 0.045 -0.046 0.091 0.081 0.258 
 
Table 6: Effect of electoral competition (winning margin) on firms’ preference for direct 
capture, beta coefficients 
Dependent variable: firm capture index 
 Municipal level Legislative level 
Winning margin -0.1684*** 0.0535 
 (0.0801) (0.0736) 
Observations 117 96 
R-squared 0.480 0.370 
Controlsb   
Commune FE   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commune level; significance-level: ∗∗∗ 0.1%; ∗∗ 1%; ∗ 5%; and 
+ 10%, refers to two-sided t-tests. Outcome measured in standardised terms. a Outcomes with 0.000 imply a very small 
number; we preferred not to introduce scientific numbers and left this as is. b Electoral district-level covariates include: 
GDP, inequality, and 2015 electoral measures, including winning margin, and Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of party vote 
share concentration; politician characteristics controls include: indicator levels of education levels by politician.  
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Table 7: Effect of electoral reform (uncertainty decrease) on firms’ strategic decision-
making, beta coefficients 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commune level; significance-level:  ∗∗∗ 0.1%; ∗∗ 1%; ∗ 5%;  
and + 10%, refers to two-sided t-tests. Outcome measured in standardised terms. a Outcomes with 0.000 imply a very 
small number; we preferred not to introduce scientific numbers and left this as is.  b  Electoral district-level covariates 
include:  GDP, inequality, and 2015 electoral measures, including winning margin and Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of party 
vote share concentration; politician characteristics controls include: indicator levels of education levels by politician. 
 
Table 8: Balance table, politicians’ characteristics in communes affected and not affected 
by electoral reform  
Dependent variable: 
 Refund Policies 
Programme 
change 
Support 
candidate 
Budget line 
Electoral 
reform 
(decrease 
uncertainty) 
-0.0000 -0.6481∗∗∗ -1.0992∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.4829∗∗∗ 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.327 0.544 0.466 0.415 0.739 
Controlsb     
Commune FE     
 Procurement Patronage 
Firm 
patronage 
Recruitment 
control 
Firm capture 
index 
Electoral 
reform 
(decrease 
uncertainty) 
-0.0000 -0.4374∗∗∗ -0.4365∗∗∗ -0.6061∗∗∗ -0.2595∗∗∗ 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.508 0.402 0.494 0.506 0.391 
Controlsb      
Commune FE      
 
Mean 
control 
Mean 
treatment 
Diff Diff. S.E. p 
Title:  politician (=1) or broker 
(=0) 
0.893 0.787 0.106 0.085 0.212 
Mayor 0.036 0.045 -0.009 0.044 0.835 
Age 46.500 45.854 0.646 2.313 0.780 
Years living in region 39.429 39.933 -0.504 3.125 0.872 
No education 0.107 0.011 0.096 0.039 0.015 
Elementary 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.028 0.011 
College 1st cycle 0.286 0.146 0.140 0.083 0.095 
College 2nd cycle 0.143 0.202 -0.059 0.085 0.487 
University 1st cycle 0.107 0.258 -0.151 0.090 0.095 
University 2nd cycle 0.250 0.258 -0.008 0.095 0.930 
Graduate 0.036 0.124 -0.088 0.066 0.184 
Member of political party 1.000 0.966 0.034 0.034 0.329 
Participated in elections as 
candidate 
0.786 0.764 0.022 0.092 0.814 
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Table 9: Effect of electoral reform (uncertainty decrease) on use of non-programmatic 
politics and transfers to business interests, beta coefficients 
Dependent variable: 
 
Non-conditional 
transfers 
Pork-barrel 
expenses 
Pro-business 
transfers 
Non-visible 
expenses 
Electoral reform 
(decrease 
uncertainty) 
0.7186∗∗∗ -0.7240∗∗∗ 0.4834∗∗∗ -0.1202∗∗∗ 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.399 0.446 0.422 0.509 
Controlsb    
Commune FE    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commune level; significance-level: ∗∗∗ 0.1%; ∗∗ 1%; ∗ 5%; and + 
10%, refers to two-sided t-tests. Outcome measured in standardised terms. a Outcomes with 0.000 imply a very small 
number; we preferred not to introduce scientific numbers and left this as is. b Electoral district-level covariates include: GDP, 
inequality, and 2015 electoral measures including winning margin and Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of party vote share 
concentration; politician characteristics controls include: indicator levels of education levels by politician. 
Participated in commune-level 
elections 
0.955 0.956 -0.001 0.051 0.979 
Participated in legislative-level 
elections 
0.136 0.147 -0.011 0.087 0.903 
Num. of participations in 
commune elections 
1.455 1.662 -0.207 0.193 0.287 
Num. of participations in 
legislative elections 
0.182 0.147 0.035 0.097 0.721 
Party switch 0.429 0.651 -0.223 0.200 0.268 
Party switch 2 0.545 0.552 -0.006 0.226 0.978 
Ideology reason 0.364 0.557 -0.194 0.122 0.116 
Poor project definition 0.227 0.343 -0.116 0.114 0.314 
Personal interest 0.318 0.457 -0.139 0.121 0.255 
Opposition to movement 0.773 0.614 0.158 0.117 0.177 
Movement towards opposition 0.000 0.086 -0.086 0.060 0.159 
First-time runner 0.214 0.247 -0.033 0.093 0.725 
Hold political position 0.679 0.730 -0.052 0.098 0.599 
Hold private position 0.321 0.337 -0.016 0.103 0.880 
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Figures 
Figure 1:  Electoral competition in Benin, commune elections 2015 
Figure 2:  Campaign cost by type of election and evaluation of funds 
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Figure 3:  Ideal vs real campaign costs, by election type and evaluation of funds 
 
Figure 4:  Ratio of firms’ funding to campaign costs by type of election 
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Figure 5:   Effective number of parties and electoral competition in 2015 
Figure 6:  Electoral competition and firms’ preference for direct capture, by election 
type 
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Discussion of ‘Campaign finance and state capture’ 
‘Campaign finance and state capture’ provides a new perspective on topics that are at the 
heart of the literature on the political economy of development. In particular, the study of 
democracies in the developing world tends to focus on issues of clientelism or political 
exchange – directly or indirectly providing private benefits for constituencies in exchange for 
electoral support. However, as this chapter points out convincingly, not only are different 
forms of political exchange targeted at voters, different forms of political exchange are also 
practised by firms, each with potentially different implications for economic development and 
democratic consolidation. One problem with the literature on clientelism is that it tends to 
focus on political exchange between voters and politicians, without regard for the strategies 
of firms. Arguably, not only does this miss an important part of the dynamic for understanding 
political exchange more broadly, it also understates the development impact of clientelism. In 
focusing on small-scale ‘retail’ strategies, such as vote-buying or patronage, we may be 
missing the more important forms of ‘wholesale’ strategies, such as capture or cooptation – 
strategies that arguably have more distortionary effects on both economic development and 
democratic consolidation. 
As a result, in addition to highlighting important dynamics in Benin with implications for 
political institutions and economic development, this chapter addresses a first order question 
in the literature on clientelism. This work is exemplary in leveraging results from a specific 
country context in order to make broader theoretical arguments. It does so by contributing 
both a novel framework – bringing together the two literatures on clientelism at the voter and 
firm levels – and bringing new data from Benin to test it. 
Networks 
One potentially helpful area for exploring extensions to this work is to think more about firm 
and politician networks. Theories of networks underlie both the literature on clientelism and 
the literature on firm capture and cronyism, making it a natural fit given that this project is 
bringing new data to create a unifying framework for the two literatures. Furthermore, 
networks are implicit in the chapter’s analysis (even if not sufficiently explicit), and in fact, 
networks were a key part of the data collection because of the snowball sampling 
techniques. 
Networks matter not only because of the direct connections, but also for understanding the 
broader structure of how business interests interact with clientelism. This short note 
addresses two types of networks, firm networks and politician networks, in order to suggest 
potential extensions to the analysis. Firm networks matter because they determine access to 
political ‘goods’, but also because the types of networks that firms invest in may provide 
evidence of their priorities and strategies for lobbying. As a result, firm networks would be 
expected to matter for the range of demands that firms might pursue, and their techniques for 
doing so. It is also possible that networks operate as a constraint on firm strategies – to the 
extent that firms invest in developing ties and cultivating relationships with a broad range of 
industry and government actors, it may be difficult for them to switch strategies even when 
political circumstances change (Fisman 2001). 
Similarly, politician networks matter not only for electoral competition, but also for the types 
of strategies they may pursue once they are in office. For example, a large literature links 
politician networks to different types of electoral strategies. In particular, clientelistic political 
Campaign Finance and State Capture 
© Economic Development & Institutions  32  
exchange requires dense, hierarchical networks for the identification of clients and the 
delivery of benefits and monitoring of voter behaviour. Compared to the internal 
organisational problems inherent in programmatic parties, for clientelist politics the problem 
is monitoring and controlling the political brokers at each level in the process (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007). Such mechanisms require elaborate networks to monitor actors and 
manage exchange relations (Stokes 2005). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) describe these 
networks as necessary because of the need to monitor political actors at each level in the 
process. Research by Calvo and Murillo (2009) has argued that clientelist politics requires 
different types of political network structures to programmatic politics: clientelist countries 
have large, heterogeneous, vertically integrated parties, while programmatic countries have 
smaller, homogenous, horizontally integrated parties. The ability to monitor is a fundamental 
aspect of successful politician networks (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Larreguy 2012). 
Firm networks 
It is widely accepted that better-connected firms exercise more political influence. However, it 
remains little understood how different types of ties affect different types of political action. 
The notion that the types of ties matters underlies much of the work on politician networks 
and political parties. With this type of analysis, it becomes possible to explore whether firm 
connections affect the strategies firms pursue, or the ways in which they engage with 
politicians. 
For example, Cruz and Graham (2019) contrast the effect of ties to other firms in the same 
industry (peer ties) with direct ties to elected officials and bureaucrats (government ties). 
Their framework proposes that peer ties facilitate collective action, most often with respect to 
broad policy issues that affect many firms, while government ties are primarily used to 
address narrow, particularistic issues. Cruz and Graham use a new survey of foreign-owned 
firms operating in the Philippines to demonstrate that different ties are associated with 
different approaches to lobbying. Consistent with theories of collective action among firms, 
ties to other firms are associated with efforts to influence policy at the national level, where 
issues are broader-based and affect larger numbers of firms. By contrast, ties to government 
actors (bureaucrats or politicians) are associated with seeking policy influence at the local 
level, where actors have narrower scope but can direct specific benefits and concessions to 
firms. 
For example, Figure 1 is a visual illustration of firm ties with politicians, bureaucrats, and 
other firms.15 Each of the orange circles (nodes) represents an actual firm in the sample and 
the grey circles represent political actors: congress, local government, and the bureaucracy 
(labelled). For each firm, the figure presents: (i) ties to congress, bureaucracies, or local 
government, depicted by connecting lines between the firm node and the government actor 
node; and (ii) ties to peer firms, represented by the size of the circle, where large circles are 
those firms that report a larger number of peer firms. A substantial number of firms, including 
many with a large number of peer ties, have no direct government ties. 
                                               
15 Ties are measured in two   different ways. First, because the sample is too small to be able to capture the entire 
firm network, the number of peer firms that respondents report having a relationship with is used as a proxy for 
peer ties. To differentiate peer firms from clients, suppliers, or other partners, respondents are asked about the 
number for firms in each category separately. The variable uses the logged number of peer firms. Second, the 
measure of government ties reports the number of ties to either elected officials or bureaucrats. 
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Figure 1: Peer and government ties 
 
 
Politician networks 
Another important aspect of networks that could extend the important findings in this chapter 
are differences in the networks and strategies of politicians. Figure 2 is a visual illustration of 
ties among mayors in Isabela province, in the Philippines. Some mayors are well-connected 
horizontally, while others have vertical connections: instead of ties to other mayors, they 
have ties down to the village level officials and up to the congressman and governor of the 
province. The structure of these ties affects the incentives of politicians to pursue different 
types of political exchange. 
Vertical ties are associated with individually-targeted political exchange, because in a 
political context where there are overlapping constituencies, politicians can reduce the costs 
associated with individual-targeted political exchange by pooling their efforts. Politicians at 
higher levels collude with lower-level politicians and political brokers. The high-level 
politicians provide funding and the lower-level politicians provide the personnel and oversight 
for the implementation. A big part of the costs of vote-buying involves logistics: identifying 
targets, sending personnel to conduct the transaction, as well as monitoring and enforcing 
the transaction. Once a system for monitoring or verification has been set up and the political 
broker has already been hired to hand out the envelope of money, the marginal cost of 
asking the voter to also vote for another politician on the same ballot is relatively small. The 
overlapping constituencies create incentives for such collusion among politicians organised 
through vertical networks. 
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Horizontal ties, by contrast, facilitate group-targeted strategies like pork-barrel politics. When 
pork-barrel funds take the form of spending allocated to more than one municipality, mayors 
who are able to cooperate with each other can act collectively to demand pork-barrel projects 
that benefit their municipalities. In these cases, the funding is typically controlled by 
politicians at the national level (such as governors or congressmen) or national government 
agencies. Very few local-level politicians are influential enough to lobby successfully for 
these types of funds on their own. However, groups of mayors acting collectively can 
successfully bid for large-scale projects affecting their areas. Examples of such projects 
include fisheries and shoreline support for coastal municipalities, irrigation systems for 
municipalities along a river, or construction and road projects that go through more than one 
locality. Horizontal ties are important not only for the process of bidding for national or 
provincial-level projects, but also for ensuring that mayors cooperate throughout the project 
implementation process. 
Extended to firms, we might also expect that the form of political alliances and political 
networks might also condition how politicians engage with firms. For example, politicians with 
ties to the bureaucracy might offer to negotiate with firms by offering regulatory deals. 
Politicians with more discretionary funding may prefer to offer concessions and kick-backs. 
As a result, in addition to considering the preferences of firms for direct or indirect forms of 
capture, it is equally important to consider that politicians may be differentially positioned to 
offer these different types of ‘policy goods’. 
Figure  2:  Mayor network in Isabela (1st district–white; 2nd–light grey; 3rd–dark 
grey; 4th–black) 
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1 Introduction 
Cotton has a long history in Benin’s development strategies and it continues to play a major1 
economic role today, accounting for about 50% of export revenue (excluding re-exports) and 
45% of tax revenue (excluding customs revenue).2 It contributes to the livelihoods of about 
one-third of the population3 and it constitutes 60% of physical capital in Benin’s industrial 
sector (19 ginning factories, four textile factories, and two agro-food factories for vegetable 
oil extraction) where it generates about 3,500 paid jobs (Ministère de l’Agriculture de 
l’Elevage et de la Pêche, 2008). In addition, cotton contributes to activities in the services 
sector (e.g. transport and construction), and also plays a socio-political4 role in rural 
development in Benin (see, e.g., Kpadé, 2011).  
Several indicators have been proposed to assess the economic performance of the cotton 
sectors in African countries (e.g Tschirley, 2009) but data limitation forces us to focus this 
analysis on three main indicators: production; yield; and acreage. In some cases, we discuss 
performance related to two additional indicators: the producer price of seed cotton; and 
Benin’s market share of cotton lint in the international market. We derive data on the first key 
three indicators from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Corporate Statistical 
Database (FAOSTAT), allowing to make a consistent comparative analysis with other 
countries over a long time period (1961-2017).5 Data from three other sources (the Institut 
National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique-INSAE, the Association 
Interprofessionnelle de Coton au Bénin-AIC, and the Programme Regional de Production 
Intégrée du Coton en Afrique-PR/PICA) are used to discuss the performance of the sector 
over the recent period (2016-2018).  
Figure 1 reports the performance of the cotton sector in Benin and in Burkina Faso, a 
neighbouring francophone country; it gives the production of seed cotton, yields, and 
cultivated area over the 1961–2017 period.6 The left panel presents the performance in 
Benin and Burkina Faso in levels, whereas the right panel displays the performance of Benin 
relative to Burkina Faso (1961=100). The data in the right panel show a relatively poor 
                                               
1 It is, however, difficult to understand the methodology underlying many indicators related to the importance of 
cotton in Benin. The values of some indicators are inconsistent across sources and important information needed 
for the analysis is sometimes simply not available. For instance, it was not possible to get information from the 
the website of the Association interprofessionnelle du coton au Bénin (AIC) (www.aicbenin.org) because the 
website has been down since 2018. Therefore, there is a need to develop a coherent framework for data and 
other historical documents related to the cotton sector. 
2 Before cotton, palm oil- promoted by King Ghézo (1818–1858) - played the leading role in Benin’s development. 
The relative roles of palm oil and cotton are displayed in Figure 11 in the appendix. In 1962, for instance, palm oil 
products accounted for around 60% of export revenue, against only 2% for cotton. From 1972, however, the 
share of palm oil decreased dramatically, to 19%, and in 2016 palm oil became almost non-existant in Benin’s 
official export statistics. By contrast, cotton’s share increased to 30% in 1972 and in 2016 it stood at 45% of 
export revenue.  
3 Benin’s total population is 10.7 million. 
4 For instance, cotton farmers finance local infrastructure and a number of them hold political power at the village 
and district levels.  
5 Another source for an international comparison is the International Cotton Association (ICA) but we currently do 
not have access to their database.  
6 Burkina Faso is a good comparator for Benin not only because the two countries share a common border but 
also because the initial performance of Burkina Faso (in 1961) was close to that of Benin. Production in Benin 
and Burkina Faso were 2,482 tonnes and 2,352, respectively. Yield figures were 1,204 and 1,026 hectogram per 
hectare, while land areas allocated to cotton were 20,608 and 22,925 hectares, respectively. Cote d’Ivoire and 
Mali are two other possible comparators but their initial production levels were much higher than that in Benin 
while their performance did not significantly improve over time (see Figure 12 in appendix).  
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performance in Benin’s production in 1962–1969, 1974–1992, and since the early 2000s. In 
1961–1969, this was primarily caused by a more rapid expansion of acreage in Burkina Faso 
since Benin was doing relatively well in terms of productivity per land unit. In the period 
1974–1992, Benin lagged behind both in terms of yields and acreage.  
In contrast, Benin outperformed Burkina Faso in 1970–1973 and 1993–1997. In the first 
subperiod, Benin’s performance was due to a spectacular improvement in yields, whereas in 
the second subperiod the result mostly stemmed from a more rapid extension in the area 
allocated to cotton. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that, up until 1993 and except for the 
subperiod 1970–1973, the output of cotton in Benin moved roughly hand in hand with the 
cultivated land area, suggesting that improvement in yields did not play a significant role. In 
Benin, yields thus appear to be volatile and, more worryingly, in recent years they have 
come down to the level where they were in the early 1970s. 
What are the causes of the performance in the cotton sector in Benin? This paper aims to 
provide a diagnostic of the cotton sector in Benin. In particular, it reviews the underlying 
factors of the sector’s performance, with an emphasis on the role played by institutional 
factors. Over the years the sector has operated under different modes of organisation, 
between public and private types, each of which has been reversed over time. We aim to 
elaborate on the underlying causes of these changes and their implications for the 
performance of the sector. For this purpose, we make use of academic and grey literature. 
Moreover, we obtained information from key informants within the sector. 
Section 2 introduces the framework of the analysis. Section 3 summarises the historical 
background. Section 4 reviews the performance of the cotton sector in the period 1961–
2016. It seems too early to provide an analysis of the sector after 2016, particularly because 
we lack crucial information on the current functioning of the Association Interprofessionnelle 
du Coton au Benin (AIC). We therefore do not provide an in-depth analysis on the 
performance of the recent period but we leave such an analysis for future research. Section 
5 presents the synthesis of the diagnostic.  
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Figure 1: Performance of the cotton sector in Benin and Burkina Faso 
  
 
Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT). Data over the 
period 2016-2017 is obtained from INSAE and AIC and is being updated in the FAOSTAT database. Note that 
the data presented here are sometimes different from the values presented in studies (e.g. Gergely, 2009, 
Kpadé, 2011, Saizonou, 2008, and Yerima, 2005) citing AIC.  
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2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Organisation of the cotton sector 
There are nine main interrelated functions in the cotton sector: 
1. input supply and distribution; 
2. research (seed variety development); 
3. technical and extension services; 
4. production – seed cotton; 
5. primary marketing; 
6. processing – cotton lint, cotton seed, oil, etc.; 
7. final marketing (of cotton lint, including export); 
8. quality control; and 
9. price-setting. 
In this setting the performance of the sector depends on both domestic and external factors 
(e.g. Bourdet, 2004; Ahohounkpanzon and Allou, 2010, and Baffes, 2002, 2004; Cabinet 
Afrique Décision Optimale, 2010; Gergery, 2009; Kpadé, 2011; Saizonou, 2008; Yérima, 
2005). We discuss the specific role of both of these sets of factors below.  
2.2 External factors 
External factors include international forces that cause fluctuations in the global cotton price. 
Figure 2 displays monthly data on world cotton prices in US dollars and CFA franc (CFA), 
together with the CFA franc/US dollar nominal exchange rate over the period 1980–2017. 
The figure also displays the real producer price, which we obtain by dividing the nominal 
price by the consumer price index (CPI). The co-movement between the nominal and real 
price series is strong (0.65). Therefore, the rest of the discussion will be focused on the 
nominal series.  
The data show that variations in both the nominal exchange rate7 and the dollar value of 
world cotton price have caused great fluctuations in the CFA franc value of the cotton price. 
In the second half of the 1980s, in 2001–2002, and in 2004–2009, for instance, the dollar 
value of cotton price exhibits a declining trend, amplified by a persistent appreciation of the 
CFA franc. We briefly discuss the causes of these fluctuations in the world dollar cotton 
prices. Thereafter, we elaborate on their impact on domestic cotton supply and the welfare of 
producers. 
Understanding the fluctuations in world cotton prices 
Fluctuations in the world dollar price of cotton are caused by both demand and supply forces 
(see, e.g., Janzen et al., 2018). The impact of world supply operates through the action of 
subsidies in some leading cotton-producing countries, the US in particular. For instance, 
                                               
7 Except for the 1994 devaluation in the CFA franc, the variations in the currency mainly reflect movement in the 
French franc (prior to 1999) and the euro (after 1999), to which the currency has been pegged.  
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FAO (2004) argues that world cotton prices would have been 10 to 15 percentage points 
higher in the absence of the subsidies to cotton producers in big producing countries. In 
value terms, the effect of subsidies amounts to a loss of about $150 million in the export 
earnings of West African cotton-producing countries (Tschirley et al., 2009). In 2003, a 
number of these African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) submitted a case to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to request the elimination of such subsidies by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and financial 
compensation. Following discussions at the WTO, the US removed around 15% of its 
subsidies to the cotton sector but did not provide any direct compensation.  
On the demand side, fluctuations in world cotton prices are explained by variations in global 
demand and by the development of substitutes in the form of synthetic fibres. Figure 3 
demonstrates that the role of synthetic fibres in the global market has considerably grown 
over the past decades. In particular, the share of cotton fibres in the world market of textile 
fibres shrank considerably from 70% to below 30% between 1960 and 2014, due to the 
marked decrease in the relative price of synthetic fibres. For Benin and other West African 
countries, this new factor calls into question the sustainability of any long-term development 
strategy grounded primarily in the cotton sector. However, in absolute terms there is no 
decline in cotton fibre. We come back to this issue in Section 5.  
Figure 2: World cotton price and the CFA franc/ US dollar exchange rate (1996=100) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) commodity database and IMF internal financial statistics. Note: Real 
price in CFA is obtained by normalising the nominal price by CPI. Due to missing data we were not able to 
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construct the real price before 1991M12. After the CFA/kg were constructed all series were transformed in 
indices worth 100 in base year 1996. The real price is obtained by dividing the nominal price by CPI. The real 
series starts from 1991M12 because of missing information on CPI prior to that date.  
Figure 3: Composition of global consumption of textile fibres and the ratio of 
synthetic to natural cotton prices 
 
 
Source: Krifa and Stevens (2016) for the left panel and Baffes (2004) for the right panel, which reports the ratio of 
synthetic to natural cotton prices.  
Figure 4: World and producer prices of cotton (CFA/Kg) and rolling correlation 
coefficients of the prices  
 
 
Sources: The original world price of cotton comes from the World Bank and has been converted into CFA with 
the exchange rate series obtained from World Development Indicators. The producer price series comes from 
Baffes (2007) prior to 1980, Kpadé (2011) from 1980 to 2009, and the Institut National de la Statistique et de 
l’Analyse Economique (INSAE) for the remaining period. The right panel contains rolling correlation coefficients of 
the two prices. The correlation coefficient value for 1980 is obtained using information from 1970 to 1979. The 
correlation coefficients for the cyclical components are based on de-trended series using the HP filter where the 
value of the smoothing parameter is set to 100. 
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Welfare impact of cotton price fluctuation 
Farmers are sensitive to the price of cotton, especially because cotton requires more labour 
effort and other inputs than other crops.8 A number of studies find a positive response of the 
supply of seed cotton to production price and a positive effect of higher prices on producers’ 
welfare in Benin (e.g. Ali et al., 2017; Minot and Daniels, 2002; Gergely, 2009; World Bank, 
2004; and Hugon and Mayeyenda, 2003). For instance, Ali et al. (2017) report price 
elasticities of cotton’s supply ranging from 1.3 to 2.6.9 In a related study, Minot and Daniels 
(2002) find that a 40% reduction in the producer price of cotton results in an 6–8% increase 
in rural poverty.10 Moreover, they estimate the multiplier effect of cotton: national income 
would be reduced by $2.96 for each $1 decrease in the income of cotton farmers.  
These microeconomic findings are in line with the aggregate data reported in Figures 2–4. 
First, the right panel of Figure 4 shows a strong co-movement between the world price and 
the producer price, although the strength of the correlation is less pronounced before 1992 
when the statistics are based on the cyclical component of the two prices. We elaborate later 
on, in Section 3, the producer price-setting rules. Second, following the drop in cotton prices 
observed during the years 2001–2009, both the output and the surface of land planted in 
cotton have declined significantly in Benin and Burkina Faso. However, Benin displayed a 
much larger negative response, suggesting that country-specific factors may also explain the 
behaviour of cotton supply.11 Conversely, cotton supply increased sharply in the same 
countries following a strong increase in the dollar price and the devaluation of the CFA franc 
in 1994.  
2.3 Domestic factors 
There are three main domestic factors affecting the performance of cotton: climatic risks, 
technical skills, and the quality of institutions. Climatic risks are exogenous and cannot be 
directly acted upon. Cotton supply depends on specific climatic conditions across the 
growing cycle: the length of the rainy season, dry spells, flooding periods, temperature, and 
solar radiation (e.g. Blanc et al., 2008). The role of climatic risks is not systematically 
discussed in the chapter. Technical skills depend on training and experience and will also 
not be discussed further here. But, the role of institutions is of special interest to us. These 
include the type of coordination of the different functions in the supply chain and the specific 
rules and regulations that are involved. 
There are two views regarding the required type of coordination in the cotton value chain: 
the French view and the World Bank view. The French view is based on the strategy 
developed by the Compagnie francaise pour le developpement des fibres textiles (CFDT), a 
                                               
8 For instance, Minot and Daniels (2002) report that cotton is 15% more labour-intensive than the area-weighted 
average of other crops analysed in their study on Benin (maize and cassava, cowpeas, groundnuts, sorghum, 
millet, yams). Moreover, the cultivation of cotton requires 23% more hired labour per hectare than the average of 
other crops 
9 Moreover, the authors estimate the cross-price supply elasticity related to alternative crops to cotton (maize, 
millet, sorghum and related crops, rice, yam, cassava and other tubers, beans and related crops, and peanuts 
and related crops) in the range -0.28 to -0.39%.  
10 The baseline poverty incidence is estimated at 40%.  
11 During the years 1984–1993, the continuous appreciation of the CFA also contributed to low cotton prices, yet 
this did not prevent cotton supply from rising perceptibly, not only in Benin but also in Burkina Faso. This again 
suggests that other factors than producer prices have been at work. 
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French parastatal company that modernised the cotton sector in the former French colonies 
of Africa. It advocates a vertical integration of the value chain through a single channel (a 
monopoly/monopsony) from farmers to ginnery companies and input suppliers. Moreover, 
the chain controls research activities for variety development, which are linked to extension 
services. In addition, it is in charge of promoting stable producer prices. After independence, 
the CFDT entered into joint ventures with African governments and the single channel was 
maintained. In the mid-1980s, when world cotton prices collapsed, subsidies from 
governments and money from donors were used to rescue the African cotton companies.  
The World Bank view assumes that (state) monopoly is less efficient because of excessive 
public employment and political interference (e.g. Baffes, 2007). Such a monopoly can also 
be blamed for excessively taxing farmers who receive a rather small share of the world 
cotton price. Hence, allowing competition should decrease this tax and stimulate the supply 
of cotton. The view of the World Bank, also supported by the IMF, was dominant in the 
1980s and was enforced through the structural adjustment programmes in many African 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Conceptually, it is hard to say a priori which of the two modes of coordination would 
generate a better performance for the cotton sector, because each of the approaches has its 
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, while competition can boost producer prices, it 
typically implies higher coordination cost in a weak institutional environment characterised by 
imperfect credit markets, asymmetric information, and weak contract enforcement. In a 
system where ginneries provide input credit to farmers, competition will encourage side-
selling12 to cotton-buying competitors, discouraging credit supply by final buyers, thus 
causing inefficiencies in the input segment of the supply chain. By contrast, whereas a 
monopoly maintains a lower producer price it will achieve a higher degree of coordination 
and better limit the side-selling problem. Hence, it is shown that the organisation of the value 
chain implies a trade-off between competition and coordination (e.g. Tschirley et al., 2004, 
2009, and 2010). A recent empirical analysis by Delpeuch and Leblois (2014) confirms this 
trade-off. They find that African cotton producers in a competitive system achieve higher 
yields but lower acreage and production, whereas in a regulated system of the CFDT type 
lower yields but higher acreage and production are observed. On a related point, Baffes 
(2007) argues that taxation of farmers has been reduced as a result of the liberalisation and 
privatisation of the cotton sector in Benin and many other African countries13, as evidenced 
in Table 114 below.15 Figure 4 above also shows that the world price of cotton is much higher 
than the producer price but we currently lack relevant and consistent information to discuss 
the underlying factors behind the difference.  
                                               
12 “Side-selling is the sale of seed cotton to a buyer other than the company that provided the producer with 
inputs on credit during the production season”.(Poulton et al, 2004) 
13 However, Benin represents a special case as regards the timing and the nature of these liberalisation 
programmes, as we will discuss in the rest of the chapter.  
14 Note, however, that many other factors may be driving these nominal rate of assistance numbers and we do 
not have the necessary material to discuss this further. The data on producer prices and subsidies are also very 
noisy. 
15 The idea of taxation of African farmers goes back to Bates (1981)  
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Table 1: Nominal rate of assistance16 to cotton farmers in West and Central African 
countries (%) 
 
Sources: Baffes (2007) 
Finally, there is also a debate about the mode of coordination among producers. For 
instance, should access to technical and agricultural services be organised at the individual 
or the farmer-group levels? Should production and input decisions be taken at the individual 
or the famer group level? Related to access to input and credit, a joint liability approach is 
used in the cotton sector of Benin and other West African countries. The joint liability 
approach may create, however, free riding problems, which will generate inefficiencies in a 
weak contract enforcement environment. Farmers often report this free riding problem in 
West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali) as evidenced by Theriault and Serra 
(2014). Theoretically, however, it is difficult to predict the efficiency of the farmers who report 
the problem. For instance, inefficient farmers may report more the problem if they are afraid 
that their relatively low level of production will not make it enough to cover credit at the 
reimbursement time. In this case, their assets may have to be seized in order to repay the 
loan. In the same way, efficient farmers may also report the free riding problem because 
they have to pay for those who fail to repay their loans. Theriault and Serra (2014) argue that 
producers who report more problems with the joint liability feature are more inefficient in a 
sample of West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali). 
 
 
                                               
16 The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is based on the difference between the net price received by producers 
and world prices, controlling for freight and ginnery costs. A negative value indicates taxation whereas a positive 
value reflects subsidies to farmers. The author includes price subsidies but it is not clear how input subsidies and 
the price of credit have been taken into account in the estimation.  
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3 Historical background of cotton in Benin: 1641-1960 
3.1 Pre-colonial period to 1949: private mode of organisation 
The origin of cotton in Benin dates back to the pre-colonial period. Cotton was produced in 
the northern (Atacora-Donga and Alibori-Borgou departments) and central (Zou-Collines 
departments) regions of the country, and the raw cotton was entirely processed by the local 
artisanal textile sector (Manning 1980, 1982; and D’Almeida-Topor, 1992).17 Figure 5 shows 
that the Alibori-Borgou departments easily dominated cotton production. Moreover, the data 
show that the central region, which was the second most important contributor to cotton 
production in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined considerably over time. In fact, the level of 
cotton production (not reported) has increased in the northern region, while it has decreased 
in the central region.  
The northern region has a dry climate whereas the central has a humid climate. A humid 
climate is less favourable to cotton production and this partly explains the decline in cotton 
production in the central region (e.g. Ton, 2004). In particular, the producer cost of cotton is 
relatively high in that region, for example because farmers would need to consume relatively 
more pesticide to protect cotton from diseases. As a result, farmers switch more frequently 
to alternative crops when the relative producer price of cotton decreases (and/or the relative 
cost of cotton increases, or when the quality of input deteriorates). On the other hand, the 
support of development aid projects is one possible explanation for the increase in the 
production in the northern region.18 We will elaborate on these points later. 
Figure 5: Share of the main cotton-producing areas (percentage) 
  
                                               
17 Before 1999 Benin was divided into six departments: Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou, Mono, Ouémé, and Zou. In 
the 1999 reform each of these six department were divided into two departments, such that the country now 
includes 12 departments, as displayed in the right panel of Figure 5: Atacora has been split into Atacora and 
Donga; Atlantique into Atlantique and Litoral; Borgou into Borgou and Alibori; Mono into Mono and Couffo; 
Ouémé into Ouémé and Platteau; and Zou into Zou and Collines. Because of these changes it is difficult to trace 
the production of specific departments before 1999. Thus, when we refer to information related to Borgou 
department (before 1999) in the text we have in mind that this information also includes the Alibori department. 
18 There was also a project in the central region but it seems that more efforts were put into developing the 
northern region. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s there were more projects for cotton development in the 
northern area.  
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Sources: Kpadé (2011) and World Bank (1984). The map in the right panel displays the production shares for 
2016 
During the colonial period (1894–1959), French entrepreneurs encouraged the production of 
cotton with the purpose of supplying cotton to their textile industries in France.19 They 
developed two main strategies, which seem to be still relevant today (Manning, 1982; and 
Kpadé and Boinon, 2011): i) introduction of new varieties of the Barbadense family of cotton 
to improve productivity; and ii) promotion of small-sized farming (in order to limit labour 
movement).20 In this context, ginneries were built in the central area (in Savalou and 
Bohicon) in order to process raw cotton.21  
The market structure of the cotton industry in this period was thus decentralised and 
potentially competitive with the private sector in charge of the main activities, including 
marketing and processing. Following these efforts cotton production improved and exports to 
France began around 190422 (Maning, 1982). The two ginneries were upgraded in 1924 
(Savalou) and 1924 (Bohicon). However, the sector’s development was still marginal around 
192623 (Figure 5). One problem was the low producer price compared to other crops (coffee, 
cacao) that were subsidised by the colonial authorities. Moreover, due to several market 
imperfections that characterise Africa’s rural areas, the market-based mode of coordination 
did not ensure an efficient provision of inputs and agri-services to farmers (Kpadé and 
Boinon, 2011).  
                                               
19 Cotton was also encouraged in other former French colonies at that time. French entrepreneurs were 
motivated to do this because of difficulties in importing cotton from the USA (Fok, 1993; and Kpadé and Boinon, 
2011). For this purpose, they created the Association Cotonière Coloniale (ACC) which had a representative in 
each of the colonies. Emile Poisson was the representative for Benin at that time (Manning 1980, 1982; and 
D’Almeida-Topor, 1992).  
20 In addition, farmers were coerced to produce cotton with the help of the colonial administration. 
21 The construction of the first ginneries in the central region can be explained by the relative proximity of that 
region to the Port of Cotonou, through which cotton lint is exported to France. The fact that the colonial power 
settled first in the central region before the northern region could also be an additional reason.  
22 1904 coincided with the period when Benin became a member of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), the 
federation of the eight French colonial territories in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, and Togo). 
23 The Great Depression (1929) and the Second World War (1939–1945) also caused volatility in exports. 
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Figure 6: Cotton exports in 1903–1960 (tonnes) 
 
Sources: Author’s estimation based on Manning (1982) and Kpadé (2011).  
The original data obtained from the two sources did not coincide in several periods.  
The data reported here are a simple average of figures from both sources. Data is missing 
in 1942-1944 due to the second world war event. 
3.2 1949–1960: private mode of organisation but regulated by the 
French government 
The modern development of the cotton industry came after the CFDT24 was created in 1949 
to take over the management of the cotton industry in the colonial territories. A research 
body, the Institut de recherche du coton et des textiles exotiques (IRCT), was established 
with the aim of developing higher yield varieties of seed cotton in support of CFDT activities. 
These changes occurred in the context of a new strategy initiated by France to develop its 
colonies after the Brazzaville conference. The strategy was based on development plans 
which were designed for each territory and financed by a French organisation, Fonds 
d'investissement pour le développement économique et social (FIDES). In Benin, FIDES 
financed two development plans in 1946–1952 and 1953–1960 (Manning, 1982; and 
Sotindjo, 2016).25  
In terms of organisation of the cotton industry, the CFDT promoted a single chain running 
from farming to exporting activities. In particular, the CFDT wielded monopsony power for 
the purchase of seed cotton from farmers and monopoly power for the supply of inputs, 
primary processing of seed cotton, and marketing of cotton lint. Typically, farmers would 
obtain inputs on credit before sowing, and they would pay this back in the form of seed 
                                               
24 In 2001 the CFDT became Développement des Agro-Industries du Sud (DAGRIS). 
25 The plans supported the development of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and other public services. In 
agriculture, palm oil was promoted as well. 
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cotton after production was realised. The CFDT also supported the acquisition of equipment 
by farmers and it provided them with technical and extension services. In addition, it 
encouraged the production of high-quality seed cotton by offering a price premium. The 
producer prices were set on a pan-territorial basis and announced before the sowing 
season. The CFDT bought the whole harvest from the producers at the announced price. In 
order to process the growing production, two new ginnery factories were built in 1955 in 
Borgou (in Kandi) and in Atacora (Djougou).26 Exports also improved, as can been seen 
from Figure 5.  
                                               
26 In September 1955 a stabilisation fund the Caisse de stabilisation des priz du coton de la fédération de l’AOF 
(CSPC) was created to jointly manage the producer price in the francophone cotton-producing colonies in West 
Africa. CSPC set the producer price and was managed by the general government of AOF, based in Dakar. It 
was financed from cotton revenue but also from subsidies received from the french textile marketing board (Fond 
de Soutien des Textile). When AOF ceased to exist in 1958, CSPC was replaced in September 1959 by a new 
regional stabilisation fund (the Caisse de Stabilization Inter-Etats du Coton), which from then on was jointly 
managed by the West African francophone countries. We currently lack additional details on these funds. 
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4 Understanding the performance of the cotton sector 
in Benin: 1961–2016 
4.1 1961–1970: a private mode of organisation but regulated by 
the newly independent state 
This period immediately following independence (in 1960) was characterised by political 
instability.27 In line with the economic policy of the previous period, two development plans 
were implemented, covering the periods 1961–1965 and 1966–1970. These plans were 
largely financed by the French government through its development fund Fonds d’Aide à la 
Coopération (FAC), which replaced FIDES in 1959. The European Commission’s special 
fund for development, Fonds Européen de Développement (FED), also contributed to the 
financing of the development plans in Benin. 
After independence, many rules and decisions were enacted to organise the agriculture 
sector.28 As the political context was characterised by a growing nationalist movement that 
had started during the colonial period, the new government started to promote parastatal 
companies and national players in various activities of the economy. For instance, a 
registration card was introduced to regulate the primary marketing of seed cotton.29 In the 
same way, there was a rule limiting exports of raw cotton, so that it could be processed 
inside the country.30 A national stabilisation fund, the Fonds de soutien des produits à 
l’exportation (FS)31 was established in 1961 to protect agriculture exports when world prices 
became lower than the operating costs (producer price, processing costs, and transportation 
cost). FS was financed by export revenue and subsidies. Taxes were charged on all export 
products.32  
The IRCT introduced a new high-yielding variety of cotton (Hirsutum) to replace the existing 
one (Barbadense). This was done in the northern region in 1962 and later, in 1965, in the 
central region (World Bank, 1972). While the two varieties were still produced in the country, 
the government issued a provision (August 1965) to regulate their distribution. More 
specifically, the rule imposed that the two varieties should be commercialised separately and 
                                               
27 There were many coups d’état that toppled several governments. For details see the appendix, Chapter 1, and 
Akindes, 2016. 
28 Other agricultural products, especially palm oil, were supported as well. For this purpose, the parastatal 
organisation Societe Nationale pour le Developpement Rural du Dahomey (SONADER), was created in 1961 to 
take over the management of agricultural production in the country. Another parastatal organisation, the Office de 
Commercialisation Agricole du Dahomey (OCAD), was created in 1962 to take over the management of the other 
components of the supply chain for these products (primary marketing, transport, processing, and export).  
29 We currently lack information on how the collection was organised before independence. 
30 Specific decisions were also taken as regards farmers. In June 1962, for instance, the government introduced 
a law imposing collective land for agriculture (champs collectifs) in each village in Benin. The idea was that 
groups of village farmers would join forces to generate income that would be used to finance local infrastructure. 
Besides these collective lands, however, farmers cultivated their individual land. Similar practices of local public 
goods financing were imposed by the colonial authorities through the organisations Société Indigène de 
Prévoyance (SIP) in 1929 and the Sociétés Mutuelles de Développement rural (SMDR) in the 1950s.  
31 The FS was initiated in parallel with the regional fund CSPC because the price support was seen to be 
insufficient for a number of cotton growers followed illegal route to export their production in neighbouring 
countries (Government of Benin, 1962).  
32 The lowest tax was applied to cotton (CFA 0.010 per Kg), whereas the highest was applied to groundnuts 
(CFA 0.75 per Kg). For palm oil products, the tax amounted to CFA 0.10 per Kg.  
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on different days in pre-defined local markets. In addition, two qualities of seed cotton were 
explicitly defined: high-quality cotton (1er choix), obtained from the current agricultural 
season and possessing attributes of homogeneity, whiteness, cleanness, and dryness; and 
low-quality cotton (2ème choix). Appointed controllers were charged with the task of 
identifying the quality of cotton offered for sale by any operator in the local market.  
The price of high-quality seed cotton was determined on the basis of the processing price of 
cotton lint from the past year. A forecast was then made regarding the processing cost for 
the next cotton season, but the quality of these estimations was only indicative. As for the 
price of low-quality seed cotton, following a proposition by FS, it was fixed by the 
government at a given ratio to the price of the high-quality product. This price-setting rule 
was thus not based on any consideration related to the growers’ production costs. Each 
year, FS transferred this price information to the government for announcement to the public.  
In the meantime, the Société D'Aide Technique et de Cooperation (SATEC) and the Bureau 
pour le développement de la production agricole (BDPA – created in 1950), two other 
French parastatals33, were established in central Benin (in the Zou and Collines 
departments) and the north-western area (in the Atacora and Donga departments), 
respectively, to take over the extension and technical services and the marketing of seed 
cotton (Sotindjo, 2017; World Bank, 1969). If the CFDT concentrated on the north-eastern (in 
the Alibori and Borgou departments) area for the realisation of these activities, it continued to 
be the main organisation for the processing and the exporting of all the cotton produced in 
Benin. 
To expand its cotton sector, Benin received support from the FAC and the FED during the 
period 1963–1970. However, most of the funding was directly handed by the French 
agencies. The CFDT concentrated its efforts on the Borgou-Alibori department and SATEC 
concentrated on the central region. The project financed one government ginnery factory in 
Parakou in the Borgou department in 1968. Furthermore, the IRCT continued its research 
activities in relation to high-yielding varieties in the stations of Mono and Parakou. As a 
result, between 1961 and 1969, production and acreage increased from 2,482 tonnes and 
20,608 ha to 23,959 tonnes and 31,884 ha, respectively.34 Concurrently, yields increased 
from 1,204 hectogram per hectare (hg/ha) to 7,514 hg/ha over the same period.  
Six cotton-processing factories, representing a total capacity of 60,000 tonnes, operated in 
Benin around the end of the 1960s (World Bank, 1972). This points to a serious problem of 
over-capacity since total production in the country was about 24,000 tonnes of seed cotton in 
1969. The CFDT owned four of these factories, two of which were located in the central 
region (Bohicon and Savalou) and two in the northern region (in Kandi and Djougou35). The 
government owned the two remaining factories: one in the South-West (Mono) and the other 
in the North (Parakou). Through an agreement with the government, the CFDT managed the 
ginnery in Parakou, in addition to the four factories under its ownership. The Societe 
Nationale pour le Developpement Rural du Dahomey (SONADER) operated the second 
government ginnery in Mono. Formally, the agreement with the government stipulated that 
                                               
33 The French parastatals are locally known in Benin as Société d’Intervention. 
34 The major increase, however, took place after 1966, when the project’s operations really started (see Figure 
1). The delay was due to administrative and technical difficulties (World Bank, 1969). These problems were partly 
related to the political instability of the time. 
35 The ginnery in Djougou become defective sometime in the 1960s or 1970s. 
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the CFDT was not allowed to purchase seed cotton from producers in the Mono region. 
However, it remained in charge of the export of all cotton lint processed in Benin, including 
the product processed by SONADER in the Mono region. In 1969, however, the 
responsibility for cotton exports was shifted from the CFDT to the Office de 
Commercialisation Agricole du Dahomey (OCAD). 
4.2 1971–1981: a public mode of organisation regulated by the 
Marxist-Leninist government 
The positive impulse of the 1960s continued its effect till 1972, when seed cotton reached a 
peak of 49,590 tonnes (left panel of Figure 1). Thereafter, production started declining, from 
1973, and reached a low level of 14,134 tonnes in 1981. We now detail a number of events 
that coincided with this poor performance of Benin’s cotton sector in 1973–1981.  
While the French parastatals (CFDT, SATEC, IRCT) contributed significantly to the 
development of the cotton sector in 1963–1972, their mode of operation was criticised on a 
number of points (World Bank 1970). For instance, the parastatals were blamed for their 
high operational costs, and for their single-crop development strategy, which ignored food 
crops and did not apply an integrated rural development approach in the areas of 
intervention. Moreover, the nationalist movement continued to grow, with the consequence 
that there was rising pressure to reduce foreign influence. In particular, the revolutionary 
government that took power in October 1972 promoted the ideas of ‘self-reliance’ and food 
self-sufficiency. Consequently, Beninese rural regional development agencies, known as the 
Centres d'Action Régional pour le Développement Rural (CARDERs), were promoted in the 
years 1969–1975, with a view to developing each department. This decision was taken in 
parallel to the creation in January 1971 of a national cotton agency, the Société Nationale 
Agricole pour le Coton (SONACO), charged with the development of the entire cotton sector 
in the country.  
In order to further expand the cotton sector, however, foreign assistance was necessary 
because the country lacked technical skills and financial resources. In this context, a new 
project was implemented from 1972 onwards, jointly financed by the government (24.5%), a 
grant from the FAC (27.5%), and credit from the International Development Association 
(IDA) for the remaining 48%. A primary objective of this project was to develop the activities 
of the newly created agency (SONACO), which was intended to progressively take over the 
management from the CFDT and SATEC of all activities in the cotton sector: technical and 
extension services, supply and distribution of inputs, processing, and marketing.36 Other 
activities of the project included the creation of a credit fund to finance inputs and equipment, 
the construction of two additional ginneries, and the rehabilitation of rural roads to facilitate 
the transport of cotton from the fields. 
An important condition imposed on SONACO was that it should work in collaboration with 
the three French parastatals already operating in the cotton sector: SATEC, the IRCT, and 
the CFDT. In a first phase, it was expected that SONACO would concentrate on the 
management of the procurement of inputs and the agricultural fund. In addition, SONACO 
                                               
36 Other activities of the project included the creation of a fund to provide credit for inputs and equipment, the 
construction of two additional ginneries, and the rehabilitation of rural roads to facilitate the transport of cotton 
from the fields. 
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would contract with the CFDT and SATEC (with the former for the North and with the latter 
for the central region) to manage the project at the regional level (distribution of inputs, 
technical and extension services, transport, marketing). Moreover, through a joint venture 
with the government, the CFDT would manage all the cotton ginneries in the country. A 
similar joint venture between the CFDT and government cotton agency was successfully 
created in other francophone West African cotton-producing countries. Finally, it was 
expected that the IRCT would pursue its research and development activities in relation to 
higher-yielding seed varieties.  
The project should have started in 1970 but serious institutional problems caused delays so 
that it was implemented only from January 1972. 37 In the beginning (1972), funds came from 
the FAC and the Government of Benin. As for IDA, it delayed its intervention until April 1973 
because of institutional hurdles. In particular, SONACO unilaterally decided to take over the 
direct control of the extension services in the field, in violation of the initial agreement to 
contract those activities to the CFDT and SATEC. Furthermore, skills shortages and 
management problems at the top level of SONACO were a hindrance to the project’s smooth 
unfolding. Also, with a new government coming to power (on 26 October 1972) there came 
big changes in the staffing of the government agencies. All these unforeseen changes 
increased uncertainty; hence the decision by IDA to postpone the disbursement of its funds. 
In the end, IDA’s decision was proved to be the right one because the cotton sector 
performed very poorly from that time onwards (see Figure 1).  
There are many reasons for the collapse of the cotton sector. First, SONACO was unable to 
adequately develop field activities, especially input supply and distribution. In particular, 
procurement problems (problems with the licensing of suppliers and non-transparent 
competitive bidding) caused delays in the delivery of inputs to farmers. Moreover, inputs 
were left unprotected in the port of Cotonou and their quality deteriorated after having been 
exposed to the rain. There were also problems in the delivery of ploughs. Furthermore, there 
were issues between producers and extension staff of SONACO, who were collectors of 
seed cotton at the village level. In particular, taking advantage of the illiteracy of the growers, 
some collectors tampered with the amount of cotton submitted by growers. All these 
problems were amplified when the CFDT and SATEC were forced to leave the country in 
1974, when the regime adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and put more emphasis on food 
crops. This is where Benin differs fundamentally from other francophone West African 
countries. As a consequence of these problems, farmers turned away from cotton, especially 
in the central region of the Zou-Collines, and they started to produce more maize for the 
Nigerian market, where demand noticeably increased following the first oil shock. This period 
marked the decline of cotton production in the central region that we highlighted above.  
                                               
37 Project preparation started in 1967 and its implementation should have started earlier, in 1970, but political 
instability, characterised by many government changes, caused delays in its definition and approval. The rule of 
Colonel Christophe Soglo, who seized power through a coup in November 1965, was interrupted by a coup 
executed by Colonel Kouandoté on 17 December 1967, then followed by another military coup, this time at the 
initiative of Alley on 21 December 1967. Alley organised a general election, the results of which were not 
validated, and Dr Zinsou was finally appointed as the new president in July 1968. Thereafter, a new coup was 
executed by Kouandoté in December 1969, followed by a new general election in 1970, which was again 
contested. Thereafter emerged the triumviate system of government first led by Maga (May 1970 to May 1972), 
then by Ahomadégbé (May 1972 to 26 October 1972), and finally by Kérékou. After Kérékou took power, several 
administrative bottlenecks delayed the effective start of the project till April 1973. 
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Changes in the other segments of the supply chain also compromised the performance of 
the sector. For instance, the fact that OCAD took over export activities from the CFDT had 
the effect of reducing the quality of cotton lint exported by Benin. The Société de 
Commercialisation et Crédit Agricole du Dahomey (SOCAD) replaced OCAD in 1972, and it 
also took over the management of the stabilisation fund FS. The change did not, however, 
improve the situation and the agencies continued to suffer from weak management 
problems. All these issues led the government and the donor to prematurely end the project 
around 1975. 
There were, however, three main positive outcomes from the project, which also affected the 
sector later on. First, one additional government ginnery (with a capacity of 18,000 tonnes) 
was constructed in 1972 in the central region (Glazoué). Second, the research unit IRCT 
developed new high-yielding varieties (although in 1973–1980 their effects on cotton yield 
were nullified by the disruption of inputs and extension services): BJA SM 67 and 444-2-70. 
Third, and most fundamentally, village groups of farmers known as Groupements Villageois 
(GV) were promoted in 1971 to take on some responsibilities in the cotton supply chain. GV 
do not use collective asset ownership (land and equipment), and neither do they practice 
common production; instead, they merely coordinate within their group the distribution of 
inputs and the primary marketing of seed cotton. For inputs, a joint liability system known as 
caution solidaire was introduced whereby farmers in each GV are jointly responsible for input 
credit to be recovered at the time of the primary marketing of cotton. As regards primary 
marketing, village collection centres were created where each GV sells its seed cotton jointly 
to the collector. The project introduced this change in order to counter the tampering with the 
amount of seed cotton by some collectors. For this purpose, the project initiated a training 
programme to develop GV’s skills in cotton weighing, as well as their literacy skills. GVs 
were paid for their involvement in the primary marketing, and revenue generated from that 
activity (‘ristournes’) was invested in rural infrastructure, such as schools, wells, and health 
centres.  
After having adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1974, in 1977 the government initiated 
two new types of farmers groups. One was the Groupement Revolutionnaire a Vocation 
Cooperative (GRVC), which is similar to the GV in terms of asset ownership and production 
organisation but it produces food crops in addition to cotton. Moreover, GRVC promote 
production in block of the members’ plots and a high degree of centralisation of extension 
services. Second, the government promoted collectivist cooperatives known as 
Coopératives agricoles expérimentales de type socialiste (CAETS) and Coopératives 
agricoles de type socialiste (CATS).38 Over time, however, CAETS and CATS did not 
succeed because they were not able to attract the most efficient producers (see, e.g., 
Yérima and Affo, 2011). Moreover, there were mismanagement problems. Only GV and 
GRCV have survived till today. 
The Marxist-Leninist government also introduced institutional changes in the other steps of 
the supply chain of cotton. In 1976 SONACO was replaced by a new parastatal, Société 
Nationale d'Agriculture (SONAGRI), and the responsibilities of the later also included the 
management of inputs for food crops. In particular, SONAGRI was assigned the activities 
                                               
38 In the strategy developed by the government GRVC were expected to become CAETS at village level, which 
would themselves become CAETS at commune (district) level. In practice, however, CAETS and CATS did not 
succeed and only GV and GRCV have survived today.  
Regulation of a Dominant Sector: A Case Study of Cotton 
© Economic Development & Institutions  19 
related to processing and input supply in the cotton chain. In contrast, extension services 
were from then on transferred to the development agencies, CARDERs. In the same period 
SOCAD was renamed Société Nationale pour la Commercialisation et l'Exportation du Bénin 
(SONACEB) in 1976 and a new stabilisation fund, the Fonds autonome de stabilisation et de 
soutien des prix des produits agricoles (FAS), was created in the same year. Following these 
additional changes, cotton production deteriorated further, from 30,654 tonnes in 1974 to a 
very low level of 14,134 tonnes in 1981. Moreover, the financial accounts of the government 
agencies (CARDERs, SONAGRI, and SONACEB) continued to be problematic.  
Around the end of 1977, however, the government took a renewed interest in cotton and 
called upon the support of donors. As such, a technical assistance programme was 
implemented in 1977–1981 to prepare new development projects. The assistance 
programme was financed by IDA (50%), FAC (31.25%), and the government (18.75%).   
4.3 1981–1991: public mode of organisation; government 
agencies were restructured and reorganised 
In 1981–1991 the cotton sector recovered strongly, as can be seen from the left panel of 
Figure 1: seed cotton increased almost eightfold over the period. This outcome was the 
result of four new projects that were developed by the government in collaboration with five 
donors (IDA, Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement (BOAD), Caisse Centrale de 
Cooperation Economique (CCCE)39, the International Fund for Agricultural (IFAD), and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)).  
The projects strengthened the capacity of the cotton sector both at the national and regional 
levels. At the national level, they helped in restructuring and reorganising the existing 
government agencies in the cotton sector. As such, in 1983, FAS, SONACEB, and 
SONAGRI were replaced by a single new organisation, The Sociéte Nationale pour la 
Production Agricole (SONAPRA), which became responsible for the management of input 
supply40 as well as the final marketing of cotton. In addition to these institutional reforms, the 
government increased producer prices from around CFA 80 in 1981 to CFA 100 in 1982–
1984, and to CFA 110 in 1985–1986.41  
At the regional level the projects helped in strengthening the capacities of the CARDERs and 
the producer groups. In this respect, the first project concentrated on the Borgou region 
(1981–1988), the second targeted the Zou region, and the third focused on the Atacora 
region (1983–1988). Finally, the fourth project was a follow-up of the first project in the 
Borgou region (1988–1991). Hence, the most productive Borgou region received more 
support, which contributed further to the development of the region.  
In 1981, the government transferred to the CARDERs all activities related to the transport 
and the processing of cotton, although these functions were formerly under the responsibility 
                                               
39 The CCCE is the French development cooperation agency, which holds a share in the CFDT. The CCCE 
became the Caisse Francaise de Développement (CFD) in 1992 and the AFD in 1998.  
40 The input supply was managed through a procurement system with international bidding. We do not currently 
have details about the firms that were assigned the import of input supply.  
41 It seems that the government reduced subsidies on inputs during that period but it is currently difficult to check 
this information.  
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of SONAGRI and should therefore have been passed on to SONAPRA. In addition, the 
CARDERs continued to manage extension services and the primary marketing of cotton, in 
collaboration with the GVs. Women’s groups were also promoted for the first time during this 
project. For extension services, a training and visit (TV42) system was introduced in the 
fields. The projects supported the training of the CARDERs’ staff and the GV members, 
which facilitated input delivery and the provision of extension services to farmers. Moreover, 
the projects supported the acquisition of equipment by farmers and the construction of rural 
roads.  
Following these institutional changes and the producer price incentive that was provided 
during the period cotton production increased substantially from 14,134 to 88,098 tonnes in 
1984, surpassing for the first time the ginnery capacity of 72,000 tonnes. From then, 
production further increased to 132,762 tonnes in 1986. In 1987, however, the sector 
experienced a crisis that caused production to regress to 70,203 tonnes. The crisis had to do 
with three main issues. First, Figure 2 shows a strong decrease of the dollar value of the 
world cotton price and a deep depreciation of the US dollar in 1984–1986. As a result, the 
CFA value of export revenue of the cotton sector depressed. Second, weak financial 
management by SONAPRA and the CARDERs combined with the continued support of the 
producer price value of CFA 110 led to a depletion of resources of the stabilisation fund in 
1985. In this context, the further decrease of world cotton prices that occurred in 1986 could 
no longer be absorbed by the stabilisation fund without external funding because the 
government itself was also experiencing financial problems. The mis-allocation of the 
stabilisation fund included: excessive prefinancing of the working capital for CARDERs; and 
transport and other logistics by SONAPRA to manage the excess production of cotton. 
Moreover, the debt of SONAPRA and the CARDERs with respect to the banking sector and 
external suppliers stood at about CFA 7.6 billion. The cotton sector was therefore bankrupt 
in 1986. 
In order to resolve this situation, a restructuring programme for the cotton sector was 
implemented in 1987–1991. The programme was executed by the government in 
collaboration with four donors (IDA, CFA, IFAD, and BOARD) within the framework of the 
second Borgou project, where money was provided to absorb the debt of SONAPRA and the 
CARDERs. An important condition imposed by the donors on the government in this 
restructuring programme was that external technical assistance should be mobilised to 
assist the management of cotton agencies. The CFDT was thus called to provide technical 
and managerial assistance to SONAPRA and the CARDERs. The programme included three 
main reforms. First, the management of ginnery factories was transferred from the 
CARDERs to SONAPRA. As such, SONAPRA gained control of the main activities of the 
cotton sector and the CARDERs were left with the status of SONAPRA subcontractors, to 
manage field activities. From then on, the cotton sector became integrated around the 
monopole SONAPRA, as was the case with the CFDT before 1972. A similar change 
occurred in other former francophone exporters of cotton, but Benin was different because 
unlike those countries the CFDT had no ownership share in SONAPRA. This was the case 
because the CFDT was forced by the Marxist-Leninist regime to leave the country in 1974.  
                                               
42 TV is a management method for organising extension services in a way that establishes a personal 
relationship between an extension agent and a farmer. The extension agent regularly visits the farmer (every one 
or two weeks) to provide advice on any matter related to the activities in the production cycle. Unsolved problems 
are reported back to the extension service for advice or research to find solutions. 
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Second, the stabilisation fund became the Fonds de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des 
Produits agricoles (FSS) and was passed on to an independent management committee. 
Moreover, the producer price-setting rule was reformed to include a price floor, which was 
announced by the government before the sowing season around April. The determination of 
the price floor was based on an opaque rule which took into account the financial viability of 
the whole cotton sector. If the export price exceeded the cost (producer price and other 
costs of the cotton sector) in a given year the benefice was distributed in the next year 
among producers, SONAPRA, the FSS, and the government, according to a pre-defined 
sharing rule. There were, however, some problems with the implementation of this new rule. 
In particular, the determination of the price floor was not transparent. Moreover, the price 
floor was not directly related to the world cotton price, such that the FSS was not always 
able to stabilise strong adverse price shocks. In any case, the government reduced the 
producer price from CFA 110 to CFA 100 in 1987 in order to contribute to the financial 
viability of the system. Moreover, input and seed distribution were limited to the high-yielding 
regions in 1987. As a consequence of these two measures seed cotton production reduced 
considerably in 1987.  
Third, various reforms were initiated to strengthen the administrative and financial 
procedures of SONAPRA and the CARDERs. For instance, internal audit units were 
established in these agencies in order to regularly check their financial viability. In the same 
way, administrative and accounting procedures were put in place to manage their invoicing 
systems. Furthermore, working capital was provided to SONAPRA and the CARDERs. 
Following these reforms, the sector’s performance improved significantly. For instance, the 
reorganisation of the government agencies helped in reducing operating costs and the 
export marketing procedure (World Bank, 1995). Cotton production surged from 70,203 
tonnes in 1987 to 177,123 tonnes in 1991.43 In the same way, the GV’s revenue increased 
from their participation in the primary marketing, which they used to further finance local 
infrastructure. The promotion of women’s groups may also have increased their voice in 
matters related to rural development in the cotton-producing areas. One of the first careful 
microeconomic analysis of the ‘impact’ of these reforms in the Borgou region claims that 
women gained the most from these changes, because they were previously less involved in 
the cotton value chain (Bruntrup, 1997).  
The sector realised this performance despite the fact that world cotton prices continued to 
decline over the period. However, it was not clear whether without the second Borgou 
project the sector would be able survive a similar crisis in the future. Hence discussions 
started between the government and the main donors to privatise and liberalise the cotton 
sector. The context was also characterised by a structural adjustment programme that 
began in 1989 and the political transition towards a democratic regime with the national 
conference in February 1990. A new constitution was adopted in the same year and a 
market economy was re-established. Hence, a new institutional framework for the agriculture 
sector was elaborated in the Lettre de déclaration de politique de développement rural 
(LDPDR) by the government in June 1991, after Soglo won the first presidential election in 
April 1991.44 The LDPDR stipulated that the government should transfer the main functions 
                                               
43 In the meantime, two ginneries were constructed for SONAPRA in Borgou to address the under-capacity 
problem: one in Banikoara and the other in Bemberekè. These were financed by IDA and CCCE.  
44 The first parliamentarian election took place in February 1991. 
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of the supply chain to the private sector (primary and final marketing, supply and distribution 
of inputs, and processing).  
4.4 1992–1999: public mode of organisation under liberalisation 
of inputs and ginnery functions 
Following the LDPDR, Benin began the liberalisation of the cotton sector in 1992 under the 
Soglo regime which ruled the country till 3 April 1996. A gradual approach was taken. First, 
the input function was gradually liberalised in 1992–1995. Second, the private sector was 
licensed to operate in the processing component, starting from 1995. Third, the government 
initiated a broader agricultural restructuring project, the Projet de restructuration des services 
agricoles (PRSA), in 1992–1999. PRSA aimed to promote a better quality of agricultural 
services by the private sector in the context of structural adjustment programmes that 
prescribed the reduction of government in various sectors of the economy. In the framework 
of PRSA many extension agents of the CARDERs were fired. In order to strengthen the 
capacity of the producers to take over new responsibilities in the sector, the Fédération des 
producteurs du Bénin (FUPRO-Benin) was created in 1994 as the national professional 
trade union of the GV (Wennink et al., 2013). The project was supported by seven donors 
(the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), FED, AFD, the German Technical 
Cooperation, Agency (GTZ), IFAD, the United Nations Development Programme, and 
BOAD).  
The liberalisation of the input component proceeded gradually from 20% in 1992 to 100% in 
1995. In 1992–1994 SONAPRA was responsible for the residual shares of input supply. The 
details of the liberalisation were as follows:  
i. In 1992 20% of input supply and distribution was attributed to the private firm Société 
de Distribution Internationale (SDI), of which Talon was a major shareholder.  
ii. In 1993 the share of SDI increased to 40%. 
iii. In 1994 60% were attributed to the private sector now to be shared among two firms: 
- SDI obtained 50%; and 
- a new firm, Société africaine de management, d’affrètement et de commerce 
(SAMAAC) entered with 10% but it seems that it collaborated with SDI. 
iv. In 1995 100% of input supply was transferred to the private sector, as follows: 
- SDI (46%), SAMAAC 15%), Société des industries cotonnières du Bénin 
(SODICOT) (15%); Société générale pour l’industrie et le commerce (SOGICOM 
(8%); and Fruits et Textiles (FRUITEX) Industries (16%). 
The selection procedure of these firms for the input supply was done by SONAPRA 
according to its procurement system, which was limited to Beninese firms in the liberalisation 
process.45 Why did the government not allow foreign firms to compete directly with the 
domestic firms? There are suggestive indications that the procurement and licensing 
procedures were not totally transparent. For instance, in a recent open letter in 2018 the 
then president Soglo argued that he took the cotton activities from the CFDT and assigned 
the input supply activities to a group of 10 entrepreneurs, including Benin’s current president 
Talon.46 Moreover, in 1992, SDI received directly the inputs from SONAPRA and it only 
                                               
45 Only the declining residual share was procured with international firms. 
46 See details of the letter here: www.jeuneafrique.com/560768/politique/benin-nicephore-soglo-repond-a-jeune-
afrique/ 
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reimbursed it afterwards (Yérima and Affo, 2015). It is also interesting to see that the number 
of firms increased greatly in 1995. We do not yet have a clear understanding of why this 
happened. However, 1995 was the year of the second parliamentarian election in Benin and 
it is possible that the competition to win that election could be related to the one to enter the 
input market.  
In addition to these reforms, the CFA value of the world cotton price improved following the 
rise of the dollar value of the world cotton price and the CFA’s 50% devaluation in 1994 
(Figure 2). Figure 4 shows that the producer price also increased over the period but the gap 
between the two series became wider over the second half of the 1990s.47 Following these 
changes cotton production continued its increase further after 1991 and reached a high 
value of 430,398 tonnes in 1996. The improvement in cotton production was such that Benin 
outperformed Burkina Faso in 1993–1996, and there was an under-capacity ginnery problem 
in 1994.   
Note, however, that this improvement in cotton production was primarily driven by land 
extension. In particular, while yields increased in 1993, they declined in 1994 and followed a 
declining trend till 1998. Several explanations can be provided for declining yields in that 
period. First, the result could be due to the price effect of imported inputs following the CFA 
devaluation. As the price of inputs increased producers were likely to reduce their input 
consumption and this could have potentially caused yield to decrease. Second, this outcome 
could relate to liberalisation having reached more farmers and hence the observed increase 
in land area. If the newcomer-farmers were less efficient in cotton production or if they 
applied the cotton input for other crops, average cotton yields would have decreased. Third, 
the new private input suppliers could have been less efficient in managing and distributing 
inputs, causing delays in supply inputs or supplying a lower quality of inputs.  
After president Kérékou took power on 4 April 1996, the number of private firms that 
obtained a licence to distribute inputs in the cotton sector further increased to 11 in 1996 and 
12 in 1998. It is possible that this increase was related to the competition for the presidential 
election of 1996 in the sense that the Kérékou regime wanted to compensate some 
entrepreneurs for their support in winning that election. In the absence of clear evidence, this 
remains speculative, however. In any case the quality of inputs has deteriorated since the 
increased number of private firms in 1997–1998. Part of the explanation is that some of the 
newcomers were less efficient. We further elaborate on other institutional causes below. We 
first discuss the liberalisation of the processing component.  
In order to address the under-capacity problem of the processing factories the Soglo regime 
initiated a liberalisation in 1995, when three new private ginnery factories of 25,000 tonnes 
capacity each obtained their licence to operate in Benin: ICB at Pehunco (Atacora); CCB in 
Kandi (Borgou); and SOCOBE in Bohicon (Zou). These three private factories are known as 
first generation (of the liberalisation period) ginneries.48 They were granted a number of 
preferential treatments by the government. First, they obtained a preferential investment 
code regime (régime C), which grants a 100% tax exoneration on profit and an exoneration 
of duty on imported equipment and intermediate inputs for about seven years. Second, 
according to a regulation SONAPRA buys seed cotton from farmers and sells them to the 
                                               
47 The devaluation also made the inputs more expensive in CFA franc terms, but we do not have the necessary 
information to further pursue this analysis here.  
48 It seems that the current President Talon is the owner of these three gin factories. 
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private ginneries. This implies that SONAPRA supported part of the risk that should normally 
be taken by the producers and the private ginneries. Third, the amount of seed cotton to be 
allocated to the private firms should be proportional to their ginnery capacity and the total 
seed cotton production. Fourth, SONAPRA contributed 35% to the capital of each of these 
three private ginneries. Applying these preferential treatments created problems in the future 
when the number of gin factories increased.  
In 1997–1998, the Kérékou regime granted licences to the second generation of ginnery 
factories. Their total capacity ranged from 40,000 to 60,000 tonnes. These included three 
new factories for SONAPRA (one ginnery in Bohicon in the Zou department and two 
ginneries in Parakou49 in the Borgou department) and five new private factories (IBECO in 
Kétou (Patteau); LCB in Pouipnan (Zou); SEICB in Savalou (Collines), Marlan's Cotton 
Industry (MCI) in Nikki; and SODICOT in Ndali (Borgou)). This gives a total of 18 gin 
factories, of which 10 were owned SONAPRA and the remaining eight were owned by the 
private sector. With these new gin factories in business, there was again over-capacity, with 
a total capacity of 442,500 tonnes compared to a production of 377,370 tonnes. In 1998 the 
gin capacity further increased to 587,500. The management of this over-capacity problem 
has been a major issue facing the Benin cotton sector. Figure 5 displays the location of the 
18 gin factories.  
Following these changes, production started on a declining trend from 1997 onwards. The 
decrease in 1996 and 1997 was not systematically related to the producer price, which did 
not decline. The producer price even increased from 1997 to 1998, despite the fact that the 
world price marginally decreased (Figures 2 and 4). This implies that an alternative factor 
was responsible for the decrease in cotton production. A number of governance problems 
coincided with this poor performance. We first briefly discuss the change in producer prices 
and later elaborate on the factors behind the decline of cotton production. In April 1996 the 
FSS was replaced by the Office Nationale de stabilization et de soutien des prix aux 
producteurs (ONS) and a new price-setting rule came into effect. The new rule took into 
account the world price of cotton and also explicitly defined a margin for each of the main 
actors along the supply chain: producer; input supply and distribution, and ginnery factories.  
As regards governance issues, the cotton sector experienced two conflicts in 1996–1997. 
The first conflict involved the government and the first generation of gin factories. In 1995 the 
private ginnery factories accumulated a lot of profit given the high production of cotton 
processed but also because the CFA devaluation implied a high value of the world cotton 
price in CFA, but producer prices only marginally increased.50 Given, however, that the firms 
were granted a preferential tax regime an agreement was reached between the government 
and the firms that firms would exceptionally contribute to government revenue in that year in 
the amount of 35 CFA per kg of cotton processed. In compensation for this contribution the 
agreement stated a decrease in the share of the government in the capital of those firms 
from 35% to 10%. When the Kérékou regime came in in 1996 the preferential tax treatment 
to these firms was reversed and the government wanted firms to continue to make the 35 
CFA per kg contribution. The firms contested this in the judicial court (as well as the 
                                               
49 One of the new factories replaced the old government ginnery in Parakou.  
50 Lower producer share price following the CFA devaluation was also observed in other West African countries. 
It was criticised and fuelled further pressure for reforming the cotton sector in these countries (e.g. Badiane et al., 
2002, Baghdadli et al., 2007) 
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Constitutional and the Supreme Courts) and when they won the Kérékou government’s 
action was reversed.  
The second conflict started in 1997 and related to issues between SONAPRA and the first 
private input providers (SDI and SAMAAC). The issues led SONAPRA to exclude these two 
companies from the input procurement in 1997. Following this decision SDI and SAMACC 
brought the case to the judicial court (and the Supreme Court), where they won. In addition, 
SONAPRA had to pay fines to these firms but an agreement was reached between the two 
parties. The agreement stipulated that SDI and SAMACC would take 50% of the input 
supply. This decision was applied from 1998 onwards and it contributed to further conflict 
because the other suppliers were left with a lower amount of input to be supplied; they 
contested this rule. This situation led to increased problems in the input component: higher 
price of input, lower quality of input, and delays in the distribution of inputs (e.g. Bidaux and 
Soulé, 2005).  
Figure 7: Ownership of ginnery factories in 1998 (left) and 2012 (right) 
  
Sources: The left-hand map is from World Bank (2004) and the one to the right is from Fludor Benin (2012). The 
ICA group and SODECO are now part of the same group. In 2017 the MCI factory was taken over by SODECO. 
Finally, a new gin factory (not shown on the map), with a capacity of 12,500 tonnes, was created in Parakou in 
2018. This gives a total of 600,000 tonnes capacity for Benin. 
In order to resolve the problems a number of actions were taken to privatise the 
management of the cotton sector. In 1998, for instance, the producer organisation FUPRO 
created the Coopérative d'Approvisionnement et de Gestion des Intrants Agricoles (CAGIA), 
to which the government transferred the management of input supply and distribution in 
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1999. Other professional associations were created in 1999: the Association Professionnelle 
des Egraineurs du Bénin (APEB) for ginners, the CAGIA for the management of input quotas 
between private firms, and the AIC for the management of the whole supply chain.  
4.5 2000–2007: private mode of organisation by AIC 
The important rules of the privatisation were decided at a national workshop in May 2000, 
which saw the participation of the sector’s representatives. The seminar decided between 
two modes of private governance for cotton: i) a unique private and vertically integrated 
mode of organisation at the country level; and ii) a private integrated mode of organisation at 
the regional level. Stakeholders decided in favour of the first mode. Moreover, a number of 
rules were put in place, such as fixed prices for inputs and cotton seeds across the whole 
country.  
In June 2000 the government suspended the monopole of SONAPRA on primary marketing 
but it continued to manage its 10 ginneries. Primary marketing was thus passed on to the 
Centrale de Sécurisation des Paiements et de Recouvrement (CSPR), which played a key 
institutional regulatory role in achieving the recovery of input loans to farmers and the 
payment of cotton seeds purchased by ginners. A development project funded by the World 
Bank, the Projet d’Appui à la Réforme de la Filière Coton (PARFC), was implemented in 
2002–2007 by the inter-professional cotton association (AIC) to strengthen their capacity. 
One important change in this period was the fact that AIC started to manage the critical51 
functions of the cotton’s sector, including technical and extension services that were 
previously under the responsibility of the CARDERs. It was also in the context where the 
CARDERs had to fire many workers as required by the PRSA project. As a result, AIC had 
to recruit private extension agents, which had to join forces with the remaining CARDERs 
technical staff to do the extension work. Figure 8 below summarises the organisational 
changes in the cotton sector before 1990 and after the liberalisations of the 1990s and the 
AIC period in 2000.  
It is striking that this period of intense organisational change did not have any effect on 
cotton production. Moreover, conflicts emerged among the actors starting from 2002–2003. 
For instance, farmers complained about expensive input prices. In the same way, a number 
of private firms contested the outcomes of the input procurement procedure, whereas some 
ginneries found fault with the quotas of cotton seeds. As a result, they boycotted the AIC-
CSPR-GARCIA system and started parallel activities. For instance, the dissident distributors 
attracted some farmers by proposing lower prices than what the official system was offering. 
However, the quality of the output delivered was not properly monitored. Likewise, the 
quality of privately supplied inputs could not be guaranteed and producers frequently 
complained that they were cheated in this regard. The ground was laid for a genuine crisis in 
the cotton sector. In particular, a lot of confusion was generated by the plurality of input 
sources and output outlets, and a number of farmers and ginners became severely indebted 
as the CSPR could no longer track their activities. The cotton sector in Benin thus 
experienced the side-selling problem discussed in Section 2. As a consequence, the system 
encountered delays in payments, which discouraged farmers. Many of them turned away 
from cotton production, which was depressed in 2005. The GV also experienced conflicts. 
                                               
51 The other critical functions include: research for new variety development; quality control; production and 
distribution of cotton seed; statistical data production; rural road maintenance. 
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The joint liability performed poorly and farmers also complained about poor financial 
management by their leaders. Another issue experienced by the sector was poor extension 
services because there were coordination problems between the private extension agents 
recruited by AIC and the ones that used to work in the CARDERs. The private agents also 
lacked technical skills. In fact, all the critical functions were under serious problems during 
that period.  
The government’s reaction consisted of stepping in to finance the debt shortfall. Moreover, it 
introduced in 2006 institutional reforms to strengthen the professional associations. The 
producer organisation became the Conseil National des Producteurs de Coton (CNPC) and 
was limited to cotton producers, in contrast to the old FUPRO; the association of the input 
distributors became the Conseil National des Importateurs et Distributeurs d’Intrants Coton 
(CNIDIC); CAGIA was replaced by the Centrale d’Achat des Intrants agricoles (CAI); and, 
finally, the organisation of gin factories was replaced by the Conseil National des Égreneurs 
(CNEC). Furthermore, the government adopted a framework agreement (Accord-cadre) in 
2006 with AIC, but with no significant effect on the sector’s performance.  
In April 2007 the newly elected president (Yayi Boni) dissolved the agreement with AIC and 
an ad hoc Commission Nationale was established to manage cotton inputs. Moreover, the 
government allowed SONAPRA in that year to compete for input supply with private firms. 
This decision was surprising given that SONAPRA was already excluded from these 
activities. 
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Figure 8: Changes in organisational structure of the cotton before 1992 and after the liberalisation of the 1990s and from 2000 
 
Sources: Adapted from Honfoga (2013) 
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4.6 2008–2012: private mode of organisation and privatisation of 
SONAPRA 
In 2008, the industrial assets of SONAPRA were privatised and a new group, known as the 
Société de Développement du Coton (SODECO), was created to take over these assets 
after several problems in procurement management became manifest in 2006–2007. A first 
attempt to privatise these assets of SONAPRA failed in 2004–2005. The second also failed 
in 2007 due to problems involving a violation of the regularity procedure. SODECO was 
created as a joint venture between the government, accounting for a share of 66.5%, and a 
private company led by Talon, accounting for the remaining share of 33.5%.  
In 2008 the government granted another licence for a new ginnery factory, SCN, in N’dali 
(Borgou) adding a capacity of 40,000 tonnes, despite the fact that the processing component 
was already experiencing an over-capacity problem. In 2009, a new framework agreement 
was signed between the government and AIC. 
Overall, the domination by Talon’s group further increased in the sector because it merged 
with the majority of gin factories to create the ICA group. Consequently, the sector came 
under the control of a private monopoly. The government continued, however, to intervene in 
the sector. Moreover, the new organisational changes failed to improve the situation in 
Benin’s cotton sector. Yields and the cultivated area remained low.  
4.7 2012–2016: public mode of organisation is back 
In April 2012 an international commission reported serious management problems by AIC. 
The problems included an over-estimation of the value of input supplied in the field, under-
estimation of seed cotton submitted at gin factories, and mismanagement of government 
subsidies. Hence, the government cancelled the agreement signed in 2009 with AIC and a 
public mode of organisation took over its management. An inter-ministerial commission 
assumed the responsibilities of AIC, and SONAPRA and ONS were the main operational 
organisations. This new public management remained in place till April 2016, when 
President Yayi Boni finished his term. During this period the cotton sector continued to 
suffer, however. One positive change perhaps was a strategy introduced to check input 
consumption in the field. The national statistics institute went into the field with GPS to check 
accurately the size of land area of cotton in order to verify the input consumption requested. 
Several times discrepancies were found, and the additional money was recovered. This 
system continues to be implemented today. 
4.8 2016–present: private mode of organisation remains back 
In May 2016 President Talon re-established AIC after he was voted into office in April. An 
audit requested by the Talon government reported several mismanagement problems in the 
public governance of the cotton sector in 2012–2016. The new regime abolished around 10 
agricultural government agencies, including SONAPRA, ONS, and the CARDERs. 
Moreover, it initiated a broader reform agenda in the agricultural sector, where nine new 
regional development agencies were created. In addition, the government abolished 
subsidies to the cotton sector.  
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During the institutional survey developed for Chapter 3 the experts were not enthusiastic 
about these reforms.52 Since 2016, however, seed cotton production has been increasing 
according to data published by INSAE53 (451,000 tonnes in 2016 and 597,985 tonnes for 
2017) and AIC (656,460 tonnes in 2018). These figures suggest that the sector has been 
improving in the last three years. The data presented in reports by the Programme Regional 
de Production Intégrée du Coton en Afrique (PR-PICA) also confirm this improvement in 
2016-2018. The available information from AIC and INSAE indicate that the recent 
improvement can be explain by increase in both yields and acreage. Other this period (2016-
2018) the producer price has not changed. As a result, this recent improvement in 
production, yields and acreage could be related to changes on the organisation and the 
management of the sector by AIC and the government.  
It is too early to further elaborate on the recent performance as we currently lack information 
in this regard; we therefore leave this analysis for future research. Gérald Estur, an expert 
who is familiar with the issues the African’s cotton is facing, argued in May 2019 that this 
recent improvement in Benin’s cotton performance is related to changes in the management 
of the sector since the new government took power over the last three years. According to 
the expert, the changes have helped to restore trust among the stakeholders in the sector. 
The changes include: a vertically integrated coordination approach by the government; 
timely payment of cotton growers; and efficient delivery of inputs.54  
                                               
52 During the survey the experts had to provide a score between a value 0 (strongly negative opinion) and 4 
(strongly positive opinion) on questions related to institutional performance. In addition, respondents were 
allowed to reply with ‘I do not know’ when they could not provide relevant answers to a question. The average 
score value related to the reform in the agricultural sector was around 2 and 23% of respondents either reported 
a neutral opinion or did not answer the question. See chapter 3 for more detail. 
53 See this link for details https://www.insae-bj.org/statistiques/statistiques-economiques 
54 See here for details http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20190517-le-benin-nouveau-champion-coton-africain 
Regulation of a Dominant Sector: A Case Study of Cotton 
© Economic Development & Institutions  30 
5 Concluding remarks 
The cotton sector presents a unique opportunity to understand the causes and 
consequences of institutional changes in Benin over a long historical period. The sector has 
operated under different modes of organisation, oscillating between public and private 
monopolies over time as summarized in Table 2 below. Initially, the cotton sector was 
managed by French entrepreneurs. From the end of the 1940s the sector came under the 
control of a French parastatal monopoly, the CFDT, which helped to modernise the sector 
with the support of development aid. In 1972, the Marxist-Leninist regime of Kérékou 
nationalised the CFDT, which was replaced by a number of government agencies. The 
system thus disintegrated, which increased coordination costs and resulted in poor 
performance. Thereafter, the sector entered a first restructuring period in the early 1980s 
and the government agencies were re-integrated back into a single state agency, 
SONAPRA. Poor management problems and adverse world price shocks undermined the 
sector’s performance in 1986. After another restructuring plan the sector started a 
liberalisation period in 1992, after the country achieved a successful democratic transition in 
1990. In particular, a liberalisation plan was implemented in 1992–1998 and private 
Beninese entrepreneurs started operating in the inputs and ginnery components of the 
sector. Thereafter, the sector experienced a crisis from the late 1990s and an inter-
professional association of private entrepreneurs, AIC, became responsible for the 
management of the sector in 2000–2006, but the government continued to play an important 
role. In 2007 a new government suspended AIC. Thereafter, SONAPRA was privatised in 
2008 and a dominant private group emerged. AIC became responsible again for the sector 
in 2009 but new problems in the sector led the government to suspend ACI from 2012 until 
2016, when AIC was again given the management of the sector. 
What are the common causes of these institutional changes? What are the common 
institutional weaknesses in the cotton sector in Benin? What are their consequences for 
economic development in Benin? Can Benin develop a long-term development strategy 
based on cotton?  
5.1 Institutional changes and institutional weaknesses: causes 
and consequences 
There are a number of institutional weaknesses that can be derived from the foregoing 
analysis in the chapter: the discontinuity of regulations, reforms, policies, planned actions, or 
mandates of an organisation; the weak regulation of businesses (privatisation and 
liberalisation, licence management, financial management, accounting and auditing 
systems); weak capacity in public administration (including issues related to data 
management); vulnerability to world price shocks; excessive government and political 
interference; political appointments; overlapping responsibility; weak coordination; and 
imperfect credit markets, asymmetric information, and weak contract enforcement. These 
weaknesses are potentially caused by rent-seeking; election and mass support; low 
technical and financial capacity; donors’ ideologies and their interests; poor management of 
conflict of interest; the ideology of political actors; colonisation and national anti-colonial 
revolution; culture; weak campaign financing; power concentration at the executive level; 
and distortions caused by subsidies in the dominant world cotton producers. We will now 
elaborate on a few of these institutional bottlenecks.
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Table 2: Overview of mode of organisation of the cotton across the political regimes in Benin: 1960-present 
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Discontinuity of regulations, reforms, policies, planned actions, or mandates 
of cotton organisations  
This characterises a situation in which a government abruptly overturns existing regulations, 
reforms, policies, planned actions by the previous government, or re-assigns the mandates 
of organisations in the cotton sector. This type of institutional weakness has been common 
over the whole historical period. In 1972, for instance, the military regime unexpectedly 
reversed the agreed decision between donors and the previous government that SONACO 
would contract with the CFDT and SATEC to manage field activities (distribution of inputs, 
technical and extension services, transport, marketing). In the same way the governance of 
AIC was sharply interrupted several times by successive governments in the period 2006–
2016. Furthermore, SONAPRA suddenly reappeared in input supply and distribution in 2007 
and 2012–2016, whereas a regulation already excluded it from participating in these 
activities in 1995.  
Several factors may cause this type of institutional bottleneck: for instance, the Marxist-
Leninist ideology of the revolutionary regime of the 1970s, the pronounced anti-colonial 
revolution at that time, and rent-seeking by supporters of the regime may explain why the 
CFDT did not continue to play a dominant role in the cotton sector in Benin but instead 
SONACO and other newly created government agencies suddenly took over the 
responsibilities. In the same way, rent-seeking, weak campaign financing, and electoral 
institutions, as well as the poor regulation of businesses, that characterise Benin may 
promote business-politics clientelist contracts, as elaborated in Chapter 4, and this could 
potentially explain the conflicts that emerged following the liberalisation and privatisation of 
the cotton sector in the 1990s. The dominant power of the new actors in the cotton sector, 
the excessive power of the executive, together with weak campaign financing and electoral 
institutions, could in turn explain the fluctuation between the public and private types of 
governance that we have witnessed since the 2000s.  
This institutional weakness causes an increase in uncertainty in the cotton sector and 
increases the cost of agriculture services and the quality of input required by the farmers. As 
a result, it will discourage the production of cotton and/or induce low yield, which in turn will 
undermine the welfare of producers.   
Weak capacity in public administration, colonisation, donors’ ideology and 
their interests 
Donors, essentially France and the World Bank, have played a key role in the development 
of the cotton sector in Benin. The French colonisation and the interest of France to 
outsource its industries were the first explaining causes of the development of the modern 
cotton industry in Benin. The French cotton institutions, such as the vertical integrated 
system of the value chain and the price stabilisation mechanism, initiated in the colonial 
period continue to persist today in Benin. Because the public administration of Benin has 
weak capacity, Benin requested the World Bank to join forces in developing the cotton sector 
further. The World Bank’s view of the organisation of the value chain is a bit different from 
that of France in that it promotes a competitive-type system. The World Bank’s view has 
dominated in the institutional choices made for the management of Benin’s cotton sector 
because the Marxist-Leninist government undermined the French interests in the 1970s 
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because of anti-colonial sentiment that was observed at that time. Moreover, the pioneer role 
of Benin in its democratic transition and market economy in francophone Africa further 
contributed to making Benin different in the liberalisation and privatisation process in the 
cotton sector in West Africa.  
In the 1990s, however, the liberalisation and privatisation of Benin’s cotton sector generated 
problems as explained above. These problems then attracted more donors to the sector, as 
can be seen from Figure 9 below. If the new donors differed also in ideology as regards the 
organisation of the cotton sector then the increase in the number of donors could be 
expected to have increased the coordination cost to manage the influx of aid in the sector, 
and also further contribute to the problem the sector experienced. In the absence of 
evidence for this, however, this remains speculative. 
Figure 9: Donors supporting Benin’s cotton sector (number) 
 
Source:  Hougni and Moreira (2019).  
5.2 Long-term development issues 
We end the analysis with a discussion of two issues. First, is the current mode of 
organisation of the Benin cotton sector the most welfare-enhancing for the country? Second, 
should Benin still rely on cotton for its long-term development strategy?  
On the first question, the current system of a national integrated value chain is certainty less 
efficient than the alternative of regionalisation in the management of cotton’s activities. It is 
now clear why the former was selected at the national workshop in May 2000. The other 
francophone countries in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali) currently 
operate with a regionalisation system, although a pan-national pricing system is still in place 
in a number of them. Perhaps one explanation for Benin’s choice is because the system has 
created a dominant player that was afraid to lose power if the management were to be 
regionalised at that time, when the privatisation of SONAPRA had not taken place. The 
national integrated system is inefficient because cotton issues are being addressed in the 
same manner in the country as if the region producing areas were the same. We know, 
however, that the regions are different. For instance, because the Zou-Collines region’s 
climatic conditions generate humidity more specific solutions should target the region. As a 
result, the research body should develop specific crop varieties that resist against the 
specific crop disease of each region instead of imposing a unique crop variety for the whole 
country as is currently done. In a recent study, Hougni et al (2016) show among seven 
varieties of cotton, E 944-2; E 956-2; H 769-5; H 782-3; I 875-3; K 768-3 and H 279-1, that 
cotton producing regions in Benin show significant differences in yield and production across 
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these seven varieties. The pan-national pricing system of seed cotton and input cost is also 
inefficient because farmers are spread across different geographical locations and the 
current system implies that some farmers are subsidised by others. The system is therefore 
more egalitarian because it transfers resources from farmers that are more productive to the 
ones that are less productive. Note, however, that the farmers that seem to be less 
productive are more likely to be located in the central region where the majority of gin 
factories are located. As such, it is not clear a priori how the system actually works, and a 
more in-depth study would be need to shed light on the distributional aspect of the current 
system. A distributional analysis of the value added across the different actors in the cotton 
sector would be also needed as we currently lack information for such an analysis. 
With regards to the second question, the answer will depend on the conditions related to the 
world demand for cotton fibres if Benin were to continue to specialise in the export of this 
type of output.55 The data presented in the left panel of Figure 2 suggest that in absolute 
terms the world demand for cotton fibre is continuing to grow. The question that thus arises 
is to what extent Benin is competitive in producing cotton fibre, allowing it to maintain its 
market share in the world market. Benin has a comparative advantage in producing cotton, 
certainly in the Borgou region, where the agro-climatic conditions are the most favourable. A 
number of studies also claim that Benin has a revealed comparative advantage in the 
production of cotton (e.g. World Bank, 2017). Ideally, we would like to compare consistent 
production costs across countries and over time, but we currently lack such data and we 
leave it for further research. Instead, we present in Figure 10 below the market share of 
cotton export in Benin and a number of comparator countries in Africa in the period 1995–
2017. Overall, the market shares of the majority of countries started to decrease from 2015–
2016. If this trend continues then there is reason to worry about this issue. We will 
investigate this point further by including comparators outside Africa. 
Burkina Faso easily outperforms the other countries. Benin displays an average 
performance although its situation improved significantly in the 1990s – but it deteriorated 
dramatically following the introduction of the AIC governance. The situation improved again 
in 2011–2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 The textile sector is currently less efficient mainly because of electricity costs and excessive imports of second-
hand clothes from Europe and Asia. 
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Figure 10: Export market shares in the global cotton market (% of global export value) 
 
Sources: Observatory of Economic Complexity.  
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Appendix 
 First elected president – Maga: 1 August 1960–24 October 1963. 
 Coup d’état by Colonel Christophe Soglo, chef d’état major: 27 October 1963– January 
1964. 
 New constitution 11 January 1963. 
 Apithy became president after election: January 1964–November 1965 
 Coup d’état – A military government took power: November 1965 
 Apithy set back and Tahirou Congacou, president of the parliament, became 
president and ran a transition to a new government. 
 Tahirou Congacou: 29 November 1965–22 December 1965. 
 Coup d’état – General Christophe Soglo: 22 December 1965–16 December 1967. 
 Development project CFDT, SATEC. 
 Coup d’état by low-ranking officers. 
 Coup d’état – Maurice Kouandété: 17 December 1967–21 December 1967. 
 Coup d’état – Colonel A. Alley: 21 December 1967–1968. 
 New constitution 11 April 1968. 
 New election 15 May 1968, for which the three regional leaders were excluded as 
candidates; in the election only 26% of voters showed up.  
 Among the five candidates Adjou Moumouni obtained 84% of the votes.  
 The results of the election were annulled.  
 Alley formed a new government in May 1968. 
 The military regime appointed Emile Derlin Zinsou as the new president: 31 July 1968–
December 1969: 
 but he accepted only on the condition that a referendum regarding his appointment 
be held. His candidacy was supported by 76.4% of voters, with a 72.6% turnout. 
 Coup d’état by Colonel Kouandoté: December 1969. 
 Election in 1970 but the results were annulled because of an issue of low turnout during 
the election. 
 Conseil Présidentiel was a triumvirate (Apithy-Maga-Ahonmadégbé) system of 
government: 7 May 1970–26 October 1972. 
 Maga: 07 May 1970–May 1972. 
 Ahomadégbé: 07 May 1972–26 October 1972. 
 Coup d’état – Kerekou: 1972–1989. 
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Figure 11: Shares of palm oil and cotton products in export revenue of Benin (%) 
 
Sources: Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
Figure 12: Cotton yield in Benin and selected West African countries (Ha/Kg) 
 
Sources: FAOSTAT 
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Discussion of ‘Regulation of a dominant sector: A case 
study of cotton’ 
Along with starchy staple crops, cotton dominates the farming landscape in West Africa. 
Cotton is primarily cultivated under rainfed conditions in rotation with maize, sorghum, and/or 
millet on small family farms that average less than 10 hectares. Being the primary source of 
income for millions of smallholder farmers, cotton can help reduce poverty and improve food 
and nutrition security. As a main source of export revenue, cotton has wide-reaching 
implications for poor developing economies in West Africa.  
The extent that cotton contributes to the socio-economic development of West African 
countries depends heavily on the economic performance of their cotton sectors. In turn, the 
incentive structure embodied in institutions influences the cotton sector’s economic 
performance. Supportive institutions positively affect the ability of individuals and 
organisations to respond to new opportunities and challenges. Well-designed institutions 
create incentives for individuals and organisations to invest, can limit the economic and 
political power of the elites, and provide more equal opportunities for a larger portion of the 
population (Acemoglu, 2003).  
Over the last several decades, major institutional changes have been experimented with in 
West African cotton sectors, with the goal of increasing economic performance. These have 
included changes in social, political, and economic institutions, coming especially from 
market liberalisation and privatisation. With institutional changes come shifts in incentives 
and distributional power. These shifts have affected the economic performance of multiple 
West African cotton sectors, including those of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali. 
West African cotton sectors compete in a highly competitive and global environment. 
Although cotton production and exports are key to their economies, West African countries 
play a relatively small role in the international cotton market compared to larger cotton 
producers and exporters, such as China, India, and the United States. As smaller players on 
the global stage, they need the ability to adapt to external forces (e.g. price fluctuations, 
tariffs, subsidies). In addition, West African cotton sectors face internal constraints that can 
impede economic development, such as missing or imperfect access to inputs, financing, 
and insurance. Well-designed and implemented cotton-based institutions can help mitigate 
both external and internal challenges and support the socio-economic development of their 
countries. 
Many institutional changes have occurred in the West African cotton sectors since achieving 
independence and a common goal has been improving economic performance. These 
changes can be grouped into four general periods: (1) contract with the French parastatal; 
(2) nationalisation of cotton gins; (3) implementation of market-oriented reforms; and (4) 
post-market reforms. Several indicators have been used to assess the economic 
performance of West African cotton sectors. These include production and yield; price; 
access to inputs, credit, and extension services; cotton quality; farm technical efficiency; 
research and development; export revenues; and profitability (Theriault and Tschirley, 2014; 
Theriault and Serra, 2014; Tschirley et al., 2009).     
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John R. Commons’ institutional economic framework is well adapted to understanding the 
evolution in institutions and their related effects on economic performance (Theriault and 
Sterns, 2012). According to Commons’ framework, actions to address limiting factors are the 
drivers of institutional changes. These actions have both intended and unintended 
consequences that affect economic performance, which can lead to the emergence of new 
limiting factors. New sets of limiting factors resume the cycle of institutional change. Each 
institutional change generates a new incentive structure and affects power dynamics within 
the sector. Stakeholders are more likely to resist changes that would decrease their power.   
Contract with the French parastatal (1960 to mid-1970s) – Before the country’s 
independence, the French parastatal, the Compagnie française pour le développement des 
fibres textiles (CFDT) had significant control over the cotton sectors in which it operated, 
managing farm input delivery and the grading and weighing of seed cotton, as well as 
exports. In return for its monopoly status, the French parastatal agreed to purchase all cotton 
production at guaranteed fixed prices announced before the planting season. During this 
period, production went up and the CFDT was profitable. However, much of the profits were 
retained by the French parastatal and little was reinvested in West Africa, and this impeded 
economic development.  
Nationalisation of cotton gins (mid-1970s to mid-1990s) – One of the major institutional 
changes corresponds to the end of the monopoly contract with the CFDT. To encourage 
economic development after independence, several West African governments nationalised 
their cotton sectors, which gave them control over the allocation of cotton export revenue. 
During this nationalisation period, cotton became a primary vehicle for boosting agricultural 
productivity and helped to promote integrated rural development (Theriault and Tschirley, 
2014).  Both cotton and cereal yields benefited from greater public investments. State-owned 
enterprises played an important role in maintaining rural roads, ensuring access to drinkable 
water, and reducing illiteracy. Yet, in the absence of strong institutions, greater power 
created incentives for rent-seeking behaviours and political interference. Farmers were still 
lacking a voice in decisions related to cotton activities. The combination of low farm-gate 
prices, mismanagement, and inefficiencies in ginning operations led to significant debts and 
discontent among farmers. 
Market-oriented reforms (mid-1990s to late 2000s) – In response to poor financial 
performance, donors started to push for market privatisation and liberalisation. The market-
oriented reform process gave farmers the opportunity to better organise themselves to 
increase their voice within the cotton sector. Village-wide, multi-purpose farmer associations 
were transformed into formal groups focused on cotton farmers. More responsibilities, such 
as the management of farm input credit, were transferred to them. Even though farmers, 
through their organisations, became more involved in management activities, their limited 
negotiation power in the determination of the price they received from the gins remained a 
limiting factor (Theriault and Sterns, 2012). 
Market reforms were unevenly and partially implemented (Theriault and Serra, 2014). Benin 
made stronger attempts to privatise and liberalise its cotton sector than Burkina Faso and 
Mali. However, the establishment of several new cotton ginneries in Benin did not lead to 
increased competition, since the vast majority of them fell under the same, private rather 
than public, ownership. Despite the creation of new gins in Burkina Faso, the former state-
owned enterprise continues to be the dominant player. After years of privatisation 
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discussions, the Malian cotton sector remains managed by the state-owned enterprise, 
although it did undergo a change in management. Several factors can explain the uneven 
and partial implementation of the reforms, including resistance to change due to a loss of 
governmental power, as well as scepticism about the need for change and expected 
outcomes. 
Post-market reforms (late 2000s to now) – In the post-market reform era most efforts have 
been channelled towards increasing production. When world prices are high, increased 
production translates into greater export revenues. With greater export revenues, poor 
financial performance is less apparent, and therefore there is less push for market reforms. 
Cotton has been and continues to be produced under contract farming conditions, with 
guaranteed pre-planting pan-territorial prices, guaranteed seed cotton purchase, and input 
credit provision. Both farm-gate and input prices have been key limiting factors to increased 
production. Price incentives, in particular through governmental fertiliser subsidies, have 
been used to encourage farmers to increase cotton production and productivity. But this has 
not always been enough to keep farmers content, as evidenced by the repeated farmer 
boycotts in Burkina Faso recently. After years of decline, Benin cotton production has been 
rising again over the last few years. This increase coincides with the arrival of the new 
president, who has a vested interest in the Beninese cotton sector (Honfoga et al., 2019).  
The current economic performance of West African cotton sectors remains highly affected by 
institutional structure. There is a trade-off between competition and effective coordination 
(Tschirley et al., 2009). Effective coordination tends to facilitate the provision of services and 
improve the quality of cotton. Market competition tends to provide incentives for higher farm-
gate prices and greater cost efficiency at the gin level. In more regulated cotton sectors, 
such as in West Africa, farmers are provided with extension services and inputs on credit but 
receive lower farm-gate prices due to limited competition. The fact that no institutional 
structure performs unambiguously better across all performance dimensions can, in part, 
explain the abandonment of market reforms.    
The institutional structure also affects the ability of cotton to spur food crop productivity. This 
indicator has been the strongest in the regulated cotton sectors of West Africa. Direct and 
indirect pathways, through which state-owned enterprises have contributed to food crop 
intensification, include input provision and extension advice for food crops and agronomic 
spillovers. Moving from a regulated to a more competitive market structure could have 
affected the food–cotton crop interdependence in West Africa, which may have threatened 
food security in the region.  
Other limiting factors to the economic performance of West African cotton sectors include 
climate change, invasive species, low technology adoption, and lack of market influence. 
The increasingly erratic rainfall as a result of climate change has a detrimental impact on 
cotton production and productivity. The proliferation of counterfactual pesticides makes it 
more challenging to control for pests, while posing human, environmental, and financial risks 
to cotton farmers. With limited investment in agricultural research and development, West 
African cotton sectors are facing low and stagnant yields. Low adoption of technologies by 
farmers and gins result in low yields, limited traceability, and quality issues from 
contamination. With low processing capacity and domestic consumption, they are vulnerable 
to global development.  
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Moving forward, it is essential that any proposals to reform the West African cotton sectors 
take into account the institutional setting, such as the strong intertwined relationship between 
food and cotton crops, in order to avoid major discrepancies between expected and realised 
economic performance. Increasing farm productivity, while strengthening farmer resilience 
as well as ginning efficiency are key to improving the economic performance of the West 
African cotton sectors. The promotion of regional integration is a viable approach for West 
African cotton sectors to increase their influence in the international market. Building strong 
institutions take times, but once built, they help to ensure that economic development occurs 
in an effective, accountable, and inclusive way.  
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Abstract 
Using a database providing information on tax revenue over the period 1980–2015, covering 
42 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, we analyse the efforts by Benin to raise tax 
revenue, in regard to structural characteristics, and we explore possible determinants of, and 
the scope for, a greater domestic revenue mobilisation and for tax policy and administration 
reforms. First, the analysis aims to compare the non-resource tax-to-GDP ratio in Benin with 
its peers, to identify whether Benin is near to, or far away from, its tax frontier. We conclude 
that the tax effort in Benin has remained relatively stable during the period: collected tax 
revenue rises on an average to 63.5% of potential total tax revenue over the period, ranked 
Benin 14th out of 42 countries. The analysis identifies a higher tax effort in Togo, which 
exhibits a tax effort of 69.9% on average, ranking it fifth out of 42 countries. Second, we 
study the effect of some economic and institutional variables on tax effort. Using a logistic 
regression, we analyse in particular the impact of natural resources, aid, political regime and 
stability, transparency, corruption and accountability. Third, we investigate several ways to 
reduce the tax gaps in Benin. In particular, if the tax policy seems relatively constrained by 
reference to the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Tax Directives, the 
Togolese experiment of switching to a semi-autonomous revenue authority and comparison 
with other WAEMU countries may provide guidance to find some room to improve domestic 
revenue mobilisation. In particular, Benin should review the management of human 
resources in the tax and customs administrations, and the scope of derogatory regimes 
which generate tax expenditures. 
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1 Introduction 
The 2015 Addis Ababa Conference highlighted the central role of domestic revenue 
mobilisation for financing development in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Improving tax revenue contributes not only to the financing of public spending, but also to 
reinforcing the accountability of the government (see Brautigam et al., 2009). 
With a tax revenue to GDP ratio equal to 13.5% in 2017 (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
2018a),1 Benin remains below the WAEMU criterion of 20%. Meanwhile, at the same date, 
Togo, a neighbouring country managed to raise 18.3% of its GDP in terms of tax revenue. 
Such a gap (between Benin and Togo) is not temporary, but seems to be lasting and has 
even increased in recent years (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Tax (left) and non-resource tax (right) over GDP 
 
Both countries inherited the same tax law, the French Tax Code, when they gained their 
independence – on 1 August 1960 for Benin and on 27 April 1960 for Togo. Both countries 
belong to the same customs and monetary union, WAEMU. The WAEMU Commission has 
produced several tax Directives, covering the main taxes (corporate income tax, value added 
tax, excises etc.), which aims to bring about tax harmonisation or coordination among the 
eight member states2 (see Mansour and Rota-Graziosi, 2013). These Directives strictly limit 
any potential divergence of Beninese and Togolese tax laws after 1960. However, some 
discrepancy may still emerge not only in the enforcement of these tax laws by the tax and 
customs administrations, but also as a result of the scope of derogatory regimes (for 
instance, the investment code), which generate tax expenditures.3 
An important difference between Togo and Benin relates to the administrative side. In 2014, 
Togo transformed its tax and customs administrations into a single revenue authority (the 
Office Togolais des Recettes), while Benin has a more ‘classic’ organisation for French-
speaking countries, with two separate administrations: the tax and customs administrations.4 
                                               
1 Total revenue, including tax arrears and telecommunications royalties, reached 15.4% of GDP. 
2 The original member countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo; Guinea-
Bissau became the eight member on 2 May 1997. 
3 Tax expenditures are tax revenue losses due to tax exemptions or tax rate reductions, for instance (see 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2010). They may total 3% to 5% of GDP. In 
2015, the WAEMU Commission produced a Decision committing member states to assessing their main tax 
expenditures and publishing these in an appendix of their respective finance law. This exercise is still ongoing in 
Benin and Togo. 
4 Burundi is the only other French-speaking country which has experimented with the switch to a Semi-
Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA). 
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First, using a database providing information on tax revenue over the period 1980–2015, 
covering 42 SSA countries5, we analyse the efforts by Benin to raise tax revenue, as relates 
to its structural characteristics. The analysis aims to compare the non-resource tax-to-GDP 
ratio in Benin with its peers, to identify whether Benin is near to, or far away from, its tax 
frontier, before exploring possible scope for greater tax revenue raising and for tax policy and 
administration reforms. 
We conclude that the tax effort in Benin has remained relatively stable during the period, with 
an average of 63.5% of its total potential tax revenue over the period, ranked 14th out of 42 
countries. A tax effort of 63.5% means that the level of non-resource tax revenue is at 36.5% 
of the country’s maximum capacity. Knowing that, on average, Benin collects 11.45% of its 
GDP in non-resource tax revenue and is at 63.5% of its capacity, it would have raised 
18.03% of its GDP as non-resource tax revenue if it had used all its potential, given its 
characteristics. The estimated gap is higher than that estimated by Barhoumi et al. (2016) 
which was 1.5–2% of GDP based on a sample of SSA countries for the period 1995–2011. 
The analysis identifies a higher tax effort in Togo, which exhibits a tax effort of 69.9% on 
average and is ranked fifth out of 42 countries. Togo would have mobilised 21.61% of non-
resource tax revenue as a percentage of GDP if it had made the maximum tax effort. This 
result appears intuitive. Indeed, Togo has a lower GDP per capita than Benin ($6,280 for the 
former and $6,480 for the latter) and its agricultural share is more important (35.73% of GDP 
in Togo; 35.11% in Benin) (Figure 2). These characteristics penalise the mobilisation of non-
resources tax. At the same time, Togo mobilises more non-resources tax revenues (15.11% 
of GDP in Togo; 11.45% in Benin). Hence, unfavourable characteristics of Togo, combined 
with its relative success in mobilising revenues, translates into a higher tax effort of Togo with 
respect to Benin. 
  
                                               
5 The country list is provided in appendix in Table A1. 
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Figure 2: Non-resources tax revenues and characteristics of Benin and Togo 
2.a. Non-resources tax revenues (% GDP)  
 
2.b. GDP per capita            
2.c. Agriculture share (% GDP) 6 
 
Second, we study the effect of some economic and institutional variables on tax effort. While 
the calculation of the tax effort includes only structural supply factors of the tax pressure as 
inputs in the stochastic frontier analysis, we then study the effect of demand factors on the 
estimated level of tax effort.7 Using a logistic regression, we study in particular the effect of 
the presence of natural resources, aid, transparency, corruption and accountability, and the 
political regime and stability. We find that aid is associated with a lower probability of 
belonging to a quartile of high tax effort, while institutional quality – measured by the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index – increases the probability of belonging to 
an efficient quartile in terms of tax effort. If the effect of the political system is not clear, 
political stability is strongly and positively associated with a greater likelihood of having a 
high tax effort. 
Third, we analyse the potential policy and administrative sources of the tax gaps. We shed 
light in particular on the human resource policy of the tax administration8 and the 
remuneration mechanisms, which may be obsolete. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the tax effort estimation; Section 3 
proposes an empirical study of the effect of some institutional and economic factors on the 
estimated tax effort scores; Section 4 reviews some tax policy and tax administrative issues 
and proposes reforms, with a view to improving tax mobilisation; and Section 5 concludes. 
                                               
6 As a result of a change in the national accounts, the share of value added in GDP fell sharply (from 36.6% to 
23.2%) between 1998 and 1999 in the original series. To avoid potential biases due to this measurement error, 
the series has been adjusted by applying the growth rates for agriculture and GDP to the 1998 figures. 
7 The distinction between supply and demand factors is made in Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2014). 
8 Similar information was not available for the customs administration. 
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2 Empirical estimation of tax effort in Benin: a 
stochastic frontier analysis 
We define tax effort as the extent to which the actual tax revenue collected is near the 
maximum level of tax resource that could be collected. In other words, tax effort in Benin is 
the extent to which Benin makes use of its potential of tax revenue regarding its tax base and 
its structural supply characteristics. 
The empirical analysis is based on a sophisticated stochastic frontier analysis in which 
commonly used supply factors driving government tax revenue are considered as the inputs 
and the total non-resource tax revenue as the output (see Box 1). The rationale behind these 
methods is that an economic agent cannot exceed an ‘ideal frontier’, which is the optimal 
level of output, given the limited endowment of inputs. The tax frontier refers to the tax 
capacity, which represents the maximum tax revenue that a country could raise given its 
structural characteristics. The model used in the study of Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker 
(2014) makes it possible to distinguish country effects, persistent inefficiency, and time-
varying inefficiency. Hence, we control for country effects – which capture the effect of time-
constant variables for each country – and obtain a total level of inefficiency that is the result 
of an identified persistent inefficiency and of a time-varying inefficiency for each country. 
In the first stage of the estimation, countries’ tax ratio is regressed on a vector of structural 
explanatory variables. The calculation of the tax effort includes only structural supply factors 
of the tax pressure as inputs in the stochastic frontier analysis. Demand factors are excluded 
from the estimation of the tax effort: the impact of these factors on the level of tax effort is 
studied in the second part of the analysis. Based on the relevant literature on the 
determinants of government tax revenue, we introduce the following set of inputs in the 
stochastic frontier analysis: 
i. The level of development: Countries’ tax capacity is positively associated with the 
level of economic development (proxied by real GDP per capita), which is linked to 
the efficiency of tax administration, the degree of economic and institutional 
sophistication, and the demand for public goods and services (see Lotz and Morss, 
1967; Tanzi, 1987; Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). 
ii. Agriculture value-added (% GDP): In addition to the numerous sectoral tax 
exemptions and tax holidays typically provided in developing countries, agriculture is 
often considered hard to tax in developing countries. Focusing on SSA countries, 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997) emphasise that the share of value-added of this 
sector in GDP is negatively associated with tax revenue. 
iii. Trade openness: Trade liberalisation policies implemented in most developing 
countries in the early 1970s have substantially increased trade volume in these 
countries. Therefore, trade openness expressed as total trade (imports and exports) 
as a share of GDP is expected to influence tax revenue, in particular through 
households consumption and domestic corporate profits (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 
2006; Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Keen and Perry, 2013 among others). 
iv. Financial development: A high financial development combined with high access to 
credit allow individuals and firms to finance profitable projects, which favour tax 
collection (Gordon and Li, 2009). On the other hand, in the presence of an ineffective 
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financial system, firms can successfully evade tax payment by conducting business in 
cash, which is harder for tax administrations to monitor. 
Figure 3 gives a scatter plot of non-resource tax revenue against each of the explanatory 
variables introduced as inputs in the stochastic frontier analysis. Table 1 displays the 
pairwise correlation between interest variables. As expected, all variables are positively 
associated with non-resource tax revenues, except the agriculture sector, which is 
significantly and negatively correlated with non-resource tax revenues. The detailed sources 
and definitions of variables are provided in the appendix (Table A2). 
Box 1: Estimation strategy: stochastic frontier analysis 
An approach that is increasingly being used to capture countries’ tax effort is the stochastic 
frontier method, which was introduced in the seminal work of Aigner et al. (1977) to model 
firms’ production behaviour (see Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto and Pessino, 
2013; Langford and Ohlenburg, 2015). The literature proposes several parametric and 
non-parametric models for stochastic frontier estimation. Data envelopment analysis 
(Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 2013) and the free disposal hull (Deprins, Simar, and 
Tulkens, 1984) are the two main – and increasingly popular – methods used for non-
parametric stochastic frontier models. The main disadvantage of such methods lies in the 
fact that the production function is more heavily influenced by outliers, and thus more 
vulnerable to measurement errors (Clements, 2002).  
We draw on a parametric model to estimate the tax effort as we are dealing with a single 
output (the total non-resource tax-to-GDP ratio). In panel data analysis, parametric models 
can be categorised into five groups: (i) time-invariant technical inefficiency models; (ii) 
time-varying technical inefficiency models; (iii) models that separate firm heterogeneity 
from inefficiency; (iv) models distinguishing persistent and time-varying inefficiency; (v) and 
models separating firm effects, persistent inefficiency, and time-varying inefficiency. We 
use the model by Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker (2014) that makes it possible to 
distinguish country effects, persistent inefficiency, and time-varying inefficiency. We 
estimate the following equation:  
𝑁𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 +  𝜓𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖𝑡                                                                             (eq. 1)  
where {
𝜙𝑖𝑡 =  𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝑖 −  𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜇𝑖𝑡 > 0 ;  𝜂𝑖 > 0
                                                                                          (eq. 2) 
The dependent variable 𝑁𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 (eq. 1) represents the natural logarithm of total non-
resource tax revenue. The subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote country and time dimensions, 
respectively. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of structural and institutional factors explaining countries’ tax 
ratios, which are one period-lagged to mitigate endogeneity issues and to account for 
delays in their effect on non-resource tax revenue. Time-invariant country-level 
characteristics that could potentially affect government non-resource tax revenue are 
captured by 𝜓𝑖. The last term 𝜙𝑖𝑡, is a three-component error term (eq. 2) including the 
time-invariant tax inefficiencies, 𝜂𝑖 (i.e. persistent tax inefficiencies owing, for instance, to 
sociological, cultural, religious, or geographical factors) and time-varying tax inefficiency, 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 (e.g. tax losses due to tax policy, tax administration, or tax officials qualifications, which 
can change over time). Thus, the model makes it possible to identify persistent and time-
varying factors determining SSA countries’ tax effort.  
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The combination of (eq. 1) and (eq. 2) can be rewritten as follows:  
𝑁𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0
∗ +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜗𝑖𝑡                                                                           (eq. 3) 
with:  
𝛼0
∗ =  𝛼 − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑡)                                                                                              (eq. 4) 
𝛼𝑖 =  𝜓𝑖 −  𝜂𝑖 +  𝐸(𝜂𝑖)                                                                                                  (eq. 5) 
𝜗𝑖𝑡 =  𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸( 𝜇𝑖𝑡)                                                                                              (eq. 6) 
Equation 3 is then estimated following a three-stage procedure: (1) In stage 1, the ?̂? is 
estimated by performing a random-effect-based regression (eq. 3). This stage gives the 
predicted values 𝛼?̂? and 𝜗𝑖?̂? of 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜗𝑖𝑡, respectively; (2)  In stage 2, the time-varying tax 
inefficiency, 𝜇𝑖𝑡, is estimated using the predicted values 𝛼?̂? and 𝜗𝑖?̂? from the first stage. To 
do this, (eq. 6) is estimated by performing a standard stochastic frontier technique. Using 
Battese and Coelli’s (1988) model, this procedure gives the prediction of the time-varying 
tax effort, 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜇𝑖𝑡|𝜗𝑖𝑡); (3)  Finally, in stage 3, the persistent tax inefficiency component, 
𝜂𝑖, is estimated by performing a stochastic frontier model on (eq. 5) as in the previous 
stage. The persistent tax effort is then predicted and given by: 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂𝑖). Hence, the 
overall tax effort is obtained by the product of the time-varying tax effort and the persistent 
tax effort. 
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Figure 3: Correlation between total non-resource tax revenue and input variables 
3.a. Non-resource tax and percentage of GDP        3.b. Non-resource tax and agriculture share 
  
 
3.c. Non-resource tax and trade openness       3.d. Non-resource tax and financial dev. 
  
Table 1: Pairwise correlation between interest variables 
 
Note: *Coefficient significant at 10% level. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the full sample and for Benin and Togo. Benin is 
generally below the mean for the full sample (except for the agriculture share). It is slightly 
above the average of its income group, the low-income countries. Benin and Togo have very 
similar characteristics. As we noted, however, the ratios of tax and non-resource tax over 
GDP are higher on average in Togo than in Benin (Figure 1), while Benin has a higher GDP 
per capita and a lower agriculture share, which should facilitate tax revenue mobilisation. 
Although Togo has a higher trade openness and a better financial development index, this is 
not sufficient to explain the far higher tax over GDP ratio for Togo relative to Benin. While 
Benin’s performance is growing relatively steadily, Togo’s performance is more unstable 
(Figure 3). Except over the period 1992–2002, the ratio of tax and non-resource tax over 
GDP has been lower in Benin than in Togo. 
-1
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4
0 20 40 60
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
95% CI Fitted values
Log Nonresource Taxes
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1
2
3
4
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDPPC (constant 2010 USD)
95% CI Fitted values
Log Nonresource Taxes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
(1) Non Resource Taxes (% GDP) 1
(2) GDPPC (constant 2010 USD) 0,51* 1
(3) Total Trade (% of GDP) 0,43* 0,63* 1
(4) Agriculture, value added (% GDP) -0,54* -0,62* -0,62* 1
(5) Financial development index 0,62* 0,37* 0,37* -0,59* 1
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max 
Full sample 
Total taxes (% GDP) 16.19 8.97 13.79 0.57 53.33 
Non-resource taxes (% 
GDP) 
12.46 6.67 11.14 0.55 49.85 
GDPPC (constant 2010 
USD) 
6.92 1.06 6.68 4.87 10.16 
Agriculture, value added (% 
GDP) 
27.42 15.70 28.37 0.89 72.03 
Total trade (% of GDP) 73.97 47.07 60.98 6.32 531.74 
Financial development 
index 
0.11 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.64 
Benin 
Total taxes (% GDP) 11.92 2.57 12.45 6.76 16.04 
Non-resource taxes (% 
GDP) 
11.46 2.29 12.02 6.36 14.96 
GDPPC (constant 2010 
USD) 
6.50 0.09 6.48 6.36 6.70 
Agriculture, value added (% 
GDP) 
30.41 4.26 31.92 24.12 37.86 
Total trade (% of GDP) 55.37 8.00 56.24 38.30 76.53 
Financial development 
index 
0.09 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.11 
Togo 
Total taxes (% GDP) 16.89 5.96 15.28 7.71 30.15 
Non-resource taxes (% 
GDP) 
15.11 4.57 15.07 6.27 26.17 
GDPPC (constant 2010 
USD) 
6.26 0.09 6.26 6.01 6.53 
Agriculture, value added (% 
GDP) 
35.73 4.22 35.20 26.96 44.14 
Total trade (% of GDP) 90.22 15.61 92.32 56.48 125.03 
Financial development 
index 
0.10 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.12 
 
Table 3 presents the three-stage estimation results. The first-stage estimation involves 
regressing countries’ tax ratio on a vector of explanatory variables. All variables have the 
expected sign and are strongly significant at the 1% level: per capita real GDP, trade 
openness, and financial development are positively associated, while the share of the 
agriculture sector is negatively and significantly correlated with non-resource tax revenues 
(Table 3 A). The level of development measured by the per capita real GDP has a significant 
effect on countries’ non-resources tax ratio: one percent increase in real GDP per capita is 
associated with a 0.243 percentage point increase in non-resource tax revenue.  
From that first stage, the Kumbhakar, Lien, and Hardaker (2014) model determines the 
maximum tax potential for each country, given its structural characteristics, estimates the 
persistent and time-varying inefficiencies, and computes the total inefficiency. On average in 
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the period, SSA countries are at 53.96% of their potential, so that they have room for about 
46.04% additional non-resource tax revenue (see Table 3 D). Knowing that, on average, 
countries collect 12.46% of their GDP in non-resource tax revenue, they would have raised 
23.09% of their GDP as non-resource tax revenue if they achieved their maximal 
capacity, given their characteristics. The differences in total tax effort across SSA 
countries are mainly driven by persistent factors: the full sample average stands at 0.8005, 
0.6724 and 0.5396 for the time-varying, the persistent, and the total tax effort, respectively. 
That room includes both tax administration (e.g. corrupt tax officers, tax evasion, inadequacy 
of tax administrations, tax exemptions, etc.) and tax policy. It is hard to determine whether 
persistent and variant inefficiencies are attributable to a tax gap or an administrative gap. If 
there is a tendency to associate the persistent inefficiencies with an administrative gap, and 
time-varying inefficiencies with a tax policy gap, significant administrative reforms may be 
implemented over time while tax policy may experience some persistence over time. In any 
case, the persistent factors – whether they come from administrative or tax policy 
inefficiencies – explain the major part of the inefficiencies.  
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Table 3: Three-stage estimates of the tax effort in SSA countries 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
[3] [4] [5]
CIT PIT Goods & Serv.
0.235*** (0.0331) 0.457*** 0.240*** 0.202***
(0.0361) (0.0552) (0.0565) (0.0725)
-0.056*** (0.0141) 0.406*** 0.456*** 0.141*
(0.0420) (0.0625) (0.0682) (0.0847)
0.018*** (0.0042) -0.0128 -0.440*** -1.018***
(0.0121) (0.0137) (0.0173)
0.526*** (0.1238) -0.0827*** -0.142*** 0.0274
(0.133) (0.199) (0.223) (0.269)
0.622*** (0.247) -4.452*** -2.260*** 1.028
(0.405) (0.580) (0.617) (0.818)
1190 1,204 1,117 1,12 1,185
0.1994 0.794 0.656 0.739 0.568
39 41 40 40 41
yes yes yes yes yes
error Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
frontier one  0.238*** 0.0114 20.74 0.000 0.2159     0.2609
usigmas _cons -2.385*** 0.0911 -26.16 0.000 -2.5637      -2.2064
vsigma _cons -3.875*** 0.1076 -36.02 0.000 -4.0862    -3.6645
error Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
frontier one_te  0.509*** 0.0133 38.04 0.000 0.482       0.535
usigmas _cons -1.009*** 0.0584 -17.27 0.000 -1.124     -0.894
vsigma _cons -3.463*** 0.1078 -32.12 0.000 -3.6747      -3.2520
Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
1190 0,8005 0,1043 0,1689 0,9577
1190 0,6724 0,1702 0,0444 0,9307
1190 0,5396 0,1548 0,0218 0,8268
D) Summary of the estimation results
Time-varying tax effort
Persistent tax effort
Total tax effort
Total Trade(-1)  (% of GDP)
C) Third stage, estimation of the time-varying tax inefficiency (stochastic frontier)
                                                     Number of obs  =    1,190
                                                     Wald chi2(1)   =    1447.19
Log likelihood = -543.512                                                    Prob > chi2        =     0.000
                                                     Number of obs  =    1,190
                                                     Wald chi2(1)    =     430.30
Log likelihood = 73.1133                                                      Prob > chi2       =     0.000
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Nb. of countries
Country FE
B) Second stage, estimation of the time-varying tax inefficiency (stochastic frontier)
Agriculture, value added(-1)  (% of GDP)
Financial development(-1)
A) First stage random-effect estimates 
Dependent variable
[1]
NRTAX
Log GDPPC(-1) (constant 2010 USD)
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Table 4: Full sample tax effort-based ranking 
Country 
Average 
Tax 
Effort 
Rank Country 
Average 
Tax 
Effort 
Rank 
Lesotho 0.767 1 Swaziland 0.555 21 
Burundi 0.758 2 Uganda 0.547 22 
Malawi 0.72 3 Seychelles 0.545 23 
Ethiopia 0.704 4 Mali 0.539 24 
Togo 0.699 5 Cabo Verde 0.524 25 
Gambia 0.695 6 Ghana 0.495 26 
Senegal 0.669 7 Guinea 0.484 27 
Mozambique 0.669 8 Cameroon 0.474 28 
Namibia 0.658 9 South Africa 0.462 29 
Kenya 0.658 10 Sierra Leone 0.446 30 
Zambia 0.656 11 Mauritius 0.405 31 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.652 12 Guinea-Bissau 0.384 32 
Rwanda 0.649 13 Botswana 0.366 33 
Benin 0.635 14 Congo Rep. 0.331 34 
Comoros 0.615 15 Gabon 0.274 35 
Niger 0.6 16 Chad 0.274 36 
Burkina Faso 0.598 17 Nigeria 0.257 37 
Central African Republic 0.583 18 Angola 0.219 38 
Madagascar 0.579 19 Equatorial Guinea 0.033 39 
Tanzania 0.571 20     
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Table 5: Full sample tax effort over time 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
  
Year AGO BDI BEN BFA BWA CAF CIV CMR COG COM CPV ETH GAB GHA GIN GMB GNB GNQ KEN LSO MDG MLI MOZ MUS MWI NAM NER NGA RWA SEN SLE SWZ SYC TCD TGO TZA UGA ZAF ZMB
Year_Av
g
1981 0.64 0.71 0.49 0.43 0.6 0.73 0.55 0.38 0.53 0.51 0.29 0.45 0.64 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.66 0.46 0.76 0.63 0.64 0.27 0.62 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.61 0.2 0.8 0.12 0.34 0.54
1982 0.77 0.72 0.49 0.42 0.64 0.73 0.55 0.4 0.54 0.52 0.26 0.45 0.61 0.72 0.63 0.55 0.68 0.45 0.75 0.55 0.63 0.27 0.58 0.59 0.45 0.42 0.62 0.17 0.82 0.49 0.35 0.54
1983 0.67 0.65 0.46 0.41 0.62 0.71 0.54 0.39 0.59 0.5 0.25 0.43 0.58 0.73 0.61 0.52 0.73 0.47 0.76 0.58 0.6 0.27 0.55 0.61 0.32 0.51 0.62 0.14 0.79 0.52 0.39 0.53
1984 0.76 0.54 0.43 0.42 0.63 0.67 0.47 0.39 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.64 0.5 0.68 0.47 0.75 0.63 0.62 0.22 0.57 0.63 0.3 0.48 0.62 0.21 0.82 0.54 0.37 0.53
1985 0.76 0.57 0.43 0.37 0.59 0.65 0.37 0.39 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.58 0.81 0.6 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.25 0.65 0.62 0.24 0.51 0.63 0.25 0.82 0.54 0.41 0.53
1986 0.82 0.6 0.54 0.33 0.53 0.72 0.35 0.38 0.64 0.48 0.5 0.26 0.58 0.8 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.45 0.8 0.72 0.62 0.3 0.71 0.59 0.17 0.51 0.64 0.21 0.8 0.46 0.43 0.54
1987 0.77 0.57 0.56 0.32 0.57 0.74 0.34 0.37 0.55 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.43 0.6 0.61 0.51 0.64 0.45 0.78 0.69 0.58 0.25 0.66 0.6 0.28 0.48 0.65 0.21 0.76 0.62 0.31 0.41 0.52
1988 0.76 0.54 0.56 0.3 0.55 0.73 0.39 0.36 0.63 0.47 0.5 0.32 0.43 0.63 0.6 0.52 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.69 0.54 0.23 0.66 0.64 0.25 0.5 0.66 0.24 0.72 0.61 0.39 0.42 0.52
1989 0.78 0.42 0.52 0.3 0.55 0.7 0.37 0.34 0.58 0.48 0.5 0.36 0.26 0.61 0.55 0.41 0.75 0.45 0.8 0.74 0.56 0.21 0.65 0.58 0.28 0.48 0.65 0.28 0.72 0.65 0.35 0.45 0.51
1990 0.74 0.48 0.5 0.34 0.64 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.65 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.41 0.57 0.44 0.82 0.7 0.55 0.24 0.61 0.64 0.39 0.45 0.65 0.29 0.71 0.65 0.45 0.48 0.52
1991 0.81 0.51 0.51 0.32 0.58 0.7 0.33 0.38 0.57 0.5 0.49 0.35 0.27 0.59 0.43 0.5 0.6 0.45 0.78 0.71 0.5 0.25 0.62 0.67 0.37 0.57 0.63 0.27 0.63 0.66 0.52 0.48 0.52
1992 0.78 0.57 0.46 0.39 0.57 0.7 0.35 0.38 0.67 0.55 0.42 0.35 0.15 0.61 0.53 0.5 0.67 0.43 0.8 0.68 0.5 0.22 0.6 0.68 0.46 0.54 0.64 0.28 0.54 0.67 0.44 0.49 0.69 0.52
1993 0.79 0.58 0.47 0.4 0.51 0.62 0.31 0.38 0.65 0.55 0.5 0.36 0.24 0.61 0.51 0.5 0.74 0.42 0.68 0.68 0.5 0.2 0.57 0.62 0.51 0.5 0.64 0.25 0.39 0.6 0.54 0.46 0.65 0.51
1994 0.82 0.59 0.58 0.36 0.52 0.64 0.44 0.33 0.66 0.56 0.54 0.39 0.43 0.73 0.51 0.43 0.7 0.41 0.77 0.65 0.43 0.24 0.28 0.59 0.52 0.5 0.63 0.23 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.49 0.74 0.53
1995 0.83 0.61 0.62 0.3 0.61 0.67 0.47 0.37 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.42 0.3 0.73 0.51 0.48 0.7 0.4 0.52 0.67 0.53 0.28 0.53 0.62 0.45 0.5 0.61 0.28 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.49 0.71 0.54
1996 0.15 0.75 0.62 0.65 0.28 0.48 0.67 0.48 0.37 0.62 0.55 0.53 0.4 0.33 0.71 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.36 0.62 0.65 0.53 0.28 0.63 0.66 0.5 0.54 0.57 0.31 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.72 0.53
1997 0.18 0.74 0.66 0.66 0.27 0.57 0.66 0.49 0.26 0.68 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.39 0.69 0.56 0.57 0.66 0.39 0.73 0.69 0.57 0.29 0.68 0.68 0.34 0.56 0.54 0.32 0.62 0.66 0.63 0.49 0.71 0.54
1998 0.23 0.81 0.68 0.64 0.29 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.37 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.45 0.17 0.71 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.38 0.78 0.67 0.6 0.29 0.69 0.69 0.42 0.57 0.54 0.32 0.62 0.55 0.63 0.5 0.71 0.54
1999 0.18 0.76 0.67 0.68 0.29 0.61 0.64 0.53 0.27 0.6 0.51 0.5 0.46 0.42 0.7 0.63 0.57 0.62 0.39 0.72 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.66 0.69 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.32 0.58 0.46 0.64 0.5 0.75 0.54
2000 0.17 0.77 0.66 0.66 0.32 0.61 0.61 0.53 0.24 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.45 0.44 0.7 0.63 0.55 0.64 0.38 0.76 0.66 0.61 0.3 0.63 0.7 0.53 0.57 0.53 0.32 0.55 0.45 0.62 0.5 0.75 0.54
2001 0.25 0.79 0.65 0.64 0.33 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.33 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.43 0.69 0.57 0.54 0.6 0.35 0.8 0.64 0.63 0.31 0.69 0.7 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.32 0.65 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.76 0.55
2002 0.24 0.79 0.66 0.66 0.31 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.29 0.61 0.57 0.29 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.36 0.69 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.34 0.5 0.59 0.65 0.3 0.72 0.71 0.54 0.52 0.45 0.33 0.62 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.7 0.53
2003 0.25 0.8 0.67 0.66 0.35 0.55 0.61 0.51 0.32 0.66 0.55 0.29 0.55 0.52 0.5 0.38 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.38 0.58 0.6 0.65 0.31 0.64 0.71 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.31 0.76 0.47 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.54
2004 0.24 0.77 0.67 0.68 0.38 0.58 0.65 0.51 0.29 0.69 0.56 0.29 0.57 0.52 0.69 0.38 0.69 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.38 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.29 0.71 0.67 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.27 0.75 0.48 0.63 0.47 0.69 0.55
2005 0.26 0.76 0.68 0.67 0.39 0.57 0.61 0.53 0.25 0.66 0.56 0.26 0.57 0.56 0.68 0.44 0.7 0.59 0.6 0.64 0.43 0.65 0.64 0.6 0.26 0.71 0.72 0.51 0.63 0.47 0.21 0.72 0.54 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.55
2006 0.25 0.72 0.7 0.67 0.39 0.6 0.62 0.53 0.23 0.63 0.57 0.26 0.57 0.53 0.74 0.42 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.38 0.66 0.68 0.51 0.23 0.7 0.72 0.52 0.67 0.44 0.22 0.76 0.54 0.63 0.49 0.62 0.55
2007 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.42 0.57 0.62 0.53 0.26 0.61 0.56 0.27 0.56 0.56 0.75 0.41 0.03 0.66 0.62 0.56 0.65 0.38 0.71 0.69 0.6 0.25 0.7 0.73 0.51 0.65 0.41 0.28 0.77 0.59 0.63 0.49 0.61 0.55
2008 0.7 0.71 0.66 0.43 0.6 0.6 0.53 0.26 0.62 0.57 0.25 0.55 0.58 0.74 0.4 0.02 0.67 0.62 0.54 0.65 0.39 0.7 0.65 0.65 0.25 0.71 0.7 0.54 0.66 0.38 0.31 0.74 0.58 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.55
2009 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.43 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.3 0.64 0.52 0.29 0.54 0.58 0.74 0.44 0.03 0.67 0.57 0.57 0.7 0.39 0.74 0.63 0.69 0.27 0.68 0.71 0.54 0.65 0.44 0.31 0.73 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.55
2010 0.75 0.7 0.68 0.43 0.65 0.63 0.52 0.27 0.64 0.53 0.29 0.56 0.57 0.7 0.46 0.03 0.68 0.62 0.57 0.75 0.38 0.74 0.57 0.67 0.17 0.7 0.73 0.53 0.56 0.46 0.31 0.74 0.57 0.59 0.46 0.57 0.55
2011 0.79 0.67 0.66 0.4 0.62 0.5 0.53 0.28 0.62 0.54 0.27 0.56 0.58 0.73 0.45 0.03 0.68 0.61 0.56 0.77 0.37 0.74 0.64 0.67 0.27 0.7 0.74 0.54 0.57 0.52 0.3 0.72 0.55 0.59 0.47 0.64 0.55
2012 0.78 0.67 0.68 0.41 0.65 0.64 0.53 0.31 0.65 0.5 0.7 0.25 0.56 0.59 0.72 0.45 0.04 0.67 0.58 0.55 0.78 0.37 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.25 0.71 0.72 0.53 0.66 0.47 0.31 0.72 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.59 0.56
2013 0.74 0.69 0.7 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.53 0.35 0.65 0.5 0.73 0.27 0.53 0.59 0.71 0.44 0.03 0.69 0.56 0.59 0.79 0.36 0.7 0.67 0.68 0.23 0.72 0.71 0.52 0.65 0.45 0.32 0.75 0.57 0.6 0.47 0.56 0.56
2014 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.41 0.48 0.6 0.54 0.37 0.64 0.48 0.72 0.27 0.55 0.59 0.75 0.46 0.04 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.36 0.74 0.7 0.69 0.23 0.73 0.72 0.5 0.65 0.46 0.32 0.74 0.59 0.61 0.48 0.59 0.56
2015 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.42 0.56 0.62 0.53 0.4 0.61 0.51 0.67 0.26 0.55 0.59 0.77 0.47 0.04 0.69 0.61 0.62 0.78 0.36 0.73 0.7 0.68 0.18 0.73 0.73 0.5 0.64 0.45 0.31 0.78 0.56 0.63 0.48 0.55 0.56
Average
0.22 
(rank: 
38)
0.76 
(rank: 2)
0.63 
(rank: 
14)
0.6 
(rank: 
16)
0.37 
(rank: 
33)
0.58 
(rank: 
18)
0.65 
(rank: 
12)
0.47 
(rank: 
28)
0.33 
(rank: 
34)
0.61 
(rank: 
15)
0.52 
(rank: 
25)
0.7 
(rank: 4)
0.27 
(rank: 
36)
0.49 
(rank: 
26)
0.48 
(rank: 
27)
0.69 
(rank: 6)
0.38 
(rank: 
32)
0.03 
(rank: 
39)
0.66 
(rank: 
10)
0.77 
(rank: 1)
0.58 
(rank: 
18)
0.54 
(rank: 
24)
0.67 
(rank: 8)
0.4 
(rank: 
31)
0.72 
(rank: 3)
0.66 
(rank: 
10)
0.6 
(rank: 
16)
0.26 
(rank: 
37)
0.65 
(rank: 
12)
0.67 
(rank: 8)
0.45 
(rank: 
30)
0.56 
(rank: 
21)
0.55 
(rank: 
22)
0.27 
(rank: 
36)
0.7 
(rank: 4)
0.57 
(rank: 
20)
0.55 
(rank: 
22)
0.46 
(rank: 
29)
0.66 
(rank: 
10)
0.54
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Figure 4: Input variables in efficient and inefficient countries 
            
  
Table 4 provides a country ranking over the period studied based on their total tax effort 
scores and Table 5 gives the tax effort over time for the full sample. Lesotho, Burundi, and 
Malawi appear to be the most efficient countries, while Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and 
Nigeria record the lowest tax efforts. As shown in Figure 4.a, the tax revenue ratio as a 
percentage of GDP is high in efficient and low in non-efficient countries. At the same time, 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea have GDP per capita levels well above the average (Figure 
4.b). Thus, Angola and Equatorial Guinea’s poor performance are the result of the 
combination of low output and advantageous inputs. These two countries are rich in natural 
resources and the effort made to raise non-resource tax revenues appears to be very low. By 
contrast, Burundi manages to raise more revenues than the average while its characteristics 
are very unfavourable. Over the most recent subperiod, Togo emerges as the top performer, 
with a tax effort score of 0.78 in 2015 (rank 1).  
The average tax effort score for the full sample – which amounts to around 54% – remained 
on average relatively stable (Figure 5) during the period. Starting in the late 1980s for Benin 
and early 1990s for Togo, the performance in terms of tax effort for both countries has 
improved. The trend for Togo is more one of boom and bust but the gap in performance 
between the two countries stands around 6 percentage points. Togo has 9 percentage points 
more than Benin at the end of the period and ranks first among all countries. However, with a 
total tax effort level of 0.78 and 0.69 in 2015, Togo and Benin have not recovered their level 
of tax effort of the beginning of the period. Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, or Malawi also 
experienced an overall decline in performance during the period. Togo has experienced an 
increase in the last 15 years (Figure 6). By contrast, Benin’s tax effort has declined over the 
same period.  
4.a. Non-resource tax (% GDP) 4.b. GDP per capita
4.c. Agriculture value added (% GDP) 4.d. Trade (% GDP)
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Figure 5: Tax performance over time 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Figure 6: Growth rate of tax effort over the period 2000–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
We extend the analysis by estimating the tax effort by type of tax: value added tax (VAT), 
corporate income tax, personal income tax, trade tax, and excise (Table 6). These results 
should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, tax revenue determinants of the different taxes 
(inputs) may differ. At the same time, comparison would be complex if a different model were 
determined for estimating the tax effort for each type of tax. We therefore chose to maintain 
the same model.  
The tax effort is heterogeneous according to the type of tax. In particular, Benin appears 
relatively better ranked in terms of VAT (rank 4) and corporate income tax (rank 13), than in 
terms of trade tax (rank 28), excise (rank 15), and personal income tax (rank 14). The tax 
effort for VAT is 0.686 and 0.666 on trade tax, and only 0.344 and 0.396 on average for 
corporate income tax and personal income tax. The ranking in terms of Togo’s performance 
is more homogeneous but the values of the tax effort vary according to the type of tax: from 
0.676 for trade tax to 0.504 for corporate income tax and only 0.452 for personal income tax. 
These results tend to corroborate those of Barhoumi et al. (2016) which show an under-
performance in terms of income tax relative to the performance in terms of trade tax in Benin. 
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Table 6: Tax effort by type of tax 
VAT TE Rank Corporate income taxTE Rank Personal income tax TE Rank Trade tax TE Rank Excise TE Rank
Angola NA NA Angola NA NA Angola NA NA Angola 0.683 5 Angola NA NA
Burundi NA NA Burundi 0.712 2 Burundi 0.544 2 Burundi 0.663 31 Burundi NA NA
Benin 0.686 4 Benin 0.344 13 Benin 0.396 14 Benin 0.666 28 Benin 0.739 15
Burkina Faso 0.677 6 Burkina Faso 0.326 14 Burkina Faso 0.445 10 Burkina Faso 0.677 10 Burkina Faso 0.748 6
Botswana 0.634 12 Botswana 0.169 33 Botswana 0.14 35 Botswana 0.677 9 Botswana NA NA
Central African Rep 0.469 27 Central African Rep 0.184 31 Central African Rep 0.456 6 Central African Rep 0.657 37 Central African Rep 0.739 16
Cote d'Ivoire 0.479 25 Cote d'Ivoire 0.24 27 Cote d'Ivoire 0.339 22 Cote d'Ivoire 0.673 15 Cote d'Ivoire 0.708 28
Cameroon 0.664 9 Cameroon 0.279 22 Cameroon 0.315 23 Cameroon 0.669 25 Cameroon 0.746 7
Congo, Dem. Rep. NA NA Congo, Dem. Rep. NA NA Congo, Dem. Rep. NA NA Congo, Dem. Rep. NA NA Congo, Dem. Rep. NA NA
Congo, Rep. NA NA Congo, Rep. 0.199 29 Congo, Rep. 0.197 32 Congo, Rep. 0.662 33 Congo, Rep. NA NA
Comoros 0.446 30 Comoros 0.283 20 Comoros 0.208 30 Comoros 0.671 19 Comoros 0.738 17
Cabo Verde 0.709 3 Cabo Verde 0.282 21 Cabo Verde 0.299 26 Cabo Verde 0.683 4 Cabo Verde NA NA
Ethiopia 0.61 15 Ethiopia 0.666 4 Ethiopia 0.273 28 Ethiopia 0.67 21 Ethiopia 0.734 20
Gabon 0.476 26 Gabon 0.177 32 Gabon 0.142 34 Gabon 0.697 2 Gabon NA NA
Ghana 0.571 21 Ghana 0.296 19 Ghana 0.39 18 Ghana 0.678 7 Ghana 0.738 18
Guinea 0.569 22 Guinea 0.105 37 Guinea 0.186 33 Guinea 0.663 32 Guinea 0.731 22
Gambia, The 0.669 8 Gambia, The 0.574 5 Gambia, The 0.446 9 Gambia, The 0.68 6 Gambia, The 0.723 25
Guinea-Bissau 0.462 29 Guinea-Bissau 0.157 34 Guinea-Bissau 0.202 31 Guinea-Bissau 0.67 22 Guinea-Bissau 0.727 24
Equatorial Guinea 0.236 33 Equatorial Guinea 0.031 38 Equatorial Guinea 0.018 38 Equatorial Guinea 0.651 39 Equatorial Guinea NA NA
Kenya 0.595 17 Kenya 0.729 1 Kenya 0.519 3 Kenya 0.667 27 Kenya 0.748 5
Lesotho NA NA Lesotho 0.267 24 Lesotho 0.394 16 Lesotho 0.726 1 Lesotho NA NA
Madagascar 0.587 18 Madagascar 0.301 18 Madagascar 0.307 24 Madagascar 0.672 17 Madagascar 0.744 12
Mali 0.643 11 Mali 0.271 23 Mali 0.348 21 Mali 0.675 12 Mali 0.703 29
Mozambique 0.679 5 Mozambique 0.478 7 Mozambique 0.449 8 Mozambique 0.669 24 Mozambique 0.741 14
Mauritius 0.318 31 Mauritius 0.141 35 Mauritius 0.136 36 Mauritius 0.666 29 Mauritius 0.662 30
Malawi 0.608 16 Malawi 0.69 3 Malawi 0.546 1 Malawi 0.667 26 Malawi 0.745 10
Namibia 0.677 7 Namibia 0.35 12 Namibia 0.426 11 Namibia 0.684 3 Namibia 0.728 23
Niger 0.581 19 Niger 0.386 11 Niger 0.393 17 Niger 0.671 18 Niger 0.733 21
Nigeria 0.315 32 Nigeria 0.265 25 Nigeria 0.125 37 Nigeria 0.669 23 Nigeria 0.71 27
Rwanda 0.624 14 Rwanda 0.435 10 Rwanda 0.473 5 Rwanda 0.66 36 Rwanda 0.746 8
Senegal 0.715 2 Senegal 0.303 17 Senegal 0.36 20 Senegal 0.675 13 Senegal 0.742 13
Sierra Leone 0.463 28 Sierra Leone 0.26 26 Sierra Leone 0.42 13 Sierra Leone 0.664 30 Sierra Leone 0.737 19
Sao Tome and PrincipeNA NA Sao Tome and PrincipeNA NA Sao Tome and PrincipeNA NA Sao Tome and PrincipeNA NA Sao Tome and PrincipeNA NA
Swaziland 0.646 10 Swaziland 0.212 28 Swaziland 0.305 25 Swaziland 0.673 16 Swaziland 0.712 26
Seychelles 0.749 1 Seychelles 0.304 16 Seychelles 0.298 27 Seychelles 0.677 8 Seychelles 0.756 1
Chad NA NA Chad 0.141 36 Chad 0.362 19 Chad 0.67 20 Chad NA NA
Togo NA NA Togo 0.504 6 Togo 0.452 7 Togo 0.676 11 Togo 0.745 9
Tanzania 0.553 23 Tanzania 0.323 15 Tanzania 0.423 12 Tanzania 0.662 35 Tanzania 0.744 11
Uganda 0.581 20 Uganda 0.19 30 Uganda 0.213 29 Uganda 0.674 14 Uganda 0.748 4
South Africa 0.532 24 South Africa 0.456 9 South Africa 0.394 15 South Africa 0.662 34 South Africa 0.749 3
Zambia 0.627 13 Zambia 0.46 8 Zambia 0.48 4 Zambia 0.657 38 Zambia 0.75 2
Zimbabwe NA NA Zimbabwe NA NA Zimbabwe NA NA Zimbabwe NA NA Zimbabwe NA NA
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3 The determinants of tax effort: a logistic regression 
analysis 
Using a logistic regression, we now study the effect of some variables – natural resources, 
aid, institutional quality, political regime, and political stability – on tax effort.  
As a first step of the analysis we present some general descriptive statistics. We can observe 
that non-resource rich countries and non-fuel exporters have higher tax effort scores than 
their resource-rich peers (Figure 7). This may support the view that governments in resource-
rich countries have less incentive to mobilise tax revenues when they have resource rent. 
Similarly, landlocked countries make a more intense tax effort and countries that are 
considered as offshore financial centres have low performance in terms of tax effort. East 
African Community (EAC) and WAEMU member countries appear to have better 
performance than CEMAC and South African Community (SAC) countries. If we look at the 
evolution of tax effort in the WAEMU and CEMAC countries (Figure 8), it appears that 
WAEMU countries are on average better performing, which lends some support to the 
arguments in favour of regional harmonisation (of both customs and domestic tax policies). 
Benin has little room to increase tax revenues unless it addresses the reasons why it is 
below weak taxable capacity by conducting institutional reforms to expand its tax revenue 
potential. Using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database and following Frankel 
et al. (2013), we compute an index of institutional quality based on an average of four 
normalised variables: investment profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. 
Higher values of the index are associated with better economic and political institutions that 
should favour tax revenue collection. As Figure 9 shows, tax effort appears to be positively 
correlated with the ICRG index. 
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Figure 7: Tax effort by country category 
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Figure 8: Tax effort in UEMOA and CEMAC countries 
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Figure 9: Tax effort and ICRG index 
 
In order to study rigorously the determinants of tax effort, we carry out an econometric 
analysis to complement the previous statistical analysis. Based on an international 
comparison, we examine the effect of some variables on tax effort scores. Our focus here is 
on the effect of natural resources, official development assistance (ODA), transparency, 
corruption and accountability (CPIA indicator), and the political regime and stability. 
The analysis of the factors explaining the level of tax effort is based on a logistic regression. 
Tax effort scores range from 0 to 1, the most efficient countries having the highest scores. 
The ranking is grouped in quartiles according to the score obtained: we have four classes, 
from Q1 to Q4. Thus, the observations with the lowest scores belong to the first quartile while 
the observations with the highest scores are in the fourth quartile. These quartiles are 
considered as the dependent variable. Using quartiles allows us to estimate the effects 
associated with each group of countries. 
As the dependent variable is thus an ordinal variable, we use a mixed-effects ordered logistic 
model (see Liu and Hedeker, 2006; and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). This model is 
an ordered logistic regression containing both fixed and random effects. The identification 
strategy makes it possible to control for the characteristics of countries that can affect the 
evolution of efficiency over time. We use a two-tier model. For M countries, the cumulative 
probability that a Yit observation belongs to an efficiency quartile greater than q is given by: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡 > 𝑞|𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝜑𝑞 , 𝑢𝑖) = 𝐻(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖 − 𝜑𝑞) 
with Xit a set of covariates, 𝜑𝑞 a set of cut points
9, and ui a set of random effects (i=1,… ,M 
country, each i has a given number of occurrences in time t=1,… ,n occurrences). H( ) is the 
cumulative logistic distribution function that represents the cumulative probability. The Xit 
vector of dimension 1*p represents covariates for fixed effects with β coefficients. The 1*q 
                                               
9 The cut-off points φ are φ1, φ2, φ3 because we have four efficiency groups (quartiles). 
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vectors of Zit are covariates corresponding to random effects and can be used to represent 
intercepts and random coefficients. 
While the estimation of tax effort scores requires focusing on structural supply variables, we 
now consider the potential effect of demand factors on the estimated level of tax effort: 
natural resource rent, aid, institutional quality (transparency, corruption, and accountability), 
political regime, and political stability.  
The effect of natural resource rent on tax revenue ratio is widely evidenced in the literature. 
Natural resource endowment is associated with lower non-resource tax revenue, suggesting 
a natural resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Eltony, 2002; Melou et al., 2017). In 
particular, during commodity prices upswings, governments in resources-rich countries have 
less incentive to mobilise tax revenues so that resource rent crowds out tax revenue. We 
consider in our model total natural resources rents (% GDP) as the sum of oil rents, natural 
gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents10. 
ODA can also modify government behaviour (Bahl, 2000; Bird and Smart, 2002). The 
literature highlights several effects. Among the most documented, the flypaper effect is an 
empirical regularity: any increase in transfers/aid leads to greater public spending than an 
equivalent rise in the private revenue of the population (Hines and Thaler, 1995). In a context 
of informational asymmetries, aid challenges the fiscal discipline of recipient governments by 
raising a moral hazard problem (Pisauro, 2001; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003): it can be 
perceived as a kind of windfall resource, which crowds out own-source revenue by reducing 
the willingness of governments to improve their tax effort. More broadly, aid dependency 
seems to erode governments’ accountability, a prerequisite for the quality of public 
expenditures and taxpayers’ voluntary compliance. Hence, we consider in our model ‘Net 
ODA’ (source: World Bank). It consist of ‘disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC 
countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the 
DAC list of ODA recipients’11.  
Institutional quality may also play a key role in mobilising resources. Indeed, it can improve 
tax policies and administrations’ ability to collect revenues, as well as taxpayers’ voluntary 
compliance. In particular, the degree of transparency, accountability, and corruption in the 
public sector determine the extent to which citizens can hold the executive accountable for its 
use of funds, and for the results of its decisions and actions. It also determines the extent to 
which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative 
decisions, use of resources, and the final results obtained. Using the ‘CPIA transparency, 
accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating’ variable makes it possible to 
account for these potential effects. The three main dimensions assessed in that indicator are 
‘the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their 
performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by 
narrow vested interests’ (Wold Bank, 2009, page 301).  
Beyond the institutional aspects, the political regime in place may explain the level of tax 
effort. A growing body of literature suggests that political regime type matters in determining 
taxation. Garcia and Von Haldenwang (2016) identify three different causal mechanisms that 
                                               
10 World Bank estimates based on sources and methods described in ‘The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018: 
Building a Sustainable Future’ (Lange et al, 2018). 
11 It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). 
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affect the relation between regime type and taxation: economic growth, redistribution, and 
legitimacy. First, based on a positive link between democratic rule and economic growth, 
democracy should lead to higher tax collection because of growing taxable income. Second, 
based on the median voter theorem (Milanovic, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), the 
expansion of suffrage induced by democracy should lead to higher levels of redistribution 
and more public services, which may impact the level of taxation. Third, tax contractualism 
emphasises the importance of legitimacy and credibility in bargaining processes and tax 
compliance (Moore, 2008; Timmons, 2005; Levi and Sacks, 2007; Bates and Lien, 1985; 
Mahdavi, 2008). In this context, democracy should lead to higher tax collection, as taxpayers 
can be more confident that fiscal resources are spent for the common good and that the 
distribution of the tax burden is fair. Empirical research on the relationship of political regimes 
to taxation yields mixed results and it appears that there is no linear trend in favour of 
democracy. To test for these potential effects, we use a modified version of the ‘Polity’ 
variable proposed by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) that allows the use of regime 
measure in time-series analyses. This variable captures political regime authority spectrum 
on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy)12.  
Tax effort may also be influenced by political instability. An important literature shows that 
political stability determines the level of taxation (Cukierman et al., 1992; Aizenmana and 
Jinjarak, 2008; Melo, 2011). A rise in the level of political instability generates a decrease in 
the resources available and public expenditure in the next period. Moreover, the risk of 
radical policy changes in the future can have a detrimental effect on the tax behaviour of 
governments and on tax compliance. We include in the empirical analysis a variable from the 
World Bank that measures ‘perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. [The e]stimate gives the country's score on 
the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from -2.5 to 
2.5’. 
Table 7 displays the pairwise correlation between tax effort and interest demand variables. It 
appears that the total tax effort is negatively associated with natural resource rent and ODA, 
while it is positively correlated with CPIA and political stability. The correlation between tax 
effort and political regime is not significant.  
Table 7: Pairwise correlations between total tax effort and its potential determinants 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
                                               
12 The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested three-part categorisation of 
‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and ‘democracies’ (+6 
to +10). The performance score is from 0 to 100. The highest score reflects the best situation. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(1) Tax effort 1.0000
(2) Natural resource rent -0.1357* 1.0000
(3) ODA -0.3594* 0.0013 1.0000
(4) CPIA 0.1955* -0.3599* 0.1307* 1.0000
(5) Political stability 0.3089* -0.3430* -0.2669* 0.5086* 1.0000
(6) Political regime 0.1759 -0.2727* -0.1079* 0.1255 0.2633* 1.0000
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Table 8 presents the results of the regression of the logistic model. We regress successively 
each of the interest variables (columns 1 to 5) and then all these variables at the same time 
(column 6). Aid is associated with a lower probability of belonging to a quartile of high tax 
effort while institutional quality (measured by the CPIA index) increases the probability of 
belonging to an efficient quartile in terms of tax effort. If the effect of the political system is 
not clear, political stability is strongly and positively associated with a greater likelihood of 
having a high tax burden. When the model is regressed across all variables, the effects of 
aid, institutional quality, and the political system appear to be significant. 
Table 8 : Logistic regressions results 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Quartiles of tax effort (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
-0.001*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
0.048 -0.003
(0.017) (0.032)
1.626*** 1.030*
(0.203) (0.770)
-0.027 -0.060**
(0.022) (0.026)
0.617*** -0.207
(0.160) (0.386)
-2.351*** -1.501*** 0.418 -1.891*** -1.833*** 1.549
(0.305) (0.263) (0.966) (0.489) (0.258) (2.596)
-0.554* 0.176 2.316** -0.064 -0.106 3.696
(0.296) (0.258) (0.972) (0.481) (0.251) (2.613)
0.567* 1.286*** 3.769*** 0.821* 1.093*** 5.222**
(0.299) (0.262) (0.981) (0.484) (0.255) (2.620)
1.475* 1.474*** 1.454*** 1.465*** 1.453*** 1.515**
(1.097) (0.203) (0.260) (0.345) (0.212) (0.842)
Observations 851 845 684 288 864 216
Number of groups 24 24 19 8 24 6
Log-vraisemblance -779.05 -795.29 -662.16 -261.35 -801.82 -223.43
ODA
Natural resource rent
CPIA
Political regime
Political stability
Cut3
Var (Const)
Cut1
Cut2
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4 Tax policy or revenue administration reforms 
In this section, we review some tax policy and tax administrative issues in Benin, and 
suggest some reforms to improve tax mobilisation 
4.1 Tax policy and tax expenditures 
The Beninese government sets the tax policy under the control of the legislative authority 
and following the WAEMU tax Regulation (Réglement in French), Directives, or Decisions.13 
WAEMU tax Directives define the rates and bases of the main taxes: VAT, corporate income 
tax, excises, portfolio incomes, etc. Therefore, WAEMU member countries share a similar set 
of tax laws, which are encompassed in their respective national tax codes. However, tax 
effort analysis highlights the leading role of Senegal, which belongs to WAEMU too. Senegal 
displays a tax effort above 70%, meaning a tax gap less than 30% of potential tax revenue 
over the most recent period (2015). 
A potential explanation of this discrepancy between Benin and Senegal (or Togo) is 
derogatory tax regime, such as the Investment Code (IC). Indeed, all the WAEMU countries, 
like almost developing countries, provide some tax incentives through their IC (or Act). Such 
a policy, sometimes suggested by the World Bank, aims to attract foreign direct investment. 
The main issue is in the details of these incentive schemes, which may also reflect the 
effects of lobbying.  
The comparison of the Beninese IC, enacted in 1990 and modified in 1998 and 2008, with 
the Togolese one (in force since 2012), yields the conclusion of a greater generosity towards 
investors in Benin. Indeed, the Beninese IC offers a complete corporate income tax 
exemption over a period from five to 9 years (even 15 years if the investment is located in 
remote areas). Moreover, tax advantages and their duration increase with the investment 
amount. Meanwhile, the Togolese IC does not provide such a corporate income tax break, 
but only a 50% rebate on corporate income tax owed. Moreover, this advantage is limited to 
five years and does not apply to some sectors, such as mobile phone companies, banks, 
insurance companies, retailers, or firms in charge of seaport and airport infrastructure. 
Another noticeable difference between the Beninese IC and the Togolese one concerns the 
importation of second-hand materials necessary for projects: Togo raises a unique 5% tax for 
VAT and duty purposes, while Benin provides a complete exemption. 
If the efficiency of such incentives in attracting foreign direct investment remains uncertain 
(see Van Parys and James, 2010), tax revenue losses captured through tax expenditure 
assessment are more obvious.14 Consequently, despite similar tax laws between Benin and 
Togo, tax expenditures such as these provided in ICs may differ significantly, partly 
explaining the gap in tax effort between these two countries. Yearly tax expenditure 
assessments and publications contained in the appendices to finance laws, in accordance 
                                               
13 These three regional legal texts do not have the same power of enforcement. While the WAEMU Regulation 
has immediate force of law and must be transferred into national legislation, WAEMU Directives and Decisions 
can be interpreted when they are integrated into the national laws. 
14 Anderson (2008) defines tax expenditures as ‘provisions of tax law, regulation or practices that reduce or 
postpone revenue for a comparatively narrow population of taxpayers relative to a benchmark tax.’ The 
assessment of tax expenditures usually follows such a revenue loss approach, which involves assuming 
unchanged (investment or consumption) behaviour: the investor (consumer) would have invested (consumed) the 
same amount with or without the derogatory tax regime (see OECD, 2010). Such an assumption may induce an 
overestimation of tax expenditure. 
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with the 2015 WAEMU Decision, would contribute to streamlining these incentives, and 
improving the tax effort by reducing the policy gap. 
4.2 Tariff policy and informal trade with Nigeria 
Beyond tax policy, an important component for Benin is the tariff policy, which is determined 
by the WAEMU Commission and, officially since 2015, by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Commission. ECOWAS is a customs union with 15 members.15 
The ECOWAS Common External Tariff implementation is still ongoing, but it will impact 
Benin’s tax revenue, given the weight of the transit activity in this country. Tax revenue 
collected at the border represented almost half of total tax revenue in 2015: 4.41% of GDP 
for trade taxes and 2.64% of GDP for VAT collected at the border.  
A large part of Beninese importations is not for the domestic market, but for the Nigerian one, 
and for landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger). Indeed, Nigeria has developed 
a protectionist trade policy by banning the importation of some goods (e.g. poultry meat, 
beer, used clothes, tires, used cars, etc.) or raising high tariff rates on some other goods 
(e.g. 50% on rice or sugar). This trade policy fuels smuggling activity in Benin and Togo. The 
former manages to extract significant tax revenue from this activity, which is estimated at 
14% of total tax revenue, or equivalent to 2.4% of GDP in 2008 (see Golub, 2012; and IMF, 
2012). Despite a geographical advantage for Benin, given the common border with Nigeria, 
there is competition between Benin and Togo to attract this illegal transit activity. This 
competition may seriously limit efforts to improve domestic revenue mobilization, at least at 
the border. For instance, despite or because of the WAEMU Common External Tariff in place 
in Benin and Togo since 2000, competition takes place on the reported value of imported 
goods for the Nigerian market. Such competition does not respect the World Trade 
Organization transaction value principle. Hence, special attention should be given to tariff 
policy in Benin, taking into account the existence of the informal trade with Nigeria. 
4.3 Administration capacity 
Tax effort is closely related to the tax and customs administration capacity. Benin still has a 
‘classic’ organisation of these administrations, while Togo implemented a SARA in 2014. 
While it may be too early to assess the efficiency of such a reform in this particular case, 
Mansour et al. (2015) found a significant positive impact of SARA on domestic revenue 
mobilisation: an increase by 4 percentage points of GDP. A natural question, then, would be 
whether Benin should switch to a revenue agency.  
First implemented in Africa by Ghana in 1985, the SARA is a drastic reform, which can be 
understood as a strategic delegation of taxing power to an autonomous agent. The 
autonomy, which differs significantly across countries, is a signal of a more credible audit 
policy, since control occurs, at least theoretically, without any political interference. Two main 
advantages of SARAs are advanced in the literature. First, SARAs involve the merger of tax 
and customs administrations in order to: (i) exploit synergies, in particular for VAT on imports 
(Keen, 2008); and (ii) save costs by combining operational functions in tax collections (World 
Bank, 2010). The second advantage is the human resource management. Recruitment, 
promotion, and dismissal do not have to respect civil service rules, allowing a number of 
                                               
15 In addition to the eight WAEMU members, ECOWAS gathers also Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. 
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flexibilities, such as higher wages (Fjeldstadt and Moore, 2009; and Moore, 2014). Table 9 
and Figure 9 show preliminary evidence of a positive correlation between public sector 
wages and salaries16  and estimated tax effort. 
Table 9: Correlation between civil service wage bill and tax effort 
 
Figure 9: Correlation between civil service wage bill and tax effort 
 
 
Switching to a SARA is a radical reform and the transition may be costly and risky, as it 
involves the replacement of a significant share of the staff. Alternative reforms may focus on 
the payment and incentive mechanisms in place in the Beninese tax and customs 
administrations. In 2016, the Beninese tax administration numbered less than 500 staff17 
(there are more than 1,500 in Togo and there are 1,200 in Senegal). These staff receive 
several premiums in addition to their wage: prime de rendement, prime d’incitation, prime 
d’impulsion, and potentially risk premium. A large part of these premiums remains collective, 
reducing their incentive dimension. Several empirical studies have highlighted the advantage 
                                               
16 Data concerning civil service wage bill come from the Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) 
database: https://edenpub.bceao.int/index.php  
17 Data are not available for customs administrations. 
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of reviewing such incentives. For instance, Khan et al. (2016) show that a rewarding scheme 
based on collected revenue significantly improved property tax revenue in Pakistan. 
However, they emphasise also that the revenue gain resulted from a small number of 
properties, the values of which were reassessed, and that a risk of higher bribes emerged 
with the increase in collectors’ bargaining power because of this new incentive mechanism. 
Thus, the introduction of individual performance contracts may be necessary, but is not 
sufficient to reduce the risk of corruption. As with a SARA, this mechanism should be 
complemented by extensive and effective monitoring (see Fjeldstad, 2003). 
In 2017, Benin carried out a reform of its tax administration through a significant 
reorganisation,18 which follows the segmentation approach of taxpayer population. It 
introduced a risk analysis for its audit policy and human management based on results. The 
details of this reform are unknown and the previously described incentive mechanisms seem 
to remain.  
The 2017 tax administration reform also established a tax policy unit. This unit is in charge of 
defining the tax policy, forecasting expected tax revenue and the effect of tax reforms, and 
assessing tax expenditure. If the creation of a tax policy unit is an improvement in designing 
the Beninese tax system, the location of this unit inside the tax administration itself may 
seriously limit the efficiency of such a reform. First, it reflects a common inconsistency in 
French-speaking countries, and even in France, in which the tax administration not only 
collects taxes, but also designs the tax policy. Moreover, given the role of the tax policy unit 
in forecasting tax revenue, the tax administration seems to have complete control over the 
goals to be achieved in terms of tax revenue, and the bonuses to be distributed to its staff. 
Second, customs remains an important tax collector and should be included in any tax 
reform and tax expenditure assessment. A natural location of the tax policy unit would have 
been ‘above’ both revenue administrations, headed by the special tax adviser of the Ministry 
of Finance. There is a need to clarify the role of each stakeholder: the revenue authorities, 
which collect taxes, and the Ministry of Finance, which designs the tax policy, with 
parliamentary control. 
 
                                               
18 Decree N°3005/MEF/DC/SGM/DGI/SP. 
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5 Conclusion 
Based on a large database covering 41 SSA countries and the period 1980–2015 we 
analysed the effort by Benin to raise non-resource tax revenue in light of its structural 
characteristics. The stochastic frontier analysis, by comparing non-resource tax-to-GDP ratio 
in Benin with its peers, identified whether Benin was away from the tax frontier: the tax effort 
in Benin remained relatively stable during the period, with an average of 65.1% over the 
period and a rank of 13 out of 42 countries. A tax effort of 65.1% means that the level of non-
resource tax revenue is at 34.9% of the country’s maximum capacity. Knowing that, on 
average, Benin collects 11.14% of its GDP in non-resource tax revenue and is at 65.1% of its 
capacity, it would have raised 17.11% of its GDP as non-resource tax revenue if it had used 
all its potential, given its characteristics. Hence, Benin has little room – insufficient to reach 
the WAEMU criterion of 20% of tax revenue to GDP – to increase tax revenues, unless it 
addresses the reasons for the weak taxable capacity and conducts institutional reforms to 
expand its tax revenue potential.  
In order to study rigorously the determinants of tax effort, an econometric analysis then 
complemented the previous statistical analysis. Based on an international comparison, we 
examined the effect of natural resources, ODA, transparency, corruption and accountability 
(CPIA indicator), and the political regime and stability on tax effort scores. We found that aid 
is associated with a lower probability of belonging to a quartile of high tax effort while 
institutional quality (measured by the CPIA index) seems to increase the probability of 
belonging to an efficient quartile in terms of tax effort. Political stability appears to be strongly 
and positively associated with a greater likelihood of having a high tax burden. 
Analysing potential policy and administrative sources of these tax gaps, we shed light on the 
human resource policy of the tax administration and the remuneration mechanisms, which 
may be obsolete. The payment and incentive mechanisms in place in Beninese tax and 
customs administrations should be reviewed and associated with an extensive and effective 
monitoring to improve tax effort and limit the risks of corruption. The 2017 tax administration 
reform may improve tax revenue through a more efficient organisation of departments and 
divisions. However, it also raises a critical issue of providing the decision-making power in 
tax policy to the tax administration through the creation of a tax policy unit. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Country list 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Table A2: Data sources and definitions 
Variables Definition Sources 
Total non-resource 
tax (% GDP) 
Total tax revenues excluding resource rent 
Mansour 
(2015) 
Tot. nat. res. rent  (% 
GDP) 
Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and 
soft), mineral rents, and forest rents over GDP 
World bank 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 US $) 
Volume of imports and exports divided by GDP 
Total trade (% of 
GDP) 
Volume of imports and exports over GDP 
Agriculture, value 
added (% GDP) 
Net output of forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production, after adding 
up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs, divided 
by GDP 
Financial 
development index 
Aggregate of nine indices that summarise how developed 
financial institutions and financial markets are in terms of 
their depth, access, and efficiency. 
Svirydzenka 
(2016) 
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Table A3: Tax-to-GDP ratio-based country ranking (sub-period averages)
 
  
C o untry
N r tax 
revenu 
o ver 
GD P R ank C o untry
N r tax 
revenu 
o ver 
GD P R ank C o untry
N r tax 
revenu 
o ver 
GD P R ank C o untry
N r tax 
revenu 
o ver 
GD P R ank C o untry
N r tax 
revenu 
o ver 
GD P R ank
 Angola -  Angola 4,89 39  Angola 7,72 35  Angola 7,71 36  Angola 6,97 39
 Benin 9,34 23  Benin 11,74 15  Benin 12,17 17  Benin 13,98 14  Benin 13,42 22
 Botswana 11,76 16  Botswana 9,24 24  Botswana 12,18 16  Botswana 19,23 7  Botswana 18,80 8
 Burkina Faso 7,30 27  Burkina Faso 10,44 19  Burkina Faso 10,88 22  Burkina Faso 11,88 22  Burkina Faso 13,03 24
 Burundi 15,23 9  Burundi 13,17 14  Burundi 13,54 14  Burundi 12,59 18  Burundi 13,35 23
 Cabo Verde 13,48 12  Cabo Verde 14,18 12  Cabo Verde 17,34 7  Cabo Verde 19,46 6  Cabo Verde 18,16 10
 Cameroon 6,85 30  Cameroon 9,93 22  Cameroon 10,84 24  Cameroon 11,42 24  Cameroon 11,89 26 Central African 
Republic 7,67 26
 Central African 
Republic 7,81 32
 Central African 
Republic 7,69 36
 Central African 
Republic 8,17 35
 Central African 
Republic 7,50 38
 Chad 3,75 39  Chad 5,52 37  Chad 4,94 40  Chad 4,73 41  Chad 5,62 40
 Comoros 11,23 17  Comoros 9,98 21  Comoros 10,89 21  Comoros 10,57 28  Comoros 11,36 30 Congo, Dem, 
Rep, -
 Congo, Dem, 
Rep, 0,55 42
 Congo, Dem, 
Rep, 3,38 41
 Congo, Dem, 
Rep, 6,96 38
 Congo, Dem, 
Rep, 9,36 35
 Congo, Rep, 10,47 19  Congo, Rep, 8,21 31  Congo, Rep, 8,13 34  Congo, Rep, 7,12 37  Congo, Rep, 11,57 27
 Côte d'Ivo ire 15,15 10  Côte d'Ivo ire 15,04 8  Côte d'Ivo ire 13,93 12  Côte d'Ivo ire 14,40 12  Côte d'Ivo ire 13,89 21
 Equatorial Guinea 9,78 21  Equatorial Guinea 4,16 41  Equatorial Guinea 1,92 42  Equatorial Guinea 1,25 42  Equatorial Guinea 1,51 42
 Ethiopia 6,63 32  Ethiopia 8,92 28  Ethiopia 10,94 20  Ethiopia 10,82 26  Ethiopia 11,90 25
 Gabon 10,08 20  Gabon 10,77 17  Gabon 10,78 25  Gabon 10,18 30  Gabon 9,98 32
 Gambia, The 13,30 14  Gambia, The 11,21 16  Gambia, The 10,43 27  Gambia, The 14,45 11  Gambia, The 15,27 14
 Ghana 8,20 25  Ghana 9,41 23  Ghana 11,94 18  Ghana 12,50 19  Ghana 14,02 17
 Guinea 5,69 36  Guinea 6,65 35  Guinea 8,58 32  Guinea 10,55 29  Guinea 13,89 20
 Guinea-Bissau 3,56 40  Guinea-Bissau 4,56 40  Guinea-Bissau 5,55 39  Guinea-Bissau 6,37 39  Guinea-Bissau 8,17 37
 Kenya 14,51 11  Kenya 14,86 9  Kenya 14,29 11  Kenya 14,37 13  Kenya 15,46 13
 Lesotho 30,07 1  Lesotho 31,24 1  Lesotho 30,88 1  Lesotho 44,52 1  Lesotho 39,73 1
 M adagascar 7,28 28  M adagascar 9,22 25  M adagascar 9,08 31  M adagascar 10,62 27  M adagascar 9,61 34
 M alawi 12,88 15  M alawi 13,43 13  M alawi 10,53 26  M alawi 12,89 17  M alawi 14,01 18
 M ali 6,65 31  M ali 8,95 27  M ali 10,28 28  M ali 9,88 31  M ali 10,60 31
 M auritius 15,70 7  M auritius 14,23 11  M auritius 14,70 10  M auritius 16,55 9  M auritius 16,61 11
 M ozambique 8,90 24  M ozambique 8,50 29  M ozambique 9,60 29  M ozambique 11,90 21  M ozambique 20,53 7
 Namibia 25,03 3  Namibia 25,84 2  Namibia 23,32 3  Namibia 27,62 3  Namibia 32,06 2
 Niger 6,27 35  Niger 7,64 34  Niger 9,36 30  Niger 9,43 33  Niger 11,54 28
 Nigeria 4,30 38  Nigeria 6,07 36  Nigeria 7,09 38  Nigeria 4,88 40  Nigeria 5,08 41
 Rwanda 6,95 29  Rwanda 9,06 26  Rwanda 10,84 23  Rwanda 11,65 23  Rwanda 13,99 19 São Tomé and 
Principe 5,35 37
 São Tomé and 
Principe 7,75 33
 São Tomé and 
Principe 12,63 15
 São Tomé and 
Principe 13,58 15
 São Tomé and 
Principe 14,47 16
 Senegal 13,36 13  Senegal 14,85 10  Senegal 16,29 8  Senegal 17,99 8  Senegal 18,43 9
 Seychelles 29,10 2  Seychelles 23,37 4  Seychelles 24,61 2  Seychelles 23,45 4  Seychelles 27,93 3
 Sierra Leone 6,60 33  Sierra Leone 5,40 38  Sierra Leone 8,36 33  Sierra Leone 8,29 34  Sierra Leone 8,71 36
 South Africa 17,84 5  South Africa 20,15 5  South Africa 20,25 4  South Africa 22,65 5  South Africa 22,65 6
 Swaziland 16,04 6  Swaziland 17,58 6  Swaziland 19,37 5  Swaziland 28,16 2  Swaziland 26,69 4
 Tanzania 10,72 18  Tanzania 8,45 30  Tanzania 7,11 37  Tanzania 9,57 32  Tanzania 9,92 33
 Togo 9,49 22  Togo 10,56 18  Togo 13,68 13  Togo 15,22 10  Togo 16,02 12
 Uganda 6,36 34  Uganda 10,06 20  Uganda 11,42 19  Uganda 11,33 25  Uganda 11,39 29
 Zambia 15,70 7  Zambia 17,25 7  Zambia 16,15 9  Zambia 13,07 16  Zambia 14,89 15
 Zimbabwe 21,38 4  Zimbabwe 24,49 3  Zimbabwe 18,67 6  Zimbabwe 12,26 20  Zimbabwe 24,97 5
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
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Discussion of the ‘The Tax Effort in Benin: How can tax 
gaps be reduced ?’ 
The article by Emilie Caldeira and Gregoire Rota-Graziosi presents the tax collection 
situation in Benin in comparison with the performance of tax collection in Togo. The text is 
clear and easy to read. However, there are some observations to make:  
1. The theoretical question is whether the increase in the tax burden is an end in itself. 
Is a lower tax burden not an incentive to invest? The question needs to be asked. The 
United States has a lower tax burden than Denmark, but it has a per capita income 
and higher productivity. The tax burden should not be viewed as an absolute goal.  
2. In practical terms, the study would be more useful for both Benin and Togo if it 
indicated the causal relationship between the various indicators cited and the 
difference in tax collection rates between the two countries. The study cites as 
possible causes: corruption, motivation of staff, the merger of the tax and customs 
administrations, the status of the staff (contract or civil servant), etc. If the 
government of Benin seeks to use this document to correct its tax policy, it will not 
know what lever to act to improve the tax return.  
3. The bibliography contains no items by authors from the countries concerned and 
more generally from French-speaking West African countries. The only 
bibliographical references are to authors from/writing about English-speaking 
countries in Africa. 
1  Overall point of view   
The study choses the institutional perspective as an angle of analysis regarding the issue of 
brakes on and adjuvants to growth for development in Benin. In this regard, we can advance 
ideas that complete the comparison between Benin and Togo, especially on the tax issue. 
Togo has created a revenue office and this has improved tax revenues. The Togolese 
scheme, which is similar to those in place in Rwanda and Burundi, addresses a major 
obstacle in Benin: the power of the trade unions in the finance sector (customs and taxes). 
The government has reduced by law n ° 2017-05 of 29 August 2017 the rights of workers by 
limiting to 10 per year the annual statutory period of walkout. The unions are therefore 
reduced to grumbling without a real threat capacity as regards the continuity of public 
services. However, there is reason to fear a similar manoeuvre to that adopted by Burkina 
Faso trade unionists in the finance sector, which led to the departure of their minister of 
guardianship and a ministerial reshuffle after a zeal strike (presence at the office but actually 
working throughout the entire period), in February 2019. For its part, the Government of 
Benin has shown no intention of going in the direction of a revenue agency. On the other 
hand, it has strongly oriented its administrative policy towards the creation of agencies in all 
sectors. In general, the agency as a management institution appeared in the course of the 
reforms undertaken with the advent of new public management in the 1980s. The goal is to 
apply the managerial methods of the private sector to allow public administrations to become 
more competitive while guaranteeing a quality public service. Countries like Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and many others have followed this path. An 
agency makes it possible to combine the advantages of a public administration (regulatory 
power, power of constraint, general interest) with the managerial flexibility enjoyed by private 
The Tax Effort in Benin: How Can Tax Gaps be Reduced? 
© Economic Development & Institutions  35 
individuals: a merit pay system, recruitment according to need, simplified dismissal, ease of 
appreciating individual and collective performance. 
In the space of three years of government, the new President of the Republic, elected in 
2016, has created about 50 agencies. In the particular field of taxes, the National Agency of 
Domain and Land was created (by decree n° 2015-10 of 29 January 2015). This agency 
deals with cadaster issues and facilitates upstream collection of property tax. 
The question of the modernisation of public administration goes back a very long time (as 
mentioned by Pisani, 1956, ‘Management Administration, Mission Administration’). Today we 
speak more often of development administration, in the logic of what we could call the 
‘government by corporations’. The dynamics of differentiation present the attraction of the 
flexibility of management rules, the ease with which they are recruited and the rules of public 
accounting. Development administration resembles a management administration in the 
durability of its existence and its power of constraint. On the other hand, it is closer to 
mission administration in the result requirements and its management flexibility. 
Development administration is more concerned with performance. The question of the 
performance of administrations is evident in the massive ‘agenciation’ underway in Benin, 
which is the beginning of a solution to the problem of administrative institutions and their 
impediment to growth in Benin. By multiplying agencies in Benin, the government provides 
solutions to two types of problems: 
1. First of all, the large numbers of general administration with profiles that often do not 
correspond to job positions. Public administration is often a refuge for incompetent 
people who cannot find jobs in the private sector. Very often, offices are cluttered with 
staff who work little because they are five or 10 in a position that only one person can 
occupy with adequate working means. This overpopulation of the public 
administration goes hand in hand with insufficient staffing for certain managerial or hi-
tech positions. We are thus witnessing a contradictory phenomenon where on the 
one hand some people get bored at work, and on the other hand other agents are on 
the verge of burnout.  
2. The question of motivation of the staff could also be regulated by the ‘agenciation’. 
Indeed, public officials receive premiums and are subject to a promotion system that 
is usually based on seniority and not on the quality of work. This is the standard 
contained in the General Code of the Civil Service (Law No. 2015-18 of 02 April 2015 
on the General Statute of the Civil Service). In an agency, staff should be periodically 
evaluated on their professional performance, results achieved, innovations made, 
quality of work done (attendance, relations with colleagues, etc.). This evaluation of 
the agent could be sanctioned by bonuses, promotions, and many other things. Poor 
performance should lead to punishments, downgrades, and even dismissal if 
necessary. The agent in an agency knows that he or she is recruited because of his 
or her skills and abilities, and not because of his or her relationships. 
3. Then comes the question of recruitment and dismissal: officials are guaranteed 
employment and can only be dismissed from their job in extreme circumstances. 
They are safe from economic redundancy and even if the nurse receives only two 
patients in the day for her village infirmary, this work is enough to guarantee her 
salary at the end of the month. The notion of return has no place in public 
administration. Officials obey the rules of the public service of the state. Labour 
productivity is not evaluated, and neither is yield. The agency offers the possibility to 
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its leaders to leave the administrative framework of the civil service. Recruitment is 
carried out on the basis of a need for staff. The employment contract which binds the 
agent to his or her agency will be able to continue on two conditions: first, if the agent 
fulfils his or her professional obligations correctly. He or she does what he or she 
must do on time and perfectly, under the appreciation of his or her managers. Then, 
the overall performance of the agency will justify the maintenance of the agency or 
not. An agency that is not performing can be dissolved, merged with another, or its 
team renewed entirely to give it a new lease of life. The fate of an agency is not very 
different to that of a private company, and nor is its management. 
4. Finally, there is the question of remuneration: civil servants are considered to be 
poorly paid and are not motivated at all to do quality work. It is popularly believed that 
the state pretends to pay officials and officials in turn pretend to work. The 
management of an agency makes it possible to combine an optimum workforce, 
satisfactory remuneration, and good motivation of the agents. It is total quality 
management.  
2  ‘Agenciation’ of the revenue services in question 
In the African countries that have adopted this approach (Togo, Rwanda, Kenya, etc.), the 
‘agenciation’ of the services responsible for collecting taxes (domestic taxation and door 
taxation) has had consequences for: 
1. the motivation of staff; 
2. a synergy effect that favours revenue optimisation; and 
3. the system of corruption. 
 
Benin has not chosen this solution of ‘agenciation’. The option is to be able to push on other 
levers to achieve the same results regarding staff motivation and the system of corruption. 
1. The promotion of results-based management: the African Center for Training and 
Administrative Research for Development pleaded in 2010 for accountability and 
transparency in tax administrations. These are values promoted by governments in 
general government. The African Union has adopted the Public Service Charter 
(2001) to highlight the concepts of productivity, objectives, and evaluation. For its 
part, the General Tax Directorate of Benin has started to apply a results-based 
management system: defining objectives, issuing mission letters, evaluating 
performance, and implementing positive and negative sanctions. The record of this 
policy is mixed but the method may have a more convincing impact with the 
development of other managerial techniques, notably the dematerialisation of 
procedures. 
2. The dematerialisation of procedures: The dematerialisation of procedures means 
that the IT tool is used to reduce contact between tax and customs agents and users. 
At the customs port of Cotonou, the importer does all of his or her own operations, 
without ever encountering a customs officer. Import documents are entered into the 
electronic platform and the amount of customs duty is generated automatically. 
Payment of tax and customs is made in a commercial bank. The number of the 
payment receipt is entered into the computer system, which immediately issues the 
notice with the right to remove the goods. However, customs posts at land borders 
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are not yet equipped with this computer system. As for the Directorate General of 
Taxes, it has also started a system of dematerialisation of these procedures of 
calculation and payment of the tax. The immediate consequence is the reduction of 
opportunities for contact between users and the tax administration. This should 
reduce the risk of corruption involving tax officials. 
3. Saving time: Dematerialisation must also enable time savings in the execution of 
formalities with the tax authorities. According to the 2017 Paying Tax Report, it takes 
908 hours (37 days) to fulfil tax obligations in Nigeria, 630 hours (26 days) in 
Cameroon, 124 hours (5 days) in Rwanda, and 82 hours (3.5 days) in Djibouti. Time 
management is related to the management of paperwork. It has a cost for the tax 
administration and generates additional costs for taxpayers. In South Africa, the use 
of electronic platforms has improved tax revenue mobilisation and reduced the cost of 
corporate tax compliance by 22.4%. 
3  Conclusion 
The Government of Benin is using the technique of ‘agenciation’ to modernise the public 
administration and to make it more efficient. 
Curiously, the same government seems not to be moving towards ‘agenciation’ with respect 
to tax management. We understand that the decision is to achieve the same results that 
allows the ‘agenciation’ using other managerial techniques: the promotion of results-based 
management, the dematerialisation of procedures, and the reduction of the time that 
taxpayers dedicate to their tax obligations. 
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4  List of active agencies in Benin 
1. Agence des grands projets urbains (Agence GPU) 
2. Agence du cadre de vie pour le développement du territoire (Agence CV-DT) 
3. Agence nationale d’approvisionnement en eau potable en milieu rural (ANAEPMR) 
4. Agence des services et systèmes d’information (ASSI) 
5. Agence pour la promotion des investissements et des exportations (APIEx Bénin) 
6. Agence pour le développement intégré de la zone économique du lac AHEME et ses 
chenaux (ADELAC) 
7. Agence nationale des migrations et de la diaspora (ANTD) 
8. Agence nationale de surveillance des systèmes financiers décentralisés (ANSSFD) 
9. Agence nationale du domaine et du foncier (ANDF) 
10. Agence béninoise de gestion intégrée des espaces frontaliers (ABeGIEF) 
11. Agence nationale de protection civile (ANPC) 
12. Agences territoriales de développement agricole (ATDA) 
13. Agence de développement de la mécanisation agricole (ADMA) 
14. Agence de promotion des aménagements hydro-agricoles (APAH-SA) 
15. Agence nationale de la sécurité sanitaire des aliments (ABSSA) 
16. Agence nationale pour l’emploi (ANPE) 
17. Agence nationale de vaccination et des soins de santé primaires (ANV/SSP) 
18. Agence nationale pour la transfusion sanguine (ANTS) 
19. Agence nationale de l’assurance maladie (ANAM) 
20. Agence nationale de la gratuité de la césarienne (ANGC) 
21. Agence béninoise de valorisation des résultats de recherche et de l’innovation 
technologique (ABeVRIT) 
22. Agence Bénin presse (ABP) 
23. Agence béninoise des services universels, des communications électroniques et de la 
poste (ABSU-CEP) 
24. Agence nationale des transports terrestres (ANaTT) 
25. Agence nationale de l’aviation civile (ANAC) 
26. Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar 
(ASECNA) 
27. Agence nationale de la météorologie (METEO Benin) 
28. Agence nationale de la propriété intellectuelle (ANaPI) 
29. Agence de normalisation, de métrologie et du contrôle qualité (ANM) 
30. Agence nationale des petites et moyennes entreprises (ANPME) 
31. Agence béninoise d’électrification rurale et de maitrise d’énergie (ABERME) 
32. Agence de contrôle des installations électriques intérieures (CONTRELEC) 
33. Agence nationale pour le développement des énergies renouvelables (ANADER) 
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34. Agence de bassin de l’Ouémé (ABO) 
35. Agence de bassin du Mono-Couffo (ABM) 
36. Agence de bassin de la Volta-Pendjari 
37. Agence de bassin du Niger-Mékrou-Alibori-Sota 
38. Agence béninoise pour l’environnement (ABE) 
39. Agence pour la réhabilitation de la cité historique d’Abomey (ARCHA) 
40. Agence pour la réhabilitation de la ville de Porto-Novo (ARPN) 
41. Agence foncière de l’habitat (AFH) 
42. Agence nationale de traitement (ANT) 
43. Agence pour le développement du numérique (ADN) 
44. Agence nationale de promotion des patrimoines et de développement du tourisme 
(ANPT) 
45. Agence de développement de la cité internationale de l’innovation et du savoir (AD-
CIIS) 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the issue of land tenure, which has been identified by the research 
coordinators as one of the major institutional problems in Benin. It deals more specifically 
with the recent land reform that was enacted by the 2013 Code Foncier et Domanial (Land 
and Domain Code).1 The orientation of this chapter is significantly different from the others, 
both in its purpose and approach. It is not so much a question of proposing an institutional 
diagnosis of the sector and highlighting desirable areas for reform, as it is of analysing an 
ongoing reform process. In accordance with the terms of reference, this chapter deals with 
the political economy of the reform. It deals with the reform’s political and economic stakes, 
the groups of actors and interests which pushed it, those which are opposed to it, and those 
which seek to shape it for their own benefit.2  It also provide a detailed history of the reform 
process. 
A matter of ‘power, wealth, and meaning’ (Shipton and Goheen, 1992), land is indeed at the 
heart of societies and of the formation of the state: (i) the way of thinking and organising 
access and control of land and its resources reflects the conceptions of the society, its forms 
of authority, and the differentiations that structure it; (ii) the distribution of rights over land and 
resources determines, in part, socio-economic inequalities; and (iii) the capacity to define 
rules covering, and to grant or validate, land rights is at the heart of political power and 
construction of the state (Boone, 2014). Any land policy necessarily has power-related 
stakes (politics) and societal stakes (polity) (Léonard and Lavigne Delville, to be published). 
Besides the economic policy stakes, land reform processes are linked to the interests of the 
different groups of economic and political actors, the weight of professional corporatism, the 
conflicts of societal projects, and the question related to the plurality of norms that run 
through the society (Lund, 2001). These political and social stakes of land lead to 
controversies and even to conflicts, which makes any attempt of reforms much more 
complex than in other sectors – water supply, for example – where neighbouring countries 
have also launched similar policy reforms at the same time (Lavigne Delville, 2018c). 
1.1 Land reforms in Africa, between the privatisation paradigm 
and the adaptation paradigm 
Since the middle of the 1980s the land issue in Africa has come back again onto the agenda 
of development policies, in a context of state crises, economy liberalisation, and increased 
conflicts in rural areas. Two major visions clash, both challenging the colonial and post-
colonial state’s monopoly on land (Gbaguidi, 1997), but with different answers. The first one, 
described as ‘standard’ or ‘offensive’ (Chauveau, 2016), is based on a narrative that 
                                               
1 In French-speaking African countries, land law makes a distinction between ‘land’ issues, which are about 
private property, and ‘domain’ issues, which are about state- (and local government-) owned or controlled land. 
Several countries have a Land and Domain Code, which deals with both dimensions. This is the case in Benin 
since the advent of the 2013 Land and Domain Code, which I will be simply call the ‘Land Code’ or ‘Code’ in this 
chapter.  
2 The analysis presented below is based on long-term research on land reforms in West Africa, with a main focus 
on Benin, that was initiated some 15 years ago (Lavigne Delville, 2018a), and in particular on a two-month 
research trip in autumn 2018 specifically devoted to the political issues of the 2013 reform and its 2017 review. It 
has also benefited from a complementary research mission carried out in March 2019 as part of the Economic 
Development and Institutions project. I would like to thank the discussants and participants of the workshop 
organised by the project in Grand Popo in March 2019, in particular Mr Djibril-Akambi, Agence Nationale du 
Domaine et du Foncier (National Agency of Land and Domains) (ANDF) Deputy General Manager, and Kenneth 
Houngbedji and Jean-Philippe Platteau, for their contributions. I also thank Clement Dossou-Yovo, lawyer and 
land expert, for our numerous exchanges on this reform. 
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promotes the replacement of informal customary rights, considered as obstacles to 
productivity, by private ownership rights, supposed to be a condition for economic 
development. The other one, described as ‘adaptative’ (Bruce, 1992), ‘defensive’ 
(Chauveau), and ‘pro-poor’ (Borras Jr and Franco, 2010; Zevenbergen et al., 2013), 
acknowledges the dynamics of local/customary land rights. For the second vision, the issue 
of land reforms is to build a favourable institutional environment that secures people’s rights 
and allows these rights to evolve peacefully.  
Both paradigms emphasis the issue of the security of land rights, but with different 
assumptions regarding what ‘tenure security’ means. For the privatisation paradigm, it means 
private ownership rights recognised by the state and full capacity of transfer and sale. For the 
adaptation paradigm, land tenure security is before all an institutional issue: it means that 
one’s rights (of whatsoever kind) cannot be challenged without good reason, and that 
legitimate authorities (customary, state, or hybrid) are able to settle conflicts (Lavigne 
Delville, 2006).  
In a context in which the role of the state in the economy is challenged, and where a market 
economy is promoted, the ‘standard’ and the ‘adaptation’ paradigms consider that the 
‘informal’ nature of the majority of land rights is one of the obstacles to economic 
development. According to a reading – well established if not dated – of property rights 
theory, the legal formalisation of private property rights is supposed to secure economic 
actors by guaranteeing them the benefit of their investments and work, on the one hand, and 
by enabling them to access credit, on the other hand. The development – or the fluidisation – 
of the land market that this legal formalisation is supposed to encourage should also favour 
the transfer of rights from the least efficient producers to the most efficient ones and, once 
again, stimulate economic development.   
Such an interpretation, which considers private property and the legal status of land as key 
variables, has been questioned or qualified for more than 20 years. Many development 
economists (Platteau, 1992; Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder, 1995; Bromley, 2009; Migot-
Adholla, Hazell, Blarel et al., 1993; Platteau, 1996) highlight the limits of a theory that makes 
direct links between title and investment. Deininger and Feder (1995) show that, in contexts 
with significant imperfections in related markets of credit, labour force, products, etc., 
favouring the land sales market is likely to have little impact on efficiency, and negative 
impacts on equity. Platteau (1996) shows that the standard narrative is highly questionable 
because investments depend on many variables outside land legal status; and because 
farmers’ access to land title does not mean that they will have access to credit. For Bromley 
(2009), titling might even be ‘the wrong prescription for the wrong malady’. These economists 
have joined those social scientists (geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) that 
have conducted field research on land rights dynamics since the 1980s. These social 
scientists question the supposed link between informality and land insecurity (Lavigne 
Delville, 2006). They analyse land conflicts not (or at least not only) as symptoms of 
increasing pressure on land but above all as a result of deficiencies in arbitration 
mechanisms in contexts of plurality of norms (von Benda-Beckmann, 2006; von Benda-
Beckmann and Wiber, 2006) and competition between authorities (Lund, 1998). They also 
highlight the interest that powerful actors have in ‘managing confusion’ (Mathieu, 1996), in 
urban and peri-urban environments (Piermay, 1986b) but also in rural areas.  
Although land tenure securitisation and formalisation are not the same (Comité Technique 
Foncier & Développement, 2015), the ‘adaptation’ paradigm also supports the ‘formalisation’ 
of land rights that have so far been largely ‘informal’ and ‘extra-legal’, particularly in rural 
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areas. However, the main issue for it is about tenure security and not privatization. According 
to this paradigm formalisation has to be implemented through progressive frameworks, and 
the development of innovative, adapted, inexpensive, and accessible approaches that are 
able to take stock of the diversity of current rights over land. 
Land issues are thus subject to conflicts of diagnosis and prescription, both at national and 
international levels. Narratives that are ‘dead theories’ (Musembi, 2007) from an academic 
point of view may be still alive in the development policy world, due to ignorance or strategy. 
In the 1990s, international aid institutions vacillated between those two paradigms, with an 
emphasis on privatisation for the World Bank and on adaptation for European aid agencies. 
The famous but highly contested ‘Mystery of Capital’ (De Soto, 2000) can be seen as an 
attempt to re-legitimate the standard paradigm in a context where poverty reduction was 
supposed to be the priority of aid. Since the 2000s, and even more since the dynamics of 
‘large-scale land acquisitions’ have become prevalent, the standard paradigm seems to be 
exercising renewed influence.  
The debate on the legal recognition of property rights in French-speaking Africa is also 
strongly structured by a legal framework that is a colonial legacy. Lawyers and even ordinary 
people think of land ownership only in terms of land title3, and ‘immatriculation’, which is a 
colonial registration procedure based on the granting ‘from the top’ (Comby, 1998a) of a 
quasi-absolute private ownership, that is both based on the ‘purging’ of all pre-existing rights 
and is incontestable and guaranteed by the state. Every plot that does not have a land title is 
subject to informal rights or ‘presumed ownership’. This approach, inspired by the Torrens 
system developed in Australia by the British Crown to grant undeniable rights to settlers in 
denial of the rights of indigenous peoples, is thus specifically colonial. ‘Immatriculation 
(hereafter referred to as standard tilting or registration) allows for ‘the entry into legal life’ of 
land previously having ‘informal’ status. However, it is a complex and costly procedure, 
historically oriented towards the needs of the colonial power and its allies, but not towards 
the recognition of existing rights. It is still reserved for a small minority.  
Standard registration and land title are, for a large number of West African land professionals 
and policymakers, the essential reference and the only conceivable form of legal property 
rights. For them, the main issue is to generalise land titles. For others, standard tilting is an 
obstacle to a large-scale access to land rights formalisation since its very logic – not to 
mention its cost – is opposed to the idea of a legal recognition of the various existing land 
rights, which are the products of history, ‘from the bottom-up’.4 The priority is thus to build 
alternatives, even when private ownership and the land market are at stake. 
These various and intricate issues explain why, even though almost every West African 
country has launched attempts at land reform, the processes and outcomes have been very 
different from one country to another. The degree of implementation of the adopted reforms 
is even more crucial (Seck et al., 2017). Indeed, ‘many would agree with Berry (1984) that 
“more stable or less contentious conditions of access and adjudication of rights to productive 
resources” (including land) must be established to ensure future growth of agricultural 
                                               
3 I write ‘land title’ when I am talking about “titre foncier” (TF), this specific kind of title over land. 
4 Comby (1998a) distinguishes two ways of creating property: ‘from the bottom’ and ‘from the top’. In the ‘from the 
bottom’ process, property is created from land rights as historically constituted over transfers, inheritances, etc. In 
this logic, applied by European countries, the owner must be able to show that he or she obtained this right legally 
from someone who held it legally. The state only defines transfer procedures and records contracts negotiated 
between actors. In the ‘from the top’ process, which is that of ‘immatriculation’, the creation of property is based 
on the attribution of titles by the state, then on the registration of the mutations in the land book, with legal value. 
See also Stamm (2013). 
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production capacity in Africa’ (Platteau, 1992, p. 183). However, the question of how to 
ensure these conditions remains controversial, 30 years after debates on the subject began. 
The case of Benin is particularly interesting from this point of view because land debate 
began in the 1990s and because, within the space of a few years (2007 and 2013), Benin 
has adopted two different land reforms. The first one focused on rural areas and promoted 
an alternative to standard registration and land title, which the promoters considered 
fundamentally unsuitable for rural areas. It was prepared from the early 1990s onwards by 
rural development projects funded by European donors. Those projects developed an 
approach to identifying and mapping customary individual and collective land rights, the ‘Plan 
Foncier Rural’ (PFR, Rural Land Map). PFRs were institutionalised by the Rural Land Tenure 
Act 2007 (Loi portant régime foncier rural), which created a new legal status, the Certificat 
Foncier Rural (CFR, Rural Land Certificate), to legalise plots registered in the PFRs, and a 
new land administration framework, anchored in rural communes.5 The second one has a 
national focus. It was led by the Ministry of Urban Planning6 and the Millennium Challenge 
Account Benin (MCA-Benin)7. Initiated in 2004–2005 and prepared between 2006 and 2011 
with the support of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), this reform aims to 
standardise land law and develop access to land title by reforming the land administration. It 
was embodied in a Land Policy Statement (MUHRFLEC, 2011a) in 2011, followed by the 
adoption of the Land and Domain Code in 2013 (slightly revised in 2017), and the 
establishment in 2016 of the Agence Nationale du Domaine et du Foncier (ANDF, National 
Agency of Land and Domains).  
The succession, within a few years, of two reforms based on different paradigms, carried out 
by different networks of actors, supported by different donors, and having experienced 
varying degrees of implementation, represents a textbook case by which to highlight the 
intricate issues of land reform, and to question the stakes and the actors’ interests around 
the idea of land reform. It also offers an opportunity to question the diverse conceptions of 
land tenure security, of land regulation institutions, and their conditions as regards 
institutionalisation and being anchored in practices.  
1.2 Understanding the political economy of an ongoing reform: a 
process-tracing approach  
This chapter provides an analysis of the ongoing land reform in Benin, initiated in 2004 under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Urban Planning and the MCA-Benin, which resulted in the 
adoption of the 2013 Land Code, amended in 2017. I study the history of this land reform, by 
putting it in the context of land practices in the 1990s and the various former attempts at 
reform. I highlight the various steps and controversies that have been involved. I describe the 
options of the reform and its degree of implementation. Elaborating on this history, the 
chapter finally discusses some of the policy choices. 
                                               
5 I use ‘communes’ and not ‘municipalities’ because in Benin most communes are rural and urban, and include a 
central town and a number of villages. 
6 This Ministry had different names : Ministère de l’environnement, de l’habitat et de l’urbanisme (MEHU - Ministry 
of Environment, Housing and Urbanism) ; then Ministère de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat, de la Réforme Foncière et 
de la Lutte contre l’Erosion Côtière (MURFLEC - Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing Reform and Fight Against 
Coastal Erosion) from 2005 to 2010, then again MEHU, etc. I will call it Ministry of Urban Planning. 
7 The MCA is the national team set up under the aegis of the Presidency of the Republic to develop and manage 
projects submitted to the MCC, an American aid agency founded following the Monterrey Conference in 2004.   
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My analysis relies on a perspective of ‘socio-anthropology of public action in countries under 
aid regime’ (Lavigne Delville, 2016). Building on the anthropology of development and the 
sociology of public policy, this perspective aims to study in depth through qualitative 
enquiries the way public policies are framed, negotiated, contested, and implemented, in aid-
dependent countries. In an ethnographic and constructivist approach, it studies the interplay 
of actors and conflicts of representation and interests throughout the policy process, taking 
into account the multiple disjunctions between its different stages (Mosse, 2004). By 
following the way in which a policy, and its devices and instruments, is gradually shaped, 
such a process-tracing approach does not separate design from implementation. It considers 
that the reality of a policy is the result of the practices of the actors responsible for its 
implementation and the reactions of the actors concerned, as much or more than the content 
of policy statements. By empirically following networks of actors, ideas, instruments, from the 
global to the local (Wedel, 2004), this approach shows the intertwining of ideas, interests, 
and institutions (Hall, 1997; Palier and Surel, 2005), and the intricate issues of policy, politics, 
and polity. It offers renewed perspectives, both on ‘the State in action’ (Jobert and Muller, 
1987) in Africa and on the intertwining of national and aid institutions (Whitfield, 2009; 
Lavigne Delville, 2018c). It thus sheds light on the double processes of building state 
apparatus and administrations (state construction) and recomposing relations between the 
state and the society (state formation) (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992).  
This analysis focuses on a reform that is still being implemented. The new institutional 
framework is largely in place, but a number of procedures, devices, and tools have not yet 
been designed and implemented. The digitalisation of existing land information and the 
preparation of the future cadastral tool are still in progress. Moreover, the reform is partly 
being built as it progresses, its current framework is not exactly as outlined in the Policy 
Statement, and various measures, already in preparation or which will emerge from the 
implementation, will also contribute to shaping its content and effects. This text therefore 
concerns an incompletely stabilised reform, and in no way claims to evaluate it. Focusing on 
retracing its history and the way in which the choices were made, it takes primarily 
retrospective look, and does not intend to take note of all recent developments. However, it 
considers that this history, the controversies that have marked it, and the achievements and 
difficulties of the previous stages, make it possible to shed light on current or future issues. 
Finally, it should be noted that the perspective on land practices and issues will have a focus 
on the rural field, which is the one I have been working on, and where controversies about 
fundamental options and questions about the effects of reform are most acute.  
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2 State ownership, informality, semi-formal 
arrangements and ‘confusion management’: a brief 
analysis of the land sector in the early 2000s  
From independence up to the 2007 Rural Land Law, land in Benin was governed by a legal 
framework resulting from the early years of independence (Gbaguidi, 1997): Law N° 65-25 of 
14 August 1965 on land ownership in Dahomey8 (which largely incorporates the colonial 
registration procedures defined by the 1932 decree). Land not registered in the name of 
private persons was in the public or private domain of the state. Act N° 60-20 of 13 July 
1960, established the system of ‘housing permits’ in Dahomey, which made it possible to 
grant ‘essentially personal, precarious and revocable’ rights to urban actors established on 
the private domain of the state.   
As in most French-speaking African countries, the colonial decrees of 1955 and 1956 on the 
recognition of customary rights were set aside by the new authorities. Enacted at the end of 
the colonial period, those decrees allowed ‘indigenous’ people to obtain legal recognition of 
their land rights. They were rarely implemented, or not at all. However, they were never 
formally repealed before the 2013 Code, and were sources of inspiration for the 2007 rural 
land reform.   
2.1 Institutional weaknesses and semi-formal arrangements  
Although representing the only legal form of access to land ownership, registration remained 
very rare: across the entirety of the country only 1980 titles were issued between 1906 and 
1967 (Comby, 1998, pp. 11–12) and in 2004 there were only 14,606 land titles (MUHRFLEC, 
2009)9, for a population of 6,769,914 inhabitants in 2002.10 Demands for land title have risen 
sharply since the 1990s and the democratic transition, mostly from urban well-off citizens. In 
practice, most of the country's territory still has an ‘informal’ or at least a ‘semi-formal’ status. 
In 2007, only 5% of urban residents and 0.8% of rural residents had land titles (INSAE, 2009: 
166), with high inequalities by wealth level: 4.4% of the ‘richest’ have a land title, compared 
to 1.1% of the ‘poorest’ (idem, p. 167). 
                                               
8 This was the name of the country until the 1975 revolution. 
9 The MCA project (Annex 1, Note 1) states: ‘and titles cover less than 20,000 ha out of 11,260,000 ha, or 0.17% 
of the national territory. They concern less than 15,000 households (1.23%) out of a total of 1210,463 
households.’ 
10 https://benin.un.org/fr/306-les-resultats-definitifs-du-4eme-recensement-general-de-la-population-et-
delhabitation. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the number of land titles (Plançon, 2017)  
 
Note: On 3 April 2019, the number of titles was 47,544 (www.andf.bj/, consulted on 24 April 2019). 
The responsibility for the management of the state domain and private land titles is entrusted 
to the Direction des Domaines, de l’Enregistrement et du Timbre (DDET, the Directorate of 
Land Tenure, Registration and Seals), within the Ministry of Finance. DDET is a highly 
centralised body: there are only two offices, in Cotonou and Porto Novo). However, the land 
sector is in practice fragmented between various ministries and institutions, with little or no 
coordination. Under-equipped, the land administration delivers few titles. Many files are 
incomplete. The plot maps drawn up by the surveyors are not connected to a general system 
of topographical markers, and the location of the titled plots is not very easy to identify. Some 
housing developments are found in the sea due to reference system problems.11 Because it 
is practically difficult or impossible to verify the legal status of the plot concerned by a new 
title, titles may be issued in partial superposition over existing titles. 
The situation according to the PGRU (Projet de gestion et de réhabilitation urbaines - Urban 
Rehabilitation and Management Project , World Bank) (Comby, 1998b) 
‘Many old titles are practically unreadable, due to storage conditions (heat and humidity); some are 
even destroyed or missing. In Cotonou, only 3,379 titles could be referenced on a computerized 
database to allow indexing by owner name. (...) The land title conservation system does not make it 
possible to know whether, on a given piece of land, there exist or does not exist a land title. The Land 
Registry shall ensure, as much as possible, taking into account the resources at its disposal, the 
archiving of the entire file of the procedure for the allocation of each title, with a precise plan of the 
corresponding land. But, in practice, this plan is rarely localizable. The file only identifies the name of 
the neighbourhood and the identity of the neighbours, but over time, the neighbours are no longer the 
same. Only the owner of the land knows where it located. In the absence of a cadastral plan, the 
existence of a land title can then only be known through a survey with neighbours. In the event of 
prolonged absenteeism of the owner, nothing prevents a new title from being issued on a plot of land 
that has already been subject in whole or in part of an old title, which legally is still valid. Several 
recent examples attest to this.’ 
  
Although the titling procedure was designed to guarantee the reliability of the information and 
ensure the finality and unassailability of the title deed, the number of steps in that procedure 
increases its costs and duration. This also increases the risk of the file becoming bogged 
down, and therefore it increases the opportunities for personalised and clientelist, if not 
                                               
11 Experienced during a meeting with the team in charge of the digitalisation of titles. 
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corruptive, processing of the files. The centralisation of the procedure drastically increases 
the travel costs of both surveyors and applicants when plots are far from the office. But 
above all, the measures intended to ensure the legitimacy of the rights claimed (contradictory 
demarcation, in particular) do not always allow this in practice: demarcation notices must be 
published in the State Gazette, and posted in the Court of First Instance and in the sub-
prefecture or town hall, where they are not easily accessible to the actors concerned. They 
are normally (but not always in practice) posted on the plot of land itself (Law 1965, art 94 
and 95), but the boundary notices are often incomplete. Local information is fragmentary or 
not realised. In short, titles may be issued to applicants with files that may be incomplete or 
even sometimes illegal, and/or without the customary holders of the land being informed (on 
existing titles). In such cases, the impossibility of contesting a title, which is supposed to 
protect the owner, serves in practice to enable fraud and errors, and to ratify spoliations. 
Applicants for titles are essentially wealthy urban actors, who are familiar with the workings 
of land administration and who want to secure their rights on the land they have purchased. 
However, many executives – and even lawyers – acknowledge that they do not go through 
with the procedure: they start it in order to have a file opened and they have the demarcation 
carried out by a surveyor in order to materialise on the spot the fact that the land has 
changed hands and to discourage possible claims. Then they stop there. The state itself 
rarely carries out registration procedures on its own land and the consistency of the state's 
domain is unclear. The text defining the scale of the sale of state land has not been updated 
since the 1960s, allowing actors familiar with the procedures to buy at low prices portions of 
the private domain of the state, which has been largely discounted over the years (Lassissi, 
2006).  
State intervention in Benin is reflected in urban planning and land subdivision operations, 
which are now largely carried out by the municipalities, and in rural areas by hydro-
agricultural developments, mainly in the Ouémé Valley. Both provide opportunities to 
manipulate lists of rights-holders, where geometers, local elected officials and notable 
officials share illegally obtained plots of land.   
During independence, then under the revolutionary regime(1974–1990), the state wanted to 
develop the country’s palm groves by creating production cooperatives12 largely controlled by 
the technical services, appropriating property from landowners in the area (Mensah, 1966) 
and offering opportunities for access to lands to state agents. In addition to the financial 
difficulties they face, until today those production cooperatives remain sites of conflict 
between co-operators and former customary owners (Hadonou, 2015). It should also be 
noted that the revolutionary regime did not nationalise land: the 1977 Basic Law recognises 
and protects private property.13 However, this period saw the creation of several state farms 
and the allocation of ‘uncultivated’ land to state companies and administrative services, and 
at the same time, ‘the consecration of the transfer of uncultivated land to the State by the 
Constitution’ (Crinot, 1998) rather than by the application of the appropriate texts. ‘The 1970s 
and 1980s were marked by the creation of State farms which were carried out in total 
illegality, on the basis of expropriations and redistribution to “clients” and to political allies of 
the regime’ (Le Meur, 2008: 6). Furthermore, the official ban on owning more than one urban 
plot of land has multiplied bypass strategies, putting other plots of land that are held in the 
                                               
12 Based on Laws 61-26 and 61-27 on rural development perimeters and agricultural cooperation. 
13 However, there was a suspension of the sale of housing land until an ‘administrative decision of the Council of 
Ministers’ of 27 January 1977 authorised it again, subject to the agreement of a provincial committee (Société 
d’Etudes Régionales d’Habitat et d’Aménagement Urbain (SERHAU), 1999, p. 405). On the other hand, the sale 
of agricultural land remained prohibited (idem.), though this did not prevent it from taking place. 
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name of offspring at risk of subsequent conflicts during succession (Andreetta, 2019, p. 118). 
Throughout this period (1960-1990), the widespread informality was not necessarily 
perceived as a problem in rural areas, where customary regulations continued to organise 
access to land and conflict arbitration. Land tenure insecurity is mostly found where the state 
is involved in development operations or projects, and where the land market is developing, 
which is mainly in urban or peri-urban areas.  
Sitting beside the land law, or reinterpreting it, various procedures, most of them dating from 
the colonial period, have gradually constituted a ‘semi-formal system’ (André, 1999; Mathieu, 
1996) of land regulation, i.e. a set of procedures and documents not explicitly integrated into 
the legal framework but nevertheless implemented in a relatively stable way, by official 
authorities.14 In particular, different procedures are used that are part of the ‘administrative 
custom’ – that is, generalised administrative practices that do not follow a specific legal text. 
The administrative certificates delivered by the local authority (formerly the district heads, 
now the mayors), normally after field survey, attest to the ownership of a plot of land. Local 
authorities also validate sales contracts by selling printed forms and by signing and stamping 
them (‘affirmation’), with reference to the 1906 decree on agreements between indigenous 
people. Local authorities also widely distribute housing permits, including for land registered 
in the name of the state (and therefore illegally).   
In other countries, small forms, handwritten or typed, can be formalised with the signature of 
an administrative or communal authority. The affirmation of sales agreements is much more 
institutionalised in Benin. Despite some variations in procedures, this process is implemented 
everywhere on the basis of official and printed forms. This strong institutionalisation does not 
prevent conflicts over sales, for several reasons. Field surveys are not always done before 
issuing administrative certificates. When signing a land sale contract, the mayor attests that 
the two persons agree to it, but he has no means to ensure that the seller is really the owner 
and has the right to sell. The ‘Certificate of non-litigation’ (Attestation de Non Litige) 
requested from the village chief is not enough. Moreover, while numerous sales concern 
family land, there is no clear obligation to have a formal approval of the sale by the family 
rights-holder before endorsing a sale. Archives are not properly managed. It is thus 
‘technically’ possible for people with no rights over the plot of land to sell it without the 
agreement of the rights-holders, and to make double or even fraudulent sales. These 
weaknesses in the system largely come from the fact that the state has never structured and 
supervised it. The biases, frauds, and manipulations are all the more frequent where land is 
a major economic issue, as in peri-urban areas, and in areas attracting external buyers.15  
In practice, municipalities have multiple responsibilities in terms of building and planning, 
without having the tools and staff that would be necessary to discharge these responsibilities. 
Thus, in 2014, the Department of Land Affairs of the municipality of Abomey-Calavi, which is 
the municipality with the highest population growth, had ‘13 employees, including 4 
permanent staff and 9 collaborators. There are 3 computers, typing machines and there is a 
lack of electronic archiving of land data’ (Kakai, 2014, p. 12).  
Urban buyers, who cannot rely on inter-knowledge to know whether the person claiming to 
sell a plot of land is the owner and whether the plot is a family property or not, and who are 
not there to guarantee their rights after the purchase, are particularly vulnerable to conflict 
                                               
14 See also Lavigne Delville, Colin, Ka et al. (2017, pp. 146–150). 
15 See Sotindjo (1996) on land speculation in Cotonou, Adjahouhoué (2013), on land transactions in the urban 
periphery in Abomey Calavi, Magnon (2013) on speculation in anticipation of the new airport project in Glo-Djigbé, 
and Kapgen (2012) and Avohouémé (2016) in the Djidja region. 
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and insecurity with regard to the plots of land they have bought. Palm plantations in the 
Ouémé Valley, and more generally all land purchased in peri-urban areas, are thus equipped 
with cement pillars, and panels indicating the name and telephone number of the owner, in 
the hope of avoiding having land taken over by others.   
Due to their limitations, these administrative practices are either largely ignored by the official 
diagnoses of land issues or strongly criticised. However, they are in practice the only way for 
interested citizens – mainly urban or peri-urban – to obtain official documents attesting to 
their land ownership. They are ‘palliative solutions’ that attempt to provide practical 
responses to the problems encountered, given the shortcomings of public services (de 
Sardan, 2014): ‘those behaviours are “unofficial”, “out of step with what the texts provide”, “at 
the limit of legality” (and sometimes even illegal), but they provide informal solutions to 
bottlenecks in public services’. It is true that these practices take various forms and only 
partially guarantee the security of the transactions. However, such a situation is in large part 
the result of the lack of recognition and guidance by the state, itself resulting from a focus on 
a titling procedure that is unable to meet the needs of the citizens. Moreover, the state 
recognise them these practices: administrative certificates and endorsed land sales contracts 
are part of the necessary documents for requesting a land title. By acknowledging them, and 
even more so by leaving citizens' needs in terms of securing unregistered land without 
political and institutional response, the state is in practice complicit in these practices, which 
are illegal or semi-legal, but which result from the lack of public care in real situations. 
2.2 Land governance, between neo-customary regulations, the 
market, and semi-formal systems  
From a socio-anthropological, non-prescriptive point of view, governance is the result of 
repeated interactions between actors (Blundo and Le Meur, 2009). Land governance in 
Benin is largely based on informal or semi-formal logics, taking very different forms in rural, 
peri-urbain and urban areas. In the cities, a large part of the territory has been subdivided 
and the inhabitants frequently hold one or more documents: residence permits, sales 
agreements, and administrative certificates. People’s rights on the plot they live on are quite 
stabilized by occupation.  
There are cases of conflicts or insecurity, due to contradictory overlapping rights, or conflicts 
over inheritance or sales. Some houses in cities are marked ‘contentious, not to be sold’. 
Family rights-holders may contest sales made without their consent, even a long time after 
the fact. Heirs can even go to trial when they see that the value of land has dramatically 
increased and they can win in court. Cases of buildings have to be destroyed because of a 
court decision, due to a conflict relating to a sale, are regularly quoted. However, there are 
few reliable data on the number of such cases. Conflicts most frequently involve disputes 
over past sales, or inheritance disputes. The lack of reliability of the sales procedures, and 
above all the lack of a guarantee of their legitimacy (sellers’ right to sell, agreement of family 
rights-holders) favour conflicts over sales. Courts tends to judge in favour of former owners, 
even long after the sale, which encourages opportunistic legal action. Frequent polygamy – 
formalised or informal - complicates the transmission of property. Family houses are 
occupied by different family members and the eldest son often takes responsibility for them 
upon the father's death, postponing the distribution among the heirs, and managing the 
income from the rented property for his benefit. The youngest, and especially women, are 
increasingly claiming their share of inheritance, based on the recent Family Code (2004), and 
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are less hesitant to go to court, which has led to an increase in the number of such cases 
(Andreetta, 2019).  
In rural areas, land governance is largely governed by customary or neo-customary16 norms 
and by ‘traditional’ authorities, whose power varies greatly from one area to another. Land 
governance is mainly carried out at the level of villages or clusters of villages and hamlets 
under the same local customary political entity, with the intervention of state agents and 
territorial administration or municipal elected officials (since 2003) in the event of conflicts. 
State intervention in the area of land is more pronounced in some areas (gazetted forests, 
lowland developments, etc.), but gazetted forests are regularly occupied by neighbouring 
farmers or agricultural migrants. Depending on the region, population density, modes of 
exploitation of the environment, land tenure relationships are more or less individualised: 
there may be a land rental or sale market or there may not. The contrast is striking between 
the southern regions (Floquet et Mongbo, 1998), densely populated, highly individualised, 
where an intra-farmers land market for purchase-sale has existed for a long time, and the 
rest of the country, where such a market is non-existent or almost non-existent (Lavigne 
Delville, 2018b). Urban buyers, with financial resources that are disproportionate to those of 
rural families, are one of the major factors in the commodification of land, in – sometimes 
even remote – peri-urban areas, along roads and on pioneering fronts, where land is still 
available. Sales contracts are sometimes based on a mutual agreement, but can also relay 
on corruption, manipulation, or even force (Kapgen, 2012).  
People from densely populated rural areas migrate to pioneer fronts, defined here as areas 
where land is still available and where they can settle and create a farm (now mainly in the 
centre, a former buffer zone between the coastal kingdoms and the kingdom of Borgou, 
which is subjected to slave raids). In these areas, they establish ‘tutorat’ clientelistic 
relationships (Chauveau, 2006; Le Meur, 2006b) between natives and migrants. In the 
customary logic, migrants who have settled in a context of abundant land gradually 
consolidate their rights, both through permanent use and the transmission of user rights to 
their descendants, and sometimes through matrimonial alliances, or even by settling other 
migrants themselves. Even if the rights of the founders are in theory imprescriptible, they are 
gradually reduced until they almost disappear in practice, since the expulsion of the migrant 
or his descendants is no longer possible except in extreme cases. However, such cases 
involve violence when autochthonous people want to claim their land back (Bierschenk, 
Floquet et Le Meur, 1999).  
In closing pioneer fronts, where land is becoming rare, urban members of large landowning 
families are pushing their elders to strengthen control over their land and settled migrants. 
For example, in the Savé region, lineage chiefs have set up a ‘lineage land register’, listing 
the land granted to migrants (Edja, 1997). Elsewhere, as in the Djidja region, where 
autochthonous lineages control very large areas thanks to the clearing of land for yam 
cultivation, large plots (tens or hundreds of hectares) are sold to urban investors, in parallel 
with the settlement of migrants (Avohouémé, 2016).   
Investing in land is indeed one of the preferred strategies of urban elites and the middle 
classes. Everyone wants to own their plot and house, but above all, investment in land, 
especially urban and peri-urban land, is profitable, given the soaring prices, which can 
multiply by 50% or 80% in a few decades (Grisoni-Niaki, 2000). This rush on land fuels acute 
                                               
16 ‘Neo-customary’ means that the norms are primarily local norms and that local land authorities claim customary 
legitimacy. But norms, rights, and authorities change with economic and social change, and due to state 
intervention. 
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land speculation, which is felt far inland, and where all blows are allowed. ‘The land situation 
in Cotonou and neighbouring cities is an inextricable legal, administrative and social 
imbroglio where the parties are ready to do anything to win their case’ (Andreetta, 2019, p. 
73). All those who can afford it buy plots of land on the periphery or in remote suburban 
areas according to the available opportunities and their financial means. ‘Land mafias’ 
expand around large cities, which brings together landowners’ lineages and ‘canvassers’, 
surveyors, and municipal or state agents. Multiple sales of the same plot of land, and 
contestation of formers sales by rights-holders (shortly after a sale made without their 
knowledge, or years, or even a generation later when they discover that the plot’s value has 
increased significantly) are frequent, causing insecurity for buyers. Nevertheless, these 
buyers rush to take advantage all opportunities, hoping to secure at least part of the plots 
they buy.     
In this context, legal uncertainty (the lack of legally recognised rights) is widespread. This 
does not necessarily translate into real insecurity, or into a proven risk. Real land insecurity is 
concentrated in some areas, some configurations, and for the least powerful actors. It is 
particularly strong for non-local buyers. In the face of this insecurity, these actors mobilise 
various securitisation strategies (Lavigne Delville, 2007): building a house (when possible) or 
at least an enclosure wall or a well, installation of boards and land pillars, employment of a 
guard, ‘mystical practices’, etc. (Adjahouhoué, 2013).  
Numerous actors highlight the high prevalence of land conflicts. However, solid figures are 
rare. ‘The proportion of plots of land that have been the subject of State disputes is 1.4% in 
urban areas and 1.1% in rural areas in 2007 compared to 2.1% and 2.4% respectively in 
2006’ (INSAE, 2009: 170). The percentage of conflicts is highest in the urban and peri-urban 
departments of the south of the country (around 4%) and very low elsewhere (less than 1%). 
Plots of land with a written document are less prone to conflict, but the title does not provide 
more guarantee than other documents: ‘According to the results of the EMICoV 2011, plots 
with no administrative documents are the most affected by land conflicts (3.4%). In second 
place are plots with a non-formal sales agreement (2.7%), followed by plots with a sales 
agreement established by municipal authorities (2.4%) and a residence permit (2.3%). Plots 
of Land with land title that are affected by land disputes nevertheless represent 2.0% of 
conflict-prone parcels’ (INSAE, 2012: 121). Having a title does not greatly protect the 
possessor from the risk of conflicts. 
‘All land conflicts in the last 12 months preceding the survey are mostly resolved by 
traditional institutions, regardless of the nature of the conflict. Thus, 17.1% of property rights 
disputes were settled by modern institutions and 82.9% by traditional institutions. 21.0% of 
conflicts relating to the boundaries of plots by modern institutions and 79.0% by traditional 
institutions. 4.5% of conflicts relating to the sharing of inheritance by modern institutions and 
95.5% by traditional institutions, 12.3% of conflicts relating to the conquest of new fallow land 
or disputes between farmers by modern institutions and 87.7% by traditional institutions’ 
(INSAE, 2012: 130). Most disputes brought before the courts are the ones concerning titled 
plots of land (78%). The duration and cost of disputes vary significantly: ‘the settlement of 
disputes concerning plots with non-formal sales agreements lasts on average 33.1 months at 
a cost of 193,900 FCFA, 29.2 months and 569,000 FCFA for those with land titles or leases 
and 8.8 months and 180,200 FCFA for those with a sales agreement obtained from 
municipal authorities’ (idem., p. 132).  
A non-systematic survey conducted as part of the preparation of the reform states that ‘more 
than half of the magistrates and judicial officers surveyed state that land disputes represent 
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nearly 25% of the cases submitted to their jurisdiction or cabinet’ and even between 25% and 
50% for a third of them (Steward Intl, 2009a, p. 9). In 2005, there were 1,158 new cases of 
land disputes brought before the courts, half of them (600) in Cotonou alone (idem. p. 12, 
source Ministry of Justice). However, data on the sources of conflict are not very precise. 
25% of conflicts brought to court are related to succession (idem, p. 14), and 42% of conflicts 
brought before the administration are related to boundary issues. For the Enquête Modulaire 
Intégrée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages (EMICov, Integrated Modular Survey on 
Household Living Conditions) study, ‘at the national level, the most recurrent nature of 
conflict is the contestation of property rights (33.9%)’. Such a contestation can have various 
sources: the sale of a plot or the delivery of a title to several persons, contestation of a sale, 
claim by the descendants of a former owner, etc.). Other causes of conflicts brought to courts 
include ‘the sharing of inheritance (16.4%)17, the boundaries of land parcels (16.1%), the 
conquest of new fallow land and disputes between farmers and herders (11.4%). Finally, 
other conflicts not classified elsewhere represent 22.2% of the conflicts cited’ (INSAE, 2012: 
122).   
2.3 ‘Managing confusion’ 
For J.L. Piermay (1986a; 1992), who studied urban land practices in central Africa, as for P. 
Mathieu (1996), who was interested in the rural situations in Sahelian Africa, the situation of 
informality and vagueness about the land rules does not result from chance. It is the product 
of a deliberate strategy of the ‘management of confusion’ by political and administrative 
elites, who are well integrated in the political and administrative networks, and able to take 
advantage of it.18 The situation of Benin confirms this analysis. The obsolete nature of the 
texts, the vagueness of the rules, the institutional shortcomings, the complex procedures, the 
lack of resources for the administrations are greatly responsible for the current situation. 
These institutional deficiencies are partly the product of a lack of interest – and budgeting – 
on the part of the state and objective constraints on human and financial resources in state 
administration bodies, constraints that have been aggravated by structural adjustment.19 But 
their maintenance over time cannot be attributed solely to negligence: for example, the lack 
of updating of the state property register and the lack of updating of the rate of sale of state 
land clearly favour the grabbing of the state's domain by actors who have mastered the rules. 
These deficiencies and the lack of resources open up many opportunities for negotiation, 
privatisation, and informal transaction, and even manipulation or corruption, from which 
different actors benefit.   
‘With decentralization, land subdivision becomes the prerogative of municipalities and a 
central issue for mobilizing local resources in the municipal political economy. It is a very 
powerful instrument for the conversion (or regularization of the conversion) of “customary” 
rural areas into “registered” urban areas, producing “pieces of city” and strongly contributing 
to the commodification of land’ (Le Meur, 2008: 10). The plurality of sources of land 
information is increasing, as is the management of confusion. The land market, which is 
developing at high speed in areas that are of interest to urban elites, is for them a privileged 
means of land accumulation, alongside or in substitution for the manipulation of the private 
domain of the state and land-related development projects.     
                                               
17 In 2014, Andreetta (2019: 20) note 1104 new succession disputes brought before all civil chambers of the 
Cotonou Court of First Instance, on 8313 new cases. 
18 See also Berry (1993), and Platteau (1992: 177-183). 
19 See Bierschenk (2008) on justice and a comparison of the ratio of judicial personnel in Benin to that in Europe. 
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At the land administration level, files are delayed in order to encourage gifts, ‘land registers 
are not always kept with total rigor. For one reason or another, a blank page may be left on 
the register marked “reserved” in pencil, where it will then be possible to insert a new title 
that will then be considered as predecessor to other existing titles’ (Economic and Social 
Council, 2005, p. 13). Land subdivisions are a privileged place for land corruption (Kakai, 
2014, pp. 16–18). Surveyors apply an exaggerated ‘reduction coefficient’ that allows them to 
illegally create new plots that they share with local elected officials. They argue that the 
communes do not pay them fully and keep the subdivision plans in their offices. Having a 
monopoly on information, they become essential intermediaries for any transaction. The 
heads of communal land services and elected officials are also involved in land speculation. 
‘Some land canvassers maintain a land mafia which sometimes leads to the counterfeiting of 
Land acts with the complicity of the Land affairs services of the Mayor Office’ (MUHRFLEC, 
2011b, p. 58). The justice process itself has a reputation for being unreliable and sensitive to 
corruption.    
As Bayart (1989, pp. 113–114) explained 30 years ago, in Africa, land and property 
ownership ‘is maybe the wealth par excellence (...). it is offered, so to speak, as a priority to 
government officials who are best able to know the administrative procedures in place, 
anticipate urban planning projects, take advantage of the necessary influences and 
overcome the ‘long obstacle course’ - the term is widely used - to which an acquisition is 
related. (...) They are now competing with the senior officials and politicians on whom they 
depend’. Access to land accumulation is not open to well-off people outside the 
administration, but the logic is still the same. If ‘in Benin, the State has sinned by a guilty 
resignation in the land legislation sector’ (Mongbo, 2000: 185), this resignation is not without 
explanation and does not only result in losers. 
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2.4 Institutional bottlenecks before reforms: a tentative synthesis 
We can summarise the situation at the end of the 1990s as follows, based on the table 
proposed by Bourguignon and Wangwe (2018, pp. 21–25).  
Table 1. Institutional bottlenecks  
Deep factors 
Proximate 
causes 
Identified weaknesses Economic consequences 
Plurality of 
social and 
land norms 
within society  
Obsolete legal 
texts  
Legal recognition of land 
rights inaccessible to the 
vast majority of the 
population 
Importance of informality  
Normative 
conception of 
the law, not 
seen as being 
in the service 
of the society  
Unregulated 
legal duality 
between state 
law and neo-
customary 
norms  
Registration procedure that 
does not guarantee reliable 
publicity and protection of 
existing rights  
Frequent conflicts, especially in 
peri-urban areas  
Conception of 
ownership as 
‘absolute’ and 
given by the 
state, ‘from 
the top’  
Centralised land 
tenure 
administration  
Unorganised plurality of 
state and neo-customary 
bodies in land governance 
and conflict resolution 
Spoliations, in particular in land 
subdivisions and plots of land 
purchases  
Colonial legal 
framework, 
left in place 
without major 
change since 
independence  
Expensive 
procedures for 
having a land 
title  
Poor reliability of ‘semi-
formal institutions’  
Transaction costs in land 
purchases  
Multiple 
interests in 
‘confusion 
management’  
Duplicate 
procedures and 
rent-seeking 
strategies by 
land 
administrations 
and 
professionals  
Unsecured sales (for family 
rights-holders and for 
buyers)  
Cost of conflict for households 
and businesses  
Rent-seeking 
financial 
system 
Semi-formal 
palliative 
institutions 
Little/no access to credit for 
rural producers, nor in the 
case of urgent need  
Distress sales  
 
Shortcomings in 
the supply of 
credit to rural 
people 
No taxation on purchased 
land not valued  
Unproductive or speculative  
accumulation by elites  
Source: author 
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3 The search for overall/sectorial adjustment in the land 
sector in the years 1990–2000: a telescoping of 
reforms20 
3.1 The emergence of the land issue in the 1990s  
In Benin, a first seminar on housing and land tenure security, in 1984, is regularly quoted as 
the starting point for further reflection. But it was only a few years later, at the start of the 
1990s, that the spoliations linked to a collapsing revolutionary regime, the land grabbing by 
the elite on the private domain of the state, and the abuses by state agents against the 
population led to the state's land monopoly being called into question (Gbaguidi, op. cit.). The 
context was one of economic liberalisation (induced by the structural adjustment plan signed 
in 1987) and democratic transition (with the National Conference of March 1990, and the 
1990 Constitution, which fully recognises private property). Land rights’ informality and 
tenure insecurity started to be raised as a problem, both in urban areas (Comby, 1998b) and 
in rural areas (Hounkpodoté, 2000). 
3.2 In urban areas, tax experiments and unsuccessful 
discussions on legal reform  
In the early 1990s, the french cooperation set up local land taxation tools, called Registres 
fonciers urbains (RFUs – Urbain Land Registers), in Cotonou and Parakou, two main towns 
in Benin (Charles-Dominé, 2012). On this basis a map of land occupations is produced and 
tax notices are issued. Theoretically listing all dwellings regardless of their land status, this 
mapping and database gives a more complete picture of the city. In the minds of its 
designers, the RFUs can become a land tool: for them, the presence on a plot for a sufficient 
period, as evidenced by the regular payment of property tax, could allow one to be 
recognised as an owner. The RFU allows a significant increase in tax resources, but remains 
incompletely mobilised by the municipalities, both because elected officials are reluctant to 
increase the pressure to pay taxes, and because of issues of weak institutional anchoring in 
the municipalities’ administrative system (Simonneau, 2015). The RFUs have been then 
disseminated to other municipalities, by various donors, in various forms and with limited 
success, due to the lower tax potential and lack of political will (idem.).  
As part of the Urban Rehabilitation and Management Project (PGRU, with World Bank 
financing), a series of studies conducted in the 1990s laid the groundwork for possible land 
reform. The experts participating in it analysed standard registration. The collection of legal 
texts compiled on this occasion (SERHAU, 1999) incorporates the decrees of 1955 and 
1956, and timidly opens the question of alternatives to title deeds, or in any case significant 
changes in procedures: ‘It may be necessary to study at the State level how to make it 
accessible to as many people as possible if it must always be maintained as the mother of 
evidence of land ownership (...). There is a need to simplify the procedure along the lines of 
the procedure for establishing customary land rights (...) and to restore the contract as an 
essential role in the acquisition of property" (p. 350, author’s underlining). In 1998, Joseph 
Comby (1998b) summarised the diagnoses and identified four possible strategies for a land 
reform. The first strategy was ‘an improvement of practices and reorganization of 
administrative means in compliance with existing law’. The second strategy was ‘a policy of 
                                               
20 See Lavigne Delville (2010a) for a first analysis, centred on rural issues. 
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occasional improvements leading to a significant improvement’ (idem). The third strategy 
built on the development of group registrations. The last strategy was based on deep 
modification of the conception of ownership and land rights legalisation: ‘a completely 
different procedure can be envisaged, in a more radical break with current legal and 
administrative practices, making ownership a matter to be settled between private persons. 
The State and its administrations no longer deal with the recognition and allocation of 
property. The peaceful owner of a piece of land is presumed to be the owner, with the burden 
of proof to any interested person to the contrary by taking legal action’ (idem). This means 
abandoning the colonial conception of state-guaranteed land ownership in favour of a 
contractual approach, like in the French Civil Code. 
‘For many people’, according to Comby ‘all the current difficulties stem simply from a lack of 
respect for existing texts. They think that it is not the law that needs to be changed, but that it 
is the practices that must be brought into conformity with the law, all the evil coming from the 
fact that the law was no longer respected’ (idem). This expert supported the ‘bottom-up 
ownership’ perspective and thus an exit from the standard registration model. He explained 
in his report why, in his view, the scenario for implementing existing law was doubly 
unworkable: it would imply being able to prohibit sales of unregistered land, and the cost and 
pace of issuing land titles are incompatible with a desire to address the problem on a 
significant scale.    
In practice, however, the first scenario was adopted at that time by the Beninese authorities, 
with the establishment in 2001 of a ‘Commission for the transformation of housing permits 
into land titles’, which was supposed to accelerate the issuance of land titles. Blocked by 
complex procedures – and according to some interlocutors, by the entry of land professionals 
raising bids on procedures – this has been quite ineffective (see below). At the same time, 
there was an ongoing reflection within the Ministry of Urban Planning on a possible reform of 
land and urban planning. The ‘Land and residential security’ programme driven by the 
Ministry for Urban Planning ‘provides for the issuance of 10,000 land titles in 2005, 15,000 in 
2006 and 20,000 in 2007, the creation of a land register for 10 municipalities and the 
updating of land legislation and its application through the reform of the land system’ (Le 
Meur, 2008, p. 10).  
3.3 In rural areas, the PFRs and the draft rural land law: the 
construction of an alternative to land title  
In rural areas, two successive development projects, under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and with French and German funding21, have integrated the issue of land tenure 
security, first as a tool for encouraging farmers to invest in anti-erosion techniques. The 
principle was laid down in the 1988 feasibility study, carried out shortly before the collapse of 
Mathieu Kérékou's socialist regime. The experts involved consider that standard registration  
and land titles 1) are inappropriate to the reality of rural tenure, which is diverse and does not 
correspond to private property in most regions of the country; and 2) in any case are far too 
costly to be affordable by farmers. Thus, the issue was seen to be to design an alternative 
based on the recognition of existing – individual or collective – customary rights 
(Hounkpodoté, 2000). The project began in 1992 and experimented in different regions in the 
                                               
21 And the World Bank for the first phase. 
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country with the PFRs approach, imported from Côte d'Ivoire, where it was invented a few 
years earlier (Chauveau, Bosc et Pescay, 1998; Gastaldi, 1998).  
In the PFR approach, the land rights of individual or collective farmers are identified through 
cross-checked field surveys, conducted on a plot-by-plot basis. Each plot-holder explains the 
rights he/she has and how – and from whom – he/she has obtained them. The limits are 
lifted with a decametre and then drawn on an aerial photo. The survey sheets and forms take 
into account two types of situations: those of individual owners (‘presumed owners’ in legal 
language) and those of family communities, represented by their ‘manager’, in other words 
the representative of the group of rights-holders, who has authority to make decisions on the 
plot in question22. The plot-holder and the holders of the neighbouring plots sign the survey 
report. After a publicity phase, which should allow everyone to verify or correct the collected 
information, the final plot map and rights-holders’ register are given to the village committee, 
which is supposed to register future changes in rights (inheritances, sales, leases, etc.) and 
to keep the land documentation up to date. PFR is thus a kind of village land cadastre, 
without legal value. But in the idea of its promoters, the demonstration that it is possible to 
map ‘informal’ customary rights, which are often considered difficult to understand from the 
outside, should contribute to promoting legal reform, which, by creating a new and more 
appropriate legal status for rural land, would enable rural actors to obtain legal recognition of 
their rights.23 Some 40 pilot PFRs have been carried out in two successive projects in 
different regions of the country, and the approach has been improved. However, the idea of a 
coherent village territory constituted of juxtaposed farmers’ plots is a simplification. It does 
not fully take into account the diversity of land rights (CIRAD-TERA, 1998) and the issues in 
areas where land rights are not stabilised (Edja, Le Meur and Lavigne Delville, 2003).24 
Present from the outset, the prospect of legal reform became clear in 1998 when a second 
project was negotiated between the Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche 
(MAEP, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries) and donors. A group of Beninese 
experts was established. The draft law resulting from their work represents a potential legal 
revolution: it renounces the presumption of state ownership of unregistered land and 
provides that every plot subject to ‘rights established or acquired according to custom and, 
more generally, local practices and standards’ (art. 7) is part of private land, in the same way 
as for those holding a land title. This drastically reduces the private domain of the state, 
which has incorporated such plots until now. Considering that there is no place in Benin that 
is not owned in one way or another, it removes the notion of ‘vacant and landless land’, 
which is the basis of this presumption of state ownership on unregistered land. It introduces 
instead the notion of ‘land that has never been the subject of a first appropriation’, extended 
to land that has not been used for more than 10 years, which belongs ‘de facto to the State’ 
(art. 6).   
The text of the draft version of the law institutionalises PFRs and gives them, as an outcome, 
a new legal document, the CFR, which can be individual or collective. A CFR is a ‘document 
of recognition and confirmation of land rights established or acquired according to custom or 
                                               
22 Note that the issues of pastoralism and common areas are not dealt with. 
23 PFRs are presented as a radical innovation. While they were created in Ivory Coast in the 1990s, the approach 
takes inspiration from the 1950s, particularly the decrees of 1955 and 1956 on land and domain reorganisation in 
French west Africa, which were never applied but allowed ‘indigenous’ people to obtain a legal document attesting 
to their rights, individual or collective. They also reinvent – without knowing them – the detailed proposals that had 
been designed at the same period to make a cadastre of the Dahomey palm-tree area (Clerc, Adam, Tardits et 
al., 1956), also without follow-up, in a pre-independence context. For an analysis of these two periods when the 
question of the legal recognition of customary rights was raised, see Lavigne Delville and Gbaguidi (2015). 
24 After the pilot projects, the GPS and satellites pictures were adopted. 
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local practices and norms’ (art. 111), which is transferable, assignable, and usable as 
security for credit (arts. 9 and 112). ‘A presumption of acquired rights is attached to it as 
proof until proven otherwise, established before the judge’ (art. 111). The aim is to reverse 
the logic of creating ownership, starting with socially legitimate rights, and to avoid the 
cumbersome procedures of standard registration.  
In line with the recent administrative reforms creating elected local governments (1999), the 
draft law sets up a local land management system, anchored in the communes and 
integrating village-level bodies (Section Villageoise de Gestion Foncière). Villages can also 
define their own rules for managing natural resources on their territories. All transfers of 
rights must be formalised at the village level. At their request, villages can benefit from PFRs. 
The registered plots can then receive a CFR, issued by the commune. This certificate may 
be individual or collective, transferable, or tradeable, and may be used as a guarantee for 
credit. It can be transformed into a land title. The objective is to progressively expand PFRs 
and thus land certificates, but the institutional framework at commune and village level, with 
a local registration of land transfers, has to be put in place everywhere for this to happen. 
This reform relies on an ‘adaptation’ paradigm. The 2001 MAEP Strategic Operational Plan 
states that ‘with regard to land (agricultural, forestry, pastoral), the objective remains to adapt 
traditional law to modern constraints, using (and maintaining) its dynamism and adaptability’ 
(p. 58, quoted by Le Meur 2008: 67). The reform is mainly focused on the new law, without a 
policy statement clearly stating the policy objectives. While it does not rely on a clear political 
support at high level, it indicates a relative consensus in MAEP and more generally among 
the actors involved in the rural zones and decentralisation policies. Nevertheless, it is 
meeting with opposition from actors in the Ministry of Urban Planning: for them, a specifically 
rural legislation makes no sense and poses insoluble problems at the boundaries between 
rural and peri-urban25 regions. In addition, the CFR is an intermediate document, of much 
lower status than the land title. It is contested on the basis of the provisions of the 
Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA, Organisation for 
Harmonising Business Law in Africa), which provides (art 119) that only the land title (or 
failing that, an ongoing application) is recognised as the basis for a mortgage. 
Partly because there is no policy statement, different visions of the reform’s main objectives 
coexist. For its promoters, it creates a long-term alternative to land titles, allowing rural 
dwellers to have access to a legal recognition of their rights. Some want to quickly generalise 
PFRs over the country. Others have a more progressive strategy: for them, the rural land law 
represents a flexible and evolving framework offering responses to conflicts over 
transactions, with or without PFRs. Since PFRs are optional, upon village request, they can 
be extended very gradually over the national territory, depending on means and needs, 
starting from areas where they are most useful (Lavigne Delville, 2009). For those who 
support land title, this is a temporary framework, and land certificates must quickly be 
transformed into titles. The ‘Law on rural land tenure’ was finally passed in 2007, and has 
presented the paradox of a legal revolution that has not received backing from a political text 
or clear political will on the part of the government.   
                                               
25 The first version of the draft bill also contained a section on state ownership, which was intended to address 
concrete problems, but it infringed on the Ministry of Urban Planning's prerogatives, with the risk of creating a 
blockage as a result. This section was removed before transmission to the government. 
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3.4 In the mid-2000s: the MCA-Benin and the emergence of a 
global reform project  
In the middle of the 2000s, two separate policies were ongoing: in urban areas, the 
Committee for Transforming Housing Permits, which was practically ineffective, and in rural 
areas, the PFRs, a draft law on which was ready. A new initiative also emerged at that time, 
carried out by the MCA-Benin, with a view to harmonising land law at the national level. 
Following the 2004 Monterrey Conference on aid funding, the USA government created the 
MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) to support economic development projects 
proposed by beneficiary countries, officially selected based on good governance criteria, with 
a big push approach: massive funding, through grants, over a limited period of time, around 
identified objectives that are supposed to be decisive levers. The projects (‘Compacts’) are 
designed and implemented by the beneficiary countries, which set up a dedicated team, the 
MCA, attached to the head of state. However, MCC experts closely monitor the project 
formulation and implementation. The MCC is perceived by various analysts as an instrument 
for promoting American neo-liberalism and the interests of American investors (Boissenin, 
2003; Daviron and Giordano, 2006; Soederberg, 2004).  
Benin was among the first countries selected, along with Madagascar. A team from the MCC 
went to Benin in May 2004 and presented their offer. The government set up a series of 
workshops to identify the themes around which to build a proposal. No theme was chosen at 
that time. The first drafts of the proposal focused on rural development, with an emphasis on 
supporting export sectors.26 The objectives and topics evolved considerably following 
exchanges with the MCC, and the land issue appeared gradually. The focus on land and 
judicial reform was validated in September 2004. It was finally in January 2005 that the 
Compact's architecture stabilised, at the interface of the successive proposals of the team 
set up by the government and the questions and influences exercised by the MCC. The 
formulation team was made up of executives from different ministerial departments. It worked 
in 2004 and 2005, with the support of MCC international consultants for the drafting of the 
project. The Compact was signed in 2006 and implemented between 2007 and 2011.   
The overall title of the project was ‘Making Benin an attractive country for investment’. Four 
axes were chosen: land tenure, the port of Cotonou, enterprise financing and microfinance, 
and justice, which were supposed to be complementary in the construction of an economic 
environment capable of fighting poverty through economic growth.    
The ‘Access to Land’ project had three components: at the institutional level, a legal reform 
that aims to standardise land law, overcome legal dualism, and provide the country with 
updated legislation; at the operational level, the objectives are to scale up previous initiatives, 
both in rural areas (PFRs) and urban areas (the transformation of housing permits into land 
titles). Positioned under the aegis of the Presidency of the Republic, with considerable 
financial resources, the MCA was the central actor, and the centre for the design and 
preparation of the land reform. Shortly after the launch of the Compact, the new President of 
the Republic, Yayi Boni, officially placed responsibility for land reform under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Urban Planning. These two bodies have steered the reform.   
                                               
26 Draft n°9 of December 2004 was also entitled ‘Increasing market opportunities for Benin's agricultural products’. 
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Figure 2. Chronology of land reforms in Benin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Securing local land rights 
in rural areas
– 1988-1990 : Land insecurity, 
management: "import" of PFRs 
as a response (BM, AFD, GTZ)
– 1992-2003 : Experimentation of 
PFRs in the framework of 
Experimental Projects PGRN / 
PGTRN
– 1999-2005 Preparation of the 
draft rural land law and the 
implementation mechanism
– 2005-2014 : Continuation of PFRs 
by GTZ
Making land a marketable 
asset (rural and urban)
- 2004-2005 : negotiation of the 
MCA Compact
- 2006 : creation of MUHRFLEC and 
beginning of Compact
- 2007-2011 : debate on White 
Paper and draft Land and Domain 
Code
– 2007-2011 : extension of PFRs 
(MCA).  Realization of 294 PFRs
– 2009-2011 : CNAO-TF
– Fin 2011 : End of the MCA; 1st 
rural land certificates; draft Land 
and Domain Code at the National 
Assembly
– Janvier 2013 : vote of the Code, 
creation of ownership certificates
– Janvier 2015 : first decrees
– creation of the ANDF
– Septembre 2016 opening of the 
first BCDFs
– Mars 2017 : review of the Land 
Code
3
- January 2007 : vote of the rural
land law
- 2008-2009  : decrees
- 2013 : Repeal of the 2007 law
? Realization of 294 PFR 
under the 2007 law
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Issuance of 211 land titles under the 65 Law
Securing land rights 
in urban areas
- 1984 : Seminar on the habitat
- 1989 : Creation of RFU (French aid)
- 1992-1998 : PGRU (World Bank), studies
- 1998 : Comby study: for a "bottom-up" 
approach
- 2001 : Creation of the PH-TF Committee
- 2013-2018 New projects to support 
municipalities integrating PFRs
(GIZ, Netherlands, AFD)
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4 Extend access to land title through a deep reform of 
land administration: MCA-Benin's ‘Access to Land’ 
project and its aftermath  
4.1 ‘Making land a marketable asset’: the framework, objectives, 
and results of the MCA’s ‘Access to land project’ (2006–2011) 
With a budget of about $30 million, out of the $350 million in the Compact, the ‘Access to 
land’ project had the stated objective of ‘making land a marketable asset’, consistent with a 
vision of the land problem in terms of economy, or in any case with the MCC's priorities. Let 
us remember that, as we saw before, land was already largely commodified, in urban, peri-
urban, and rural areas in the south of the country: 40% of plots of land in urban areas, and 
10–13% in rural areas have been purchased (INSAE, 2009: 165). Thus, one can think that 
the challenge was not so much to make land a ‘marketable asset’ as it was to remove 
insecurity and conflicts related to land.  
The conceptual scheme incorporated the assumptions of the standard property rights theory 
(Figure 3), with little consideration given to questions about the conditions of validity of this 
model. The scheme seemed to be applied above all to the rural environment (it talked about 
producers, investment, and yield), while the reform concerned the whole territory.   
Figure 3. The conceptual diagram of the Access to Land project 
 
The designers had a classic conception of land law according to which it is the holding of a 
land title that ensures security. ‘The fact is that this title is extremely rare in both urban and 
rural areas. This notorious weakness in the holding by presumed landowners of intangible, 
reliable and unassailable property titles is the main cause of the land insecurity that prevails 
today in Benin’ (MCA 2005, underlined by them). ‘The reforms identified will make it possible 
to implement a rapid registration procedure (in order to reduce the average registration time 
from 3 years currently to less than 1 year) and less costly (100,000 CFA francs instead of a 
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minimum of 300,000 CFA francs under the current procedures). The aim is to facilitate 
access to land ownership for the greatest number of people, to remove people from land 
insecurity by formally registering them, to increase their capacity to access credit and to stop 
the ‘slumming’ of urban centres that have become areas for receiving massive flows of rural 
people in search of better living conditions’  (idem., p. 4). The solution to all land problems 
was therefore seen to be in facilitating access to land title.      
Building on previous experiences (the transformation of housing permits in land titles, PFRs), 
the project aimed to change their scale and integrate them into a renewed policy. In four 
years initially, then five, it wanted to (1) reform land legislation to modernise and standardise 
it, (2) implement 300 PFRs, issue 80,000 rural land certificates (CFRs), and transform 75,000 
CFRs into land titles, and (3) reform the ‘Commission for the transformation of housing 
permits into land titles’ and issue 30,000 urban land titles. With its significant resources and 
its tight timetable, the Compact was, for some of its promoters in any case, an opportunity to 
fight against conservatism, force institutional reforms, and finally make it possible to remove 
the element of informality, which was considered as the main problem.  
While the operational objectives were clear, the institutional vision was not yet designed at 
that time. The priority was more the reform of DDET than its abolition. In the rural sector, the 
MCA formulation team was hesitant. The MCA team needed to provide a legal framework for 
the PFRs it wanted to implement on a large scale. The adoption of the Rural Land Tenure 
Act has thus been integrated as a conditionality of the Compact. However, the MCA team did 
not want to endorse the planned institutional mechanism, which gave broad responsibility to 
the communes and provided for a Rural Land Management Agency, a flexible coordination 
and supervision structure. The form that the new legislation would take was also not fixed at 
the moment. The objective of a ‘single and integrated land legislation (Land Code)’ was clear 
(MCA, 2005), but the notion of a code was at that time thought as an articulated set of texts 
(on ownership, urban planning, rural land) covered by a guiding law (idem.).    
4.1.1 Preparation of the land reform 
The initial schedule of the Access to Land Project provided for the first year to be devoted to 
land reform, after which the operational components would be implemented in a clarified 
framework during the following four years. The land policy reform project followed a 
structured process: a series of studies would help to build or refine a diagnosis; proposals 
would be drawn up on this basis and formulated in a white paper; after adoption by the 
government, this would be translated into a policy document and then a law. The whole had 
obviously to be ‘participatory’. However, the process’s openness was in practice very limited 
for several reasons. The timetable was hardly compatible with an open approach to 
consultations. The overall orientation (making land a marketable asset) was contractual with 
the MCC and therefore not negotiable. The studies were predefined and strongly framed the 
debate.27 The participation provided for in the terms of reference was above all that of 
professionals in the sector (surveyors, notaries, etc.), more than the general population. The 
global orientations, predefined in the Compact, were endorsed in the Letter of Framework for 
Land Reform in Benin, adopted at a National Forum on Land Reform in 2009.   
                                               
27 Thus, it is planned to carry out an institutional analysis of the Commission on the ‘Project for transforming 
housing permits into Land Title’ to reform it; a study to improve low income countries survey techniques, the 
objective of which is clearly to question the choices of simple techniques outside classic land titling standards. 
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An international call for tenders was then launched by the MCA to recruit a team of 
international and national experts to carry out the studies and prepare the white paper. The 
contract was won by an American consulting firm specialising in the sale of technological 
solutions for the legal security of land transfers. The relationship between the MCA and the 
firm has been stormy. International experts apparently spoke French poorly, and knew 
neither Africa nor the French-speaking legal culture, which was problematic on such 
technical subjects. In addition – and above all – their conceptions were confronted by the 
strategies of national reform actors. Most of the studies were carried out by Beninese 
consultants, land professionals rather than sociologists, and were largely defined to serve a 
pre-established design. Two general studies on land conflicts (Steward Intl, 2009a) and 
women's access to land (Steward Intl, 2008) made a short28 rather formal diagnosis, without 
any real in-depth analysis of the causes of conflicts. They mainly served to legitimise the 
options, clearly stated in the introduction. The lack of land documentation was seen as the 
main cause of conflicts. Customary logics were presented as an obstacle to women's access 
to land, without distinguishing between access to farming rights and access to property, and 
without taking into account the fact that, where the land market is developing, there is no 
statutory blockage for women.29 The study on the modalities of application of the 2007 Rural 
Land Tenure Act (Steward Intl, 2009b) made positive reading, highlighting the contributions 
of the text and the relevance of the implementation proposals. It stressed the need to provide 
for simple procedures for changing over from CFR to land title, to avoid the need for the 
holder of a CFR to have to repeat the entire procedure. It questioned the compatibility 
between the Rural Land Management Agency proposed by the MAEP (a flexible and 
temporary structure responsible for piloting the extension of PFRs and supervising 
communes in their rural land administration tasks) and the planned National Land Registry 
Agency. The idea of such an Agency emerged from the study on the institutional framework 
for land management, which had been launched at the end of 2008. On the other hand, the 
study of technologies pushed bringing the techniques of the PFR closer to those of 
registration (Steward Intl, 2009c). Overall, the diagnosis made (on conflicts, land speculation, 
women's access to land) did not take into account current economic and social science 
results or field studies (Edja, 1996; Edja, 2001; Floquet and Mongbo, 1998; Le Meur, 2006a; 
Magnon, 2013; Mongbo, 2002). It was based on standard but biased assumptions that 
customary laws were outdated, and that informality was the source of problems.  
During all the process, debates between interest groups, state structures, and professional 
corporations have been lively. The head of the ‘land reform’ component testifies to the 
extreme difficulty of its elaboration, which for him is a real ‘administrative diplomacy’ 
challenge. The first version of the white paper, published at the beginning of 2009, was 
criticised because it set out options based on a predefined framework and without debate. 
Indeed, it went so far as to already propose technical and software solutions (pp. 113–115), 
well beyond the normal scope of a white paper, whose role is to provide a diagnosis and 
propose broad strategic options. The section on inequalities in access to land focused on 
customary regimes, without a word on elite land accumulation (pp. 42–43), although 
‘equitable access to land’ was one of the main objectives stated (p. 86).     
The analysis of the problems partly included the misdeeds of surveyors during housing 
developments, the monopolisation of the private domain of the state by the elites, the 
absence of regulation and supervision of real estate agents. Nevertheless, the operational 
                                               
28 In 12 days for the study on conflicts. 
29 This inequality is apparently not so great: ‘according to EMICoV data, 64.6% in 2007 and 61.7 in 2006 men who 
own land or plots inherited them, while this percentage was 52.7% in 2007 and 53.6% in 2006 for women’ 
(INSAE, 2009 : 165). 
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strategies then took little account of them, and seemed to consider that legal and 
organisational change would suffice to prevent them in the future. In institutional terms, while 
the initial principle had been to push for the de-concentration of DDET (which has strongly 
resisted this), the choice was finally to create a National Domain and Land Agency, taking 
over a set of functions previously carried out by different technical departments spread over 
several ministries. The idea of a multi-donor pool for the financing of reform was also 
borrowed from the proposals for the implementation of the Rural Land Law.  
The white paper (MUHRFLEC, 2011b) was adopted and translated into a policy document 
(MUHRFLEC, 2011a), itself adopted in June 2011. Extended beyond what was initially 
planned, the contract with the Steward ended when only a first draft of the Code had been 
written (in March 2010). The process has then been taken up directly by the MCA team, 
which led the process until its end, organised multiple workshops, mainly involving 
government officials and professionals, and enabled the draft Code to reach the National 
Assembly, where it has been voted on in January 2013.   
4.1.2 A problematic implementation in the field  
A land reform cannot be assessed only from a legal and institutional perspective: it is also an 
issue of implementation. The institutional frameworks before and after the Code differ, but 
the progress and difficulties that MCA’s operations faced in the field, in urban as well as rural 
contexts, highlight the practical and managerial issues of land rights registration, shedding 
light on issues that the current reform’s implementation will also face. 
4.1.2.1 The PFR component: corporatist struggles, accelerated 
implementation, and a sudden ending 
The ‘300 PFRs’ project aimed to cover around one-tenth of Beninese villages. Due to delays 
in the land legislation component, it was implemented under the 2007 law that was just 
enacted and not under the Code in preparation. This led to different biases in the 
implementation process. MCA could not rely on a national body for the implementation of 
PFRs, like the Agence pour la Gestion Foncière Rurale (National Agency for Rural Land 
Tenure) that the experts working on the 2007 law had proposed. By mutual agreement, it 
contracted Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, German 
Corporation for International Cooperation) International Services, a consultant firm linked to 
the German technical cooperation, for the implementing of this new project. MCA team did 
not really support the commune-level institutional framework created by this law and had little 
interest in their effectiveness and sustainability. While the existence of a sustainable system 
for the administration of registered rights is a prerequisite for the sustainability of land rights 
formalisation operations, the project put the emphasis on the production of maps and 
registers and the issuance of CFRs, in a non-stabilised institutional framework. The 
communal and village land management bodies created by the 2007 law have been set up in 
the field but without real support.   
Establishing a PFR in a village involves a plot-by-plot survey phase combining a sociological 
survey of rights-holders and a topographical survey carried out by surveyors. GIS hired 
consortia regrouping a non-governmental organisation (NGO) and a surveyor firm to realise 
PFRs in a group of villages. The calls for tenders gave rise to a conflict between these two 
types of structures, around leadership in the consortium: the entity that has the lead 
determines the dominant logic in the implementation (the boundaries of plots of land or the 
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rights over land) and even more the distribution of the benefits between the organisations. 
While they had been subcontractors to NGOs in the pilot phases, the surveyors argued that 
they had a monopoly on topographical operations and claimed the leadership of the 
consortia. The implementation of the ‘300 PFR’ project was blocked for nearly a year by this 
corporatist struggle. To meet the quantitative objectives, many consortia were launched in 
parallel, with three months to do the work in each village, whatever the size, plot number, or 
accessibility. While about 10 people involved in the pilot projects really had the know-how 
required to establish a PFR in the field, about 20 teams worked in parallel. Staff engaged in 
sociological fieldwork had only three days of training, mainly devoted to knowledge of the 
survey sheets, with only a very short briefing on land issues and land tenure inquiries. Due to 
delays in the first year, teams were doubled for the last round of PFRs, putting inexperienced 
teams on the ground, without any training.  
The ‘300 PFR’ coordination team did not carry out any real training and support work for the 
field teams they hired, in order to help them overcome the problems they encountered. While 
identifying land rights is subtle work, they did not exercise any quality control, leaving the 
investigations to be carried out by teams of various quality and sensitivity. Interviews on the 
conduct of the surveys reveal multiple distortions. When work commenced there were 
conflicts and sometimes blockages in villages that have no territory of their own and are 
dependent on other customary villages on land issues.30 Teams also made a number of 
errors in the identification of beneficiaries. No systematic evaluation has been made but, in a 
single small area (a few villages in two neighbouring municipalities of the department of 
Collines) an in-depth study (Moalic, 2014) revealed a strong heterogeneity of practices. In 
some villages, the plots have been surveyed at the level of lineages because the teams 
wanted to go fast and limit the number of plots to survey. In others, the team pushed to 
register individual use rights, men and women of the same household each having a 
registered plot. Plots of land belonging to non-shared inheritances have sometimes been 
registered in the name of the group of heirs, sometimes in the name of their representative 
(with the risk that the latter may later be considered the owner of the whole). The state public 
domain, particularly rivers and lowlands, was not always identified in the maps. Lowlands, 
which are legally state land but are owned by peasants under customary rules; have 
sometimes been registered in the PFR, with the risk of recreating legal confusion. In many 
cases, the survey reports, which are supposed to reflect accurately the farmers' statements 
on their rights and to serve as the basic reference in the event of a future conflict, were 
drawn up in the evening, in the office, with all the distortions that one can imagine in such a 
situation.  
To go faster, surveyors sometimes made their own list of beneficiaries without waiting for 
land rights surveys, incorporating multiple errors that had to be corrected in a hurry when the 
problem was recognised. Sometimes, the cement landmarks at the plots’ boundaries were 
not installed by the surveyors during the surveys, but later by the farmers. A quality control of 
the maps produced was carried out by the Institut Géographique National (IGN, National 
Geographic Institute), but there was no quality control on the land rights surveys (Thinon and 
Elbow, 2010), creating a risk of bias and errors in the various stages of the transcription of 
rights.  
The numerous tensions or conflicts encountered, as well as the difficulties in accessing 
villages and fields in the rainy season, slowed down the work, which was interrupted 
                                               
30 See Lavigne Delville and Moalic (2019) for an in-depth analysis of these issues.  
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arbitrarily at the end of the scheduled three months, leaving some of the inhabitants without 
surveyed plots of land. 
Almost everywhere, teams could not survey the full village territory, due to conflicts – 
particularly between migrants and indigenous people, but not only – absentee owners, 
refusal to survey uncultivated areas, lack of time, etc. PFR maps often contained many 
‘blanks’, within and around the surveyed areas (Figure 4). When only some of the people and 
of the territories were surveyed, PFR created new territories and new inequalities, particularly 
in frontier and migration areas like central Benin (Lavigne Delville and Moalic, 2019). 
Figure 4. Surveyed and non-surveyed areas in Miniffi’s PFR (Lavigne Delville and 
Moalic, 2019) 
 
These biases, errors, and problems resulted from a vision of PFRs that underestimated the 
issues and difficulties of registering customary rights and did not fully consider them. Field 
teams had already experienced some of these difficulties during the pilot phase, but lessons 
were not learnt. Even more serious, a certain number of these difficulties were raised during 
the training workshop on land rights surveys and were not addressed by the project heads. 
These difficulties were aggravated by the very conditions of the MCA project: very ambitious 
quantitative objectives, and a hierarchical management system based on the monitoring of 
indicators and not the quality of the work carried out. Moreover, following the contractual 
rules between MCA and GIZ International Services, the service provider was paid according 
to the rate of achievement of the objectives set, regardless of the time actually spent, and the 
cost involved. For a former pilot project employee, working in the Coordination Unit, ‘it is the 
worse PFRs that have ever been done. We seed the basis for numerous future conflicts’31.    
MCC rules forbade expanding the deadline of a project. The 300 PFR project ended 
suddenly. The commune and village bodies that were supposed to manage the PFRs were 
equipped (with furniture and computers for the commune committee) but they received only a 
short training at the end of the project. The documentation delivered to them was 
heterogeneous. Villages did not always receive maps of their territory or received then in the 
                                               
31 Author’s interview in 2010. 
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form of a paper print, not plasticised, so that they quickly deteriorated. In some cases, the ink 
cartridges did not correspond to the delivered printer and the plots database integrated into 
the computer system was incomplete (Unité de Coordination et de Formulation, 2013).   
The first rural land certificates were issued in a hurry, in mid-2011, mainly to allow MCA to 
say that the process had begun. At the end of the contract, at the end of 2011, 294 PFRs 
had been carried out, of the 300 planned. Many had incomplete surveys, and more or less 
numerous errors. Village committees and communal services were left alone without support 
for learning and developing experience. Some adopted a wait-and-see attitude, while others 
tried to conduct their work as best as they could. However, no method had been designed for 
registering the splitting of a plot when only part of it is sold. The software enabled a new 
certificate to be issued in the event of a complete transfer of the plot, but not to split it up, 
leading to a practical blockage on the treatment of a significant part of the land market. A 
new heterogeneity emerged, linked to local land tenure configurations, the interest shown by 
communal authorities and heads of communal services in land issues, and their capacity and 
initiative.  
An econometric study of the impact of PFRs was conducted by the World Bank (Goldstein, 
Houngbedji, Kondylis et al., 2018). Based on a survey carried out in March-April 2011 before 
certificates were issued, the study allows for an interesting discussion of the impacts of plot 
delimitation itself, without certification.32 The study highlights first a massive impact on plot 
boundaries, with a strong gender bias: ‘Land demarcation activities cause a 28 p.p. increase 
in the proportion of plots with clear borders among male-headed households. In contrast, the 
effect on parcels managed by female-headed households is 8.5 p.p. lower (difference 
significant at the 10% level’, p. 64). It also shows a lack of impact on productivity: ‘land 
demarcation does not initially increase agricultural output, farm yields (measured as the log 
of the value harvested per hectare), or input use (labor, fertilizer, and improved seeds)’ (p. 
64). Finally, the study identifies a small increase in plantations (‘treated parcels are 2.4 
percentage points more likely than control parcels to be used primarily for perennial crops, 
and they are 1.7 percentage points more likely to have a newly-planted tree’ (pp. 63–64) 
which is nevertheless impressive (+25% more plots with trees in PFR villages than in others), 
and a differential effect on women who would fallow more of the surveyed plots of land. 
However, these results are difficult to interpreted, because of the analytical categories, which 
are sometimes not precisely defined. For example, the percentage of plots with ‘clear 
borders’ is 33.1% in the PFR villages, against 6,1% in the witness ones, which is highly 
significant, even if we are far from the theoretical 100% (as a PFR is intended to cover a 
whole village). However, the indicator ‘clear borders’ signifies the existence of rock or cement 
landmarks at plot boundaries, and does not consider the numerous cases where specific 
highly resistant trees are planted at the boundaries, which is the widely use farmers’ solution 
for having ‘clear borders’. As it includes rocks (natural or that people could have put), this 
indicator does not also enable the identification of the specific impact of the cement 
landmarks linked to the PFR. Considering ‘the presence of clear border’ (with that definition) 
as ‘a key intermediate outcome of the land demarcation’ (p. 63) is thus problematic. Taking 
this indicator as a proxy of land security is equally questionable, for insecurity often occurs 
due to a land rights grievance and not as a result of struggle on the plot’s limit. Finally, 
calculations are conducted by comparing the villages with and without PFRs, without making 
distinction between plots according to the rights farmers have on it, or to the fact that they 
have been registered or not. Thus, it is not proven that the increase in the percentage of 
                                               
32 I sincerely thank Kenneth Houngbedji for his information on the methodology of this study. 
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plots having perennial crops (which increases slightly, from 10.3% to 12.7% in the PFR 
villages - table 2 p.64) can be clearly imputed to the PFR. 
4.1.2.2 The ‘Project for transforming housing permits into land title’ 
component: a stalemate 
In urban areas, the objective was to accelerate the transformation of residential permits into 
land titles by reforming the National Commission established in 2001. The pilot operation 
carried out in Cotonou and Porto Novo issued only 1,483 titles in three years, including 292 
in the name of the state and 1,191 in the name of land interest associations, bringing 
together the owners of housing land, and by July 2006 only 110 beneficiaries had withdrawn 
their title (Lassissi, 2006). The Land Access Project planned to restructure the Commission 
and provide it with substantial financial resources. The Commission Nationale d’Appui à 
l’Obtention des Titres Fonciers’ (CNAO-TF, National Support Committee for the Acquisition 
of Land Titles) was created in February 2009 and began work in June 2009, after extensive 
work to check the state's land titles. The Commission began to deliver land titles in June 
2011, six months before the end of the MCA project. At the end of 2011, more than 10,000 
cases had been initiated and 211 titles issued. After the end of MCA funding, the 
Commission continued operating, with reduced resources coming from the national budget. 
By August 2014, 3,531 titles had been issued, of which only 1,567 had been withdrawn by 
their holder (including 1,190 for the city of Cotonou alone).33 
The restructuring of the Commission and the amount of the resources mobilised have 
therefore only partially improved its productivity, which remains marked by a low demand, a 
complexity of procedures requiring the intervention of multiple actors, and great difficulties in 
gathering legal evidence, even on housing allotments made by the state. Created for an 
initial period of five years, the CNAO-TF was extended in 2014 for another five years, with a 
target of 3000 titles per year, too small to reach the initial MCA target in 10 years, and in 
anyway largely insufficient to move urban land out of the informal sector. After the 
establishment of the ANDF in 2016, the CNAO-TF was shut down and its files were 
transferred to its decentralised offices.  
4.2 After the end of the MCA project (2012–2015): uncertainties, 
reconfiguration, and the vote on the Land and State Code 
At the end of the MCA project, the planned major reorganisation of land management had 
only been initiated. The geodetic station system had been set up. A preliminary draft Code 
had been drafted, but did not seem at that time to have a strong political support and its 
adoption was uncertain. The delivery of titles and certificates fell far short of the targets. The 
rural land management system had been put in place in 40 of the 77 communes, but its 
future remained largely uncertain, and the whole system was in danger of rapidly collapsing 
due to a lack of institutional consolidation. The MCA team, which carried out all of these 
actions, had been dispersed. However, the reform process continued with the vote of the 
Land Code early 2013, the redaction of the decrees in 2015, the creation of ANDF in 2016.  
                                               
33 Interview with Mr Bawa Bangana, CNAOTF coordinator, L'Autre Quotidien n°2438, 25 August 2014. 
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4.2.1 Finalisation and voting on the Land and Domain Code (2012)  
The legal reform process went on after the end of the project. The lawyer in charge of it in 
MCA team, who was very strongly committed to this issue, has pushed on the work after the 
end of the Compact and tried to move the issue forward at the political level. Confronted with 
their desire to unify the legal framework, and with strong criticism of standard registration, the 
reformers eventually abandoned the term ‘land title’. They conceptualised the logic of the 
Code in terms of ‘confirmation of land rights’, with a twofold channel, that of individual 
demand (which barely modifies the standard registration procedure) and that of PFR, both 
resulting in a single private property document, the Land Ownership Certificate. No provision 
is made for collective processes in urban contexts. Unlike the land title, a Land Ownership 
Certificate can be challenged in court for a period of five years in the event of fraud or error.34  
The reformers designed a complete reorganisation of the land administration framework 
around ANDF, which should concentrate different responsibilities that were previously 
scattered between different ministries, have decentralised offices in each commune and be 
responsible for the implementation and management of PFRs (see 5.1 for an analysis).  
A preliminary draft Code, a long text of 543 articles, was completed at the very end of the 
MCA (2011). It bore the mark of the multiple expert meetings and controversies that marked 
it.35 Fearing that the Code would favour land grabbing, a young farmers' union, Synergie 
Paysanne gathered a dozen NGOs within an ‘Alliance for a consensual and socially just land 
code’. Faced with difficulties in accessing information and a certain lack of transparency in 
the process, the Alliance mobilised to impose itself in the process and try to influence it, 
through public meetings and advocacy (Lavigne Delville and Saïah, 2016). It advocated for 
restrictions on land sales. The final draft Code has been submitted to the National Assembly 
in 2012. To shorten the time required for the adoption, the government asked a Member of 
Parliament from its political majority to propose it as a parliamentary initiative, in order to 
avoiding the stage of the Supreme Court's analysis of the project, which is necessary in the 
case of a bill introduced by the government. The government was indeed facing an 
emergency, as new MCA financing is in sight (which will not concern land) and the MCC 
wanted the reforms initiated during the first Compact to be completed. For the government, 
enacting the Code was a proof of goodwill towards MCC, in a context in which Benin was, for 
a time, criticised for corruption and could have lost the opportunity of a second Compact. 
More likely (this is the opinion of several people very close to the case) the vote was an 
explicit conditionality from MCC for gaining the new funding. Learning that the examination of 
the bill was on the agenda of the National Assembly, Synergie Paysanne organised press 
conferences in which it criticised the Code, and workshops with parliamentarians, to make 
them aware of the risks for farmers. Although it has focused its advocacy on a small number 
of issues, in particular land purchase thresholds and the duration of fallows, Synergie 
Paysanne has had only limited success (idem.).  
The adoption of the Code occurred in January 2013. The text links the future ANDF to the 
supervision of the ‘Ministry in charge of land’. However, no ministry had at that time (2013) 
the land in its attributions. A strong inter-institutional struggle then opposed the Ministries of 
Finance and of Urban Planning. The former highlighted the possible risks for land tax 
collection if land and cadastre were not under its responsibility and ultimately obtained 
                                               
34 Previously, to ensure the inviolability of land title, compensation was only possible for the injured parties, which 
amounted to ratifying fraud and errors. 
35 The Ministry of Urban Planning published at the same time (2011) the various studies funded by MCA, in final 
versions. 
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control of ANDF. Two months after the law was passed, the organisations representing the 
professions working on land issues (notaries, surveyors, architects, etc.) published an open 
letter denouncing the inconsistencies and weaknesses of the text, and in particular calling 
into question the change from land titles to Land Ownership Certificates. For them, this can 
only produce insecurity. The silence of the government and the absence of promulgation 
perpetuated uncertainties about its future – in fact, this time lapse was due to the verification 
of compliance with constitution. The text has been finally promulgated in August 2013, but by 
the end of September, no signed version had been circulated and the various actors were 
still trying to verify if the Code had really been circulated. Scheduled to take one year, the 
legal reform process in fact lasted eight years. 
4.2.2 A collapse of MCA PFRs  
One year after the end of the MCA project, the MCA Coordination Unit (the team responsible 
for preparing a new Compact and providing some follow-up to the first Compact) toured the 
municipalities and drew up a report that it itself described as showing ‘very poor results’ 
(MCA-Benin/ formulation and coordination unit, 2013, p. 4). Only 25 of the 40 communes 
having PFRs used the land information system set up; only 5,246 certificates had been 
issued out of the 72,742 expected (7.2%), and 3,527 had been withdrawn, or 4.8% (Table 2).    
The delivery of CFRs was slowed down by enduring hardware problems (broken printers, 
etc.) which in some cases hide a reluctance of communes with regard to PFRs and their 
management. As we saw, communes had not really been involved in the decision to make 
PFRs on their territory. Their priority was urban land and housing allotments. Taxes on sales, 
which are an important part of local revenue, were called into question by the PFR system, 
which provided for sales contracts to be drawn up at village level. Finally, several commune 
officials were concerned about their future capacity to negotiate land in villages for public 
infrastructure: if plots had land certificates, would the villagers still agree to freely give land to 
the commune for building a school? If land had to be purchased or expropriated by the 
commune, the cost of investments would increase.  
Table 2. CFRs issuance rate in November 201336 
Departments 
No. of 
expected 
CFRs 
No. of 
established 
CFRs 
% 
No. of 
withdrawn 
CFRs 
% 
withdrawn / 
established 
% 
withdrawn/ 
expected 
pending 
% 
pending/ 
expected 
Altantique 9,385 461 4,9 435 94,4 4,64 43 0,5 
Borgou and 
Alibori 
6,474 1,165 18,0 395 33,9 6,10 52 0,8 
Zou and 
Collines 
12,663 270 2,1 117 43,3 0,92 160 1,3 
Mono et 
Couffo 
20,818 1,613 7,7 1,294 80,2 6,22 133 0,6 
Ouémé and 
Plateau 
23,402 1,737 7,4 1,143 65,8 4,88 39 0,2 
TOTAL 72,742 5,246 7,2 3,384 64,5 4,65 427 0,6 
As a result of pressures from the MCA Coordination Unit, CFR delivery rates increased, but 
by very different levels depending on the region, and even depending on the village. Rates 
                                               
36 MCA-Benin/Formulation Coordination Unit (2013 : 25). Percentages by the author. 
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were higher in south Benin than in the north. In the department of Collines in central Benin, 
only 17 certificates were issued to Miniffi, an indigenous village where some 60 plots of lands 
were surveyed, including five to non-indigenous people who are close to customary and 
administrative power, who managed to have their plots registered in their name, and one to a 
widow. Few autochthonous people were interested. By contrast, in Assiyo, a hamlet of 
‘migrants’ that has become an administrative village, nearly 90% of the registered people 
requested a certificate. After strong negotiation with the customary authorities from the 
village that historically allowed them to settle, they have obtained the right to be registered at 
PFR in their own names, which meant than they were now recognized as full owners of the 
plots that had been granted to them by the autochthonous lineages. Having a CFR was for 
them a strategy to consolidate their new land tenure position.  
The number of CFRs issued has therefore increased, as has the number of delivered ones, 
at a very heterogeneous pace depending on local issues. However, their future is uncertain 
as they are recognised in the Code, but with a low legal value, equivalent to the old 
administrative certificates. The Code does not even recognise them as ‘documents indicating 
a presumption of ownership’.  
Moreover, the commune and village bodies put in place by MCA are crumbling. MCA did not 
support them seriously. Municipalities are doubly disinclined to take charge of them: they 
have little objective interest in these bodies, in terms of financial resources, and the Code 
denies them any role in land management, which hardly motivates them to maintain the 
information for a future takeover by ANDF.  
4.2.3 A reconfiguration of international support and field projects 
The end of MCA Compact led to a vacuum. Anticipating the end of the project, the Ministry of 
Urban Planning had developed an ambitious ‘Land Governance Project’, for which it did not 
find funding. Aware that PFRs were very fragile, actors from the PFR component of the MCA 
project set up a ‘Rural Land Management Consolidation Project’ and sought to convince 
donors to fund it. Although not involved in land issues until that time, the Dutch Embassy 
agreed in 2012 to support a transitional phase, aimed at advancing the implementation of the 
recently adopted Code, through the preparation of implementing decrees and support to 
municipalities in the management of PFRs. It also supported the creation of an informal 
coordination group on land issues, bringing together donors, national institutions, NGOs, and 
farmer unions, to facilitate the exchange of information. This coordination group allowed for a 
certain institutional decompartmentalisation of the land sector, after the strong monopoly 
exercised by MCA.  
The consolidation project initially submitted was very expensive. It took time to negotiate and 
resize it on a two-year basis. It started in early 2014, just over two years after the end of the 
MCA. As no national institution was at that time clearly in charge of the reform, the Embassy 
could not entrust the implementation of this project to a ministerial directorate. In the absence 
of a better solution, they gave it to the MCA Coordination Unit, the team coordinating the 
preparation of the new Compact, even though the land experts had been dismissed and the 
second Compact would not work on land policy. In a phase of institutional vacuum, a MCA 
team with no legitimacy on land issues anymore that had been asked to organise the 
preparation of implementing decrees. The legal expert recruited for this work, who had been 
strongly involved in PFRs since the beginning, did important work in mediating and 
negotiating decrees, and in attempting to remedy a number of shortcomings in the text. 14 
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decrees were prepared, which were promulgated in January 2015. The most controversial 
was the one on the ANDF37.  
Support to municipalities in the management of PFRs only started at the end of 2014, after 
three years during which the PFR system, the commune land services, and the village 
committees were left to their own devices. The consolidation project had in practice only time 
to refinance some equipment and run a series of training sessions. 
During that period, several development projects, funded by other donors, continued to 
implement PFRs in their own areas. These projects had supported the initial design of PFRs 
as an alternative to land title and were concerned about the orientations of the Code. After 
the vote on the Code, they reviewed their approaches in the light of changes in the legal 
framework, and in particular the obligation to also survey residential areas. In the Atacora 
and Donga regions, the German cooperation (GIZ) funded some 60 PFRs between 2007 and 
2015. In the region of Borgou, a three-year worldwide GIZ project, the ‘Responsible Land 
Policies’ project started activities in July 2016. Agence Française de Développement (AFD) 
had largely supported PFRs from the inception until 2007 but had failed to set up a new 
project at that time. It integrated a land component into its ‘Project to support agricultural 
development in the Collines Department’, which it has started to prepare. The feasibility 
study took place in September 2013. It proposed that the land component should provide 
support to communes and village land committees, starting with a shared assessment of the 
PFR experience. The feasibility study also proposed that the land component should 
facilitate the transition from the legal framework of the 2007 law to that of the Code and that it 
should contribute to national reflection based on its local anchoring. As the initial financing 
assumptions had been reviewed, the project had to be reconfigured and only started in mid-
2015. Finally, in parallel with support for the preparation of the decrees, the Dutch 
cooperation financed a local land management project in two municipalities in the south of 
the country (2015-2018), in order to experiment the reform and provide tools and 
methodologies.  
Conceived as projects to support decentralisation, these various projects promoted PFRs 
from a rural and communal point of view, and sought to negotiate modalities of 
implementation of the Code that were anchored in local contexts. They have been in tension 
with the newly created ANDF, which was seeking to assert itself.  
4.2.4 Temporality of projects vs temporality of policy reform  
The four years following the end of the MCA project (2012–2015) have been a period of 
institutional change and consolidation of the reform. The Code has been voted in 2013. The 
legal framework has been achieved with the publication of the decrees needed to implement 
the Land Code. The international networks working on land have been reorganised, with the 
arrival of the Dutch Embassy as the central international actor on land in Benin, both as a 
supporter of the reform and as a funder of a field project to test the implementation.  
The tight schedule provided for in the MCA project has been considerably extended. The 
initial project, which in five years wanted to link legal reform and a scaling up in the field, has 
been confronted with the reality of policy change and project implementation, with induced 
                                               
37 The authorities did not put this decree on the agenda of the validation workshop. Refusing to leave the 
government a blank cheque on this subject, the workshop participants refused to sit and secured its inclusion in 
the work programme.  
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negotiations, power relations, and operational constraints. One can finally consider that the 
temporalities have been eased, with a policy reform that is almost done in 2015, allowing 
implementation to begin, while results on the ground were far below the initial objectives, and 
fragile.  
Figure 5. The MCA project: delays in time and results 
 
Ten years for such a reform is quite normal. However the objectives and timeframe planned 
into the Compact had been very optimistic, not to say unrealistic. The corporatist struggles 
largely slowed down the operational aspects. But even more, the conception of the reform by 
the MCA made a confusion between the temporality of the policy reform, which is not 
predictable as it includes political negotiation and compromise, and the temporality of 
projects, which are supposed to be feasible in a given time scale (Lavigne Delville, 2014). 
The MCA team saw land policy reform as a technical issue that they could achieve in a short 
timeframe, allowing for a quick implementation in the field. However, negotiating the legal 
reform has taken much more time than planned. In consequence, land reform and field 
operations have been done simultaneously. The latter has been implemented within the 
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arrangements were under question.   
4.3 Since 2016, the gradual implementation of the new 
institutional framework 
The years 2016–2018 saw the establishment and ramp-up of ANDF, the repositioning of the 
various actors, and the beginning of the actual implementation of the Code.   
The institutional landscape became clearer after the adoption of the decrees in January 2015 
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charge of the deployment of the institutional mechanism provided for by the reform, which 
will take place in a coherent manner. The Ministry of Finance is reorganising itself, dissolving 
DDET and integrating ANDF into its organisational chart. ANDF has formally been created, 
and a start-up budget has been granted by the state. An action plan for implementation was 
defined in July 2015 (Gandonou, 2015). The Director was recruited through an open call for 
applications in 2016. The Director of DDET, probably supported by the Ministry of Finance, 
was a candidate. However, it was the lawyer who led the reform at the MCA level who was 
recruited. The central team was then set up. The decentralised office in Cotonou was 
opened. It was decided to open decentralised offices initially only at the level of the heads of 
department, and not at the level of each commune, as set out in the Code. Teams were 
gradually set up, through the assignment of staff and contractual recruitment. 14 Bureau 
Communal du Domaine et du Foncier (BCDFs, Local Offices of Land and Domain) (one per 
department, plus one for Abomey-Calavi and Ouidah) were officially opened in September 
2016. The staff joined them only gradually and the tools and procedures were also put in 
place progressively.   
President Talon's coming to power in 2016 gave a boost to the reform. In October 2016, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Environment (ex-Urban Planning) introduced a 
Communication in the Council of Ministers presenting the project, to prepare a national 
cadastre, and requesting a temporary suspension of all cadastral operations, in order to audit 
them and integrate them into the future cadastre. Field development projects that planned to 
make new PFRs were blocked. They asked for political support from their donors and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The latter argued that the decision was illegal, given that it was 
responsible for PFRs, and a member of the ANDF Board of Directors, and it should thus 
have been consulted. It also argued that there was a difference between the PFRs and 
cadastre. The blockage was finally lifted in April 2017 and the new procedures manual was 
adopted in December of the same year (ANDF, 2017).  
At the same time, a digitisation project for land documentation was launched from April 2017, 
implemented by a French consultancy firm, which collected all land information (titles, 
supporting documents such as sales agreements or administrative certificates, plot maps of 
PFRs and housing allotments) to digitise them and integrate them into a single GIS. The 
spatial calibration of land titles was a huge task, since the references used by surveyors 
were heterogeneous. Land subdivisions were relatively easily repositioned on satellite 
images, but the case of individual titles could be more complex. The team has almost 
succeeded in positioning existing maps and titles in the GIS but the information on 
landowners is still indicative, as the data are sometimes fake (in cases where only the 
planned resettlement plan exists, and not the final one) or obsolete due to changes, 
inheritances, transfers, or even fragmentation since the time the maps were drawn up. The 
consultant firm also validates the demarcation plans for new titles before integrating them 
into the GIS, which leads them to reject many plans and forces surveyors to do their work 
again. Field experiments for the implementation of the land cadastre in areas where there is 
no land information were launched in early 2019, as part of Dutch support.   
At the end of 2018, i.e. more than five years after the promulgation of the Code, the 
institutional framework and its tools and procedures are more or less in place, apart from the 
cadastre. ANDF has just over 200 agents. The land documentation has been transferred 
almost entirely to the BCDFs. ANDF began issuing new land titles in April 201838, at a very 
slow pace (Table 3). Applications for new land titles are being processed, with a view to 
                                               
38 www.andf.bj/index.php/le-foncier-au-benin/statistiques-bcdf 
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meeting the tight deadlines imposed by the Code. Pending applications are processed 
gradually. 
Table 3. Production of land titles by ANDF  
  Created land titles Signed land titles Withdrawn land titles 
Total 1,705 1,134 1,228 
Monthly Average 284 189 205 
(New applications and inherited files, June–August 2018 and November 2018–January 2019)39 
The Code has been slightly revised in 2017. The Finance Law reduced the cost of land titles 
and customary ownership certificates and temporarily offers free registration of transactions 
(instead of at a cost of 8% of their amount), which has led to many regularisations. However, 
the compilation of available land information is still ongoing, and not all the tools are set up. 
Teams in the Agency’s decentralised offices face difficulties in processing land title 
applications in a timely manner. The cost of the land title has not dropped significantly, 
because the main cost – plot demarcation and landmark setting – is still at the discretion of 
the surveyors. Even if new offices have been opened, the number of notaries remains very 
low, and above all very unevenly distributed throughout the territory. The same applies to 
surveyors. The cadastre is being built gradually from existing documentation, but with 
uncertain information on owners outside the areas with land titles. Extension to areas without 
cartographic documentation will face the same difficulties as PFRs and will require 
considerable resources, which are not yet available. 
                                               
39 Source : author calculations based on data from www.andf.bj/index.php/le-foncier-au-benin/statistiques-bcdf 
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5 The Land Code, its orientations and controversies 
Negotiating the land policy and the Land Code has been a complex and highly controversial 
process, and the subject of bitter struggles. Different visions of what land policy should be 
(standardisation vs. recognition of plurality) have been at stake, as well as different interests, 
which have tried to protect the existing situation and the rents it allowed, and/or tried to seek 
to exploit the text in the service of different interests. Any attempt to simplify the registration 
procedure has been strongly contested. The very fact that the Code would constitute a single 
legal text has been strongly opposed, particularly by the defenders of the Rural Land Law. 
For them, the initial idea of a code as an articulated set of complementary sectorial laws 
should have been maintained, which would have made it possible to maintain the initial logic 
of PFRs and land certificates as complementary to standard registration. In this section, I will 
describe the main provisions of the Code and situate them within the controversies that have 
surrounded some of them. I will then detail the changes related to the 2017 revision.  
5.1 The main orientations of the Code and its controversies 
The 2013 Land and Domain Code is an ambitious text that aims to radically reform the legal 
and institutional framework of land tenure in Benin. It includes 543 articles, organised into 10 
titles and 31 chapters. It explicitly repeals the 1965 Property Act, the 1960 Residential 
Permits Act, the 2007 Rural Land Tenure Act, and also, implicitly, the 1955 and 1956 
decrees, which had never been formally repealed before.  
Focusing on private property, the Code intends to break with legal dualism and standardise 
the law. It recognises a single title of ownership, the Land Ownership Certificate (Certificat de 
Propriété Foncière). This new name is the result of a compromise that had been difficult to 
find between land title and CFR, and this will be unstable, as we will see. It is a response to 
criticisms centring on the intangible, unassailable nature of land title: while it is supposed to 
guarantee the security of the holder but in the event of fraud or error, it in fact allows 
dispossession and enables impunity, particularly in cases where demarcation and land 
marking are carried out without informing local stakeholders. The CFR was clearly a title not 
guaranteed by the state, and could be challenged in court, as can property titles wherever 
the cadastre has a fiscal function and does not prove ownership. The new Land Ownership 
Certificate is still intangible, but it temporally violates this principle by assuming that it can be 
contested in the event of fraud or error within one year after the discovery of the fraud (art. 
146). However, any action lapses after five years from the date of establishment of the 
Certificate of Land Ownership.  
The Code follows the logic of the ‘confirmation of land rights’, with two ways of obtaining a 
Land Ownership Certificate. One is on an individual basis and follows the former standard 
procedure of registration, with some amendments.40 This process must respect a maximum 
duration of 120 days (art. 139). The other is collective, via the PFRs or collective confirmation 
processes (art. 142 ss), at the request of local authorities or a group of urban owners 
organised in a land interest association. The Code suppresses the intermediate documents 
(residence permits, administrative certificates, CFRs) which, as we have seen, were until 
now the most accessible documents, and the most used by citizens. However, it creates an 
Attestation de Détention Coutumière (ADC, Attestation of Customary Possession) for the 
rural environment, a new intermediate document issued by the local land management 
                                               
40 In particular, in terms of local information for the persons concerned. 
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offices. In individual applications, this attestation, relocation certificates (obtained in land 
subdivisions), and tax notices for the last three years can be used as ‘presumption of 
ownership’ documents to initiate the confirmation request. The recognition of tax notices as 
implying a ‘presumption of ownership’ is an important step toward the recognition of peaceful 
occupation as source of ownership. However, sales agreements, residence permits, 
administrative certificates, CFRs are no longer recognised as documents allowing a person 
to apply for a Land Ownership Certificate. They can only be used, among others, in courts.41 
As in the 1965 law on land ownership, the confirmation of rights is not mandatory. This 
maintains a dualism between plots having a Land Ownership Certificate and other plots. 
However, a Certificate is required for any sale or transfer (art. 17), under penalty of nullity. A 
‘certificate of membership’ (mentioned but unspecified in the Code) may be issued by the 
Land Agency to allow the sale of a plot whose registration is ongoing. As in the 1965 law, 
only sales create an obligation to obtain a certificate, and the transition from ‘informality’ to 
land title is thus progressive, with a long period of coexistence between informal and titles 
plots. Any sale concerning a titled plot of land must be drawn up in the form of a notarial 
deed or, failing that, under private contract and deposited in the minutes of a notary (art. 18), 
before being copied and added to the Land Ownership Certificate by the local land office.  
In urban areas, possession of a Land Ownership Certificate is the norm. Housing permits 
have been abolished. The idea of a quasi-automatic transformation of existing precarious 
housing permits into land ownership has therefore been abandoned. A housing permit is not 
even recognised as a document indicating presumption of ownership. The Code reaffirms 
that housing permits can only be issue on State titled land.42 The future of the thousands or 
hundreds of thousands of housing permits issued by communes is thus unclear. 
Condominiums have been created, as well as construction leases.  
In rural areas, the Code maintains the institutional framework created by the 2007 law, with a 
land management committee at commune level, with few prerogatives, having branches in 
every village. Every land transfer contract (final or temporary) relating to rural land must be 
registered at the village committee. The Code also integrates the PFR, which now leads to 
Land Ownership Certificates. Procedures for obtaining a Certificate for a plot registered in a 
PFR seem contradictory: following art 200, it seems to be automatic43 but elsewhere it seems 
to occur upon request (art. 203-204: the issue is made within one month, on request). CFRs 
already issued are ‘upon simple presentation by the holder, transformed into a Land 
Ownership Certificate’ (art. 520) by means of a confirmation request form and identity 
document. The rules that apply to rural land vary depending on whether or not a PFR exists 
on the area. Some measures, which are not very precise, concern user rights and their 
formalisation in the form of a written contract. The Code therefore introduces specificities for 
untitled rural land, which is inconsistent with its ambition to standardise the law and 
reproduces the problem of delimiting rural land, which was criticised in the 2007 law. 
However, the Code does not recognise any specific legal status for rural tenure, except for 
the Attestation of Customary Possession, whose role is unclear in the text). Therefore, it 
                                               
41 However, administrative certificates were recognised by the 1965 law (art. 90). 
42 Article 380: ‘The housing permit is a precarious and revocable authorisation issued by the State to a person on 
a domain previously registered in the name of the State. It may only be used to provide proof of the right of use or 
usufruct. The judge cannot base a confirmatory decision of ownership on it.’ 
43 Art. 200: at the end of the preparation of the final documents of the rural land plan, a Land Ownership 
Certificate is issued to each holder registered in the list of rights-holders. 
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reproduces the traditional division between ‘informal’ land and registered land that existed 
prior to the 2007 law.  
The Code establishes the cadastre (chapter IV, art. 452-481), with a triple vocation: technical 
(representing all the plots of land in the country), fiscal, and also legal, for land covered by a 
Land Ownership Certificate. The Code also defines the rules for the management of the 
public and private domain of the state and of local governments. ANDF is in charge of the 
state domain, it ‘ensures the identification and monitoring of the State's built and non-built 
properties and holds the list of the State's land located abroad’ (art. 297), and it ‘holds, by 
department, the general picture of the State's real land properties’ (art. 298). Land 
administration bodies already had this responsibility, but it was never discharged, especially 
since a large part of this domain, both public and private, has never been delimited and only 
a small part of the private domain has been titled.  
The Code incorporates an innovative principle of ‘extinctive’ prescription for customary land, 
in order to avoid former owners or relatives of former owners challenging the sale of plots of 
land. However, no prescription is possible for land titles, even if it existed in the 1965 law for 
the benefit of the state (art. 82). The Code also creates a right of pre-emption by the state, 
exercised by ANDF, in order to reconstitute a private domain of the state. However, the 
purposes and modalities of pre-emption are not defined by law or by decree. The Code 
devotes a full section to the question of litigation and defines the methods of contestation and 
arbitration. To avoid the destruction of buildings in the event of the loss of a lawsuit by the 
buyers, a procedure allowing the losers of a lawsuit to buy back the land in question is 
included (art. 527 and following). The Code also introduces a criminal land law, which has 
not existed until now: to discourage fraud and errors, it provides for severe penalties, both for 
individuals and for official officials (mayors, stewards) (art. 487–515). The penalties provided 
for land administration managers in the 1965 law (art. 176) were set at ‘200 to 2000 francs 
for a first contravention, and dismissals for the second’, have never been revised, and have 
not been very dissuasive44  and have not been applied. The heavy threats apparently have a 
real deterrent effect on local elected officials in particular. It will be necessary to see if they 
materialise and make it possible to end the wide impunity that has so far been the rule.    
As provided for in the Land Policy Statement, the administration of land rights (issuance of 
land titles, registration of transfers, cadastre management) is entrusted to ANDF, placed 
under the supervision of the ‘Ministry in charge of land and domain’ (art. 416). This agency 
brings together functions previously dispersed in different institutions and must have 
decentralised offices (BCDFs) in all communes of the country, with extensive responsibilities. 
In particular, each BCDF has a manager capable of issuing land titles.  
ANDF is managed by a board of directors open to different types of actors, including farmers' 
organisations and the associations of commune heads. It is supported by a Land Advisory 
Council, which is a steering body (art. 424 and following) that is also responsible for handling 
some cases or conflicts, and a Compensation Fund (not yet set up) designed to enable the 
state and local authorities to expropriate or purchase the land they need for infrastructure.45 
                                               
44 200 to 2000 FCFA = 0,3 to 3 € 
45 Until now, in rural areas, the appropriation of land for public use is negotiated with landowners, who transfer it 
to the municipality free of charge. 
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5.2 Criticisms of the Code and the 2017 review 
The controversies during the preparation of the Code did not stop after the vote. The 
preparation of the decrees raised various practical problems that justified a tidying up of the 
text. The need for a partial revision was quite quickly recognised. ‘The Code is a human 
work; like any human work, it has imperfections’, was heard from various sides after its 
promulgation. The amendment was launched shortly after Patrice Talon took office in 2016. 
Strongly politically supporting the reform, he also lowered the cost of the procedures and 
increased ANDF’s funding.   
5.2.1 Challenges to Land Ownership Certificates and inconsistencies in the 
text of the Code 
The professional organisations of specialists working in land issues had been largely 
involved in the preparation of the Code. However, shortly after the vote in April 2013, all of 
them (lawyers, notaries, bailiffs, surveyors, auctioneers, and architects) published an inter-
professional communiqué explaining their criticisms46. For them, the draft law made 
“confusing terminological choices and introduces new legal concepts whose consequences 
have not been assessed and whose compatibility with the Benin legal system is uncertain. 
There is a worrying mix of the notions of prescription and foreclosure47 and the absence of a 
strict distinction between simple customary tenure rights and property rights’. The Code did 
not remove legal dualism. Much more, it introduced land insecurity by challenging the 
‘inviolability and sanctity of ownership’, and by introducing a five-year time limit during which 
it is possible to contest a Land Ownership Certificate. ‘The deliberate simplification of 
formalities (...) has led to the replacement of land title by the land ownership certificate but 
the reserves of error and fraud on the one hand, and the 5-year time limit, on the other hand 
make the Land Certificate permanently fragile and create genuine land insecurity. As soon as 
a simple administrative certificate is sufficient to defeat the 5-year foreclosure and as long as 
there is an administrative or judicial claim or dispute, the land ownership certificate will never 
be final and unassailable. It therefore appears that the law has not taken into account 
administrative practices and the land mafia that operates in the field of the services of the 
competent local authorities.’  
For these professionals, those few openings in the conception of land titles represented 
sources of insecurity and were unacceptable. They followed the analyses of lawyers 
(Djogbénou, 2013), who, while acknowledging the innovations of the Code, also considered 
that the possibility to challenge a Land Ownership Certificates weakened it deeply, and was 
‘a step back from the 1965 law’ (p. 28).48 With regard to the ‘Benin sociology’, they 
considered that this measure would increase the number of disputes, with family rights-
holders waiting until the last moment to contest a sale, and the risk of the certificates being 
challenged preventing banks from granting loans. The arguments reflected as much real 
risks as a refusal to think outside the box of land title, sometimes in bad faith. For example, 
an administrative certificate cannot challenge a Land Ownership Certificate: ‘when the Rural 
Land Certificate and/or the administrative certificate are in conflict with the Land Ownership 
Certificate, the judge grants a provision to the Land Ownership Certificate’ (art. 378). 
                                               
46 http://news.acotonou.com/h/2332.html. 
47 The Code mixes acquisitive and extinctive prescription (art. 30 ss.). 
48 It should be noted, however, that they consider a little further on (p. 72) that the possible cancellation of a 
fraudulent title – instead of mere compensation as in the 1965 law – is ‘a remarkable step forward’. 
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This communiqué was published in April 2013, between the vote of the Code and its 
promulgation.  These convergent critics of all professional organisations raised questions 
about the future of the text. ‘Aren't the shortcomings noted in the law likely to hinder its 
implementation? Because, we also know that in Benin, laws are sometimes passed without 
ever being applied. The Land Code, which is of vital importance to the population, is it not in 
danger of the same fate?’ (in Adjinakou newspaper, 23 April 2014). 
5.2.2 The effects of the Code on the communes and their attempts to get 
involved in the issue of land 
The communes had been little directly involved in the preparation of the reform. They 
understood only after the vote on the Code how much they would be impacted, including in 
their budgetary resources. The revenues derived from their land responsibilities constituted a 
significant part of their resources: throughout the country, resources of land origin 
represented 14% to 18% of communal revenues, with the following distribution: assertion of 
rights and transfers (47%), sale of developed land (32%), earning on allotments (11%), and 
taxes on built and non-built properties (10%)49 (Gandonou and Dossou-Yovo, 2013: 29-30). 
Under the Code, land sales must be recorded by a notary and communes no longer have the 
right to endorse sales agreements and receive taxes for that. This jeopardises their finances 
and the Association Nationale des Communes du Benin (ANCB, Benin National Mayors’ 
Organisation) have been particularly active after the Code vote. It engaged in efforts to 
secure a seat in the ANDF Board of Directors and the Land Advisory Council, and to recover 
some prerogatives for communes, which it finally achieved with the changes in the ADC, 
integrated in the 2017 review of the Code.   
Development projects carrying out PFRs and ANCB have also invested the new ADC and 
insisted on the need to better define it content and modalities. They argued that the local 
land management offices would not have the necessary knowledge on local land rights to 
judge the validity of the claims.  Since those attestations had to be established with the 
village land committees, which are under the supervision of the commune land management 
committees, they should be issued by the communes and not by BCDF. Projects and ANCB 
have thus worked together to propose a methodology and format for ADCs and have fought 
to ensure that their delivery – which must be paid for – goes back to the municipalities, in 
order to partially replace the loss of revenue due to the abolition of sales agreements.   
5.2.3 The 2017 amendments 
5.2.3.1 A return to land title 
The 2017 amending law provided for the disappearance of the Land Ownership Certificate 
and the return to the land title, with its intangible nature. Any fraud or error can again only 
give rise to compensation, paid by the state from the land compensation fund (art. 147)50. 
The state may then claim compensation from the fraudster.51  
                                               
49 In practice, several municipalities have waived taxes on non-built land due to the difficulty of collection. No 
property taxes are levied in rural areas. 
50 As the same time, Art.148 seems to introduce uncertainty on this issue: ‘in the event of a material error in land 
title or failure to comply with the legal procedure for issuing land titles, or any other forgery that has occurred in 
the procedure for registering and confirming land rights, the injured party shall receive compensation without 
prejudice to any action to claim the right to property’ (underlined by author). 
51 This expands its mandate and increases its resource requirements. 
History and Political Economy of Land Administration Reform in Benin 
© Economic Development & Institutions  42 
The return to land title was legitimised by both the OHADA (the French-speaking Africa 
regulations for business) and the fears expressed by professional orders following the 2013 
vote. The reaffirmation of the definitive and unassailable nature of the title may result, as was 
the case in the past, in sanctuating spoliations. The fact that the state should compensate 
victims is an innovation, which might be costly for the state if there were many cases.  
5.2.3.2 ADCs under the responsibility of the communes 
In accordance with the demands of ANCB, the 2017 law recognises the responsibility of 
communes to issue ADCs, in a compromise to ease tensions with municipalities and limit 
their loss of revenue induced by the Code. It is now the mayor who receives requests for 
ADCs and organises the procedure (art. 352), but the Code does not explain whether those 
ADCs are registered with ANDF, and how.  
ANCB itself prints and sells the forms to the communes. In April 2018 ADCs were just 
beginning to be used. In the 2018 Finance Act, the state defined tariffs, preventing 
communes from setting them freely and reducing their expectations in terms of financial 
resources. An ADC would cost around 35,000 FCFA, depending on the size of the plot. This 
is well above the cost of the former CFRs, which was between 2,000 and 5,000 FCFA, 
depending on the communes and the size of the plot, and this will make it difficult for rural 
people to access ADCs.  
In practice, as lawyers involved in the Code recognise it, the ADC is nothing more than a 
renewed administrative certificate, with more formalised procedures and a mandatory field 
survey involving village land committees. The first requests registered in the municipality of 
Tchaourou were made by buyers, looking for a ‘document of presumption of ownership’ to 
initiate a request for land title. As farmers’ interests in paper is not very high in most of the 
country, it is very likely that the ADC will mainly play this role, diverting it from its primary 
purpose.  
5.2.3.3 More possibilities for requesting a land title  
The 2013 text was very restrictive and only a few documents could be used for requesting a 
land title. The documents giving presumption of rights have been extended and now include 
administrative certificates and CFRs (in contradiction of art. 520, which still provides that they 
are automatically processed in land titles). Sale agreements are still not recognised as giving 
a presumption of ownership.  
An additional paragraph to art .112 should make it easier to transform housing permits into 
land titles: ‘the State shall issue land titles to holders of a housing permit on a plot belonging 
to it under the conditions set by decree issued by the Council of Ministers’. A first decree (No. 
2018-473 of 10 October 2018) has been promulgated, which concerns housing permits 
established on land (registered or not) belonging to the state. Another one is in preparation 
for housing permits delivered by communes on non-state land, outside the law, which is a 
crucial issue for many urban dwellers. 
5.2.3.4 Other adjustments 
The duration of the transition phase has been extended to 10 years (art. 256), i.e. by 2023, 
which will be barely sufficient for the actual deployment of the system. 
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Other amendments reflect compromises made to municipalities and projects. For example, 
ANDF remains responsible for PFR operations, but can now ‘delegate to any public or 
private legal person’ (art. 196). Note that several contradictions or inconsistencies (or even 
French-language mistakes) identified earlier have not been addressed, showing the limited 
ambition of this review. 
5.2.3.5 A strange new section on borders 
The 2017 version of the Code also contains a long new section of 11 articles on ‘land 
ownership in border areas’. This section provides that land located in a 2.2-km strip along 
borders that is not already state or local authority property must be incorporated into the 
public domain of the state (art. 346-3). It can only be registered in the name of the state or 
the local authority (art. 346-5)52, but it can be exploited with the authorisation of the Ministry 
of the Interior (art. 346-8 to 10). Land included in 200-metre-wide ‘high security’ zones 
cannot be the subject of a private occupation, it can only be used by the state for military or 
mining purposes (art. 346-6); but this does not cover land in the border strip.  
The need for a ‘national border policy’ was mentioned in the Land Policy Statement (p. 35). 
But the issue was about materialising the borders, not excluding people and villages settled 
near the borders. This surprising section is contradictory to the focus of the Code, which 
does not deal with state public domain. According to some informants, a specific law on 
borders had been prepared but had not been put on the agenda of the National Assembly. 
The consultant responsible for drafting the revised Code introduced the content of this draft 
law in this new section into the Code at the request of the National Border Management 
Agency, and the Members of Parliament hardly noticed it during the debate in the Assembly. 
5.3 Synthesis: The Land Code, an updating of the land law with 
innovations and contradictions  
All the lawyers interviewed acknowledge that the Land Code is a definite achievement. It is a 
single, up-to-date text, integrating private land and state ownership. It brings some 
innovations to address real problems, such as measures on litigation, extinctive prescription, 
and criminal land law. It also partly endorses the innovations made by the 2007 Rural Land 
Law. However, many interviewees regret the lack of innovation and the weight of notaries 
and surveyors in the drafting process. For them, the Code does not signify a legal revolution. 
No in-depth debate has been made regarding the real problems faced by citizens and the 
Code is above all an updating of the 1965 law.   
The Code reflects a very normative conception of land rights. Far from starting form current 
land rights and problems faced by citizens to design concrete solutions, it mainly reflects the 
classic conception of land titling, considering that most of the evil came from the fact that the 
law was no longer respected, and from the lack of technical tools, and that it is the practices 
that must be brought into conformity with the law. In the typology suggested par Joseph 
Comby (1998) (see section 1a), the reform mainly follows the logic of ‘improving practices 
and reorganizing administrative means in compliance with existing law’, coupled with 
elements of ‘a policy of punctual improvements leading to significant improvement’. We are 
far from more radical approaches aimed at massively transforming housing permits into land 
                                               
52 Which is contradictory: state public domain cannot be registered. Registration by the state incorporates the plot 
in the private domain of the state – that is, the land it owns as a private owner – and not its public domain. 
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titles through collective registration, and even more so from strategies for recognising various 
kind of land rights ‘from the bottom up’, as products of history and contexts. In fact, state 
agents and professionals working on land issues have blocked various attempts at 
simplification and have succeeded in ensuring that practical obstacles to cheap and simple 
registration are maintained or added whenever possible. They have largely closed the 
avenues for collective land titling, put forward since the 1990s for the urban sector. They 
have succeeded in creating suspicion about PFRs, removing the CFRs, and making access 
to land titles for plots registered in PFRs difficult. The acquisitive prescription, provided for in 
the 2010 draft Code, has been replaced by an original extinctive prescription, which is a step 
back: in the former case, a person who demonstrated that he had been occupying a plot 
peacefully and in good faith for 15 years would be directly recognised as the legitimate owner 
of this plot. Now he will be able to dismiss challenges to his rights based on claims from older 
occupants, but this will not give him any right of ownership: he will have engaged the full 
procedure from the beginning and will pay the full costs. 
The Benin reform is thus more a reform in land administration that a reform changing the way 
land issues are dealt with. This strategy allows significant progress but it also has its limits, 
especially for the rural world.   
 The studies commissioned by MCA to prepare the reform did not fully support the idea 
that registration and land titles were an indispensable solution. They showed that a 
significant part of the conflicts concerned the legitimacy of sales and could therefore be 
addressed by improving contract negotiation and validation. Another part concerned 
inheritance conflicts (Steward Intl, 2009a), which the title does not prevent. The cost and 
duration of dispute resolution did not differ significantly depending on whether the plot of 
land has a title or a sale agreement (INSAE, 2012: 130). ‘...the proportion of loan 
amounts secured by a Land Title is very low (1% at most)’ (Steward Intl, 2010: ix).  
 Despite the willingness of its promoters to move away from legal dualism and to 
standardise the law, the Code could not avoid reproducing this dualism, maintaining a 
divide between titled lands and others. This applies to the urban environment, at least 
until every urban plot is titled, which will necessarily take time. It is much more the case in 
the rural environment. There, the Code had to create a new intermediary paper, the ADC, 
to respond to situations where title is unaffordable. But, while being legally defined (which 
was not the case with the old administrative certificate), ADCs may pose the same 
problem as the old certificates: a lack of cartographic support to locate the plot of land, a 
relatively high cost, from 30 to 50 000 FCFA (€45 to €75), that can be problematic for 
poor farmers or in places where the need of such a paper is not obvious for rural 
dwellers. One can even perceive a step backward compared to the CFR, which was 
certainly limited to plots of land registered in the PFR, but represented an intermediate 
document, with the same legal content, and which was really inexpensive (from 2,000 to 
10,000 FCFA depending on the surface area and the communes, i.e. from €3 to €15).   
 Although it officially aims to reduce insecurity and conflict, the Code only addresses the 
problem of sales conflicts by prohibiting any sale on a plot without land title. While legally 
coherent, such a measure is difficult to apply in a context where very few lands have a 
title and where the rate of issuance of new titles by ANDF remains very low. Even more, 
it imposes a temporality that is incompatible with the rates of sales (distress sales, which 
are urgent, form the majority in rural areas) and the cost of a title is still far above the 
value of the land in most regions. Moreover, nothing is said about what should be put in 
sales contracts, and in particular how to ensure that the seller has the right to sell and – 
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in the case of family plots53 that the other rights-holders agree. While they play an 
important role in the land market, the profession of intermediary or direct sellers is not 
regulated. A significant part of the functioning of land markets is not addressed.  
 Although incorporating provisions specific to the rural environment, the Code refuses to 
take into account the diversity of rights existing in rural areas and the existence of 
collective rights at different scales. Such rights are mentioned here and there, but their 
status and treatment remain extremely ambiguous. The reality of land rights in rural areas 
is very diverse as we saw. They are certainly greatly individualised in the south but not 
elsewhere. While PFRs have sometime induced a dynamic of individualisation, this is not 
general and does not always extend to individual ownership. By proposing only individual 
ownership, the Code induces tensions both within extended families and between 
indigenous people and migrants (Lavigne Delville and Moalic, 2019). This is far from the 
ambition to ‘overcome the climate of mistrust that generally prevails between customary 
landowners and that are generally indigenous and migrant exploiters’ (MCA Compact, 
project on access to land, p. 16). This situation jeopardises the principle of access to land 
for family rights-holders, which is obsolete in the densest areas, but which remains valid 
elsewhere and plays an important role in social security.  
Let us add that, subject to an evaluation of practices, the measures planned to combat land 
speculation in rural areas appear largely symbolic: authorisations are required for land 
purchases in rural areas (art. 261), with an obligation to carry out a development project 
above 2 hectares (ha) and authorisations that depend on surface thresholds.54 No acquisition 
of land can exceed an area of 1,000 ha, but 1000 ha is already huge for Benin and it is easy 
to bypass the  thresholds by dividing the purchase into several contracts. A ‘per purchase’ 
threshold does not prohibit in any way accumulation of ownership far exceeding 1,000 ha for 
a single body. Moreover, the experience of authorisation thresholds, which exist elsewhere in 
Africa, shows that they more frequently result in political control over major acquisitions than 
in real regulation linked to the quality of productive projects. There is currently no definition of 
the criteria for judging this point and ANDF does not have the necessary skills to do so. 
Finally, the prohibition on the purchase of land by non-Beninese, which is a problem for 
border residents and migrant farmers, is also symbolic here, because it is sufficient to have a 
joint venture with a Benin shareholder or to create a subsidiary under Benin law to 
circumvent it. The Code also takes from the 2007 law the measures of forced rental in the 
case of unused land, but their practical feasibility is questionable.   
                                               
53 The Code of Family addresses this problem on paper, but not in practice, as shown by the many conflicts over 
family land and inheritance.   
54 Authorisation by the municipal council between 2 and 20 ha, by ANDF between 20 and 100 ha, by the minister 
in charge of land after approval by the municipal council and ANDF between 100 and 500 ha, and by the council 
of ministers above 500 ha. 
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6 Issues, strengths and limitations of an ambitious 
reform of land administration 
Benin's land reform is still being deployed and not all of its instruments and mechanisms are 
yet in place. Moreover, it is not totally fixed and its implementation itself is leading to changes 
and adjustments.  
One of the interesting aspects of the reform is precisely that it is adaptive: its meaning is not 
completely stabilised. How will the housings permits be treated? How and at which rythm will 
the cadastre put in place? Will shortcomings be dealt with and how? Moreover, the reform 
will have to face the reality of both the enormous interests at stake in the peri-urban area and 
the habits and routines in place: ‘Are the actors of land corruption, most of who are still in the 
State apparatus, willing to adopt formal regulations or even to secure land? This question 
remains unanswered’ (Kakai, 2014: 10). The capacity of the reform to reorganise over time 
the practices of all stakeholders is still an open question. The issue is not only important for 
ordinary citizens who have to adapt to the new rules and formalise more than before their 
land rights, it is even more so for the people who had an interest in the previous situation: the 
‘land mafia’, the corrupt civil servants, the surveyors manipulating the land subdivision 
processes, etc. It is also an important issue for the agents of land administration offices, who 
will undoubtedly face numerous demands or pressures to be flexible or to accept 
manipulating the files, and for the agents of communal land services, of tribunals, etc. The 
success of the reform, its ability to clean up the sector and significantly enlarge access to 
formal rights, will depend on how far all of these actors will change and adapt their rules and 
their practices, how far the one who see their interests or routines challenged will be able to 
resist, circumvent, or neutralise it. The harsh penalties provided for by the law worry many 
actors, but will they really be dissuasive in the long term? Will the culture of impunity really 
end?  
It is clearly too early to attempt a review or evaluation. Nevertheless, the history of the 
reform, and an analysis of the actors involved and the difficulties encountered, make it 
possible to put into perspective its conception, the choices made, the progress made, and 
the possible risks or impasses.   
6.1 A difficult negotiation: promoters and opponents of reform 
The broad consensus on the need for reform by the 2000s masked different visions of the 
origin of the land problems and the solutions to be promoted, with an intersection of political 
visions, a variable knowledge of land realities as they are experienced by citizens, and 
corporatist or institutional visions and interests. Those political conceptions and 
representations of the land sector and those interests strongly influenced the reform process.   
The main foundations of the reform were laid very early on, in the 2005 Compact's project 
document, but its precise formulation and implementation have been a process, hampered 
by conflicts of interest and vision, which have affected its trajectory. Several groups of actors 
and dividing lines can be identified.   
6.1.1 Inter-institutional struggles to protect interests 
The reformers first faced DDET, within the Ministry of Finance, responsible for the issuance 
and administration of land titles. We saw that DDET’s lack of equipment and its practices, but 
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also its high degree of centralisation, were one of the causes of the problems identified. The 
decentralisation of DDET had been planned for a long time: ‘Five (05) devolved conservator's 
offices called District Domain Offices have already been formally created by Memorandum 
No. 183/MFE/DC/SGM/DGID/DDET of August 10th, 2004’ (Compact, Annex 1, p. 6). The 
MCA fought throughout the Compact for the opening of those District Offices, which DDET 
slowed down as much as it could. Such a decentralisation was essential to bring land 
administration closer to the people, but it meant cutting the power of the DDET head, who 
had control over title application files for almost all the country and in particular on the 
periphery of Cotonou where the land issues are most intense. The strong resistance of 
DDET to any decentralisation finally convinced the MCA team that internal reform was 
impossible and that land administration should be entrusted to an autonomous agency.  
The Ministry of Finance did not seem to be very active in formal debate arenas, preferring to 
follow the process and assess the risks for it without being overly visible. DDET exercised 
strong passive resistance during the first phase, doing everything in its power to ensure that 
the decentralised offices, although largely financed by the MCA, did not open. When the 
reform was adopted, the Ministry of Finance invested heavily to win the battle for the 
agency's supervision. Once they gained it, they became supporters, undertook a series of 
internal reforms to integrate the ANDF into their organisational structure, reform the scope of 
DDET's competence, and organise the transfer of files.   
The IGN is part of the inefficient public structures in a situation of monopoly rent. The reform 
tried – without success – from the outset in the early 1990s to reform the IGN by integrating it 
into ANDF. The entire history of PFRs has been marked by complicated relations with the 
IGN, which did not – or only did so very late – provide the – remunerated – services that 
were required of it in terms of the provision of aerial photographs or satellite images. During 
the MCA project, the IGN was responsible for the quality control of the PFR maps produced, 
which it did with very variable rigour. They requested funding of a new building in return for 
agreeing to sign the partnership agreement. The IGN finally avoided integration into ANDF.  
The reform also opposed the communes. MCA team and land specialists strongly criticised 
their land practices (allotments, issuing administrative certificates, asserting sales 
agreements without real rigour, and issuing housing permits outside the legal field). Mayors 
rightly consider that the reform represents ‘a deliberate desire of the legislator to reduce the 
prerogatives of communes in land management’ (Gandonou and Dossou-Yovo, 2013, p. 24). 
As we have seen, the reformers condemned communes’ land practices without taking into 
account the institutional deficiencies of the state, which partly explains their ‘semi-formal 
practices’, and without attempting to reorganise and upgrade the practices. The Code 
removes most of the land responsibilities of communes, also greatly reducing their 
resources. After the vote on the Code, communes fought to recover some responsibilities 
and incomes. 
The reform also challenges the role played by MAEP on rural land. From an institutional point 
of view, the fact that the management of the reform has been entrusted to the Ministry of 
Urban Planning extends its prerogatives to the rural world. MAEP tried to maintain control 
over rural land, mainly in supporting the PFRs, the supervision of which was explicitly 
assigned to it in the 2007 law. MAEP is divided between the promotion of family farming – 
and thus the protection of peasant rights – and of agribusiness.55 Its defence of the 2007 law 
                                               
55 The first draft of its 2005 policy document was clearly pro-agribusiness and had to be rewritten following 
reactions from farmers' organisations and donors. The official position is now in favour of a mix of family farming 
and agribusiness, while individuals have contrasted visions. 
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is as much about this institutional challenge as it is about a vigorous defence of peasant 
rights. However, the Ministry is politically and technically quite weak and it could not really 
influence the reform. After the vote on the Code, MAEP repositioned itself around the 
productive dimensions of land and invested in the theme of tenure contracts, totally 
neglected by the Code.   
6.1.2 Fighting in defence of the specific features of the rural world: between 
challenging the foundations of reform and negotiating compromises 
The historical network of actors supporting PFRs as an alternative to land title was partly 
anchored within MAEP, partly within the various projects implementing PFRs. Some of them, 
who were integrated into the MCA team, were considered as traitors by the others, who 
continued to defend PFRs as an alternative and challenged the very logic of the reform. They 
highlighted the specificities of land tenure in rural areas; they strongly contested the land title, 
both in its logic of exclusive private property guaranteed by the state, and in its procedures, 
cost, and defects in terms of people’s rights security. They tried to preserve the CFRs as a 
durable solution for farmers and a commune-level management system for those certificates, 
autonomous vis-à-vis the national land administration. For them, the Land Code had to only 
be a hat, encompassing various sectorial texts including the 2007 Rural Land Law.  
It does not seem that associations representing urban populations have mobilised on the 
subject or criticised the focus on land title in urban areas. Regarding rural contexts, as we 
have seen, a young farmers' union quickly mobilised against the risk of land grabbing and 
fought to obtain better control over those risks. The umbrella farmers' organisation, the 
Plateforme Nationale des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles du Bénin 
(National Platform of Farmers' and Agricultural Producers' Organisations of Benin) explicitly 
entrusted the land reform issues to Synergie paysanne. Its leaders, who are big farmers, did 
not necessarily contest the land title itself. Between the lack of knowledge over the stakes 
and the interests of the big producers, rural organisations did not question the logic of the 
title itself. On the other hand, livestock associations were rightly concerned about the future 
of pastoral areas, mobility, and access to crop residues in a Code based on private 
ownership that does not say a word about their existence. With the support of the MAEP 
livestock directorate, they worked in 2015–2016 on a draft Pastoral Code, which was passed 
on 3 July 2018 and promulgated in April 2019. Its articulation with the Land Code remains to 
be studied. 
The network of experts defending historical PFRs, MAEP, and the farmers' organisations 
thus shared interests in working together, exchanging information on the process and trying 
to influence the draft Code, even if their own priorities were different. After the Code vote, 
each of them repositioned themselves around the issue of implementation and the practical 
problems that the Code posed to them. Synergie Paysanne tried to work on farming land 
contracts. The projects teams made a new alliance with communes. The new issues related 
to the future of existing CFRs and completed PFRs, the role of communes in land 
management, technical criteria for the implementation of PFRs, modalities for the articulation 
of PFRs, and the future cadastre. These were all points of contention with an ANDF that had 
just being set up and was seeking to assert itself. Those tensions reflected both different 
conceptions of reform, a defence of PFRs (which seemed threatened by the ANDF) and a 
demand for the autonomy of projects and their programming from ANDF. In particular, at the 
end of 2016 there was a major conflict between ANDF and projects over the capacity of 
projects to implement scheduled PFRs. While the latter agreed that new PFRs had to be 
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integrated later into the cadastre, they refused to stop making new PFRs until the cadastre 
software was ready.  
At that time, the question of the desirability of formalising land rights, which had been raised 
in the early 2000s around the scope of validity of PFRs and the case of pioneer fronts and 
village reserves (Edja, Le Meur, and Lavigne Delville, 2003), had largely disappeared from 
the debates, which focused more on operational issues. The questions on the relevance of 
land title to the rural environment no longer took the form of a challenge to the title itself, but 
of questions about the spaces left by the Code for other options: is it still possible to deliver 
CFRs on PFRs that are already finished? Are PFRs without legal formalisation useful for 
securing farmers’ rights? Etc. In private, some stakeholders questioned the relevance of 
continuing to conduct PFRs in the new context.56 Others are trying to address the issue of 
user rights, and the relationship between rights-holders and farmers, in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, thus investigating a related field of land tenure security, which has 
always existed in historical PFRs but had remained secondary.  
The new version of the PFR procedures manual, prepared in 2015–2016, incorporated a new 
requirement for precision, at the risk of making it impossible to integrate previous PFRs into 
the future cadastre. ANDF blocked its approval, which has been interpreted by project teams 
as a desire to marginalise or even to suppress PFRs. In 2016, the various projects were very 
active in supporting the National Association of Communes in the preparation of texts on 
ADCs, which they considered to be a substitute for the CFRs. In October 2018, ANCB, with 
the support of the Projet Foncier local (Local Land Management Project), funded by the 
Netherlands, organised a national workshop on land, to assess the situation, almost 5 years 
after the vote of the Code and at the end of the project. This workshop was an opportunity to 
publicise the controversies between communes’ heads and ANDF and to make pressure on 
it.  
6.1.3 Professionals in the sector, between carrying out the reform and 
protecting vested interests 
The last group of actors is made up of the various professionals working in the land sector, in 
particular surveyors and notaries. Surveyors have, by all accounts, a very strong political 
weight in Benin. They are at the heart of the defence of the classical land titling procedure, 
which offers them comfortable income. Indeed, for each plot, they have to do two 
delimitations, the first one to make the map that is part of the application, the second one 
during the titling procedure to check the limits in presence of the neighbouring land owners 
and install the cement landmarks. The decree creating their order gives them a monopoly 
over all topographic work even where less skilled professionals could do it cheaper (we have 
seen how they fought for leadership over land operations in MCA PFRs). They are also 
among the actors who benefit greatly from the confusion by managing land subdivisions in a 
discretionary manner, manipulating registries and selling the land information they keep for 
themselves. IGN surveyors frequently hold positions both in the public service and private 
practice, which presents obvious conflicts of interest. They have been at the forefront of 
demands to apply urban standards to rural areas, and to take advantage of the use of high-
precision GPS to impose a unnecessary accuracy. MCA commissioned the President of the 
                                               
56 An evaluation by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau - the German Funding Agency - explicitly asked the question in 
May 2018. 
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Order of Surveyors for the study on PFR techniques (Steward Intl, 2009d), which, not 
surprisingly, advocated the application of titling standards to PFRs.   
Land professionals can be considered as co-authors of the reform, including when they have 
hindered any simplification of procedures that would be against their interest and when they 
have challenged the choice of Land Ownership Certificates. One can wonder if and how far 
extending their role and clarifying the rules of the game will be sufficient to stop their illegal 
practices. Notaries also benefit greatly from the reform: at the end of the transition period, no 
plot of land can legally be sold without the sale being carried out in the form of an authentic 
deed or in any case registered in the minutes of a notary. This increases notaries’ volume of 
activities and allows them to develop their intervention outside urban centres. Although they 
were involved in the drafting of the Code, surveyors and notaries were both, together with the 
other professional bodies (bailiffs, architects, lawyers, etc.), signatories in April 2013 to the 
open letter vigorously contesting the Code.  
The promoters of reform have thus had to fight against an ossified land administration and 
have had to force it to reform itself, rally professionals who were part of both the problem and 
the solution, and marginalise those who contested the basic options proposed while taking 
into account some of their proposals. In an interview, one of the reform’s main architect said 
his work was in fact a huge task of administrative diplomacy. Having succeeded in 
overcoming those many obstacles, in bringing the draft Code to a successful conclusion and 
in obtaining the political support necessary for the implementation of the reform, is in itself an 
important achievement.  
6.2 Maintaining an orthodox approach to land and land security, 
at the risk of continuing to exclude the majority of citizens 
The conception of land and land administration advanced by the reform promoters is based 
on the traditional conception of registration and land titling. Land title is seen as both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for land tenure security. Such a vision contrasts with 
current analyses that highlight the fact that a title is only valid if institutions (land 
administration, justice, etc.) guarantee it, show that it is therefore possible to have land 
tenure security even with ‘informal’ rights  and consider land tenure security primarily as 
institutional issue (Lavigne Delville, 2006; 2017).  
Standard land titling is based on a colonial model of ‘creating ownership from the top’ 
(Comby, 1998a). It is very different from the logic of the state recognising property rights that 
have been constructed ‘from the bottom up’, which has historically been the experience in 
Europe (Stamm, 2013). The idea that ownership can emerge from a gradual consolidation of 
rights with permanent occupation, as proposed by the promoters of the Urban Land Registry. 
There may be various legitimate rights not related to private property, as in rural areas, 
where it is difficult or impossible to accept this perspective. For those who support this 
orthodox conception of land titling, official documents issued after field survey – like former 
administrative certificates and now ADCs – are not considered as proof of ownership. They 
are only indicators of a ‘presumption of ownership’, a first step that is necessary to begin the 
titling procedure. Far from constituting the very basis of legal property rights – as is the case 
in most European countries – the contract of sale is not even considered as proving a 
‘presumption of ownership’. It is only a preliminary step to requesting an administrative 
certificate or an ADC, which then allows an individual to begin making an application for a 
title.  
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With the Land Code, the procedure for obtaining an individual ‘confirmation of rights’ is 
almost the same as the former titling process. The same stages are maintained, with maps 
needed twice, with a publication in the Official Gazette of each request while local 
information of local stakeholders is not really secured. BCDF managers acknowledge that 
they do not have the means to verify whether the information about a future plot demarcation 
has really been disseminated in the village. That means that demarcations can be done in 
the absence of uninformed rights-holders, just as before. LAs we have seen, lack of local 
information is one of the sources of spoliations, since a demarcation with no opposition 
allows the land administration to deliver a title.   
As we saw, the issue of legitimacy of sales and procedures ensuring it is not dealt with, 
particularly for untitled plots. Of course, the Code prohibits any sale of untitled land (art. 17), 
which on paper resolves those issues. However, it was already the case in the 1965 law (art. 
5-2) and it proved impossible to enforce. Will ANDF have the means to impose this rule, 
knowing that it imposes a deadline of several months, which is incompatible with the urgency 
of financial needs that frequently trigger sales? The same art. 17 states that it is possible to 
sell an untitled plot if one has a ‘certificate of belonging’ (Certificat d’Appartenance) delivered 
by ANDF with a 12-month validity. However, neither the Code nor the decrees details what 
this is, and how it is delivered. The trustworthiness of this certificate does not seem very 
clear. 
Efforts to reduce the fees of a titling process (enshrined in successive finance laws) are real. 
ANDF services and various taxes should not cost more than 100,000 FCFA (€150). 
However, the overall reduction in the cost for citizens is doubly limited: first, surveyors freely 
fix the cost of demarcation, which is one of the major costs of the procedure, and frequently 
exceed 300,000 FCFA (€450). Second, the registration procedure follows several others 
(purchase, having a certificate, etc.), and the full cost for users must include those steps, as 
well as other indirect expenses (travels to the office, etc.). The cost of land titles remains 
high, but above all for demarcation fees – unregulated and therefore freely fixed by 
surveyors. Introducing notaries as a mandatory step for transfers adds significant costs 
upstream: a notarial sales contract or a minute registration costs around 300,000 FCFA 
(450€). The total continues to be high regarding the value of the plot in towns outside major 
urban centres and may still exceed it in rural areas.  
Defenders of PFRs and of RFUs as a possible source of rights consider that standard land 
registration and land title have historically been designed in the service of colonial officers 
and their allies, and then of national elites after independence, and are by no means meant 
to be in the service of the entire population. The possibility of really lowering the costs is 
limited as long as it still is the reference. The problem is considerable for urban poor or small 
middle class. It is crucial for rural dwellers. Therefore, the ability of the reform to make title 
largely accessible to the population risks to be hampered, to a level that is still difficult to 
predict.  
6.3 The issue of cadastre  
Consolidating reliable land information in a single GIS is undoubtedly useful. However, the 
conception and making of the cadastre raises some questions. Created by the Land Code, 
the cadastre is supposed to provide information also on untitled plots of land, thus avoiding 
the problems linked to the fact that legal dualism is maintained. Multi-functional, it has a 
technical, fiscal, and legal role. It is supposed to cover the entire territory. By assigning a 
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unique number to any plot of land in the country, whether or not it is the subject of a land title, 
it intends to avoid ambiguities about presumed owners and facilitate the transition to the title 
of unregistered plots. As the reformers say: ‘with the cadastre, from your computer, you will 
be able to know who owns any plot of land’57.   
The first step to create the cadastre is to digitalise information on existing titles and geo-
localise them. A second step is to gather and compile existing land information wherever 
there has been work to map plots and identify the rights-holders, such as subdivisions, 
PFRs, and urban land registers. The question here is the reliability of the information, and 
especially its accuracy when the documentation is old or incomplete (for example, a map of 
an urban subdivision made 20 years ago): there is a very high risk of creating an obsolete 
database from the outset, putting wrong names in the software. Even the map itself may be 
outdated since numerous divisions may have occurred. Buyers who have bought a plot will 
be invisible, even with a contract of sale registered and an administrative certificate at the 
commune, because local archives are not examined, which runs the risk of allowing former 
owners to deny the sales they have done. 
The third step concerns the creation of land information on areas on which there is currently 
no information, which form the vast majority of the national territory. The approach is 
currently being tested. The PFR methodology, which combines the identification of plot 
boundaries and the investigation of rights held over it, will provide most of the necessary 
tools. In urban or peri-urban built areas, the identification of plots of land does not pose any 
(or many) difficulties, since walls mark the limits. Identification of the presumed owners may 
be trickier, as the difficulty in transforming the housing permits into land titles has shown. In 
rural areas, developing the land registry will face the same difficulties as PFRs for areas that 
are not individually owned (land reserves controlled by customary authorities, lineage 
heritages, etc.), and for plots where rights are not quasi-ownership. The conception of an 
absolute right, based on the purging of all existing rights, is a fiction (Comby, 1989) which 
does not correspond to the social reality of land rights as they exist in large parts of society. 
Even more than PFRs, the future cadastre will reduce overlapping rights into a single 
registered property right and exclude other rights-holders since there is no provision for 
registering them. It will not be able to avoid the risk of profoundly transforming rights at the 
same time as it registers them, and it will not be able to avoid the risk of generating conflicts 
and spoliations. 
Covering the full national territory is a huge and very costly task. One issue of the current 
pilot phase of the cadastre is to improve productivity. However, it is difficult to see how the 
methodology could be significantly simplified and its cost greatly reduced without losing a lot 
in reliability. The desire to quickly establish a national land registry prohibits the strategy of 
gradual long-term extension of rural rights mapping, allowed by the 2007 law, which stated 
that PFRs were carried out at the request of the village. While systematic mapping can make 
sense in the urban peripheries and rural southern regions of the country, which are densely 
populated and have an active land market, its cost/utility ratio is questionable in many parts 
of the country.  
In addition, the real problem of any cadastral system is updating it. When it is not possible to 
ensure the registration of changes, a land information system quickly becomes obsolete 
(Lavigne Delville, 2010b). Succeeding in registering millions of plots of land in a few years is 
a challenge that only two countries (Rwanda and Ethiopia, two authoritarian countries) have 
                                               
57 Author’s interview, 2010. 
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succeeded in in Africa. Success in ensuring updating is another: in Rwanda, in some 
municipalities, the rate of unregistered transfers reaches or exceeds 40%.58 The ability of the 
future cadastre to register changes is all the more uncertain since the registered land will not 
have legal status. The experience of PFRs and of transforming housing permits show that 
the popular demand for title is not very high. What could be the incentive for people who do 
not see the interest of a title to pay for the updating of an informal registration of their rights? 
Assuming that the obligation to title a plot of land before it is sold can be guaranteed and that 
every sale is recorded (which is not self-evident, as we have seen), the cadastre will slowly 
expand and update with the rhythm of sales (and recorded inheritances). But a large part of 
the territory, where the land is transmitted by inheritance, will remain for several decades 
outside the updating mechanisms and therefore with obsolete land information, which raises 
questions about the advisability of systematic mapping, at least for a significant part of the 
rural environment. Developing a land tax could be a solution, as nobody wants to pay if he is 
not the owner. However, is it cost-efficient where the value of land is low and the recovery 
costs high? 
The future of the land cadastre therefore depends first on Benin's ability to mobilise the 
necessary resources to implement it, and therefore on the willingness of donors to provide 
the corresponding resources. But it depends even more on the ability to ensure that 
information on ‘presumed owners’ – with or without presumed ownership documents – is 
accurate and updated, which could be problematic where sound information does not exist 
and where there are few or no incentives for citizens.  
It could be simpler and more cost-effective not to register every plot but only those where a 
legal procedure has been made (title, PFR, land subdivisions, ADC, land sale, share of 
inherited plots with new ADCs, etc.). Designing a cost-effective way of using GPS at a local 
level to register the limits of such plots could make it possible to incorporate news plots in the 
GIS on a case-by-case basis, including those having an ADC. Systematic surveys could be 
commissioned in peri-urban areas or rural areas with a dynamic land market, where detailed 
information is useful. 
6.4 The issue of the transition: length and management 
These findings raise broader questions about the way the reform’s promoters thought the 
transition from the current situation to the expected one would occur. The reform strategy 
initiated in 2004–2005 was both proactive and extremely ambitious. It was designed based 
on both a quite technocratic vision of change and an overly optimistic timetable. However, 
following the planned steps and obtaining political support is not enough to really induce 
change in practices. The planned timeframe largely underestimated the time necessary for 
the implementation of planned actions, both because of the length of the bureaucratic 
procedures and the numerous oppositions, blockages, inertia capacities, and other capture 
strategies, which in practice determined the pace of the project.59 The initial timetable, which 
included a one-year reform phase followed by four years of implementation, reflected a 
strong confusion between the temporality of policy change and the temporality of projects 
                                               
58 Personal comment of a doctoral student on land in Rwanda. 
59 Foreseeing 300 PFRs for the MCA project was seen as a sign of caution by the project designers: ‘it is 
essential not to move quickly in a geographical expansion of PFRs and land certificates. This is why, during the 
first phase, only 300 of Benin’s 3743 villages, or about 8% of all villages in the country, were selected’ (Compact, 
annex 1, p.10). However, given that only 41 had been made in 15 years in the pilot projects, creating 300 PFRs in 
four or five years was in fact quite optimistic. 
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(Lavigne Delville, 2014). As we saw, it led to operational results that were well below the 
objectives and a high risk of erosion.  
This desire for a rapid changeover was also reflected in the 2013 Code, which provided for a 
transitional phase of five years before all the measures would be in force, and in particular 
that any sale would be carried out in authentic form or recorded in the minutes of a notary. 
This corresponded to the logic of the replacement paradigm, which promotes a rapid switch 
from ‘informal’ rights to generalised formal ownership and aims to prevent the persistence of 
intermediate situations and devices, on the margins of the law. However, the time needed to 
implement the measures provided for in the Code and necessary for such a switch was in 
contradiction with this five-year transition phase. Besides the creation and deployment of 
ANDF, the full deployment of the new institutional framework requires having surveyors and 
notaries available in every region. They are currently few in number and very unevenly 
distributed throughout the territory: in 2013, there were only 35 notaries in Benin, all or 
almost all of them based in the south of the country. The state opened new offices in the 
regions, but these remain largely insufficient. Consequently, the compulsory registration of 
any sale by authentic instrument or by agreement recorded in the minutes of a notary will 
remain difficult to achieve in a significant part of the country for several years. The 2017 
revision extended the deadline to 10 years (art. 516), that is 2023, which is still a very short 
timescale. It will also take many years to deploy the future cadastre and to have a full 
working institutional and operational framework. 
The Code opened up the possibility of defining transitional arrangements, but this was not 
taken up, which caused institutional uncertainty, particularly on the issue of sales of plots of 
land. A literal interpretation of the text said that it should be only five years after the 
promulgation of the Code (i.e. mid-2018 originally) that sales must be registered before a 
notary, the old sales agreements signed by the communes becoming illegal (and severe 
punishments imposed for them). This meant that the former system would have remained in 
force until then. Nevertheless, ANDF and lawyers stated as soon as the Code was passed 
that these agreements were immediately illegal, leading to confusion about the transitional 
period. Fearing the heavy penalties provided for, some mayors refused to sign them, leaving 
sales in an increased state of informality, and possibly awaiting subsequent regularisation. In 
the same vein, no provisions have been made for ensuring the maintenance of the existing 
PFRs until ANDF takes it in hand. The shortcomings in the thinking about the temporality of 
the reform (and more generally the temporality of institutional change) is also reflected in 
ANDF's aborted desire to suspend topographical operations until the cadastral software is 
ready, as if land dynamics could be stopped until the new system is set up. Since the 
transition inherent in such a reform can probably not least than 15 or 20 years, it seems 
important to think of it as such, by dealing with intermediate situations, which are inevitable. 
Failing to do so leads to the risk of leaving a legal and institutional blur, and the risk of seeing 
adaptive semi-formal solutions redeployed during this time. 
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7 Conclusion 
Land tenure is at the heart of societies and the relationships between states, social networks, 
and citizens. The way in which a society defines property rights and ensures their security 
has a deep connection to the way in which social relations are thought of, whether 
inequalities (of status, wealth, and power) are considered acceptable or opposed, and the 
way in which people see the state and its role. Any land reform project has necessarily 
simultaneously and intricate political, economic, and societal stakes. It necessarily 
crystallises multiple issues at very different levels.  
In Benin, negotiating the reform, in its orientations and modalities, has been a complex 
process, involving multiple actors, institutional, private, and customary, etc., but also 
international experts and donors. Benin's land reform has had the merit of confronting long-
standing institutional deficiencies and consolidated interests. It has set up an efficient 
geodetic infrastructure, making it possible to link topographic surveys to a single reference 
frame, and it has deeply transformed the legal and institutional framework for land 
management, with the creation of ANDF and its decentralised offices, which now have many 
more staff and resources than the former land administration. The reform made it possible to 
digitise existing land documentation, centralise information and make it accessible, correct 
spatial referencing errors, and identify gaps in files. The time and cost of issuing a land title 
has – at least on paper – been significantly reduced. Transparency and rigorous 
management are highlighted. However, it is questionable whether this is sufficient to ensure 
the equity of access and the exit from informality highlighted in the land policy objectives. 
Framing the problem as a matter of legal updating, administrative reform and technology is 
not the same as framing it in terms of administrative failures, state negligence, intricate 
institutional bottlenecks and ‘management of confusion’, with a large range of actors, 
including powerful political and economic actors, and actors positioned at key points in land 
administration, benefiting from the situation. The choice to dismiss intermediate tools and 
documents like rural land maps and certificates, and to maintain the logic of standard 
registration and unquestionable land titles, raises questions about the reform’s inclusiveness. 
The full cost of a land title includes the cost of obtain the ‘presumption of ownership’ 
document, travelling several times to the Land Office, paying the surveyors for the 
contradictory mapping, etc. This cost is still very high for most citizens. The risk is that this 
excludes part of the population: holders of existing housing permits or sales contracts that 
are no longer recognised and are even more informal than before, and rural buyers who will 
not be able to face the requirement of titling before selling a plot and who are not fully 
protected from spoliation during the titling process. There is therefore a risk of recreating 
informality, which is even greater for actors for whom the title is inaccessible, because they 
will no longer be able to rely on the set of intermediate documents that previously ensured a 
given recognition of their rights. As has been demonstrated elsewhere, land registration can 
‘modernize insecurity’ for a number of citizens (Jansen and Roquas, 1998).  
Failing to recognise the role played by existing intermediate solutions, and thus failing to 
build a plural system offering a range of legal solutions, Benin's land reform reproduces in 
practice the legal dualism that previously left a large part of the population in the ‘informal’ or 
semi-formal category, which it had claimed it wanted to fight. That will also undoubtedly give 
rise to new intermediate, semi-palliative, semi-instrumental practices of the type the reform 
sought to combat, either for areas where the transition to title is complex or poorly justified, or 
after the title has been issued, due to the cost of registering transfers for poor households. 
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Only experience will show how far the integration of the popular categories in the field of land 
title will be achieved and what will happen to others and if this analysis is wrong. 
Basing its diagnosis on the situations experienced by citizens and takes into account the 
semi-formal mechanisms that those institutional deficiencies have generated, the broader 
institutional analysis we made shows that the blockages identified and addressed by the 
reform are more related to what the “Institutions and Economic Development” research 
framework calls the ‘causes of proximity’ than to the ‘underlying factors’ (see Table 1). 
Benin's land reform is above all a reform of land administration, which does not question the 
land title and its logic, which, as we have seen, was the case for promoters of rural reform 
and some experts working on urban issues. Based on the conceptions of land tenure 
professionals more than on the concrete problems of citizens the Code is actually designed 
more for land administration and land professionals, and for wealthy land buyers, than for all 
citizens, especially rural people, and it runs the risk of leaving them aside or even making 
them more insecure. 
Despite the current government's clear commitment, Benin's land policy raises a number of 
questions. Even if the new land administration system and cadastral software can be 
deployed within the remaining four years of transition, analysis of the procedures and their 
cost shows that, in practice, they will probably only be accessible to a part of the population – 
although expanded compared to today – which poses the risk of increasing land 
informalisation and land insecurity for others. The risk is therefore that the reform will serve 
above all to extend access to land ownership for a – expanded but still small – minority of 
quite wealthy actors who are able to mobilise the law and to take advantage of faster 
procedures (particularly urban dwellers buying land in rural areas), and that it will serve to 
allow the state to reconstitute a private domain that has been largely sold off to the elites 
since independence. This would be to the detriment of the majority of the population. 
Another strategy was possible, which would have started more from the situation ‘in the field’, 
problems, and people's resources, and from an analysis of the role played by semi- formal 
mechanisms, in order to reduce contradictions and ensure greater land security, in line with 
pro-poor approaches (Zevenbergen, Augustinus, Antonio et al., 2013). That was more or less 
the logic of the RFUs and PFRs implemented in Benin after the 1990s. While also making 
land title more accessible and reliable for those who really need it – and in particular those 
who need mortgage credit – such a strategy would have focused mainly on the concrete 
needs of all citizens as regards securing their diverse rights over land. It would have offered 
them a range of institutional solutions, from which they would choose depending on the 
context and their own situation. Such institutional solutions would be based on a will to 
protect existing rights against spoliation, to favour acquisitive prescription to solve old cases, 
and to secure the negotiation and formalisation of land sales, even for untitled plots of land. 
In such a strategy, all transfers – except for local sales in rural areas – would be included in 
the land cadastre, which would focus on plots of land with legal status and would gradually 
expand. In this perspective, sales and inheritance contracts, drafted and formalised 
according to strict procedures, with a notary for urban areas, and on the field with the Village 
Land Committee and Land Office agents for rural areas, would be the basis of ownership, 
including when they concern untitled land. Sale or inheritance contracts would assess the 
seller’s right to sell, specify the origin of the rights held and the content of the rights 
transferred, including various easements linked to other rights-holders or local rules. Family 
land could not be sold without a family council record explicitly authorising the sale and 
specifying the distribution of its amount among rights-holders and validated by the Village 
Land Committee for rural areas. Actors who do not have such documents and need to 
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secure themselves legally could request an attestation of customary possession, which 
would rely on a cross-checked field survey. The plots sold or plots having an attestation 
would be surveyed by local surveyors using GPS of a sufficient (but not centimetre) precision 
and data would be integrated in the national cadastre, which would gather information on 
land titles as well as on sales, transfers, and ADCs on untitled plots of land. A PFR-like 
systematic survey would be carried out where the stakes are high, in peri-urban areas, where 
the land market is developing, leading to certificates. The integration of plots into the 
cadastre would be a progressive process, along with social and economic evolution and 
people’s needs. 
Altogether, the Benin land reform, its achievements and limits, and the fierce debate that 
took place during those years, contributes to the general debate on land reform strategies. It 
raises questions about the potential and limits of improvement strategies that do not question 
the global model of land title. It contributes to a rethinking of the relevance of adaptive 
strategies, which organise over time the transition from an existing and dynamic situation that 
is problematic in specific contexts to better land governance that focuses primarily on the 
security of land tenure of citizens and economic actors, starting from their real situations. 
History will show whether and to what extent the actors in charge of the reform’s 
implementation will integrate pragmatic adaptations to the challenges they face, and to what 
extent they will be able to face the issue of social inclusion.
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Figure 6. Code logic vs. pro-poor logic 
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Discussion of ‘History and political economy of land 
administration reform’ 
Setting the scene 
As a resource, land produces a range of services for human development, such as food 
production, housing, and ecosystem services through forested areas. While statistics related 
to homelessness are scarce for Benin, the most recent statistics of the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimate that agriculture and forest represented 
respectively 33% and 38% of the land area of the country in 2016. However, in terms of 
contribution to food security, employment, income generation, and the creation of goods and 
services, agricultural activities play a central role in the social and economic life of the 
country. According to the most recent statistics, the share of the employed population 
working in agriculture in 2018 was estimated at 41%, and contributed to producing 23% of 
the value generated by economic activities (World Bank, 2018).  
Despite this position and the positive economic performance in recent years, the agricultural 
performance in Benin is still very much lagging behind in international comparisons. Figure 1 
illustrates this situation and reports the evolution of cereal yields in Benin and at the global 
level between 1960 and 2017. 
Figure 7: Evolution of cereal yields in Benin (1960–2017) 
 
While the rest of the world experienced gradual and substantial productivity gains throughout 
the entire period, despite a steady growth since the 1990s land productivity remains low in 
Benin. Moreover, even though the country has a privileged access to trade routes and 
imports food from abroad, the latest report on the state of food security and nutrition in the 
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world ranks Benin among low-income, food-insecure countries. This underlines the fact that 
agricultural output is not sufficient to meet local demand for food and the country lacks the 
resources to fill the gap by purchasing food on the international market. In that context, it is 
estimated that the population is affected by multiple forms of malnutrition – including a high 
prevalence rate of anaemia among women, and child stunting – and that one out of 10 
persons (i.e. 1.1 million persons) were undernourished in Benin between 2015 and 2017. 
Agricultural production is also particularly vulnerable to climate change and this situation 
raises concerns regarding the future prospects of food security in Benin (see FAO et al., 
2018). 
This chapter on land reforms provides a thorough and in-depth analysis of the political forces 
that shaped the orientations of successive land reforms in Benin. In this discussion, we 
propose to analyse the land reforms in Benin through their impacts on the social and 
economic lives of individuals. To pursue that goal, we provide a bird’s-eye view of the 
theoretical and observed effects of the land reforms implemented and offer remarks on some 
of the challenges and opportunities ahead to promote sustainable improvement of the social 
and economic lives of individuals in Benin. 
Land reforms in Benin: theoretical expectations 
A property right refers to socially recognised structures of allowable individual actions. It 
determines how a resource is used for consumption and/or income generation (see, for 
example, Besley and Ghatak, 2010). Hence, a system of property rights provides the 
incentives and devises the constraints that shape human interaction, whether political, 
social, or economic (North, 1990). 
There is a well-established theoretical literature that shows that the enforcement of private 
property rights, which make it possible to legally exclude others from using a good or asset, 
within an effective legal framework, should in theory increase productivity and spur economic 
development (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). The literature proposes three channels through 
which productivity gains arise in these contexts. First, the codification and enforcement of 
private property rights reduce expropriation risks and promotes long-term investments. 
Second, enforceable property rights should lower transaction costs and allow productive 
farmers to negotiate land use rights from less productive farmers, thus making both parties 
better off. Third, a clear definition of property rights reduces information asymmetry about 
ownership rights and can allow individuals to use their property as collateral for loans. 
Nevertheless, to be effective, the ability to use land as collateral requires a number of 
conditions, including the presence of a properly functioning credit market. 
Theoretical predictions of the effects of the enforcement of private property rights on 
productivity suggest that places where property rights are clearly defined and enforced 
should be more productive. However, most agricultural land in Benin is held under 
customary rules, where the allocation and enforcement of land rights involve a diverse and 
complex set of arrangements made and upheld by local stakeholders, such as village chiefs, 
councils of elders, and land chiefs (Le Bris et al., 1982). Therefore, private property rights, as 
conceptually defined in theory, do not match local practices of land rights management. 
Yet there are good reasons to consider that land tenure insecurity represents a challenge for 
investment and living conditions in Benin. First, using detailed information on agricultural   
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practices on plots, Lawin and Tamini (2019) find evidence suggesting that land tenure 
arrangements significantly influence farmers’ decisions to invest in practices that improve 
agricultural productivity while preserving the environment. Second, there is evidence that 
under customary land management, land tenure insecurity prevents farmers from leaving 
their land fallow, a low-cost soil fertility management investment practice that improves 
agricultural practices (Goldstein et al., 2018). Third, available statistics estimate that 34% of 
the population in Benin felt insecure about their tenure rights over the home they owned or 
rented in 2018 (Prindex, 2019).60  Though home tenure insecurity appeared evenly 
distributed across urban and rural areas, it varied geographically and was highest for 
vulnerable groups, such as women and renters. 
To reduce land tenure insecurity, in a context where allocation and enforcement of land 
rights have historically been vested in customary practices, policymakers in Benin approved 
the Rural Landholding Law of 2007, which provided formal recognition of land held under 
customary arrangements. A new land law was then adopted in 2013 to improve the definition 
of property rights. This established the Agence Nationale du Domaine et du Foncier (ANDF), 
a national agency with responsibility for the implementation of land policies. 
While little is known about the effects of the implementation of the 2013 land law, more can 
be learned from studying the effects of the implementation of the Rural Land Law of 2007. In 
practice, the Rural Land Law allowed willing villages to produce Rural Land Use Plans, or 
PFRs (Plans Fonciers Ruraux), which embed the resolution of land disputes, the 
demarcation of plots, and the recognition of individual land rights within customary practices, 
and which provide documentary evidence of those rights. PFRs are a community driven 
approach that seeks to provide legal recognition of land rights held under customary tenure 
systems (see, for example, Colin et al., 2009; Cotula et al., 2004; Lavigne Delville, 2014). 
The approach systematically demarcates several plots at once, making it an affordable 
policy option. However, the impacts of the PFRs are theoretically unclear, since customary 
land rights which are formalised are not necessarily private and still remain (partly) vested in 
customary practices. 
Empirical effects of the PFRs in Benin 
To our knowledge, available empirical studies of the effects of Benin’s PFRs include a study 
of changes in land security for landowners and access to land for tenants (Yemadje et al., 
2014), variation of agricultural investment decisions (Goldstein et al., 2018), and changes in 
individual levels of cooperation and trust (Fabbri, 2019) as a result of land registration 
activities. 
In the oil palm-based cropping system on the Adja Plateau, Yemadje et al. (2014) report that 
following the land registration activities carried out as part of the PFRs, land conflicts have 
decreased and there was a shift towards agricultural intensification. Tenants and landowners 
increasingly invested in land through rotations between maize and cowpea (rather than 
maize mono-cropping) and the use of mineral fertilisers, without increased use of household 
waste. The paper suggests also that as a result of the PFRs there was a shift from oral to 
                                               
60 Perceived tenure security was assessed via a central question about people’s home: ‘In the next five years, 
how likely is it that you could lose the right to use this home, or part of this home, against your will?’ (See 
Prindex, 2019, for more details). 
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written land rental contracts, from un-witnessed to witnessed contracts, and from contracts 
backed up by local chiefs under customary rules to contracts backed up by the state in a 
legal system. 
Covering a larger study area that spreads across 40 of the 77 communes of Benin, 
Goldstein et al. (2018) compare the agricultural decisions of rural households in villages that 
were randomly selected to receive a PFR intervention to otherwise comparable households 
in villages that were not selected. The authors find that following land demarcation 
agricultural households were on average more likely to have their plots demarcated. In line 
with theoretical predictions, households in villages that implemented a PFR were also on 
average more likely to shift their investment decisions to long-term and perennial cash crops. 
There was also evidence that, on average, the PFRs helped to reduce the gender gap in 
fallowing, a key soil fertility investment. 
The results reported by Yemadje et al. (2014) and Goldstein et al. (2018) are in line with the 
effects reported for similar interventions in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In Ethiopia, 
Deininger et al. (2011) find that the registration of land rights in Amhara significantly reduced 
fear of land loss, and increased the propensity to rent out land and the propensity to invest in 
soil and water conservation measures by 20 percentage points. Studying the effects of 
Rwanda’s large-scale land tenure regularisation programme, Ali et al. (2014) find that the 
land tenure regularisation increased soil conservation investments among male-headed 
households by approximately 10 percentage points, and that the impact for female-headed 
households – at 19 percentage points – was nearly twice as large. 
The long-term impacts of the registration of customary land rights on agricultural productivity 
and food security in Benin remain an area of active research. However, outside Benin, 
Holden et al. (2009) find that, up to eight years after the rural land registration in the Tigray 
Region in Ethiopia, plot productivity increased. In Vietnam, Newman et al. (2015) study the 
effect of the land use certificate (LUC) on rice production and find that ‘plots that move from 
not having a LUC to having a LUC experience gains in rice yields of 4.9%’ (Newman et al., 
2015). 
Concluding remarks 
Theoretical and empirical results suggest that land tenure arrangements matter for 
agricultural practices. Empirical studies of the PFRs provide evidence that the land 
registration activities have on average increased agricultural investment and have 
encouraged the adoption of soil fertility management techniques in parts of Benin. While 
detailed studies of the long-term impacts of the PFRs on land productivity in Benin remain to 
be carried out, it seems unlikely that the formalisation of land rights alone will boost 
agricultural productivity to the level observed in the rest of the world. To sustain investment 
in agriculture and maximise the chances of improving food security in Benin, a systemic 
approach is needed to connect farming to local demand for food while reducing externalities 
on the environment. 
While the evidence suggests that the formalisation of land rights in rural areas can be 
instrumental in increasing land tenure security, it raises a number of concerns about the 
distributional effects of land registration under customary settings. As pointed out by 
Yemadje et al. (2014), land registration of customary rights does not exist in a vacuum. Land 
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registration activities take place in contexts marked by spatially heterogeneous land tenure 
management systems, and the issuance of formal documentary evidence of land rights 
changes expectations and coordination between individuals. For instance, the issuance of 
land certificates can skew land tenure security toward holders of land certificates. This can 
reduce tenure security for other individuals that may have claims to the same piece of land 
and to different dimensions of use of that land (Lavigne Delville, 2014; Udry, 2012). This is 
particularly a salient concern for women, who typically obtain land use rights via a male 
intermediary. Alternatively, land registration activities can embed conflict resolution 
mechanisms and can help uphold the land rights of vulnerable groups, as protected by the 
legal system. In this way there are also reasons to expect that land registration activities act 
as a magnet that helps customary and legal practices coevolve and converge (Aldashev et 
al., 2012). 
Overall, given, on the one hand, the role that access to land plays in social recognition, 
access to housing and the economic lives of individuals, and on the other hand the spatial 
variation of existing customary practices, land registration activities are expected to produce 
an array of impacts depending on the constraints that are locally relaxed and or 
exacerbated. It therefore seems worth considering various approaches to land registration 
activities depending on local context.  
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1 Introduction 
Benin’s approximately 800 km north–south border with Nigeria plays a critical role in Benin’s 
economy. Nigeria’s population of around 190 million is nearly 20 times larger than Benin’s 
and the differential in gross domestic product (GDP) is even larger, with Nigeria’s output 
equal to nearly 40 times Benin’s, reflecting Nigeria’s oil wealth rather than a higher standard 
of living. Thus, the economic relationship between the two countries is necessarily 
asymmetric, with Nigeria’s influence on Benin much more powerful than vice versa. 
Moreover, Nigeria’s combination of massive oil wealth, interventionist economic policies, and 
high levels of corruption has led to pervasive distortions and inefficiencies.  
It is in this context, during the first oil shock in 1973, that Benin adopted a development 
policy centred on serving as an ‘entrepôt state’ vis-à-vis its neighbours, particularly Nigeria 
(Igué and Soulé, 1992). That is, Benin aimed to expand its role as a trading hub, importing 
goods and re-exporting them to Nigeria, thus profiting from the distortions in Nigeria’s 
economy. Heibrunn (1999) aptly described Benin as the ‘Flea on Nigeria’s Back’.  
Benin’s dependence on Nigeria is not apparent from official trade statistics, with Benin’s 
reported trade with Nigeria accounting for only about 6% of Benin’s exports and 2% of 
Benin’s imports in 2015–171. These official statistics are very misleading, however, as they 
ignore the huge unrecorded informal trade between the two countries (Benjamin, Golub, and 
Mbaye, 2015). As we discuss in detail below, Benin imports very large quantities of 
consumer goods that are subject to high import protection in Nigeria and then transships 
them to Nigeria through elaborate institutional mechanisms. Conversely, Benin illegally 
imports a large proportion of its petroleum products from Nigeria, where consumer prices are 
highly subsidised. This two-way informal cross-border trade (ICBT) has in the past 
accounted for a large share of Benin’s income, employment and fiscal revenues. Recently, 
however, the volume of this trade has dropped considerably due to a recession in Nigeria, 
revealing its fragile foundations. This chapter will analyse the nature, institutional 
foundations, and consequences of ICBT between the two countries, and it will draw out 
policy implications. 
ICBT is pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting a confluence of historical and institutional 
factors: artificial national borders established in the colonial era and maintained after 
independence; porous borders between contiguous nations; a long history of regional trade 
predating the colonial era; kinship groups that transcend national borders; weak border 
enforcement capabilities; corruption of high- and low-level officials who profit from collusion 
with traders; and perhaps most importantly lack of coordination of economic policies among 
countries sharing these borders (Golub, 2015). We will show how these factors play out in a 
particularly dramatic way in Benin. 
An interesting dimension of regional ICBT is the intense competition between Benin and 
Togo for informal access to the Nigerian market. Togo is less well situated geographically 
than Benin for transshipping to Nigeria, since goods coming from Togo must go through 
Benin or Niger, but Togo compensates in part through lower taxes and fees (Golub, 2012). 
                                               
1 Based on data from International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics online.  
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Although land-locked, Niger is also heavily involved in smuggling to Nigeria (Hashim and 
Meagher, 1999); so too is Cameroon, though to a lesser extent (Golub and Kobou, 2019). 
Benin has developed elaborate institutional mechanisms to support ICBT, notably through 
specific customs procedures. In some respects these mechanisms are quite efficacious, 
belying the notion that institutions in Benin are dysfunctional. At the same time, however, the 
national priority placed on promoting unofficial trade is not a viable long-run strategy for 
development. The recent downturn in the re-export trade starkly reveals Benin’s vulnerability 
to shocks in Nigeria. Even more so than for other countries of the region, Benin’s economy is 
dominated by the informal sector, which provides a dubious foundation for sustainable long-
term development (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012; Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye, 2019).  
Despite the vulnerability to shocks in Nigeria and the questionable sustainability of informal 
trade, Benin’s heavy dependence on this trade for government revenues and the numerous 
beneficiaries among both formal and informal operators explains the government’s 
reluctance to crack down on smuggling. Furthermore, even if the government were 
determined to shut down informal trade with Nigeria, it would be difficult to do so as long as 
the underlying incentives created by Nigeria’s distortions remain. Large price differences 
between adjacent countries with porous borders are an invitation to smuggling that ingenious 
traders are bound to exploit. Thus, rather than focus on eradicating ICBT, the government 
should pursue policies to diversify Benin’s economy to reduce its vulnerability to Nigeria’s 
instability. 
In this chapter, we focus on two of the main dimensions of Benin’s ICBT with Nigeria: 
imports of goods subject to heavy protection in Nigeria, particularly used cars and rice, which 
are then re-exported to Nigeria; and Benin’s imports of petroleum products, which are highly 
subsidised in Nigeria. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides 
historical background. Section 3 discusses the effect of divergent economic policies as a key 
driver of informal trade between Benin and Nigeria, particularly Nigeria’s high import 
protection and fuel subsidies. Section 4 provides evidence on the magnitude of informal 
trade. Section 5 describes the institutional processes governing informal trade, particularly 
the role of customs administration, with illustrations in the cases of used cars, rice, and 
petroleum products. Section 6 analyses the effects of informal trade on Benin’s economy, 
particularly fiscal revenues. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Historical economic relations between Benin and 
Nigeria  
Benin and Nigeria have deep historical economic ties, reflecting their geographical and 
cultural proximity. The two countries share several languages and ethnicities. Trade within 
the region predates the colonial period, was altered by colonial economic and political 
relations, and further adapted to post-colonial political and social developments, most 
importantly divergent trade and other economic policies.  
Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo trading networks operated prior to the colonial era, but expanded in 
response to the arrival of European traders in the 17th century (Igué and Soulé, 1992; 
Hashim and Meagher, 1999). Long-distance caravan trade routes linking coastal West Africa 
with the Sahara and the interior were based on artisanal and ecological comparative 
advantages, but even in pre-colonial times trade patterns of taxation and tolls impinged on 
trading routes. The kingdom of Dahomey, corresponding geographically to contemporary 
Benin, had highly developed institutions that facilitated economic ties with Europe, notably 
the slave trade centred around the town of Ouidah. English, Portuguese, Dutch, and French 
ships arrived in Ouidah loaded with tobacco, liquor, guns, and miscellaneous items of cheap 
junk much prized by the local population, which were exchanged for large numbers of 
slaves. The slave trade was a major source of revenue for the kings of Abome, who 
designated a special representative (‘Yovogan’ or ‘chief of whites’) to administer the trading 
relationships between leading local merchants with European slave traders (Igué and Soulé, 
1992).  
In the second half of the 19th century, as the slave trade collapsed, traders switched from 
slaves to palm oil, transacting with French trading firms from Marseille, which created trading 
posts in Dahomey exporting palm nuts and oil in exchange for tobacco, guns, cloth, and 
vegetables.  
The official colonisation of Dahomey in 1894 by the French altered trading relationships for 
several reasons. The French colonial government granted a monopoly to French trading 
companies, spurring the creation of unofficial networks by displaced local businessmen. The 
geographic situation of the new colony of Dahomey, sandwiched between German-
controlled Togo and English-controlled Nigeria, provided a corridor for French trade with 
their land-locked colonies, Niger and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), creating a precursor 
to Benin’s role as an entrepôt. Furthermore, Dahomey’s relatively advanced educational 
system reinforced its advantage as a commercial hub. The Yoruba group’s spread provided 
a network across the region along the Gulf of Guinea. 
The colonial borders between Dahomey and Nigeria were largely retained as national 
frontiers when the countries gained independence in the 1960s. These borders artificially 
separated people sharing similar cultural backgrounds, who largely disregarded official 
borders in their social relations. As Isyaku (2017, pp. 210–213) describes it: ‘The traditional 
rulers have always refused to accept this situation [partition]...The socio-cultural relationship 
between the two states is further fostered by the fact that Yoruba groups occupying the 
contiguous localities claimed a common origin from Ile-Ife, spoke… dialects of the same 
language and possessed similar political, social and religious institutions. Economic links, 
particularly commercial routes and markets, contributes to this cultural uniformity.’  
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In the post-colonial period, kinship groups continued to play a major role in organising 
informal trade between Benin and Nigeria, notably the Yoruba (Igué and Soulé, 1992; Igué, 
2003; Golub and Hansen-Lewis, 2012). Along the northern frontier between the two 
countries, the Hausa are dominant. Adherence to Islam is a source of solidarity and 
motivation for both the Hausa and Yoruba, providing security for transactions, mutual 
assistance, and credit, all based on trust rather than formal contracts (Sudarkasa, 1985). In 
recent years, however, there have been numerous clashes between Yoruba and Hausa 
traders over control of markets (Porter et al., 2010). 
Informal trade was boosted by the instability in Nigeria following the Biafra war in 1967, with 
an influx of Ibo refugee traders into Benin, and Benin supplying goods to sections of Nigeria 
cut off from supplies. During the war, Benin became a major cocoa exporter, despite non-
existent production of this product, as Nigerian cocoa was diverted through Benin.  
Starting in 1973, Benin adopted low-tariff policies to facilitate the entrepôt role of Cotonou to 
take advantage of the oil boom in Nigeria following the first oil shock. Benin also took steps 
to expand access to credit to importers by opening up the banking system, and deregulated 
the importation of key products, such as rice, formerly monopolised by state-owned firms. 
The Marxist government of Benin deployed the nationalised banking system in favour of the 
re-export trade. These credits were limited to Beninese nationals, with defaults on these 
loans contributing to the banking crisis of the late 1980s (Hashim and Meagher, 1999). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Benin took several further steps to liberalise its imports. 
Customs duties were waived on the two main items re-exported to Nigeria at that time: rice 
and cloth. In 1985, the state monopoly on imports was eliminated. In 1993, all remaining 
quantitative restrictions on imports were removed. In 1994, a simplified system of customs 
duties with a maximum rate of 20% was established, with rice and cloth still exempt (IMF, 
1996).  
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a group of mostly francophone 
countries of which Benin is a member (and of which anglophone Nigeria is not), established 
a common external tariff (CET) in 2001 that lowered import duties for most member 
countries but raised them for Benin (and Togo), particularly for cloth, rice, and other 
important re-export goods (Soulé, 2000, Table 7.3). Nevertheless, the WAEMU duties 
remained well below those in Nigeria. Moreover, Benin has found ways of circumventing 
WAEMU import taxes by exercising customs valuation with consideration discretion, and 
most importantly making greater use of special customs regimes for transit and re-exports, 
through which it imports at very low tax rates. These customs regimes are described in detail 
in Section 5 below. 
Both Benin and Nigeria are members of the larger regional group the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), which encompasses both the francophone and 
Anglophone nations of West Africa. ECOWAS has progressed far less than WAEMU in 
regional integration. Some cooperative regional efforts have advanced, particularly in the 
political realm, but Nigeria is large enough that it has seen little need to coordinate with its 
much smaller neighbours, and it has sometimes obstructed or failed to implement ECOWAS 
harmonisation efforts (Hoffman and Melly, 2015). After numerous delays, ECOWAS agreed 
to a CET in 2013. Although Nigeria is among the countries that have adopted the CET in 
principle, in practice it has not fully implemented this regime or has availed itself of escape 
clause provisions that allow higher protection. Thus, a number of Nigerian imports face tariffs 
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which exceed the ECOWAS maximum of 35%, and there remains a list of items facing 
outright bans, as discussed below.  
Nigeria has made repeated threats to eradicate smuggling, but with little lasting effect. The 
borders have sometimes been closed due to other political tensions between the two 
countries. From February 1984 to February 1986, Nigeria shut down the border with Benin in 
an effort to curb smuggling of petroleum products out of Nigeria. During this time, Nigeria 
closed down all service stations within 10 km of the border with Benin, in a futile attempt to 
curb smuggling. Heilbrunn (1999) observes that the effects of the border closures were 
short-lived at best and that the recession in Nigeria in 1985 had far larger effects on lowering 
ICBT than the ineffectual measures of the Nigerian authorities. 
In 1996, President Abacha of Nigeria closed the border in a political dispute with Benin’s 
President Soglo, related to the latter’s military cooperation with the United States, which 
Abacha viewed as a threat. The resulting dislocations in Benin, notably gasoline shortages, 
contributed to Soglo’s loss in the 1996 presidential elections.  
In August 2003, the border was closed for a week following a confrontation between the 
Nigerian and Beninese governments precipitated by the harbouring of a suspected Nigerian 
criminal in Cotonou.2 Only when he was turned over to the Nigerian authorities following a 
meeting between Obasanjo and President Kerekou of Benin in Badagry, Nigeria, was the 
border re-opened. Following the meeting, the two presidents issued the ‘Memorandum of 
Badagry’, which committed the Benin and Nigerian governments to fostering formal trade 
relations while curtailing smuggling and criminality. In March 2008, Nigeria initiated a 
crackdown on imports of used cars, holding up car convoys at the usual crossing points such 
a Kraké and Igolo3. More recently, President Buhari has taken a number of measures to curb 
smuggling from Benin, notably prohibiting imports of rice and car imports through land 
borders once again.  
Notwithstanding these occasional border closings and frequent threats from Nigeria, the re-
export trade has always recovered as the enforcement of border controls reverts to its 
normal laxity. A sharp downturn in informal trade in 2015–2017 for some products, notably 
used cars, has yet to be fully reversed. As discussed below, this prolonged decline is likely 
due more to the recession in Nigeria dampening demand than to border closures. 
Regardless, these episodes reveal Benin’s acute vulnerability to economic shocks from 
Nigeria.  
Officials from Benin and Nigeria have recently announced joint efforts to curb smuggling.4 
Further, the two governments have just opened a joint centre for customs control at the 
largest official border crossing between the countries—the Seme-Kraké corridor. As 
commentators have noted, however, most smuggling does not go through official border 
                                               
2 The case involved the assassination of one of then-Nigerian President Obasanjo’s nieces in a carjacking in 
Lagos. The carjacking ring stole cars in Nigeria and took them to Cotonou. The head of the carjacking ring, 
Tidjani Hamani, a Niger national, was based in Cotonou, where he was released by the Benin judiciary after 
having been arrested.  
3 ‘Difficultés commerciales entre le Bénin et Le Nigeria: Embargo sur les véhicules d’occasion venues de 
Cotonou,’ Le Matinal (Benin), 14 March 2008. 
4 www.illicit-trade.com/2018/08/nigeria-niger-and-benin-to-hold-counter-rice-smuggling-summit/, 7 August 2018. 
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posts, so the utility of this initiative is questionable.5 More generally, the implementation of 
anti-smuggling measures is likely to remain ineffectual given the disparate interests of the 
countries involved, and, more importantly, given the beneficiaries of smuggling within them, 
as described below.  
                                               
5 www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/654673/politique/entre-le-nigeria-et-le-benin-un-nouveau-poste-frontiere-sur-
la-route-de-lenfer/ 
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3 Causes of informal trade: Nigeria’s pervasive 
distortions incentivise smuggling 
The most important underlying source of Benin’s informal trade is Nigeria’s dysfunctional 
economic policies, which provide incentives for traders to profit from circumventing them. It 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse in detail the reasons for Nigeria’s corruption 
and mismanagement, but it surely reflects a combination of Nigeria’s size, ethnic 
fractionalisation, and oil wealth. Indeed, Nigeria has been one of the starkest examples of 
the ‘resource curse’, whereby natural resources such as oil contribute to inefficiencies and 
corruption (Venables, 2016). Revenues from natural resources crowd out manufacturing and 
agriculture. Nigeria has attempted to maintain its industrial and agricultural base through 
import substitution, but this has largely fostered inefficiency and incentives for evasion. 
Worse, large resource rents can provide an irresistible political temptation to engage in the 
notorious wasteful spending and corruption that occur in Nigeria.  
In effect, therefore, Nigeria’s resource curse and institutional weaknesses have been 
transmitted to Benin. The distortions in Nigeria fuelled by oil and corruption provide 
economic rents to smugglers in Benin, so much so that much of Benin’s institutions, both 
formal and informal, have evolved to capture these rents.  
The dominance of the informal sector and the artificial nature of national borders in West 
Africa are also crucial underlying causes of the informalisation of trade. Throughout West 
Africa, and particularly in Benin, the informal sector represents approximately 50% of GDP 
and 90% of employment. The ascendency of the informal sector, including ICBT, is both the 
cause and effect of the weakness of the formal sector. With the economic crisis and 
subsequent structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, government employment 
dropped sharply in Benin as in other sub-Saharan countries and formal private sector 
employment failed to pick up the slack as the business environment remained poor (Golub 
and Hayat, 2015). The informal sector became the employer of last resort, particularly for 
young people newly entering the labour market, even those with substantial education 
(Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012; Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye, 2019). Many of the informal 
gasoline transporters and retailers are young people with secondary education who are 
unable to obtain formal jobs. The booming informal sector in turn contributes to the hostile 
climate for formal business investment, creating a vicious cycle.  
Moreover, contrary to common perceptions, the informal sector is in some respects better 
organised than the formal sector, with large informal firms often rivalling formal firms in size, 
and kinship groups linking together informal operators into networks that cross borders and 
even continents. The Yoruba and Hausa are particularly important for Benin–Nigeria ICBT, 
as previously noted. 
3.1 Import protection in Nigeria 
Nigeria has long had some of the most restrictive import barriers in the world, including very 
high tariffs and import prohibitions, while Benin (and Togo) have deliberately maintained low 
import taxes to foster their roles as entrepôts for Nigeria (Igué and Soulé, 1992). Recent 
research has confirmed the importance of Nigeria’s import barriers in driving unofficial 
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exports from Benin to Nigeria (Golub, 2012; Raballand and Mjekiqi, 2010; Bensassi, Jarreau, 
and Mitaritonna, 2018).  
Table 1 displays Nigeria’s import restrictions on some of the key products of the re-export 
trade as they have evolved over time. Unlike Benin (and Togo), Nigeria has aggressively 
promoted domestic manufacturing and agricultural industries through import substitution, 
unfortunately usually resulting in highly inefficient production, with powerful interest groups 
favouring continued protection. While Nigeria has liberalised some sectors as part of the 
ECOWAS harmonisation efforts noted above, including reducing the number of goods that 
are subject to import bans, progress has often been reversed. For example, in 2015 Nigeria 
lifted its import ban on textile (cloth and clothing) imports but then raised the import tariff to 
45% in 2016 and placed textiles on a list of goods that were ineligible to use the official 
foreign exchange market, in effect raising transactions costs via a de facto additional tax on 
imports to the extent that the unofficial exchange rate tends to be depreciated relative to the 
official rate.  
Import taxes on goods for domestic consumption have generally been lower in Benin than 
Nigeria. With the advent of the ECOWAS CET in 2015, these differences have declined for 
many goods but for goods on domestic consumption and others subject to special protection 
in Nigeria large gaps remain. Furthermore, import duties in Benin are largely irrelevant for 
unofficial trade to Nigeria as products destined for diversion to Nigeria are mostly imported 
via special transit and re-export regimes with very low tax rates, rather than for domestic 
consumption, where normal duties and value added taxes apply. In cases where Nigerian 
protection is particularly elevated, it can still be advantageous to import goods for domestic 
consumption and re-export to Nigeria, but clearly importing under transit and re-export status 
is even more attractive. The extent to which imports intended for Nigeria enter under a 
regime for transit rather than for domestic use varies considerably by product and over time, 
as we discuss further below.  
Table 1: Nigeria’s import barriers on selected products, import tax rates (%) and 
import bans 1995–2018 
  1995 2001 2007 2013 2018 
Beer Banned 100 Banned Banned Banned 
Cloth and apparel Banned 55 Banned Banned 45/ Forex ban** 
Poultry meat Banned 75 Banned Banned Banned 
Rice 100 75 50 100 70*** 
Sugar 10 40 50 60 70 
Cigarettes 90 80 50 50 95 
Used cars* Banned Banned Banned Banned Banned / 70 
Vegetable oil Banned 40 Banned Banned Banned 
*The maximum age of cars banned from import has varied over time: it was more than eight years old in 1995, 
and was more than five years old in 2001; it then moved back to more than eight years old in 2007 and is now 
more than 15 years old. In addition, imports via land borders have been banned since 2016 . 
**Banned from using the official foreign exchange market. 
***Rice imports through land borders banned since 2013. 
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Sources: Soulé (2004), Nigerian customs data provided by the World Bank, Nigerian import prohibition list, online 
reports, World Trade Organization Nigeria Trade Policy Review 2017. 
3.2 Macroeconomic and exchange rate policies in Nigeria 
Macroeconomic policies, particularly exchange rate policy, are another relevant factor driving 
cross-border trade, with Nigeria having a crawling peg to the US dollar but an inconvertible 
exchange rate regime, while Benin is a member of the WAEMU Communauté Financière en 
Afrique (CFA) franc single currency, formerly pegged to the French franc and now to the 
euro.  
Nigeria’s economy is highly dependent on oil, and thus subject to shocks from fluctuations in 
world oil prices. The recent recession in Nigeria in 2015–2017, associated with a sharp 
downturn in world oil prices, provides a clear example of the spillover effects of Nigerian 
macroeconomic developments on Benin. The Buhari administration resisted devaluing the 
Nigerian naira (NGN) despite severe balance of payments pressures. As a result, a shortage 
of foreign currency exacerbated the recession in Nigeria. Equally important, the black market 
exchange rate depreciated sharply while the official exchange rate remained fixed, as shown 
in Figure 1. With ICBT largely operating in the parallel foreign exchange market, the 
purchasing power of Nigerian consumers fell further as the black market exchange rate 
depreciated precipitously. At the end of 2014, Nigeria’s black market exchange rate was at 
less than a 10% discount under the official exchange rate of about NGN 180 per US dollar. 
As the foreign exchange shortage worsened, in early 2016 the black market rate had 
depreciated to about NGN 350 per US dollar. A 30% official devaluation in June 2016 
temporarily eased pressures but the situation soon deteriorated again after the official 
exchange rate was repegged at NGN 300 per dollar. By February 2017, the black market 
exchange rate had tumbled again to about NGN 500 per dollar. Since mid-2017 the black 
market discount has declined considerably due to the recovery of the price of oil and 
Nigeria’s balance of payments. 
The recession in Nigeria and the depreciation of the black market exchange rate were major 
causes of the sharp downturn in Benin’s ICBT in 2016–17, as described in the following 
section. 
3.3 Subsidised fuel prices 
The main underlying source of the pervasive informal trade in petroleum products is 
differential official pricing mechanisms between Nigeria and its francophone neighbours. 
Nigeria has long delinked domestic and world prices of fuel and set very low domestic 
prices, whereas Benin has largely aligned domestic prices to world prices. Figure 2 shows 
that official prices of gasoline in Benin have greatly exceeded those in Nigeria for the past 
three decades. Similar differentials exist for other petroleum products, although the gap for 
diesel is smaller. Consequently, Benin imports almost all its fuel informally.  
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Figure 1: Nigeria’s official and black market exchange rates (NGN per US dollar) 
 
 
Figure 2: Average official gasoline prices in Benin, Cameroon, and Nigeria, 1991–2016 
(US dollars per litre) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators and Globalpetrolprices.com 
3.4 Port efficiency 
Nigeria’s adverse business climate and particularly poorly functioning port and customs also 
contribute to the attractiveness of Cotonou as an entrepôt. Table 2 compares Benin and 
Nigeria on some of the measures of the ‘trading across borders’ category of the World Bank 
Doing Business indicators.   
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Table 2: Indicators of trade facilitation, Benin and Nigeria, 2018 
  
Trading across 
borders overall rank 
(190 countries) 
Time to import: 
border compliance 
(hours) 
Time to import: 
documentary 
compliance (hours) 
Benin 107 82 59 
Nigeria 182 264 144 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Indicators 2018.  
Nigeria is ranked among the worst in the world by the World Bank as regards the ease of 
trading across borders, at 182nd out of 190 countries, despite efforts to improve port 
functioning. Benin’s ranking is mediocre, at 107th in the world, but far better than Nigeria. 
Correspondingly, the time to comply with border and documentary procedures is about three 
times longer in Nigeria and Benin. Various studies have documented the greater efficiency of 
the Port of Cotonou relative to Nigeria (Hoffman and Melly, 2015; Hoffman and Melly, 2018; 
Ezeoha et al., 2019), motivated in part by Benin’s efforts to boost its entrepôt status.  
While Benin endeavours to maintain better trade facilitation than Nigeria, that is a low bar: 
Benin is indeed superior to Nigeria in port functioning but the Port of Cotonou is still far from 
global best practices. This is even more true for other aspects of the business environment, 
where Benin is often ranked below Nigeria. Benin’s overall ranking in the Doing Business 
indicators is 153rd, slightly worse than Nigeria’s 146th. Benin does particularly poorly on 
important areas such as electricity provision and contract enforcement.  
In short, Benin’s trade facilitation institutions function better than Nigeria’s, but Benin’s 
overall business climate is poor.  
Benin’s Informal Trading with Nigeria 
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4 Magnitude of entrepôt trade between Benin and 
Nigeria 
This section provides estimates of the magnitude of ICBT between Benin and Nigeria for 
Benin’s smuggling of imported goods into Nigeria and Benin’s informal imports of petroleum 
products.  
Smuggling is of course difficult to measure but can be estimated indirectly through the 
magnitude of official imports per capita into Benin compared to Nigeria and other countries 
(Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, 2015). Our previous work showed that imports per capita into 
Benin of certain products that are heavily protected in Nigeria are far too large to be 
explained by Benin’s domestic consumption. In this section we update our comparisons of 
imports per capita in Benin, Togo, and Nigeria for some of the key products of the entrepôt 
trade—namely those that are heavily protected in Nigeria. We confirm that imports into 
Benin (and also Togo) are much too large to be explained by domestic consumption.  
Recently, however, Benin’s imports of some of these key products have dropped off sharply. 
Figures 3a–d show imports per capita for cars, rice, cotton cloth, and poultry, respectively, 
for Benin, Togo, and Nigeria.6  
While there is some domestic Nigerian production of these products, which is, after all, why 
they are protected, it is typically low relative to domestic consumption, or not large enough to 
explain the very large differences in import patterns displayed in these figures.  
Cars. Nigeria has banned imports of used cars beyond a certain age in an effort to protect 
its highly inefficient auto industry. While the permissible age of cars has gradually increased, 
all imports through land borders were banned in 2016. Nigeria also recently implemented an 
increase in tariffs. Despite this high protection, Nigerian automobile production has steadily 
declined to very low levels7. No other countries in West Africa produce cars. Togo, and 
especially Benin, have developed a car-import value chain largely to supply the Nigerian 
market. Car imports in Benin grew rapidly to very high levels until 2015, after which they 
dropped sharply. At their peak, car imports per capita in Benin reached about $80 in 2012–
2014, about eight times the ECOWAS average level of about $10 per person (Figure 3a). 
Starting in 2015, however, car imports into Benin dropped dramatically. Togo’s per capita car 
imports have also been well above Nigeria’s and average ECOWAS levels, although far 
below Benin’s, due to Togo’s geographic disadvantage relative to Benin in supplying the 
Nigerian market and the relatively high cost of transshipping cars. Box 1 in Section 5 below 
describes Benin’s ICBT in cars in more detail. 
Cloth. Perhaps no product is of more importance to low-income but fashion-conscious West 
Africans than cotton cloth. Nigeria developed a highly inefficient and protected textile 
industry and most firms have either disappeared or operate at very low capacity8. Imports of 
cloth in Benin and Togo far exceed those in Nigeria (Figure 3b). Nigerian official imports are 
almost non-existent. In Benin and Togo, imports have surged since the early 2000s, to over 
                                               
6 Imports are from the UN Comtrade database online, measured as the US dollar value of world exports to the 
respective country. Population is from World Bank World Development Indicators online.  
7 ‘Nigeria’s Automobile Industry: A Shadow of Itself’, Vanguard, 13 April 2013, 
www.proshareng.com/news/19796/Nigerias-Automobile-Industry-A-shadow-of-Itself-. 
8 See ‘Nigeria: Reviving the Textile Industry’, http://wazobiajournal.com/index.php/nigeria-reviving-the-textile-
industry/ 10 March 2013. 
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$100 per capita in 2008–2014, more than 10 times the average ECOWAS levels of about $7 
per capita. Togo’s relative success in smuggling cloth, as compared to cars, reflects the fact 
that cloth is easier to transport, as well as Togo’s historical role as a regional centre for the 
textile industry. As in the case of cars, however, cloth imports dropped steeply in 2015–
2017. 
Rice. Nigeria has prioritised the development of domestic rice production using stringent 
import protection. Nigerian rice production remains far below domestic consumption, with the 
market substantially supplied by Benin, and to a lesser extent Togo and Cameroon. Rice 
imports into Benin exploded around 2012, while Togo’s imports rose more modestly (Figure 
3c). A downturn in Benin’s rice imports occurred in 2015, as in the case of cars and cloth, 
but unlike those two, rice imports recovered sharply in 2016–2017, despite continued efforts 
by the Nigerian government to stifle smuggling, with a ban on imports of rice through land 
borders in effect since 2013.  
Almost all of Benin’s rice imports are of parboiled rice, the preferred type of rice in Nigeria 
but not in Benin. This provides additional evidence that the large volume of rice imports in 
Benin is intended primarily for Nigeria.9  
Frozen poultry. Poultry has also been on the list of banned items in Nigeria since the early 
2000s. Poultry imports into Benin have surged from a few dollars per person in the late 
1990s to over $30 per person in 2014 (Figure 3d). Nearly all of Benin’s imports are intended 
for Nigeria.10 Probably due to the high cost of transportation and refrigeration, Togo has not 
imported much frozen poultry, but an uptick from the mid-2000s until 2015 can be seen. 
Benin’s imports have dropped sharply since 2015.  
Figure 3. Imports per capita in US dollars for Benin, Togo, and Nigeria 
a. Cars 
  
                                               
9 For example, see www.proshareng.com/news/Agriculture/Smuggling-of-Parboiled-Rice-from-Across-the-
Borders/37718, 19 December 2017. 
10 ‘Nigeria: The Ban On Poultry Products’, by J.E. Oshiotse, This Day, 8 October 2002 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210080108.html 
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b. Cotton cloth 
 
c. Rice 
 
d. Poultry 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations using UN Comtrade, World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Summary on entrepôt imports: Entrepôt imports into Benin are very large but also highly 
volatile. The sharp downturn in entrepôt trade in 2016–2017 illustrated in Figure 3 is a case 
in point. There are two main causes of this recent decline: the recession in Nigeria, with an 
accompanying sharp depreciation of the naira, and President Buhari’s efforts to close the 
border to smuggling from Benin. Of these two, there are several reasons why the recession 
in Nigeria is likely to have been far more significant than the Nigerian government’s 
crackdowns. First, the efforts to curb smuggling have a long history of ineffectiveness. 
Traders are skilled in evading official detection and, more importantly, there are numerous 
beneficiaries from smuggling in Nigeria, including customs officials. Furthermore, Figure 3 
shows that imports into Nigeria also declined in 2016–2017, whereas they should have risen 
if supply from Benin was cut off, given that Nigerian production did not rise during this period 
for these products. In particular, car production in Nigeria remains minuscule. Also, the fact 
that rice imports in Benin declined only briefly in 2016, before shooting back up in 2017, is 
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consistent with the fact that rice is a basic necessity, more so than the other goods shown in 
Figure 3. Thus, rice demand is likely to have fallen less as incomes plummeted in Nigeria. All 
of this suggests that a fall of demand in Nigeria rather than the Buhari administration’s 
hardened policies on smuggling is the primary cause of the decline in Benin’s entrepôt trade. 
A sharp increase in Benin’s taxation of entrepôt imports of cars in 2012–2015 likely also 
contributed, as discussed below.  
The importance of the world oil price in driving Nigeria’s economy, and in turn Benin’s 
imports of goods intended for transshipment to Nigeria, is illustrated dramatically in Figure 4. 
The left axis shows the world oil price and the right axis the value of imports of nine products 
that are subject to import protection in Nigeria (cars, rice, cotton cloth, new and used clothes, 
poultry, sugar, and cigarettes) in millions of US dollars. Both series are deflated by the US 
GDP deflator. Changes in the world price of oil are followed with a short lag by very similar 
movements in Benin’s imports of key products. In 2011–2014, when world oil prices peaked, 
imports of these nine products alone rose to about $4 billion, equivalent to about half of 
Benin’s GDP. About 80% of these imports were likely destined for Nigeria. When the price of 
oil collapsed in 2015–2017, Benin’s imports declined by around 50%. As seen in Figure 3, 
individual products have some idiosyncratic variation but generally followed this general 
pattern, illustrating their sensitivity to the world oil price due to its importance for the Nigerian 
economy.  
Import taxes and competition with Togo are also factors affecting the volume of entrepôt 
imports in Benin, as described in more detail in Section 6. In particular, Benin raised transit 
taxes on imported cars in 2012, leading to a dip in Benin’s imports and a rise in Togo’s. This 
explains why Figure 4 and Table 3 show that Benin’s entrepôt imports dropped in 2012 
despite the high price of oil at that time. 
Figure 4: Benin’s imports of selected key products that are subject to protection in 
Nigeria (right vertical axis, 2015 US$ millions) and the world price of oil (left vertical 
axis, 2015 $US per barrel)a 
 
aThe products are cars, rice, cotton cloth, new and used clothes, poultry, sugar, and cigarettes. 
Benin’s imports are measured by rest of world exports to Benin of these products, in millions of US 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
Real Oil Price Benin Imports of Goods Protected in Nigeria
Benin’s Informal Trading with Nigeria 
© Economic Development & Institutions  17 
dollars. The oil price is the average annual Brent crude price in Europe. Both series are deflated by 
the US GDP deflator to remove common trends due to inflation. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade database, Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank database. 
Benin informal imports from Nigeria. Petroleum products constitute by far the largest 
informal import from Nigeria (Bensassi, Jarreau, and Mitaritonna, 2018). While precise 
measures are difficult to obtain for petroleum product imports into Benin, informal imports 
are estimated to supply about 80% of Benin’s consumption (Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye, 
2019). Box 2 provides a description of the trade in petroleum products. 
Benin also informally imports a variety of manufactured products from Nigeria, although the 
volumes are low relative to petroleum products (Golub, 2009).  
Comparison to other estimates. The overall magnitude of informal trade is difficult to 
measure precisely, but generalising from these sectors, as well as the evidence on imports 
by customs regime discussed in the following section, it is clear that informal trade is much 
larger than formal trade, perhaps double in size. These estimates are larger than those in 
most previous literature because, as noted in Golub (2009), previous studies have ignored 
the role of goods declared in transit regimes. The following paragraph shows that goods 
declared in transit and re-export regimes are about double the value of goods declared for 
domestic use.  
In 2011 Benin’s Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (INSAE) 
carried out a large-scale survey of informal trade in Benin over a 10-day period, as described 
in Bensassi, Jarreau, and Mitaritonna (2018). The INSAE study involved thousands of 
interviews at unofficial border crossing posts on the Benin–Nigeria border. While the survey 
had some important limitations, such as only taking place during the daytime and the fact 
that the veracity of the answers provided by traders can be questioned, the survey provides 
the only available direct estimates of the composition and magnitude of informal trade. 
Bensassi, Jarreau, and Mitaritonna (2018) focused only on domestically produced goods but 
the INSAE dataset also surveyed trade in entrepôt regimes.11 An examination of the 
summary INSAE data by product and regime reveals that the key smuggled products 
identified above constitute the bulk of goods reported in entrepôt status. That is, cars, rice, 
cloth, clothing, poultry, vegetable oil, and cigarettes accounted for about 60% of the goods 
reported by traders as transit and 90% of the goods reported as re-export. The INSAE 
magnitudes, however, are well below those estimated indirectly, as the surveys undoubtedly 
did not cover many traders, particularly those crossing at night, when the largest traders 
generally operate. On the side of exports from Benin to Nigeria, the INSAE data report that 
over 90% of Benin’s informal exports to Nigeria consist of petroleum products. Thus, the 
INSAE data corroborate the focus of this chapter on a few key entrepôt goods subject to 
high levels of protection in Nigeria and petroleum products, which are heavily subsidised in 
Nigeria. 
It may also be of interest to compare our indicators of unofficial trade with officially reported 
Benin–Nigeria trade. As already noted, official bilateral trade is very low. Figures 5 and 6 
show the composition of official Benin exports to and imports from Nigeria, in US dollars. 
Interestingly, the most important products in official trade are much the same as those that 
                                               
11 We thank Joachim Jarreau for sharing the INSAE data. 
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are smuggled, although official trade is much smaller, highly volatile, and three products 
accounted for almost all of official Beninese exports to Nigeria over 2009–2017: poultry, rice, 
and vegetable oil (in sharply varying proportions). Whereas total entrepôt trade approached 
$5 billion at its peak, the vast majority of which was destined for Nigeria, official Benin 
exports to Nigeria peaked at $200 million in 2010 and have since been below $100 million. 
In 2009–2010, poultry and rice were the two largest of Benin’s official exports but these two 
dropped sharply starting in 2011. Recently, vegetable oil has been the largest official Benin 
export to Nigeria. These fluctuations likely reflect shifting degrees of enforcement of 
Nigeria’s restrictions on informal trade for selected products, with these products sometimes 
allowed to enter Nigeria officially.  
Figure 5: Official Benin exports to Nigeria, principal products, in US$ millions 
 
Source: Data provided by Benin government and authors’ calculations 
Figure 6 shows that reported imports to Benin from Nigeria are even smaller. Petroleum 
products are usually the largest official import by far, although these official imports are 
dwarfed by smuggling of gasoline and diesel.   
In short, the composition of official trade between Benin and Nigeria seems roughly similar in 
structure to that of unofficial trade, but it is much smaller and subject to erratic changes in 
product composition. 
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Figure 6: Official Benin imports from Nigeria, principal products, in US$ millions 
 
Source: Data provided by Benin government and authors’ calculations 
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5 The institutional structure of ICBT in Benin: highly 
organised informal trade 
This section describes the institutional processes through which goods are transshipped to 
Nigeria and fuel is smuggled into Benin.  
5.1 Customs regimes 
Goods imported into Benin are rarely ordered by the final consumers of these goods prior to 
arrival in the port. Instead, large importing companies, both domestic and foreign-owned, 
bring goods into the ports of Cotonou to sell to domestic and regional buyers. Only when the 
goods are purchased are they declared under one of three main customs regimes: 
a. mis à la consommation (for domestic use); 
b. transit; and 
c. re-export. 
If declared for domestic use, the purchaser must clear all import taxes, including customs 
duties, value added taxes, and several other smaller taxes. The import duty rates are set by 
the ECOWAS CET. For final consumer goods the total tax rates are about 45%. 
There are two main regimes for the transshipment of goods in Benin and Togo: transit and 
re-exports. The classification of goods into these two categories is complex, with rather 
minor differences often determining whether transactions are classified as re-exports or 
transit. These two rubrics include a variety of sub-categories of transshipment based on 
practices that have evolved over time. In any case, the differences between the two regimes 
are quite small and the main point is that under both of these regimes imports are taxed 
much more lightly than when they are declared for domestic use, as explained below. In 
practice, the magnitude of transit trade is much higher than re-exports in almost all cases. 
We will use the term ‘entrepôt imports’ to describe both transit and re-exports. Togo has very 
similar regimes for imports. 
Transshipped goods do not necessarily – or even usually – end up in the stated destination 
country. Most goods in transit in Benin are declared for Niger, but everyone knows that most 
of them end up in Nigeria. On-site visits by the authors to car parks in Benin confirmed that 
the buyers of vehicles are overwhelmingly Nigerian. Numerous international and local press 
reports also observe smuggling from Benin to Nigeria. As discussed below, entrepôt imports 
are affected by Benin’s competition with Togo, as well as by events in Nigeria.  
Table 3 displays Benin’s imports according to the three customs classifications noted earlier 
– domestic use, transit, and re-exports – over 2002–2017 as a ratio of Benin’s GDP. These 
data are reported by Benin’s customs, whereas the trade values in the previous section are 
from the UN Comtrade database as reported exports from Benin’s trade partners. The 
overall magnitudes of the Beninese data and the UN Comtrade data are similar. The 
advantage of the Benin customs data is that they disaggregate by customs regime, but they 
are not available on a consistent basis for as long a time period as the UN Comtrade data. 
The Benin customs data importantly also include revenues collected, and thus enable a 
computation of effective import tax rates for each customs regime. 
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Benin’s entrepôt trade (transit and re-exports) is generally much larger and more volatile 
than imports declared for domestic use. While imports for domestic use are stable at around 
20% of GDP, entrepôt imports vary from 20% to 60% of GDP.  
The composition of imports between domestic use and entrepôt trade may be affected by 
differential taxation of the two regimes. Tax competition with Togo may also play a role, as 
discussed in Section 6. Statutory taxes on entrepôt imports in Benin are generally very low, 
with the notable exception of used cars. Statutory rates are largely irrelevant, however, as 
there is substantial discretion in applying tax rates. In particular, tax rates are much lower if 
goods are labelled for land-locked countries, usually Niger, but in reality the stated 
destination is almost always modified from Niger to Nigeria once the goods leave the port. 
Thus, in the analysis we use actually applied tax rates, measured by tax revenues divided by 
value of imports, rather than statutory tax rates.   
Table 3: Value of Benin’s imports by customs regime (percent of GDP), 2002–2017 
  Domestic use Transit Re-exports Total imports 
Transit and 
re-exports 
2002 21% 53% 5% 79% 58% 
2003 21% 20% 2% 44% 22% 
2004 22% 23% 0% 45% 24% 
2005 19% 28% 0% 47% 28% 
2006 18% 41% 0% 59% 41% 
2007 18% 44% 1% 63% 45% 
2008 21% 53% 2% 75% 54% 
2009 20% 58% 1% 79% 59% 
2010 20% 70% 1% 91% 71% 
2011 16% 50% 1% 67% 51% 
2012 16% 28% 1% 45% 29% 
2013 20% 39% 3% 62% 41% 
2014 26% 41% 15% 83% 57% 
2015 22% 33% 3% 58% 36% 
2016 21% 24% 1% 46% 25% 
2017 23% 31% 1% 54% 32% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Benin customs data (imports), World Bank World Development Indicators 
(GDP) 
Figure 7 shows the share of entrepôt imports of total Benin imports for the three most 
important products exported informally from Benin to Nigeria: cars, cotton cloth, and rice. 
The figure shows that for cars, and until recently cloth, imports in entrepôt status constituted 
about 90% of total declared imports, or, equivalently, imports declared for domestic use were 
only 10% of total imports. The entrepôt share for cars and cloth dropped in 2016–17 to 
around 70%, likely due to the general reduction of informal trade to Nigeria, most of which is 
declared in transit or re-export. To the extent that domestic consumption in Benin did not fall 
as much, the share of imports for domestic use rose. The share of imports of rice declared in 
entrepôt regimes was lower than for cars and cloth, at about 50% from 2009 to 2013, and 
then dropped quite sharply in 2014–2017 to about 25%. This was likely due to a reduction in 
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taxes on rice imports for domestic use, from 33% prior to 2014 to 14% in 2014–2017. Thus, 
for rice it became less advantageous to use transit status relative to importing through the 
regular channel for distribution in Nigeria, and a sizeable share of imports of rice were 
shifted from the transit regime to import for domestic use.   
Figure 7: Share of Benin’s key imports declared in entrepôt regimes (transit and re-
export): cars, rice, and cloth (percent of total imports of respective products) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Benin customs data 
5.2 Social organisation of informal trade 
Although goods are sometimes imported legally by formal firms, distribution is dominated by 
informal or semi-formal operators, both foreign and domestic, once the goods are sold and 
exit the port storage depots. Smuggling is largely controlled by sophisticated and well-
organised networks, with many small operators involved on the margins. The trust and 
connections provided by these informal networks, often ethnic or religious in nature, facilitate 
market transactions spanning continents, and enable the provision of credit and transfers of 
funds.  
In many cases, importers and distributors are large informal firms, as described in Benjamin 
and Mbaye (2012) and Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye (2019). These firms have a large volume 
of business yet in other respects operate in much the same way smaller informal firms do, 
i.e. they are controlled by a single businessman, have falsified accounts, and do not pay 
regular business income taxes. Their financing is sometimes through banks but more 
typically from own or family savings and retained earnings. The fate of the firms is 
inextricably linked to that of the owner, who often relies on political connections to maintain 
his status as a large businessman operating outside of the legal and regulatory system.  
For bulk items, such as rice, wheat, and sugar, importers purchase directly from international 
brokers, with whom they are in regular contact. A few major importers dominate the rice 
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market, with Difezi et fils controlling more than half of sales.12 Likewise, Cajaf Common, 
owned by Sébastien Ajavon, is the dominant importer of frozen chicken ultimately destined 
for Nigeria. Lebanese business networks dominate the used car trade. 
Importers of second-hand goods, such as used cars, often travel abroad or have foreign 
correspondents who provide information about sourcing opportunities. Overall, traders 
display a remarkable flexibility in adapting to changing market opportunities (Golub, 2009; 
Golub, 2012). 
ICBT has developed a sophisticated infrastructure, often organised much more efficiently 
than public services. Goods can cross the border by land or water. By land, there are 
numerous and ever-changing tracks used by traders along the long borders. A complex 
network of canals is also used, with new canals being dug when customs agents patrol 
existing routes. Specialised warehouses for various goods, such as rice, are located along 
the Benin–Nigeria border, built and operated by brokers or private traders. A network of 
markets also dots both sides of the Benin–Nigeria border, with sister markets on either side 
of the frontier.13 
Complex relationships between traders and government officials alternate between 
cooperation and conflict in both Nigeria and Benin. Importers have elaborate ruses for 
evading import taxes. Nigerian prohibitions on imports through land borders are evaded 
quite easily considering that the number of unofficial crossing points far exceeds official 
border posts. Bans simply lead to declining traffic at official posts, in favour of unofficial 
posts, mainly in the northern part of the frontier or through Niger. Further, poorly paid 
customs officials often collude with traders to get around government efforts to curb 
smuggling. Traders refer to the bribes they pay as ‘sacrifice’. A Nigerian trader with the 
pseudonym Delani vividly described the process of rice smuggling:  
‘I work within a group of about seven [smugglers]. The least any of us handles is 1,000 bags. 
When people say rice importation has been banned though the land border, people like us 
just laugh. We have a leader. How we operate is that each person shops for the rice he has 
been contracted to supply. Any week we have a large shipment, we gather everything 
together. We load them on some trailers. Sometimes it may be 5,000 bags…Then our leader 
approaches our contacts in customs to arrange how the cargo gets through the border. We 
pay the customs officials NGN 1,000 on each bag of rice and we are issued a time, date, 
and route we could pass through that is not being monitored. Usually, we cross the border 
around 11 PM.’14  
Even if officials were to implement orders to crack down on smuggling, smugglers are 
frequently more heavily equipped and armed than customs and police officials. The situation 
is vividly illustrated by an incident where an anti-smuggling officer in Nigeria was shot dead 
by an army officer of the same nationality escorting a convoy of smuggled cars into the 
country.15 
                                               
12 www.lanationbenin.info/index.php/economie-2/144-economie/16850-commerce-de-reexportation-vers-le-
nigeria-un-nid-de-fraudes-fiscales, 3 July 2018. 
13 Based on Golub (2009); Golub (2012); Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye (2019); and on site field research carried out 
in 2018. 
14 https://punchng.com/inside-nigerias-multi-billion-naira-rice-smuggling-business/, 16 September 2017. 
15 https://punchng.com/soldiers-smuggle-cars-captain-kills-lagos-customs-officer/, 14 August 2017. 
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Boxes 1 and 2 provide a more detailed description of Benin’s trade in used cars and 
petroleum products, respectively.  
Box 1: Trade in used cars16 
                                               
16 This discussion of the used car market is based on Perret (2002), Golub (2012), and Mbaye, Golub, and 
Gueye (2019), and on field research carried out by the authors in Benin on several occasions since 2008. 
Used cars have been by far the most important of Benin’s entrepôt imports in terms of employment, 
income, and customs revenue since about 2000. Imports of vehicles in transit status rose steeply 
from 50,000 in 1996 to 200,000 in 2000, and to 250,000 in 2002 and 2003. After a dip in 2004–2005 
to about 150,000, they then increased steadily to nearly 350,000 in 2014 (Figure 8). Cars imported 
for domestic use are of the order of 20,000, i.e. less than 10% of cars imported in transit status. 
However, car imports declared for transit plunged in 2016–2017, falling below 100,000, still far above 
domestic consumption but down to levels not seen since before 2000.  
Figure 8. Number of cars imported in transit status, Benin and Togo, 2004–2017 
 
Source: Data obtained from the Port of Cotonou and the Port of Lomé.  
The used car trade is one of Benin’s major industries. Huge car parks can be seen on the outskirts 
of Cotonou. The business is estimated to employ 10,000 to 15,000 people directly, in importing, 
selling, storing, and driving etc, and several thousand more indirectly (Golub, 2009). The value added 
generated by the distribution and handling of used cars has been estimated at about 10% of Benin’s 
GDP, roughly the same as cotton.  
Cars are imported into Benin through a process of elaborate subterfuge. The vast majority of cars 
imported in transit status are declared as having Niger as their destination, but it is common 
knowledge that at least 90% end up in Nigeria. For example, in 2014, of the approximately 332,000 
cars imported in transit status, 326,000 were declared for Niger—obviously bearing no resemblance 
to actual shipments to Niger, where annual car purchases are almost certainly below 10,000. There 
is a well-established set of procedures for obtaining documents from customs authorising diversion 
of the cars to Nigeria.  
Used car imports follow an elaborate and well-organised circuit. Importers with connections in 
developed countries locate, purchase, and arrange for the transportation of the cars. Some of the 
importers are affiliated with international shipping companies, such as Grimaldi, that own their own 
boats. Others rent the boats. Freight forwarders (‘transitaires’) handle all the paperwork and 
authorisations. Other intermediaries play a role in matching buyers and sellers of cars. After the cars 
clear the port, they are stored in car parks in Cotonou, before being driven to their destination by 
companies specialising in the delivery of cars to the border, under escort from customs and with 
police permission. The cars are driven at night in convoys of about 100 cars. They cross the border 
to Nigeria after paying bribes to both Beninese and Nigerian customs inspectors. The bribe is routine 
and the amount is largely set by precedent, according to the transitaires interviewed. The cars then 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
 Benin  Togo
Benin’s Informal Trading with Nigeria 
© Economic Development & Institutions  25 
                                               
17 CFA francs are converted into dollars at a constant exchange rate of CFA 500 per dollar, to avoid valuation 
effects. 
receive valid licence plates in Nigeria. In short, government officials—from the highest to the lowest 
levels— on both sides of the border facilitate and benefit from this trade. 
Customs also applies considerable discretion in the valuation of imported cars, which alters the 
effective tax rate. A lower valuation may reduce the amount of ad valorem taxes collected. Figure 9 
shows average customs valuations of cars declared for transit and for domestic consumption in Benin 
and Togo, measured in US dollars.17 Presumably, cars imported in the two regimes are similar in 
quality since the per capita incomes and demand for cars do not differ much between Nigeria and 
Benin. In 2004–2007 cars imported for domestic use in Benin were assigned much higher values 
than cars in transit, a system that ceased from 2008–2011 and then resumed to a lesser extent in 
2012. In Togo, on the other hand, customs valuations are higher for cars imported in transit than for 
domestic consumption. Customs officials in both countries are likely responding to domestic political 
pressure from consumers, other government branches, and smugglers. 
Figure 9: Average valuations of cars imported under regimes for transit and domestic use, in 
US dollars 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Port of Cotonou and Customs data. 
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18 www.eiu.com/industry/article/695039253/nigerias-automotive-industry-is-struggling-for-traction/2017-01-24. 
19 www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-benin-smuggling/nigeria-recession-deals-blow-to-smuggling-hub-benin-
idUSKBN17125X, 30 March 2017. 
Togo competes intensely with Benin for access to the Nigerian market. Togo charges lower fees for 
a speedier service in handling car imports, in an attempt to offset Benin’s geographical advantage.  
The ample supply of ageing vehicles in developed countries and low incomes in West Africa provide 
a natural basis for trade in used cars. Toyota, Mercedes, and Peugeot cars predominated in the early 
2000s but other Japanese and European companies are increasingly prevalent. An accompanying 
market in spare parts has also flourished. 
Nigeria’s ineffective attempts to protect its own struggling car industry have diverted this trade to the 
parallel market. At the end of the 1970s, Nigeria assembled 100,000 cars but the car industry has 
been moribund in Nigeria for many years. In 1994, Nigeria banned imports of vehicles more than 
eight years old. In 2002, the law was further tightened to a ban of all cars more than five years old. 
Since then the permissible age has gradually increased. In 2013, steep tariffs were implemented as 
Nigeria unveiled another attempt to revive the auto industry with the Nigerian Automotive Industry 
Development Plan. Vehicle production increased moderately at first but has fallen back to very low 
levels in the last few years, declining even more rapidly than the rest of the manufacturing sector.18 
Nigeria has repeatedly banned imports of cars by land routes. These bans, however, have until 
recently proved impervious to the porous border between the two countries, the strong demand for 
cheap vehicles, and the ambiguous attitudes of the authorities in Nigeria. The recent sharp downturn 
in Benin’s imports is likely more due to the recession in Nigeria than to the effectiveness of the import 
ban. Regardless, the collapse of car distribution in Benin has had severe effects on income and 
employment. A recent article describes the change vividly: ‘Residents say drivers used to pass by in 
huge convoys, speeding towards the border, beeping their horns in celebration. Bars that sprang up 
to cater to visiting clients have closed and dozens of Lebanese, who dominate the import business 
in West Africa, have departed.’19 
Benin’s Informal Trading with Nigeria 
© Economic Development & Institutions  27 
Box 2: Petroleum product imports from Nigeria 
Smuggling of oil products into Benin began around 1980 and increased dramatically in 2000. Like 
the entrepôt trade from Benin to Nigeria, smuggling of petroleum products into Benin reflects 
differential policies combined with the ease of slipping goods across the border and the complicity of 
the two countries’ officials, including at the highest levels of the military. In this case, however, the 
main factors are the large subsidies in Nigeria, along with the alignment of domestic to world prices 
in Benin, which together result in much lower consumer prices in Nigeria compared to Benin (Morillon 
and Afouda, 2005; Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye, 2019). In recent years, Nigeria has partially 
deregulated petrol prices, but they remain well below Benin’s, although to a lesser extent for diesel 
than for gasoline.  
The black market price in Benin is determined by a mark-up on the Nigerian official price and has 
little connection to Benin’s official price. In 2016, our field research revealed a persistent although 
variable differential between the official and black market price (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Official and black market gasoline prices in Benin, CFA per litre, 2016 
 
Source: Field research in 2016. 
The share of gasoline supplied by informal imports from Nigeria rose from about 10% in 1998 and 
1999 to about 50% in 2000, and to 83% in 2001 and 2002, only tapering off slightly in 2003–2004 to 
72% (Morillon and Afouda, 2005). Despite some increases in Nigerian gasoline prices, the share of 
smuggled gasoline was estimated at about 80% of Benin’s domestic consumption in 2013 (Mbaye, 
Golub, and Gueye, 2019).  
The dominance of the informal market in Benin is reinforced by the lack of official gas stations, and 
the lack of stations in turn reflects the dominance of the informal market, with the zones bordering 
Nigeria in particular witnessing a decline in the number of operating service stations. In contrast, 
there is a very dense network of service stations in Nigeria, which readily supply the informal traders 
who smuggle the gasoline into Benin. 
The distribution network in Nigeria includes large wholesalers who have storage depots along the 
border that hold up to 1,000 litres of gasoline. These wholesalers have close political ties to high-
level officials in Nigeria. Wholesalers sell to various intermediary distributors of various sizes, who 
sneak the gasoline through the border by pirogue, cars whose gas tanks have been expanded, in 
small quantities on scooters, or on foot. 
The net effect of this massive trade in petroleum products on Benin’s economy is complex. It entails 
a large loss of fiscal revenues but is also a source of employment and income for traders and 
distributors, accounting for about 1–2% of GDP and 15,000–40,000 jobs, depending on the method 
of estimation (Golub, 2009). 
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6 The effects of informal trade on Benin  
The effects of ICBT on Benin are mixed (Galtier and Tassou, 1998). Golub (2009) estimated 
that ICBT generates about 20% of Benin’s GDP, and a somewhat smaller but still large part 
of employment, most of it in the handling of used cars and the distribution of petroleum 
products. The effects on fiscal revenue are particularly important. On the negative side, 
informal trade contributes to an institutional environment that favours informality, and that 
thus may impede the development of a modern formal private sector. There are also 
allegations of an association of informal trading with more insidious forms of illegal trade in 
arms and narcotics, but we do not have access to information about its extent. 
6.1 Effects on national income and employment 
The contribution to national income from informal trade derives from the value added in the 
handling and distribution of entrepôt trade and petroleum products, including tax revenues. 
There are no official measures of the value added of smuggling, but rough estimates can be 
derived from the previous analysis. Together, our calculations suggest that the handling and 
distribution of entrepôt trade and petroleum product imports account for approximately 20% 
of Benin’s GDP. Of these two, entrepôt trade is by far more significant.  
For this purpose, we can consider three main categories of entrepôt trade:  
 Cars imported in transit status: Cars require much more domestic handling in Benin than 
other goods, as described in Box 1. Cars are also subject to relatively high transit 
taxation of about 20%, as described below. We thus assume that the share of value 
added in car handling, shipping, and taxation is 70% of imported value. 
 Other goods imported in transit status, such as rice, cloth, and frozen poultry: These 
goods imported in transit status face minimal transit taxation and relatively little domestic 
handling, so we assume that domestic value added is only 20% of imported value.  
 Goods imported for official use but in fact transshipped to Nigeria, notably rice and 
frozen poultry: These goods imported in regimes for domestic use face import taxes 
averaging around 45% (30% for rice) but relatively little domestic handling, so we 
assume that value added is 50% of imported value.  
We assume further based on the trade data that: 1) total imports intended for transshipping 
to Nigeria are 50% of Benin’s GDP; and 2) the share of cars, goods falsely declared for 
domestic consumption, and other goods in entrepôt status constitute, respectively, 20%, 
20%, and 60% of informal trade with Nigeria. Under these assumptions, the contribution of 
value added in entrepôt status amounts to 18% of GDP.  
The effects of imports of petroleum products on Benin’s GDP are even more difficult to 
estimate but are much smaller. The most detailed study is Morillon and Afounda (2005). 
Their estimates of the gross margins of distributors suggest that the value added in informal 
trade of petroleum products amounts to about 2% of GDP. The extent to which traders’ 
incomes are a net addition to GDP is questionable insofar as the informal distribution of 
petroleum products displaces official distribution and, in the process, results in loss of 
government revenues. As Morillon and Afouda (2005) rightly observe, however, the informal 
import of petroleum products involves a terms of trade gain since Benin can import gasoline 
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at prices below world levels. Nigeria’s subsidised petroleum products are in effect a transfer 
to Benin. Morillon and Afounda’s (2005) calculations suggest that this trade gain is around 
1% of Benin’s GDP.  
There are likewise no official measures of employment in informal trade. Perret (2002) 
estimates that direct employment in the used car trade in 2001 was about 15,000, with 
indirect employment creation of around 100,000. Morillon and Afouda (2005) estimate that 
employment in smuggled petroleum products ranged from about 20,000 to 40,000, mostly 
traders and sellers, in the early 2000s. At the peak of the re-export trade around 2014, 
employment was likely much higher. The decline in entrepôt trade since 2015 has had 
significant negative effects on employment, particularly on the car distribution sector.  
While ICBT with Nigeria accounts for a sizeable share of national income and employment, 
the longer-term effects on economic growth and diversification could be negative. ICBT 
attracts entrepreneurial talent into illegal or semi-legal informal activities. Furthermore, the 
implication of government officials at all levels in informal activities makes reform much more 
difficult. Nevertheless, ICBT does not necessarily preclude investment in sectors where 
Benin has strong potential comparative advantage, such as horticulture and agro-
processing. There is abundant under-employed labour in Benin and improved opportunities 
in formal industry would likely attract many of the small-scale traders who work in informal 
trade as a last resort.  
6.2 Effects on government revenues 
Benin’s system of import taxation has revolved around maximising the income from entrepôt 
trade, by taxing goods when they enter Benin at a rate well below that in Nigeria, or taking 
advantage of Nigeria’s import prohibitions. However, avoidance of indirect taxes on 
smuggled petroleum products from Nigeria mitigates this revenue gain from entrepôt trade. 
Table 4 shows Benin’s high dependence on import tax revenues, which account for about 
half of tax revenues, far above the average share of about 10% of international trade taxes 
in tax revenues in low-income countries (Coady, 2019). A substantial drop in the tax revenue 
to GDP ratio from 14.5% in 2015 to 12.6% in 2017 was mostly due to reduced revenues 
from international trade taxes. This drop in international trade taxes was in turn due to a 
sharp decline in revenues from entrepôt trade (Table 5). 
Table 4: Benin’s dependence on import taxation 
 2011–2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 14.6 14.5 12.6 13.2 13.4 
Tax on int'l trade (% of GDP) 7.7 7 5.7 5.9 6 
Tax on int'l trade (% of total tax) 53% 48% 45% 45% 45% 
Source: IMF 
Table 5 shows the effective tax rates in Benin and Togo on entrepôt imports. These are 
calculated from customs data provided by the governments in both countries as the value of 
revenues from taxing imports in the transit and re-export regimes divided by the value of 
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entrepôt trade. The table presents information for cars as well as aggregate trade.  A 
number of interesting features appear from these data.  
First, the tax rates on Benin’s imports of cars in transit status are much higher than the rates 
for other goods. The effective tax rates on goods imported in transit status other than cars 
are well below 1%, whereas the rates on cars are in double digits. Second, Benin sharply 
raised the effective tax rate on cars imported in transit from about 13% in 2008–2010 to 
above 30% in 2012–2015. With the recession in Nigeria lowering demand, Benin rolled back 
the effective transit tax rate on cars to 23.6% in 2017. Third, Togo’s effective tax rates on 
entrepôt trade are very low both for cars and other goods, at well below 1%. Undoubtedly, 
this reflects Togo’s efforts to remain competitive despite its geographical disadvantage in 
smuggling goods, particularly cars, into Nigeria. Togo lowered transit taxes on cars in 2016–
17 like Benin, but starting from a much lower level of only 0.8%. 
Table 5 also presents the contribution of entrepôt trade regimes to tax revenues in the two 
countries. Not surprisingly in view of the effective tax rate differences, Benin collects much 
more revenue than Togo. Furthermore, and also related to the high rate of taxation on cars, 
cars account for more than two-thirds of Benin’s revenue from entrepôt trade. At its peak in 
2012–2015, entrepôt trade regimes contributed 41% of customs revenue, with cars alone 
accounting for 25%. With the sharp downturn in trade with Nigeria, the share of entrepôt 
trade in revenue collection dropped dramatically, falling in 2017 to 11% for all trade and 6% 
for cars. Togo, on the other hand, receives very little revenue from entrepôt trade due to its 
low tax rates. However, Togo did experience an increase of this ratio from 0.3% in 2008–
2011 to 3% in 2012–2015, due both to a slight increase in its effective tax rates and more 
importantly to a surge in entrepôt trade likely incentivised by trade diverted to Togo due to 
Benin’s higher tax rates. Like Benin, Togo’s revenues fell in 2016 and 2017 because of the 
recession in Nigeria. 
The estimates in Table 5 do not include revenues from goods imported under the regime for 
domestic consumption. Some of these goods, particularly for rice and a few other key 
products, are likely intended for Nigeria, although the proportion is difficult to ascertain 
precisely. Since goods imported for domestic consumption face higher import taxes than 
those in entrepôt status, such imports have a disproportionately higher effect on government 
revenues, although they constitute a relatively small part of smuggling (we assumed it 
constituted 20% of entrepôt trade in the calculation of value added). Including these goods 
labelled for domestic use but intended for Nigeria raises the share of import tax revenue 
from informal exports to Nigeria to about half of total import tax revenue, i.e. 3–4% of Benin’s 
GDP prior to the recent downturn.  
Against this, Benin’s loss of fiscal revenue due to smuggling of petroleum products from 
Nigeria was estimated by Morillon and Afouda (2005) at about 1% of GDP. A recent 
government estimate reported in the press put these losses at $37.5 million, or also about 
1% of GDP.20 This suggests that the net contribution of fiscal revenues from informal trade 
with Nigeria was equivalent to about 2–3% of GDP in 2012–2015, before the recent 
recession in Nigeria. 
                                               
20 https://energies-media.com/benin-perd-pres-375-millions-dollars-an-carburant-contrebande/ 
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Table 5: Entrepôt trade tax rates and revenues in Togo and Benin, 2008–2017 
  2008–2010 2011 2012–2015 2016 2017 
Effective tax rates on transit and re-exports 
Benin – Cars 12.9% 16.4% 33.6% 29.7% 23.6% 
Benin – All goods 3.4% 4.4% 6.9% 3.6% 2.1% 
      
Togo – Cars 0.8% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 
Togo – All goods 0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Share of import tax revenue due to transit and re-exports 
Benin – Cars 15.8% 21.9% 25.1% 11.5% 6.3% 
Benin – All goods 25.8% 38.7% 41.1% 17.5% 11.3% 
      
Togo – All goods 0.3% 0.3% 3.0% 2.2% 2.4% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Benin and Togo customs data. 
Figure 11 looks more closely at the effects of tax competition between Benin and Togo over 
the period 2002–2017. The blue line shows the differential in the average effective tax rate 
on entrepôt trade between Benin and Togo (right axis). The two bars show Benin and Togo’s 
entrepôt trade to GDP ratios respectively (left axis). Until 2015, a correlation between the tax 
differential and entrepôt trade is discernible, with Benin’s trade falling and Togo’s rising when 
the tax differential rises. In particular, Benin raised its taxes in 2003, and again in 2012, and 
Benin’s entrepôt trade fell while Togo’s rose. After 2014 the correlation breaks down due to 
demand-side shocks coming from Nigeria, causing Benin’s trade to fall despite a declining 
tax rate. Over the period 2002–2014 the correlation coefficient of the tax differential with the 
entrepôt to GDP ratio is -0.44 for Benin and 0.52 for Togo, confirming the visual impression. 
In summary, informal entrepôt trade constitutes a large part of national income and fiscal 
revenues, but they are subject to high variability due to competition from Togo and shocks in 
Nigeria.  
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Figure 11: Entrepôt tax rate differential (Benin minus Togo, in percent) and Entrepôt 
trade in Benin and Togo (percent of GDP) 
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7 Summary and policy conclusions 
Much of Benin’s economy is under the spell of the policies and institutions of its giant 
neighbour Nigeria. Nigeria’s power as the largest economy on the African continent is 
unfortunately distorted by the resource curse of dependency on oil in a setting of weak 
institutions. A rather unhealthy, even parasitic, relationship has developed between Benin 
and Nigeria. Resource rents in Nigeria are ultimately transmitted to Benin through smuggling 
rents. 
Benin has developed a sophisticated institutional structure to support its role as a smuggling 
hub for Nigeria. The resulting entrepôt trade has become one of Benin’s largest industries. 
This trade can be quite lucrative, both for the participants and for Benin’s government, which 
collects substantial revenues from it. Used cars are by far the most important industry in 
terms of national income and fiscal revenue, accounting for about two-thirds of aggregate 
import tax revenue from entrepôt trade. Customs administration in particular is configured to 
enable smuggling. The Benin tax authorities balance the priority to raise additional revenues 
against fostering the growth of this trade.  
These benefits of ICBT to Benin, however, are very fragile, dependent as they are on the 
vagaries of economic policy in Nigeria. The repeated closures of the border are ominous 
demonstrations of Nigeria’s ability to shut down the re-export trade if it chooses to do so. 
Likewise, if Nigeria ever did really harmonise its trade policies within ECOWAS, the raison 
d’être of this trade would largely disappear. Perhaps of greater immediate concern is Benin’s 
vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks emanating from Nigeria. The recent sharp drop in 
most entrepôt imports in Benin is due primarily to the recession in Nigeria rather than border 
closures. The severe shortage of foreign exchange in Nigeria in 2015–2017, combined with 
a fixed official parity, led to large depreciation of the naira on the black market. This black 
market depreciation has exacerbated the downturn, as Nigerian consumers must pay higher 
prices in naira for goods invoiced in foreign currencies.  
At a broader level, a case can be made that the flourishing of informal trade has retarded 
Benin’s development. The large fiscal benefits of re-exporting have reduced the 
government’s impetus to promote productive economic activities. The lure of the rents in 
Nigeria’s distorted markets exacerbates a culture of corruption and tax evasion that is not 
conducive to a productive economy. It is doubtful that a development strategy based on 
smuggling and fraud is a viable long-run path to emerging market status. 
In principle, it would be desirable for Benin to coordinate macroeconomic and trade policies 
with Nigeria, to avoid creating incentives for Benin to circumvent discrepancies in prices 
between countries. It is highly unrealistic, however, to expect Nigeria to coordinate its 
policies with Benin. Benin is far too small to exert any substantial influence on Nigeria’s 
policies and Benin has limited autonomy insofar as it is tightly integrated into WAEMU. 
Nigeria is unlikely to abandon the protection of influential industries any time soon. For 
Nigeria, domestic interest groups and perceived national interest are going to trump Benin’s 
interests. Thus, the numerous announcements of separate or joint efforts to combat 
smuggling by the two governments, such as those discussed in Section 2, have had no 
discernible long-run effects on informal trade. The incentives to take advantage of large 
pricing differences due to Nigeria’s high import barriers and subsidies are very powerful 
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inducements both to traders and border officials to engage in or enable smuggling. The only 
sustainable solution is for Nigeria to realise that it is not in its interest to pursue policies of 
relying on import protection to boost inefficient domestic industries and subsidising gasoline 
use.  
Benin can work within ECOWAS to gradually promote harmonisation of policies, but Nigeria 
is unlikely to cede a great deal of sovereignty to ECOWAS either. ECOWAS does have 
agreements to combat child trafficking and other illegal activities but has no programmes to 
stop smuggling in legal goods, as far as we know. For example, Nigeria has retained an 
import prohibition list for which there are no provisions in ECOWAS. The Buhari 
government’s refusal to join the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) further reveals 
Nigeria’s intention to continue to protect domestic industries. Benin is also one of the three 
remaining countries that have yet to sign ACFTA (Eritrea is the third).21 
Instead, Benin should focus on improving its own institutions and productive capabilities. In 
some respects, Benin’s combination of formal and informal institutions supporting entrepôt 
trade are quite sophisticated and effective in their objective of promoting Benin as an 
informal trade hub. The problem is that a development policy oriented towards informality 
and smuggling is unsustainable. The challenge for Benin is therefore to channel its evident 
energy and creativity in a more viable direction. Benin is well placed to continue to serve as 
a regional trading and service centre for legal trade and services, benefiting from its 
proximity to Nigeria and links to the land-locked countries to the north. Moreover, if Benin 
moves away from smuggling towards formal trade, avenues for cooperation with Nigeria 
could open up. 
Rather than focus on eradicating smuggling, which it is largely impossible to do under 
current Nigerian policies, Benin should take measures that improve the business 
environment for legal businesses. The 2005 Benin Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 
(DTIS) (World Bank, 2005) argued that Benin could emulate Hong Kong.22 Hong Kong 
transitioned from being an entrepôt for illegal trade to China in the 1950s into a diversified 
manufacturing and service economy (Chau, 1997). Hong Kong developed world-class 
institutions, particularly trade facilitation (port and customs), a reliable legal system and 
property rights, and efficient infrastructure. Hong Kong managed to maintain the efficiency 
and probity of its own public services even as it served as an entrepôt for illicit trade. In 
Benin, by contrast, the institutional underpinnings of a market economy, such as the legal 
system and infrastructure, are better than Nigeria’s but generally still poor.  
The recent sharp downturn in entrepôt trade due to the recession in Nigeria and Nigeria’s 
efforts to close the border to smuggling from Benin should be a wake-up call to Benin to 
initiate fundamental reforms. The 1951 United Nations embargo on China was a major 
impetus to Hong Kong’s shift from an entrepôt economy to a producer of manufactured and 
service exports for developed countries.23 At the same time, if Nigeria is able to rein in 
corruption and tap its own massive potential it could then benefit Benin, just as Hong Kong 
                                               
21 ‘African Union urges Nigeria to join New Trade Zone’, Financial Times, 9 May 2019, 
www.ft.com/content/b1d880a2-723b-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5 
22 Stephen Golub was the lead consultant and author of the 2005 Benin DTIS.  
23 As Chau (1997) describes, Hong Kong’s traders were able to adapt their entrepreneurial skills to 
manufacturing remarkably easily, contrary to the view, which is often voiced in Benin, that trading and production 
are antithetical. Also, Hong Kong benefited from the movement of entrepreneurs from China, just as Benin can 
take advantage of the influx of Nigerian businesspeople. 
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re-invented itself as a financial and organisational service centre for Chinese manufactured 
exports with China’s opening to the world economy in the 1980s.  
Benin is much less developed than Hong Kong but the precedent set by Hong Kong in 
transitioning from illicit to formal trade is still relevant as providing a general plan. In 
particular, Benin needs to follow Hong Kong’s example in two ways: 1) reinvent itself as a 
legal commercial centre serving the region; and 2) develop competitive domestic industries. 
In the case of Hong Kong, export diversification involved shifting into labour-intensive 
manufacturing; Benin has a comparative advantage in tropical produce and horticulture. At 
present, Benin’s trade facilitation institutions and business climate are sufficiently superior to 
Nigeria’s to circumvent Nigeria’s trade barriers, but inadequate for serving as a regional 
service centre for legal trade and facilitating foreign and domestic investment. The mediocre 
quality of public services in Benin extends to the port and customs administration, which are 
critical for a country with ambitions to serve as a trading centre.  
The two Benin DTIS (World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2015) provide detailed 
recommendations for improvements in trade facilitation and other institutions that could 
contribute to Benin becoming a hub for formal trade with Nigeria and other countries in the 
region. These include: modernisation of customs, using more information technology and 
formal management procedures that improve accountability and transparency; improved port 
logistics; and linked rail and road infrastructure investments. Some progress in this regard 
has been made. The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s programme for improving the Port 
of Cotonou was found to have a considerable success in raising operational efficiency, 
lowering costs, and reducing petty corruption (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2018). 
While past reforms of customs have largely failed, more recently progress has been made in 
the adoption of a new customs code and modern international practices, such as the SAFE 
framework of Standards of the World Customs Organization, the revised Kyoto Convention, 
and the Agreement on the Facilitation of WTO Trade (World Bank 2018) 
More broadly, Benin needs to upgrade its institutions to boost investment in productive 
activities, as discussed throughout this book. A positive agenda for encouraging investment 
is more promising than cracking down on informal trade with Nigeria. The latter largely 
depends on Nigeria adopting more sensible policies while the former is much more in 
Benin’s own control. In terms of the availability of resources, there is no need to eradicate 
informal trade with Nigeria for Benin to expand formal production of goods and services. 
There are plenty of under-employed people who will gladly switch to better-paying and less 
hazardous formal sector jobs if these were to be created. The binding constraint is the 
adverse business climate that deters foreign and domestic investments in productive 
activities. Improvements in the business climate in turn require better governance. The 
question then is whether the pervasiveness of informality precludes reforms to the business 
climate. There is obvious cause for concern in this regard. Despite some significant 
improvements in trade facilitation, little progress has been made in improving governance 
and reducing corruption. There are numerous interest groups that benefit from and 
perpetuate Benin’s high level of corruption who will oppose efforts to create a more inclusive 
and transparent business climate. It remains to be seen if President Talon has the vision and 
leadership skills to catalyse reforms of the business environment that support formal 
investment. His background as a successful entrepreneur in the cotton sector is promising. 
An important symbolic step would be for Benin to join ACFTA.  
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Discussion of ‘Benin’s informal trading with Nigeria’ 
Benin–Nigeria relations are based on close ties reinforced by the disparities created by 
historical, geographical, and colonial factors. These disparities were amplified by the 
discovery of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s and the spread of oil revenue in neighbouring 
countries. For Benin, the result was the adoption of a re-exporting policy introduced in 1973 
by the revolutionary government, to take better advantage of Nigeria's oil revenue. This re-
exporting system, which turned the country into an 'entrepôt state', has remained in force to 
this day, despite the various upheavals the country has gone through. 
Benin–Nigeria relations also play an important and specific role in the Beninese economy. 
As such, they have long been the subject of comprehensive studies by various authors, 
particularly within the Regional Analysis and Social Expertise Laboratory (LARES). From this 
perspective, the study presented by S. Golub and A. Mbaye is interesting because of the 
specific approach they take, i.e. analysing the institutional constraints. Rather than 
discussing, refining, or adding to some of the points they raise, the discussion below will 
primarily focus on the future prospects of Benin–Nigeria relations, based on the current 
situation of the Benin economy. The first section will cover the difficulties facing the 
Beninese economy following the economic slowdown in Nigeria, and the second will cover 
the strategies to be developed for the future. 
1 The impact of Benin–Nigeria trade relations on Benin's economic sector 
Despite the enormous benefits of Benin–Nigeria trade relations for the population and public 
revenues, they constitute serious obstacles to vital sectors of the economy. For the public, 
re-exporting and imports from Nigeria are the main activities, both in cities and in the border 
regions. As regards public revenues, the activities of customs authorities, and even the tax 
department, largely depend on these relations.  As for the vital sectors of the economy, the 
competitiveness of the Nigerian market compared to the Beninese market paralyses 
industrial activity. Various economic sectors are the victim of the trade relations between 
Benin and Nigeria. The most affected are industry, distribution, and transport.  In the 
industrial sector, the most affected sectors are manufacturers of reinforced concrete and the 
food industries, including SOBEBRA, the Beninese brewing company.  Still in the food 
sector, fish farmers, such as the company Cossi et Fils, a company which specialises in 
breeding catfish, have seen a significant slowdown in their activities, as there are fewer and 
fewer Nigerian customers, the main buyers of these catfish. On top of these difficulties, 
sellers of imported fabrics, such as Indian merchants, located along Avenue Delorme, who 
sell lace and printed fabrics from China, no longer see large numbers of Nigerian buyers in 
their shops. Even Walkden, which specialises in selling wax fabric, is no longer immune. 
These leading merchants from the Dantopka market no longer sell in the quantities they 
used to.   
But the main difficulty for industry arising from the Nigerian financial crisis of recent years is 
that borne by the cement sector, which faces stiff competition from cement from Nigeria, 
which is sold along the border at CFA 50,000  per tonne, versus CFA 65,000 for cement 
produced in Beninese factories. Given the importance of having your own home in Benin, 
this trade in cement is likely to lead to the same result as occurred in the trade in Kpayo 
petrol: it will destroy the cement factories in Benin.  
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All these crisis situations and collapsing sales weigh heavily on public revenues and 
people's living standards.  In terms of public revenues, these are measured by customs 
revenues and the taxation of re-exporting activities, as well as the level of taxes paid by 
private companies. These revenues form the basis of the state's resources. 
As regards the consequences of Benin–Nigeria trade relations for the public, these can be 
assessed in two ways. On the one hand, there are the negative consequences of the state's 
inability to ensure the vital needs of the population, which are partially met by the 
extraordinary development of the informal sector. On the other hand, these consequences 
can also be analysed positively in relation to the competitiveness of the Nigerian market, 
which is very popular with the Beninese public. Nigerian goods are cheaper, thereby 
enhancing the purchasing power of the Beninese. The markets for Kpayo petrol, beverages, 
and building materials imported from Benin's eastern neighbour also work in the same way. 
These products are less expensive, allowing Beninese to save money. 
2 The future of Benin–Nigeria trade relations  
The future of Benin–Nigeria trade relations depends on the envisaged strategies for 
improving trade relations with Nigeria and preserving the competitiveness of the Beninese 
economy vis-à-vis its neighbour to the east. These strategies concern both the 
administrative authorities and the economic actors themselves.  
2.1 The strategies of the administrative authorities 
As regards the strategies that should be adopted by the Beninese government, we can 
identify six different strands:  
 Better organising Benin's economy around promising sectors, such as strengthening the 
service economy, for which people based in Nigeria (including ECOWAS managerial 
staff and international institutions) will need Benin (efficient educational institutions, 
benchmark health centres, a state-of-the-art communication system with an innovative 
and efficient financial system, etc.). 
 Improving and promoting the agricultural sectors which are in high demand in Nigeria, 
including soybeans, maize, pineapples, and livestock.  
 Better organising the actors of this economy, who are currently trying to penetrate the 
Nigerian market without any discernible plan, only an individualistic strategy, which 
means it is not possible to ensure the supply and quality of Beninese products on the 
Nigerian market. The aim should be to organise these actors into cooperatives, for each 
promising sector, to forge links with Nigerian economic operators in order to better 
negotiate the conditions for selling Beninese products in Nigeria.  
 Setting up new bilateral cooperation instruments. Benin–Nigeria cooperation is governed 
by several bilateral agreements concluded within the framework of the Benin–Nigeria 
Commission, which meets periodically. Despite the existence of this legal framework, 
cooperation between Benin and Nigeria does not always meet the expectations of the 
public of these two countries, who have set up several cross-border cooperation 
associations in the border corridors. For Nigerian and Beninese companies, the free 
movement of people and goods rings hollow. They want these cooperation instruments 
to insist on ending the harassment of traders, that new infrastructure be put in place 
Benin’s Informal Trading with Nigeria 
© Economic Development & Institutions  40 
along the border, such as central purchasing offices and storage warehouses, and that 
road crossings are cleaned up, etc. 
 Setting up a new CFA–NGN exchange rate mechanism, by:  
 securing funds that need to be transported, better guaranteeing the system for 
transaction payments; and  
 a comprehensive reflection between the two countries to better stabilise the 
exchange rate between the CFA and the naira. 
 Setting up a new Benin–Nigeria trade observatory, which has become necessary and 
urgent in order to better monitor the impact of the policies pursued by neighbouring 
countries on Benin's development.  
2.2 The strategies of economic actors 
Various economic actors who would like to do business in Nigeria have very little knowledge 
of the country and how its market functions. To correct this, it is vital for Beninese economic 
operators to do the following: 
 Set up a mechanism for consultation and partnership between the chambers of 
commerce of the two countries, to resolve the problems of susceptibility linked to mutual 
mistrust. Beninese economic operators should also participate in initiatives that bring 
economic actors together in the region, such as that of Nextport Trade, a company that 
brings together businessmen looking to move into the regional market.  
 Create cross-border cooperation associations involving all the economic actors who are 
active in the border corridors, in order to better secure and facilitate the movement of 
people and goods.  
 Better inform entrepreneurs in Benin about how Nigerian companies operate, and about 
strategies to access the market. Entrepreneurs also need to accept to adjust their prices 
on the Beninese market, to be better able to respond to the Nigerian competition.  
Benin–Nigeria trade relations will remain dynamic regardless of the crises affecting Nigeria 
and the reforms undertaken by the country. There are two reasons for this dynamism. The 
first is the proximity of the capital Lagos, which has a population larger than Benin's. (We are 
talking about an urban area where the purchasing power of the public is always higher than 
that of the Beninese, no matter how much the naira falls). The second reason is the fact that 
the reforms being made in Nigeria do not always take into account the fact that the statistical 
data in this country are approximations, resulting in fairly large margins that can be captured 
through local relations.  
Nigerians are well aware of this, which is why at the public level everyone is interested in the 
relations between Benin and Nigeria. But in order for these relations to function properly, 
Benin needs to be attentive to all the developments going on in Nigeria, and to adjust its 
diplomatic economic policy accordingly. 
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Introduction 
Based on the descriptive analysis of the economic, social, and political context in the first 
part of this volume, and the various thematic studies in the second part, this final chapter 
provides an overall institutional diagnostic of Benin. This is done in three stages. First, we 
provide a summary of each previous chapter, broadening it in some instances to strengthen 
the conclusion and emphasizing their institutional implications. Placing these summaries 
side-by-side makes it is possible to draw up a short-list of the key institutional weaknesses 
that hinder Benin's development. Second, the analysis goes a step further by reflecting on 
the proximate causes of these weaknesses, and the deep factors behind them. This 
reflection thus provides a reasonably complete diagnostic of the institutional challenges 
faced by Benin. This diagnostic then feeds, in the final section of the chapter, into an 
exploration of possible and feasible policy reforms to address some of the challenges in 
order to promote sustainable and inclusive economic development in Benin.  
Before getting into the crux of the matter, several warnings are necessary about the scope of 
the diagnostic.  
The first warning concerns the need for the diagnostic to focus on Benin per se and not on 
Benin as comparable or very different from other countries in the same region and at a 
comparable level of development. It is always tempting to establish a diagnostic of a case by 
comparing it to other cases that would constitute a kind of norm. In a previous chapter of this 
volume, Benin was compared to neighbouring Sub-Saharan countries in an attempt at 
identifying features that would be specific of Benin. Few strong differences were observed. 
Likewise, the in-depth analysis in the preceding thematic chapters may point to institutional 
weaknesses that are not necessarily specific of Benin. At this stage of the analysis, however, 
this is not an issue. What matters is to what extent those institutional weaknesses are 
obstacles to faster and more inclusive development in Benin, the focus of our diagnostic. 
What prevents Benin to do better may well be common with other Sub-Saharan countries. 
As long as these countries cannot be considered as uniformly more successful than Benin 
on their development path, or models that should be imitated, it matters little for all those 
concerned by Benin's development.  
The second warning is somewhat related to the previous one, although of more conceptual 
relevance. The kind of institutional diagnostic we are about to draw goes from institutions to 
development. It tries to identify institutional weaknesses that hinder development, their 
causes and, possibly, directions of institutional reform. When analysing proximate causes 
and deep factors behind those weaknesses, however, it cannot be ignored that low 
development itself may be responsible for institutional weaknesses.  As emphasised by 
many authors – see in particular the introductory chapter in Baland et al. (2019) – the 
relationship between development and institution is circular. There is a clear cross-country 
correlation between the level of development, roughly measured by GDP per capita, and the 
quality of institutions as estimated by synthetic indicators in international databases. The 
correlation is still stronger when using cross-country panel data. But the causality clearly 
goes in both directions. Low development is an obstacle to institutional improvement and 
weak institutions hampers economic development. Benin is no exception. Yet, the 
effectiveness and policy relevance of the diagnostic exercise to be undertaken must 
precisely focus on whether the institution-development circularity may be broken on the 
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institutional side and how. This, of course, does not prevent recognising the constraints that 
development may impose on institutional reforms.  
The last warning is about the status of policy recommendation in an analytical framework 
where the political economy consequences of the institutional setting of a country are fully 
taken into account, as could be seen in several of the preceding thematic chapters. There is 
a kind of 'political economy curse' in economic analysis. No policy recommendation can 
really be made given that policy decisions are completely endogenous. There is thus a risk 
that policy conclusions can be considered as wishful thinking.  
There are various cases where this risk is limited, though. First, there may exist reforms that 
would improve the welfare of most actors in society, if not in the short run, at least over not 
too distant a horizon. If so, identifying them and introducing them in the public debate is of 
first importance. Second, a desirable reform for faster and more inclusive development may 
be opposed by powerful groups of interest today. Yet, the distribution of political power may 
change in the future and it matters very much that those who could get more control over 
policy be aware of such a reform. Third, external factors – donors, neighbouring countries' 
policies, commodity prices, etc. – play a role in shaping the set of politically feasible reforms. 
It is important to be aware of what possible changes these factors may imply.   
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1 Identifying institutional constraints on the 
development of Benin 
This section provides a summary of the previous chapters of this volume that emphasises 
key institutional weaknesses that are likely to hinder economic development. In some cases, 
additional considerations are offered that broaden or generalise the analysis and its 
conclusions. The same organisation is used as in the previous chapters of this volume, with 
the first three summaries describing the socio-economic and socio-political context of 
development in Benin and the following five focusing on critical areas of that development. 
The section ends with a list of the main institutional weaknesses, which forms the basis of 
our institutional diagnostic of Benin's economic development in the next section.  
1.1 The socio-political, economic, and institutional context of 
development in Benin  
1.1.1 The socio-political context  
Chapter 1 by Jean-Philippe Platteau, emphasises the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Benin, 
some of which also live beyond the country’s borders. The question therefore arises as to 
whether such a high degree of ethnic diversity is an impediment to the long-term 
development of the country. Here, it is useful to distinguish between economic and political 
effects. Regarding the former, the idea that a potential advantage of ethnic diversity lies in 
skill complementarities between ethnic groups applies well to Benin, where groups such as 
the Yoruba and the Bariba have over time developed useful skills and experience in all sorts 
of trading business while many other groups have specialised in agriculture, for example. 
Turning now to the political effect, ethnic diversity can create political instability, and, in this 
respect, the proliferation of political parties formed on an ethno-regional basis may appear 
worrying. Such an instability was particularly pronounced in the first decade after 
independence, and even during the subsequent Marxist-Leninist period, despite the 
authoritarian rule that was observed then. It was only in 1990, with the Renouveau 
Démocratique (Democratic Renewal), that the political system apparently stabilised into a 
liberal democratic regime, for which Benin has often been praised by donors. The 
democratic regime (with the economic liberalization that goes with it) seems to have been 
stable because it restored former post-colonial trade-and-wealth clusters attached to some 
proeminent ethnic groups, which was reassuring for the donor community. It is noteworthy 
that, since the change of regime initiated by the Renouveau Démocratique, four presidents 
have succeeded each other in democratic elections, never violating the two successive 
mandates ceiling imposed by the constitution. On the other hand, the rotation at the highest 
levels of political power (presidency, parliament, and ministerial positions) of personalities 
belonging to different ethnic groups and regions offers a reassuring picture.  
Behind the democratic façade, however, a fierce struggle opposes several wealthy men, 
who lead political factions based on ethnic and regional affiliations, but also based on other 
identity markers. Especially destabilising is the opposition between the three main branches 
of the dominant ethnic group (the Adja-Fon): struggles inside a group may thus be more 
damaging than tensions between various groups and, in the case of Benin, the Yoruba, the 
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Bariba and the Atacora group (the three other main ethnic groups) have continuously played 
a key refereeing role since the time of independence, whether in an authoritarian or a 
democratic setting. Towards the members of their faction the Big Men or oligarchs behave 
as genuine patrons, implying that in return for their support and loyalty they are committed to 
distributing various kinds of advantages down the vertical chain at the apex of which they 
operate. Because they consider state power as a privileged instrument to advance their 
particular business interests, they seek to take control of it. Their preferred tactic to achieve 
that aim consists of gaining the support of a professional politician by financing his 
campaigning expenses, or directly competing for high political positions, including the 
presidency. Given the multiplicity of factions, they need to also strike alliances with several 
other factions and small political parties, which they generally do by encouraging their 
regrouping under the umbrella of a wider political bloc or confederation.  
Alliances are typically unstable and generate unstable policies. This feature of Benin’s 
political landscape is essentially explained by two factors: (1) the lack of mutual trust 
between the oligarchs and the resulting lack of credibility of their promises, and (2) the 
existence of multiple oligarchs naturally tempted by the short-term gains of coalition shifts 
and outmanoeuvring of rivals. An example of the resulting policy instability is provided by the 
wavering between public and private management of the cotton sector over the last 10 years 
or so. Policy instability and the consequent infeasibility of long-term planning are not the only 
deleterious consequences of the patrimonial conception of the state among multiple greedy 
oligarchs and politicians. Another perverse consequence is a demoralising effect on the 
population, which witnesses a succession of obscure political manoeuvres as well as 
scandals whose most common manifestations are sheer favouritism, abuse of public 
positions, tax evasion, and the embezzlement of public resources. Accusations of 
embezzlement and rent capture concern not only prestigious construction projects, but also 
programmes that are critical for the wellbeing of the population and the long-term 
development of the country (such as water, electricity, and other vital infrastructure projects). 
In a context where most of the misdeeds and extortions stand unpunished or uncorrected, it 
is not surprising that the people of Benin have a particularly deep mistrust of tax authorities 
and the judiciary system. The positive effect of a legacy of pre-colonial centralised state 
organisations is thus undermined by an opaque political game in which key business actors 
play a major role.  
The suggestion has been made that people's mistrust of public administrations in Benin is 
the consequence of interpersonal distrust, possibly due to the ethnic fragmentation and as a 
legacy of widespread slave trading. Based on rough comparative evidence from the Afro 
Barometer, this seems to be untrue: if the citizens of Benin have a comparatively strong 
mistrust in some important institutions, they do not exhibit particularly strong distrust in their 
day-to-day interpersonal relations.  
Major institutional hurdles, to which we shall return in the second part of this final chapter, 
seem to be the environment of policy instability, deep inequalities, and widespread 
corruption that characterises Benin. Behind this adverse environment lies a neo-patrimonial 
political system in which no single figurehead exerts total control.  
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1.1.2 The economic development context  
Benin is a poor country whose development since the turn of the present century has lagged 
behind many low-income countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa. As is stressed in 
Chapter 2, by Romain Houssa and Paul Reding, its comparative advantage lies in two key 
sectors: cotton exports and illegal re-exports of manufactured imports to Nigeria. The latter 
has its roots in the long and porous border with Nigeria and the protection of manufacturing 
industry being substantially higher there than in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) customs union to which Benin belongs. This allows Benin to share the oil 
rent of its giant neighbour. Together with the importance of cotton exports, this actually gives 
Benin some of the qualities of a resource-rich country, including being dependent on world 
commodity prices, and experiencing Dutch disease – through illegal imports from Nigeria, 
the counterpart of Benin re-exports, which crowd out some domestic activity – as well as its 
governance problems.  
Even though cotton exports and the cross-border trade with Nigeria virtually makes Benin a 
commodity exporter, there is a substantial difference with other developing countries sharing 
that characteristic. It is that the diverted oil rent is exploited by the informal sector and thus 
benefits directly a large segment of the non-agricultural unskilled labour force. Thus, there is 
a dualism between the two major sectors of the economy: a rather formal organisation of the 
cotton sector vs. necessarily informal arrangements within the cross-border trade with 
Nigeria. This dualism is a key specific feature of the Beninese economy.     
Natural resources or primary commodities rarely provide exporters with a stable long-run 
engine of development. Benin's growth performance over the recent past has been 
mediocre. The 10-year mean annual rate of growth of GDP per capita has fluctuated at 
around 1.1%. Labour productivity has grown a bit more slowly, essentially because of labour 
movements out of low-productivity agricultural activities towards more productive sectors. 
Yet, this did not prevent productivity to decline in most of these sectors whereas it remained 
stagnant in agriculture.  
This poor growth performance partly originates in the two major sectors of the economy: 
cotton production and cross-border trade with Nigeria. Cotton production in Benin has long 
been trailing behind that of other West African countries, mostly because of institutional 
instability in the organisation of production and commercialisation. On the other hand, re-
exports to and illegal imports from Nigeria have created a huge low-productivity informal 
sector that may have crowded out better economic opportunities. Informality is indeed 
markedly higher in Benin than in most countries in the region.1  
Low rates of labour productivity growth in the other sectors of the economy are a major 
concern too. Whereas in the informal segment of these sectors (which is huge) low labour 
productivity is caused by a lack of capital, in the formal segment it stems from a low 
productivity of capital, itself the result of low capacity utilisation and inefficient organisation. 
An additional issue is land tenure insecurity. The problem seems particularly important in 
urban and peri-urban settings, as well as in rural areas in which significant migrant groups 
coexist with the native population. The response of the state has been hesitant and 
                                               
1 It is somewhat surprising that Benin's GDP growth is only weakly related to Nigeria's. Yet, multiple factors affect 
illegal imports in that country that are difficult to evaluate.  
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numerous changes have been made to the 2013 land law, which has faced many 
enforcement difficulties.  
Prospects for faster and more stable growth in Benin lie in the diversification and 
restructuring of the economy. This might be possible in agriculture, as exemplified by the 
recent surge in pineapple exports. Some land is still available in the north of the country and 
yields are low throughout the country and could certainly be improved. Progress would 
require more efforts in enhancing agricultural productivity, and developing transport 
infrastructure, notably rural roads in the north. Exporting transport services through 
modernising the Cotonou port and transforming it into a major hub for the whole region, 
including Nigeria and Benin's hinterland, is also envisaged. Progress on these diversification 
fronts is presently limited. If more were to be done, however, Benin's long run development 
would remain essentially based on commodity exports, with all their shortcomings.  
Development strategies anchored in more knowledge-intensive activities offer better and 
less volatile returns than traditional activities based on raw agricultural products. However, 
such a re-orientation of the economic development strategy would represent a drastic 
change as it necessitates huge investments in human capital to allow the country to move up 
the technological ladder. Over the last decades Benin has made noticeable progress on the 
educational front and this is a step in the right direction. Yet this positive assessment must 
be qualified in two ways. First, Benin started from a very low basis, and its achievements in 
terms of the literacy of the population remain very disappointing.2 Second, much of the 
educational progress is in the form of rising gross enrolment in primary (and post-primary) 
schooling. However, the quality of education has not been improved, and has probably 
deteriorated during the period of increasing admissions into the schooling system.  
Diversifying activity away from raw agricultural commodity exports would also require 
noticeable investments in infrastructure, like power supply and telecommunication. Benin is 
among the countries with the lowest consumption of electricity per capita, and much below 
the sub-Saharan median in terms of internet servers per inhabitant.  
Benin's development is not only slow, but it is unequally distributed. The coastal cities of 
Porto Novo and Cotonou, and their hinterland, constitute the growth pole of Benin’s 
economy. It is in their tiny departments that poverty is kept under control, unlike in many 
other parts of the country where it remains intolerably high. Overall monetary poverty seems 
to have increased over the last decade, the same being true of inequality in consumption 
expenditures. Development in Benin thus appears to be unbalanced and to be marked by 
big spatial disparities. The northern part of the country, in particular, suffers from a lack of 
critical public investments, in spite of the fact that its political representatives have not been 
consistently deprived of access to the highest levels of state power. A lopsided spatial 
development has resulted.  
                                               
2 This observation refers to primary and lower secondary education. It is true that in the pre-independence period 
higher education in Benin was considered as more developed than in the rest of West Africa. In 1948, Benin was 
even described as the 'Quartier Latin' of the region by a French observer. However, the true citation is more 
critical than it appears. It said: "Dahomey is the Quartier Latin of Africa. But this intellectualism made of nastiness 
and petty-mindedness is likely to sink the development of the country", E. Mounier, L'éveil de l'Afrique Noire, 
1948.   
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One of the most pressing concerns regarding the development pattern of Benin is its 
sustainability in the medium and long run. As it stands, the economy remains heavily 
dependent on external financial flows, and official development assistance in particular. 
Although slowly decreasing, the latter still amounts to more than 6% of GDP - above the 
median of Sub-Saharan countries. The ongoing structural transformation of the Beninese 
economy does not offer the prospect of a foreseeable reduction in such dependence on 
external financing. Indeed, the significant decrease in the share of agriculture in domestic 
value-added has not been associated with a corresponding increase in the share of 
tradeable manufactured goods, but rather with a rapid increase in the share of non-tradeable 
services. Directly related to this weakness is the low diversification in export goods.  
It is difficult not to relate Benin's poor development performance and prospects to the way 
institutions have been working and still work today. Even under a so-called Marxist regime, 
the general long-term interest did not prevail as key sectors of the economy, banks and 
financial institutions in particular, were simply appropriated by president Kérékou and his 
northern clique for their own short-term benefit. Albeit under more subtle forms, this 
kleptocratic system survived through the ensuing Democratic Renewal period, as witnessed 
by the continuing meddling of politicians in the economy and of businessmen in politics: the 
oligarchs acting behind the screen of formally democratic institutions make key decisions in, 
and appear to be the effective owners of, parastatals and formally independent private 
corporations. This is especially patent in the case of the cotton sector but really affects the 
whole economy.  
Such a characterization of Benin's development is fully consistent with what is observed on 
the poverty and inequality front. The comparability of data over time is generally limited in 
this area. But, based on household surveys, few countries have seen an increase in the 
proportion of poor people in the population over the last 10 years or so. Still less have 
witnessed the strong and continuous increase in inequality observed in Benin since the turn 
of the millennium.   
1.1.3 Appraisal of the quality of Benin's institutions 
Three types of evidence on the quality of institutions in Benin and the way they could affect 
development performance are considered in Chapter 3, by Romain Houssa and François 
Bourguignon:  synthetic indicators, as available in cross-country databases; a specific 
opinion survey among various types of local decision makers; and an analysis of the 
institutional implications of identified economic binding constraints in several recent growth 
diagnostic exercises. These various sources converge in pointing out several institutional 
weaknesses that hamper an acceleration of development in Benin, even though they may 
not always agree on the severity of these institutional constraints. 
Corruption is unanimously seen as the most serious impediment to the good functioning of 
institutions and a favourable development context. It is found to affect practically all sectors 
of the economy at all levels of responsibility. This is recognised and duly emphasised by 
both the respondents to the opinion survey and the authors of growth diagnostic exercises. 
However, comparison with other countries in West and Central Africa or countries that have 
out-performed Benin over the last decades is less conclusive. If the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys find that, from the point of view of business, the situation in Benin is substantially 
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worse than in the average sub-Saharan country, country-by-country comparison leads to 
different conclusions. As can be appraised through synthetic indicators, the degree of 
corruption in Benin turns out to be roughly comparable to that in neighbour countries. It 
might even be lower than in several countries that nevertheless grew faster than Benin over 
the last 20 years, this being true today as well as 10 or 20 years ago, when the GDP per 
capita was much smaller. Such findings may reflect the conceptual imprecision of synthetic 
corruption indicators, but they also call for a more nuanced analysis of the effects of 
corruption on the development of a specific country. Corruption may have other deleterious 
effects on development but, even when sizeable, it may not prevent fast GDP growth in an 
economy endowed with a solid exogenous engine of growth, as is the case in several Asian 
countries that rely on labour-intensive manufacturing exports.   
Weak public management is the second unanimously recognised source of hindrance in the 
process of development. Of course, this may partly be the consequence of corruption. Here 
too, the cross-country difference in synthetic indicators of the quality of public management 
across countries is not strongly unfavourable to Benin. Yet some sectors are singled out as 
particularly weak by survey respondents and analysts. Three of them are repeatedly singled 
out. The tax system is found to be complex and the tax administration grossly inefficient in 
collecting tax revenues, with clear adverse consequences for the dependency of Benin on 
foreign finance. The power sector, run by a state-owned monopoly, is found to perform badly 
due to weak or ineffective regulation.3 Finally, if the delivery of social services, especially 
education, is found to have made progress in quantity, this is not the case for quality. Benin 
underperforms compared to other sub-Saharan countries by a wide margin and, from that 
point of view, lags very much behind the countries that have grown faster despite having the 
same initial level of income as Benin 20 years ago.  
The opacity of government policymaking with respect to the public is another weakness 
stressed by survey respondents. This is probably to be imputed to weak public management 
but it is also a sign of deficient political institutions, generally regarded as weaker than in 
other sub-Saharan countries. On this point, however, survey respondents are somewhat 
ambivalent. On the one hand, many of them tend to trust constitutional institutions and are 
confident about the success of some current reforms. On the other hand, most also agree 
that the whole system is deeply corrupt and, because of this, often dysfunctional. Such a 
severe judgement even appears in the opening remarks of the official Country Partnership 
Framework, a document signed by the Government of Benin and the World Bank.  
Available statistics show that informality is more developed in Benin than in the average sub-
Saharan country. Growth diagnostic analyses suggest that it has a cost in terms of tax 
revenues, job precariousness, and lack of control over the economy. This is not a point that 
appears strongly in the opinion survey, maybe because of the presence of a substantial 
group of informal firm managers in the sample. It is not a dimension of institutions that 
appears explicitly in the synthetic indicators provided by international databases either. The 
reason why informality is more developed in Benin than in most developing countries, 
including in sub-Saharan Africa, is clear: it is more the result of the importance of the illegal 
                                               
3 See for instance the Ph.D thesis of Dossou-Yovo (2016) who compares the management of the public company 
responsible for electricity production and distribution, the Société Béninoise d'Energie Electrique, to the behavior 
of a clan that shares a rent among its members while systematically ignoring the consequences for rest of the 
population.   
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cross-border trade with Nigeria than the result of some specific institutional failure. Yet its 
consequences for the functioning of institutions are serious. 
A last area deserves mention, even though it is not prominent in the opinion survey and not 
explicitly covered by synthetic indicators: it is the way land allocation is managed. One of the 
growth diagnostic studies of Benin mentions that land is becoming scarce in the southern 
part of the country, so that managing it efficiently will become more and more crucial in the 
future. As in the other sub-Saharan countries, land operations raise difficulties in Benin 
because of the uncertain status of ownership and the legacy of customary practices. A 
reform was advanced in 2013, which, according to the opinion survey, is found to be 
complex and does not really resolve the sources of land conflict. Land laws and their 
implementation show weaknesses which economic consequences may be considerable in 
the future, especially in a country with a comparative advantage in agriculture.  
1.2 Some critical areas  
1.2.1 Business and politics: a clear case of complete state capture  
Benin does not differ from many other countries in the collusion that exists between business 
and politics. Yet it may be exceptional in the extent of that collusion, as illustrated by top 
businesspeople having now not only captured the economy but also the executive, and 
possibly legislative power.  
The original piece of research by R. Ch, M. Hounkpe, and L. Wantchekon in chapter 4 
focuses on local governments and the deals they make during electoral periods with 
businesspeople, who often end up in full control of local politics. By interviewing some 189 
candidates in local and legislative elections about the way their campaign was financed and 
the kind of agreement made when business was involved, they show the importance of 
business finance in an electoral democracy where public campaign funds are limited or even 
non-existent and electoral institutions are weak. They also analyse the levers that business 
thus acquires in relation to the local economy.  
The average cost of a local election campaign is around $36,000 and $160,000 in rural and 
urban areas, respectively. On average, these amounts are equivalent respectively to 18- and 
80-times GDP per worker, i.e. a campaign roughly costs the equivalent of employing 18 to 
80 workers during a full year. Business support is on average around 50% of these amounts, 
the rest being contributed by party or party coalition funding. In exchange, politicians, if 
elected, must compensate firms through various channels, including policy concessions and 
public procurement in their favour, patronage, or the awarding to funding firms of some 
control over the recruitment of local political executives.   
The chapter by Ch, Hounkpe, and Wantchekon also makes use of the natural experiment 
provided by the electoral reform undertaken by the present administration a few months 
before the 2019 local-legislative election. This reform aimed at reducing the number of 
competing parties by forcing them to regroup. It was justified on the grounds of the extensive 
fragmentation of parties in Benin, which bears a relation to the ethnic diversity of the 
population. At the time of the reform of the electoral code, some 250 parties were listed!  
Frictions in the adjustment process or deliberate political strategy, it turned out that only two 
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party groupings were validated for the 2019 election. For that election, the pre-existent multi-
party system had collapsed to a two-party block competition.  
The natural experiment arises from the fact that, prior to the 2019 election, many communes 
had a multiplicity of parties competing with each other, as was observed in the 2013 election. 
Since no more than two contenders were allowed in the new election, complying with this 
rule drastically reduced the extent of electoral competition. In some other communes, 
however, it was already the case that the competition was between the two new party 
coalitions, as could be judged from the 2013 election. In the absence of signs suggesting 
that the competition had changed by 2019, the latter communes thus provided an interesting 
'control' group to be compared to the other communes where the reform was exogenously 
modifying political competition.  
If the reform is interpreted as reducing the uncertainty about who is going to win the election, 
sponsoring firms should spend less on protecting their vested interest and/or impose weaker 
conditions in case of victory. It may also be surmised that, with less contenders, firms will 
spend less on supporting the candidates and, because they have less to recoup, they will be 
less demanding in case of victory. In other words, there should be less state capture, or less 
control over local governments' action in the communes affected by the reform. This is 
indeed what was observed. Funding firms were less insistent on having allies appointed in 
key executive positions in local governments. Irrespectively of the reform, the same 
observation could be made in communes where the previous election was less contested – 
i.e. where the incumbent had won with a large margin.  
These results are very interesting because they shed light on the extent of state capture by 
business interests, and on some of the determinants of state capture. Clearly, more public 
funding of candidates, a cap on private funding or on the total cost of campaigns, or strict 
requirements of transparency of campaign funding, should all contribute to reducing the 
influence of private business on electoral outcomes and state capture. The sheer ability of 
business to influence political outcomes would thus be reduced and its secretive 
interventions would be publicly exposed, with the effect of reinforcing the political opposition. 
The discussant of this chapter, Cesi Cruz, is right in stressing that the relationship between 
local politicians and firms may be more complex than described by candidates to local 
elections when we notice that both local politicians and firms are part of networks – i.e. 
political parties, multi-unit firms, and their network of suppliers. Deals might thus be at the 
network level: that is, between national- or regional-level politicians or parties and big firms.  
Extending the analysis in that direction would be a formidable undertaking. Without going so 
far, it may simply be stressed that the business–politics relationship analysed at the local 
level in Chapter 4 clearly generalises at the national level. The rise of a major businessman, 
Patrice Talon, to the presidency in the 2016 election, and the circumstances of that election, 
perfectly fits that analogy.  
Patrice Talon’s business career started in the provision of inputs in the cotton sector, where 
he quickly acquired a dominant position. His capture of the cotton industry then proceeded 
with the creation of ginning factories at the time the cotton sector was liberalised in 1990 and 
later, and the acquisition of the factories initially operated by the national company 
SONAPRA, at the time it was dismantled in 2008. The former operation owed much to the 
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support he offered to the election of President Soglo in 1991, and the latter to President Yayi 
in 2006. Later, thanks to his support for the re-election of Yayi in 2011, he was also able to 
secure the control of the Programme of Verification of Imports (PVI), an agency that 
assesses the value of imported goods. He thus gained considerable additional power over 
the Beninese economy and the corresponding rents. 
A conflict with President Yayi shortly after his re-election led to the PVI licence and part of 
the ginning factories being taken away from Talon's control, in a move to renationalise the 
ginning and commercialisation of cotton. It is probably this conflict that gave Talon the 
incentive to stand as a candidate in the 2016 election. He won with the support of a rival 
Beninese tycoon, S. Ajavon. In this instance, the business elite defeated the political elite in 
the political arena, most likely because the former was no longer able to control the latter 
through standard levers.  
Soon after taking power, President Talon's business regained the PVI licence and the 
ginning factories, while the cotton sector was re-privatised again. Talon’s grip on the cotton 
sector, the backbone of Benin's economy, is almost monopolistic. His control over imports is 
equally strategic given the importance of Benin’s re-export activity towards Nigeria.   
State capture by private interests in Benin is thus observed at both the local and the central 
levels, even though Chapter 4 suggests that the 2018 electoral reform may have weakened 
it somewhat at the local level. At the national level, however, the rise of Talon to power may 
indeed be considered the ultimate stage of state capture. That he was a candidate in the first 
place is easily understood given the animosity that had developed with President Yayi, 
despite having been the main financial supporter of his re-election in 2011. Being practically 
impeached in Benin, and wary that this situation would endure if the candidate of continuity, 
Lionel Zinsou, was elected, the conquest of the presidency was a rather logical move. Here 
is a radical form of political strategising on the part of the business elite. The rival business 
tycoon, S. Ajavon, was also a candidate for precisely the same reasons, i.e. to regain rents 
initially confiscated by the previous government. Eventually, the latter joined forces with 
Talon in the run-off of the election, despite their long-lasting rivalry.4 Beninese politics had 
been overwhelmed by big business.  
A deep cause of this rather successful capture of the state by business, both at the local and 
central levels, may lie in the relative weakness of central political power due to the political 
fragmentation of the population: 250 political parties, and 48 candidates at the last 
presidential election. Even under the democratic presidency of a seasoned ruler like M. 
Kérékou between 1996 and 2006, party coalitions in power were fragile and prone to 
corruption, whereas securing alliances to win an election was particularly costly. Indeed, the 
number of major corruption 'affairs' involving high-level politicians over the last 15 years or 
so is quite impressive. Although less publicised, it is likely that such affairs occur in large 
numbers at the local government level.  
Another conclusion of this reflection on business and politics in Benin is the absolute 
necessity of effective transparency in electoral financing, both at the national and local 
levels. In effect, a law does exist that limits the total amount that can be disbursed in a 
                                               
4 The rivalry between the two men quickly reappeared after the election: Ajavon is presently being sued for 
alleged drug trafficking.  
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campaign, and official campaign accounts are required from candidates. These accounts are 
audited, and candidates may be charged for having spent more than the maximum amount 
allowed on their campaign.5  Practically, however, the system remains extremely opaque 
and/or is gamed by the main actors. 
It would be difficult to conclude this brief analysis of the relationship between business and 
politics without mentioning the political consequences of the 2018 reform of the electoral 
code on the April 2019 parliament election. Because of the noise created by a reform that 
forced some regrouping of parties within bigger alliances, only two groups, both favourable 
to President Talon, were finally allowed to compete in that election. The election was 
boycotted by the opposition which strongly condemned this de facto breach of democracy. A 
political crisis unfolded, betraying an unexpected fragility in the institutions of a country that 
was praised precisely for its respect of the rules of democracy.      
1.2.2 The management of the cotton sector 
Cotton is the backbone of the formal Beninese economy. As mentioned in the first paragraph 
of the chapter on the cotton sector by Barthélémy Honfoga, Romain Houssa and Houinsou 
Dedehounaou, it accounts for 13% of GDP, 60% of (formal) export revenues, 45% of taxes – 
excluding tariffs – and 60% of manufacturing output – through ginning and seed oil 
extraction factories. Overall, it is estimated that around a third of the Beninese population 
depends on the cotton sector. The growth rate of GDP is very much influenced by the cotton 
activity. Over the last 10 years or so, more than 40% of the variation in the growth rate of 
GDP was explained by the variation in the growth rate of the production of cotton. Yet cotton 
can hardly be considered as a growth engine for Benin's economy. After substantial growth 
from 1980 to the mid-1990s, production did not grow for the next 20 years – it even fell 
dramatically in the mid-2000s. It is only during the last two years that production has been 
able to overtake its 1996 record level, but data are still provisional. 
Of course, the institutional setup of the sector is of first importance for its performance and 
dynamism. From that point of view, the history of cotton in Benin since independence is that 
of a succession of supposedly deep reforms. Overall, however, they only amounted to a 
change in the lead actor of the sector. While this actor was the state back in the Marxist-
Leninist period of governance, it is close to a single private conglomerate today, a 
conglomerate that happens to belong to the current president. Except for this, and despite 
the liberalisation that took place – as in the rest of the economy – after 1990, the 
organisation of the whole sector has remained pretty much the same, sheltering most actors 
against the competitive pressures of the market.  
Production by farmers is controlled through the allocation of inputs – cotton seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides – that results from coordination mechanisms and bargaining within the 
Interprofessional Cotton Association (AIC). The production of seed cotton is allocated to the 
18 existing ginneries, again through a process that results from bargaining among the main 
actors of the sector. The price of inputs and the allocation of credit to farmers are set within 
the AIC and subsidised by the government. The farmgate price is also largely decided by the 
AIC, even though formally set by the government. It depends only very loosely on 
                                               
5 Lionel Zinsou who lost the last presidential election to P. Talon is presently under investigation for such a 
matter.  
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international prices – e.g. after a substantial increase in 2011, the price paid to producers 
has practically not changed over the last seven years, despite international prices having 
increased by more than 50% in local currency.  
Variation in the management of the cotton sector over time concerned mostly of the 
provision of inputs upstream, and the ginning of cotton and its commercialisation 
downstream. The management structure has thus gone through various transformations 
during the last 25 years. A state company, SONAPRA, was initially responsible for all the 
preceding activities. Then some liberalisation took place in the early 1990s for the provision 
of inputs, an activity in which a businessman, who would much later become President of 
Benin, Patrice Talon, soon acquired a dominant position. The ginning market was opened a 
bit later, with eight new ginneries being created, several of them controlled again by Talon's 
group. Still later, the coordination of the whole sector, initially under the responsibility of 
SONAPRA, was privatised and entrusted to the AIC. In the process, Talon was able to 
strengthen his grip on the whole sector by controlling the 10 ginneries initially operated by 
SONAPRA. Partly because of the disorganisation created by this succession of liberalisation 
reforms, production fell dramatically. The AIC was then dismantled in the early 2010s and 
the management of the whole sector was renationalised. The state-owned company 
SONAPRA then regained its initial coordination and central planning role. However, a few 
years later, and soon after Talon’s election to the presidency, in the circumstances that were 
discussed earlier, the management of the sector was re-privatised, and the AIC was 
reactivated.  
Today, the whole sector is mostly private, even though the amount of public subsidies on 
inputs and several key decisions of the AIC – the level of producer prices in particular – must 
be formally approved by the government. However, the sector is clearly dominated by a 
single private actor, who controls the supply of inputs, the collection of cotton seeds, the 
operation of most ginneries, and hence the commercialisation of cotton. The public 
monopoly system of the 1980s has thus been transformed into a market structure close to a 
private monopoly, and one that has today established strong links with the executive.  
This chaotic evolution of the cotton sector and its present structure would not be a problem if 
they had little impact on production, its rate of growth, and its present efficiency. This is not 
the case, however. As emphasised in Chapters 2 and 5, total production has practically 
stagnated during the two decades from the mid-1990s to 2016. It is true that international 
prices have not always been favourable and adverse climatic conditions have sometimes 
affected production. There is no doubt, however, that the privatisation process and the 
disorganisation it created had a very negative impact on the whole sector during the 2000s. 
The disastrous harvests of 2005 and 2010 tragically attest to the inept approach to the 
sector’s reform. If the re-nationalisation of 2012 was followed by a recovery of the whole 
sector, it is hard to say whether this was due to public management per se or simply to the 
stabilisation of the organisational structure of the whole sector. 
After bad results in 2015, the production surged in 2016, the year during which private 
management through the AIC was reactivated, so much so that it again reached the levels 
observed 20 years before. It then reached a record level in 2017. The question then arises 
as to whether this was the result of favourable conditions for cotton production or better 
terms granted to producers with the return to private sector management – and this despite 
the monopolistic structure of the sector. 
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Comparison with neighbour cotton producers is instructive here. The two lead producers in 
West Africa are Mali and Burkina Faso. The general organisation of the cotton sector in 
these two countries is comparable to the one observed in Benin, except for the public/private 
nature of the main operators: a national company is in command of the whole sector (except 
production) in Mali, whereas in Burkina Faso there is an AIC type of structure, with three 
semi-private companies in charge of input provision, ginneries, and commercialisation in 
three distinct geographic zones. Even producer prices are comparable across countries. The 
instability observed in Benin in the management structure of the whole sector has been 
responsible for production there trailing behind the two other countries from 1995 and 2015. 
The gap went from zero to 42% during that period! It has only slightly decreased over the 
last years since it was still as high as 35% in 2017. Yet, the rate of decline of the gap is now 
accelerating, and whether this is attributable to the stabilisation of the management structure 
in Benin and thus to a growth recovery, or to the private nature of management, is difficult to 
say at this stage.  
As stressed by Véronique Thériault in her discussion of Chapter 5, cross-country evidence 
on the effect of the management structure of the cotton sector, especially its public/private 
nature, is rather inconclusive. Coordination, through the provision of inputs and credits to 
producers, works better in publicly managed systems, whereas competition offers higher 
output prices to producers in private systems. This distinction is not really relevant among 
West African countries, however, since competition barely exists in the only country with a 
privatised structure, i.e. Benin. It would be tempting to say that the main difference between 
a public and a private monopoly stems from different objective functions of the operators, 
and from varying levels of efficiency in management operations. In the case of Benin, 
objectives might well converge in maximising the growth of production for a while. However, 
it may take time before the efficiency advantage of private operators manifests itself. When it 
does, moreover, it will most likely benefit private rather than public interests.  
This last remark raises the issue of the distribution of the rent arising in cotton exports. It 
turns out that available statistical sources do not permit to estimate how much of the value 
added in the cotton sector is going to the various operators in the sector, including farmers 
and the state through taxes. The uncompetitive organization of the sector, from the 
allocation of inputs and credits to farmers to the allocation of cotton seeds to ginneries, 
which are the actual exporters, suggests that the rent - when there is indeed a rent thanks to 
sufficiently high foreign prices - is shared among the various types of operators. For 
instance, farmers would be constantly trading off cotton against other crops if there was no 
rent attached to the production of cotton. This is known to have occurred in some cases but 
is not systematic. The main point, however, is that no estimate is available about the 
operations of the company that provides inputs and credit or about the operations of 
ginneries and exporters. Yet, despite that opacity, the fact that producer prices have 
remained practically constant over the last 8 years despite a 50 per cent increase in 
international prices suggests a rather unequal allocation of the rent.    
Several lessons may be drawn from the evolution of the management structure of cotton in 
Benin. First, there is the effect of institutional instability on the growth of a sector that is of 
primary importance for the whole economy: 20 years of stagnation in a sector that 
represents more than 10% of GDP amounts to a non-negligible loss of overall growth. The 
second lesson is that the institutional instability of the sector was very much caused by 
political economy factors. The rise of the 'king of cotton', as Talon is often nicknamed, 
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coincided with an intensification of rivalrous influences of public decision makers regarding 
the organisation structure of the whole sector. This rivalry was actually responsible for the 
chaotic trend in production during that period. The third lesson is that the way the reform 
process was handled led to the capture of a key sector of the economy by practically a 
single actor. Such a situation is essentially unsound, even though it may have brought 
stability and ensuing expansion of production. Although it may contribute to economic 
progress overall, this will be the case only as long as private and public objectives are 
aligned. This may not last.  
1.2.3 State capacity and tax effort in Benin 
As emphasised in the recent economic literature on institutions – see, for instance, Besley 
and Persson (2009) – state capacity is a key determinant of development. A major difficulty, 
however, is that few indicators are available that satisfactorily measure this institutional 
feature, except for advanced countries (see, for instance, the InCISE indicator).6 The 
tax/GDP index is often used as a convenient proxy of state capacity. It has the advantage of 
being simple and reflecting two dimensions of government action: the administrative capacity 
of the government to collect taxes and its financial capacity to deliver public services. 
Various tax-based indicators are available in the literature – see, for instance, the review by 
Rogers and Weller (2014). In Chapter 6, Emilie Caldeira and Grégoire Rota-Graciosi have 
chosen non-resource tax/GDP to account for the fact that taxing the export of natural 
resources in developing countries does not require as much administrative capacity as 
raising VAT, import duties, or income tax.  
Using a stochastic frontier approach estimated on 42 sub-Saharan countries between 1961 
and 2015, Caldeira and Rota-Graciosi measure the non-resource 'tax effort' as the ratio of 
the actual non-resource tax/GDP ratio to the maximum that should be attainable at the 
frontier. Of course, this frontier depends upon the specificity of national economies and 
moves over time as they grow and their structure changes. At the end of the period the tax 
effort of Benin is 68% of the frontier, whereas the capacity of countries like Rwanda, 
Senegal, or Malawi is close to 75%. Togo, Benin’s western neighbour, even reached 78% in 
2015. With a non-resource tax/GDP ratio around 13% at that time, this means that Benin 
could increase its tax revenues by 1.9% of GDP if it had the same capacity as Togo, and 
three times that amount if it were to approach the frontier. It would then get close to the 20% 
objective set by the WAEMU.  
This rough proxy of state capacity is an interesting diagnostic tool that shows how much 
progress can be made in a country on the tax policy and the tax collection front. At the same 
time, the discussant of the chapter, Nicaise Médé, is right in stressing that the average tax 
rate of an economy reflects not only state capacity but also policy choices based on the 
premise that lower tax rates provide powerful incentives for work and investment. This may 
be true but lowering the overall rate of taxation in an economy also lowers the capacity of the 
government to finance investments that could accelerate growth and more than offset the 
distortive effects of the tax. This is precisely why the tax/GDP ratio is indicative of state 
capacity.  
                                               
6 The Institute for Government (2017), “The International Civil Service Effectiveness Index 2017”, London.  
The Benin Institutional Diagnostic 
© Economic Development & Institutions  16 
The analysis developed in the chapter on taxation goes further in trying to identify some of 
the factors that explain why Benin is farther away from the frontier than neighbouring Togo. 
A first possible factor may be tax expenditures. It seems the case, in particular, that Benin 
grants more favourable tax conditions to foreign companies in terms of both the income tax 
and the VAT. A second factor is the structure of taxation and the tax base. It happens that 
both countries take advantage of the heavy protectionism of Nigeria, their giant neighbour. 
This is possible because their overall taxation rate of imports – i.e. duties plus VAT – is 
lower. Goods are thus imported by Benin and Togo that are re-exported – or, more exactly, 
smuggled – across the porous Nigerian border. These re-exported goods generally benefit 
from low duties when entering the country but are subject to VAT. As Benin and Togo belong 
to the WAEMU, they apply the common tariff on imports. They also have comparable VAT 
rates. They thus can compete only by lowering the reported value of imported goods, 
second-hand cars for instance. Because trade is relatively more important in Benin, this may 
explain why tax revenues are relatively smaller than in Togo. In both cases, the difference in 
tax/GDP ratios between Benin and Togo might reflect strategic choices more than 
differences in state capacity.  
There may also be institutional factors that are directly responsible for the less efficient tax 
collection system in Benin than in Togo. Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi mention two of them. 
The first is that Togo has recently (2014) reorganised the tax collection system into a Semi-
Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA), a structure that is somewhat independent from the 
rest of the public sector and is essentially responsible for the collection of all taxes and 
customs duties. Such a structure offers the advantage of not being constrained by public 
employment management rules, thus allowing for original incentive schemes and some clear 
synergy between the collection of taxes and customs duties. But it also offers some 
disadvantages, in particular a possible conflict between tax collectors and tax policymakers. 
According to Fjeldstad (2007), who closely followed these reforms in several sub-Saharan 
countries, the advantage of the SARAs would seem to vanish after a few years, mostly 
because most actors progressively learn how to game the new system.  
In his comments, Nicaise Médé, notes the strong propensity of the present government to 
create semi-autonomous agencies along the model of SARAs for the production or 
management of several public services, with the purpose of delivering services more 
efficiently – because they are less constrained than state administrative units typically are. 
That the same model was not applied to tax collection is a political choice that reflects a 
certain degree of faith in the standard incentivising and auditing instruments available in the 
tax administration. Time will tell whether progress in tax collection occurs significantly faster 
in Togo than in Benin.   
Thanks to better wage incentives and monitoring facilities, agencies like SARAs are more 
efficient in their fight against corruption than fully centralised tax authorities as we usually 
know them. Nowadays, variation in the perception of corruption between Benin and Togo is 
minor7. It will be interesting to see whether this changes in the future because of a different 
management structure of tax collection and tax policymaking. 
A last factor that could explain the tax/GDP advantage of Togo over Benin is the size of the 
tax collection and policy administrative unit. Rather surprisingly, while the ‘Direction 
                                               
7 See Transparency International (2019).  
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Générale des Impôts’ counts roughly 1,500 employees, or a little more, in the former 
country, it relies on only 500 officials in the latter. Here too, there are probably trade-offs, yet 
such a large gap in the personnel of the tax management system is surprising and most 
likely reflects understaffing in the case of Benin. 8 
In summary, what lessons can be drawn from that comparative analysis of the tax effort, 
considered as a proxy of state capacity, between Benin and other sub-Saharan countries, 
and Togo in particular? First, the importance of tax revenues for the development of Benin 
need not be under-estimated. Benin, like many other sub-Saharan African countries, is over-
dependent on foreign funds for the preservation of its level of investment in physical as well 
as human capital (see Chapter 2). Its external debt has increased substantially faster than 
GDP over the last decade. That evolution, and the uncertainty about the level of future 
foreign flows, can only be neutralised by higher tax effort if investment in public infrastructure 
is to be maintained, if not increased. Yet the tax/GDP ratio has stopped increasing over the 
last 10 years. It has even fallen since 2015. Improving tax revenues, both by using existing 
policy levers and building-up state capacity, is thus essential.  
Second, the general organisation of the tax collection system is a major obstacle to higher 
tax revenues. It is difficult to identify precisely how much of the present level of tax effort is 
constrained by voluntary tax policies and how much is structural and due to an inefficient 
organisation. That countries that have adopted a SARA system of tax collection have been 
able to make progress on the tax revenue front, at least temporarily, shows that the 
institutional structure of the sector matters. In a country where the perception of corruption is 
high by regional standards, it is also difficult to believe that this factor does not affect public 
revenues negatively. Finally, although we lack precise criteria relating tax revenues to the 
size and the organisation of the tax authority, it is equally hard to believe that a country with 
half the number of staff devoted to tax collection as are devoted to it in a neighbour country 
can be as efficient, especially when the size of the public sector is comparable. 
Restructuring the public sector to reinforce the tax apparatus may have a cost in the short 
run, but it should permit faster progress in state capacity in the longer run.  
A last remark is in order. It refers to the determinants of the frontier used to evaluate the 
maximum tax effort likely to be supplied by a country. It turns out that a key determinant is 
the level of GDP per capita. If the analysis shows that Benin does not do as well as some 
other countries at a comparable level of income, it should be kept in mind that, in all these 
countries, state capacity is actually constrained by the availability of resources. In Benin, as 
in Togo or in Rwanda, the tax/GDP ratio is low not only because it would be possible to do 
better with existing resources, what the analysis actually shows, but more fundamentally 
because resources - equipment, skills, complementary public agencies – are limited. That 
state capacity is as much the consequence as the cause of a low level of development 
should not be ignored when conducting an institutional diagnostic.  
                                               
8 It might be argued that it is Togo's SARA that is overstaffed, and that Benin is closer to the norm. The following 
comparison suggests this is not the case. Assuming that the number of tax administration staff is proportional to 
formal employment, it turns out that the coefficient of proportionality is roughly 2.6 staff for 1,000 employees in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Given the 14% share of formal 
employment in both Benin and Togo, tax unit staff should be around 1,700 persons in Benin and 1,300 in Togo. 
In view of this very rough norm, Benin is definitely understaffed, whereas Togo is close to the norm.  
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1.2.4  Land rights  
The chapter by Philippe Lavigne Delville provides a detailed and comprehensive picture of 
the efforts of the Government of Benin to reform land tenure rights in the country’s urban and 
rural settings. The approach belongs to the field of social anthropology of public policy (of 
which legal anthropology is a key component) as the discussion centres around the various 
pillars of the legal framework and the positioning of various interest groups assessed from 
qualitative interview material. The approach is also dynamic in the sense that it carefully 
reports the back-and-forth moves of the lawmaker, giving the overall impression of 
continuous wavering under the influence of these groups.  
There were three main stages in the reform process. The need to reform land tenure seems 
to have arisen from widespread land appropriation by state agents and state-connected 
elites under the revolutionary regime of Kérékou. The first stage was initiated in the early 
1990s and was formalised in a law enacted in 2007. Based on a participatory process aimed 
at documenting and formalising customary rights at village level, it consists of two key steps. 
The process starts with a community-based land demarcation scheme called a Plan Foncier 
Rural (PFR, Rural Land Holding Plan) whereby a village committee identifies and 
demarcates all parcels situated on its territory, which includes the mapping of customary 
ownership in the form of a full land survey, and the laying of the cornerstones to explicitly 
secure parcel boundaries. Thereafter, customary land ownership is formally and legally 
documented in the form of transferable and collateralisable 'land certificates', which may be 
individual or collective. All the land transfers have to be registered at the level of so-called 
Sections Villageoises de Gestion Foncière (Village Sections of Land Management). An 
important feature is that community-based land demarcation is undertaken on demand: only 
those communities which feel the need for a survey of village lands and their certification are 
eligible. On the other hand, the law provides for the possibility that owners of uncultivated 
rural lands are forced to rent them out. 
The second stage, which telescoped the preceding reform, was initiated in 2004–2005 under 
the impulse and with the support of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Intended 
to end the legal dualism and to render uniform, and to centralise, the administration of land 
rights, land rights were crystallised in the Code Domanial et Foncier (Land Code) of 2013, 
the responsibility for which was vested in a newly created agency, the Agence Nationale du 
Domaine et du Foncier (ANDF), itself relying on 14 regional offices. The central idea was to 
promote the titling of land parcels (in 2004, only 14,606 land certificates had been issued, for 
a population of 6,769,914) by transforming rural land certificates and urban residence 
permits (permis d’habiter) into full-fledged titles. This reform was pushed with especial vigour 
after the coming to power of President Talon in 2016, yet it was only in 2018 that the ANDF 
was able to start issuing new titles. The preparation of a national cadastre and the 
digitalisation of all available spatial data demarcating land parcels are part of this ambitious 
project which was an explicit part of the 2005 reform. Aware that the issuance of titles is a 
time-consuming process that is necessarily gradual, the lawmaker replaced all the existing 
land documents (residence permits, administrative certificates, rural land certificates) by a 
new single document, named certificat de propriété foncière in the 2013 law. For rural areas, 
however, a special document known as the attestation de détention coutumière (certificate of 
customary ownership) was allowed to replace the previous administrative certificate. Its 
status was intended to be temporary. As for sales conventions, they continued to coexist 
with officially sanctioned contracts.  
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A critical aspect of the 2013 reform, however, was that it provided for a transitory period of 
five years during which a claim to land ownership materialized in a title can be contested. 
Whereas before the party reckoned to have been hurt in the issuance of a title (which often 
follows a land transaction) could only receive an indemnity to compensate for his/her loss, 
s/he could now get the disputed land parcel back. Note, however, that the ownership 
confirmation requirement was not mandatory for rural lands as long as no land alienation 
was involved. When a sale took place, it should have been registered by a notary in an 
official act, instead of giving rise to a sale convention sanctioned at the level of the commune 
as was previously the case. The better protection that the law provided against fraudulent 
sales (double sale deals, sales by people with no legitimate rights to the land, etc.), which 
are frequent in certain areas – urban and peri-urban areas in particular –, was nonetheless 
opposed by certain actors on the grounds that the five-year transition period imposed by the 
lawmaker creates a lot of confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty. Among these actors, 
professionals (auctioneers, architects, notaries, barristers, surveyors, and bailiffs) played a 
prominent role and stressed that a major flaw of the law was that ‘it did not take into account 
the administrative practices and the land mafia that operates at the level of local 
communities’. An oft-mentioned problem was the possibility of customary rights holders 
waiting until the last moment to contest a sale. Eventually, the law was amended in 2017 
and the contentious restriction was removed. 
In the new law, any fraud or error can only entitle the aggrieved party to an indemnity paid 
from a special fund held by the state. The latter may then sue the party guilty of fraud. 
Another innovation is the provision that attestations of customary ownership should be 
delivered by municipalities – no longer by the regional offices of the ANDF. Also, as a way to 
fight land speculation, the new law keeps the 2013 law provision that any buyer of a rural 
land parcel exceeding two hectares must seek an official authorisation and to obtain 
approval of an exploitation plan. The new law moreover keeps the provision of the 2007 law 
that allows for the possibility of forcing owners of uncultivated rural lands to sign a rental 
contract. Finally, the 2017 law requires that any land sale be automatically registered before 
a notary. This is consistent with the 2013 law, which allowed a five-year transitory period 
before a sale had to be officially recorded before a notary (in practice, this meant that sales 
conventions sanctioned by local mayors were still prevailing), implying that any land sale 
concluded from 2018 onwards would have to be the object of an official certification. This 
legal injunction of the 2017 law was obviously unenforceable, if only because it takes time to 
establish the decentralized offices in charge of the task and to deploy the required notary 
throughout the territory. The lawmaker had therefore to backtrack by extending the transitory 
period by another five years (so that the law provision will apply only from 2023). 
From an institutional point of view, the sequence of reforms since the 2007 land law raises 
two types of issues. The first is the process itself, i.e. the successive modifications that do 
not leave enough time for people to get used to a reform and for the administration to 
conduct rigorous evaluation. Second, the issue of the economic implications of the law itself 
as regards individual behaviour and the land allocation process.  
As far as the first point is concerned, one pivotal lesson that can be drawn from the account 
of land reforms presented in Chapter 7 is that the reform process has been very complex 
and volatile. Many changes have occurred, not only with respect to the provisions of the 
successive laws but also with respect to the institutions in charge of their implementation. 
Regarding the first source of instability, it seems that the relative bargaining power of various 
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interest groups regularly shifts, with the consequence that the law remains largely 
unpredictable in two senses: (i) there is uncertainty about whether and to what extent the 
current law is going to be implemented, and (ii) there is uncertainty about whether the 
current law will be replaced by a different law in the (near) future. In the case of some 
provisions, such as the authorisations required to buy rural lands or the possibility of forcing 
the owner of uncultivated rural land to rent it out, it is rather evident that they will not be 
seriously enforced. In the case of others, however, genuine uncertainty is created by the 
instability of the legal framework regulating land tenure rights in Benin. To some extent, the 
issue here is the misalignment of the law with respect to state capacity: a complex law is 
enacted for which the state does not have the administrative resources required to 
effectively implement it. 
Regarding the second source of instability, the fact is that many institutional choices appear 
to be the outcome of fierce struggles among rival administrative entities. This is particularly 
evident at the highest level of the state, where there has been constant wavering about 
whether to assign the responsibility for land regulation to the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Town Planning, or the Ministry of Finance. Another example is the strong 
resistance of rural municipalities to attempts to reduce their prerogatives in land matters. 
Their resistance paid off, since the right to deliver attestations of customary ownership, 
which belonged to the ANDF under the 2013 law, was shifted to municipalities under the 
2017 law. Rural municipalities also successfully fought against the attempt to completely 
suppress the mechanism of sale conventions, through the requirement that land transactions 
must be instantaneously registered by notaries. Finally, the professional bodies that earn 
incomes from land regulation, notaries, barristers, architects, and land surveyors in 
particular, played a decisive role in killing the provision of the 2013 law regarding the five-
year confirmation period. 
We are thus left with the strong impression that the legal and institutional framework for land 
regulation in Benin is driven by political economy considerations rather than by economic 
efficiency motives. The critical question is how far away the outcome of the reform process is 
from the first-best outcome, assuming that the latter can be precisely defined. Philippe 
Lavigne Delville does not conceal that his preference was for the 2007 law over the 2013 
law, and for the 2013 law over the 2017 law. This ranking naturally rests on his analysis that 
a great deal of flexibility, decentralisation, and respect for informal arrangements is desirable 
in land matters, especially in the context of rural areas. In the context of heterogeneous 
societies governed by a plurality of norms, the ambition of the state to regulate such a 
complex matter as land tenure rights in a top-down and uniform manner, without due 
consideration for the role of local agencies and semi-formalised mechanisms (such as land 
certificates and attestations of customary ownership defined within the framework of a 
proper surveying process), is doomed to end in disappointment and failure.  
Given the lack of clear quantitative evidence, it is impossible to assess his claims thoroughly. 
It is certainly true, however, that the decentralisation of land registry services, as provided 
under the 2007 law, and as experimented with through the innovative PFRs, supplied 
convenient and fast services for obtaining legal proof of landholding rights and for carrying 
out land transactions. Moreover, the need for land documents is particularly strong in areas 
where population density is high and where migrants coexist with autochthonous farmers, 
and is weaker in lowly populated and homogeneous village communities. While land 
alienation to ‘strangers’ is quite likely in the former, the opposite is true for the latter. It is thus 
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not coincidental that even in villages where a community-based land demarcation took 
place, the proportion of land certificates to the total number of parcels surveyed was typically 
low (as at March 2015, less than 20% of demarcated land parcels were accompanied by 
land use certificates), except when migrants formed a significant portion of the local 
population. This suggests that local demand for land documents varies greatly depending 
upon the specific context of rural communities. It is therefore important that priority is clearly 
given to the officialisation of land rights in areas that most need it: urban and peri-urban 
areas, as well as densely populated rural areas and areas where migrant and autochthonous 
groups live side by side.  
Concerning the economic implications of the sequence of reforms leading to formal titling, 
the real question is whether land documents should take the most advanced form of land 
titles. The answer to that question requires the collection of systematic information about the 
relative advantage of titles over less formalised land certificates, and about the cost-
effectiveness of titling in various contexts. Because to this date Benin has little experience 
with titling, the required data are non-existent. That said, Benin has experience with 
community-based land demarcation and the issuance of land certificates by local agencies, 
and we are fortunate enough to have available a few rigorous economic studies of their 
impact along various dimensions, several of which are summarised in the discussion of 
Chapter 7 by Kenneth Houngbedji. It is important to take stock of their findings, keeping in 
mind that impact is assessed through the rigorous use of a randomised control trial 
methodology. 
The first study, by Goldstein et al. (2018), is actually cited in Chapter 7 and discussed by 
Houngbedji. Yet, in view of the paucity of Benin-specific evidence in this area, it is useful to 
insist on a few additional points. 
Owing to the slow pace of certificate issuance in villages where a community-based land 
demarcation took place, the authors could only estimate the impact of the demarcation 
operation on the investment behaviour of farming households. Nevertheless, this is an 
interesting exercise insofar as the process surrounding land demarcation, whereby each 
community works to resolve competing and overlapping claims to land rights, thus clarifying 
uncertainty over land claims, is a necessary prerequisite of the establishment of valid 
ownership rights. To begin with, the authors check whether land demarcation has had the 
effect of establishing clear borders, considered as a proxy for tenure security (the 
implantation of cornerstones endows the landholder with a visible marker of security from 
encroachment and expropriation). As expected, they find strong evidence of a higher share 
of parcels with clear borders in demarcated villages (considered as the treatment villages). 
Yet it is noteworthy that, albeit strongly significant, the intention-to-treat effect of demarcation 
is far from complete: the programme increases the likelihood of having clear borders by less 
than 30 percentage points relative to parcels in non-demarcated villages (the control 
villages), where the mean is 6%. Most likely, this result reflects the fact that the boundaries 
of land parcels were often clear even in the pre-intervention situation. Land conflicts are not 
primarily about land delimitation but about inheritance, intra-family disputes, and 
encroachments by neighbours in full knowledge of their trespassing behaviour, etc. Demand 
for better land security therefore varies, even within demarcated communities, as a function 
of circumstances that do not (necessarily) depend upon the formalisation of boundaries. 
 
The next step consists of looking at the effects of land demarcation activities on investment 
and productive behaviour. Here, the results are mixed: if there is a positive significant effect 
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on investment, as measured by tree planting and the cultivation of perennial crops, there is 
no effect on agricultural output, farm yields, or input use. This absence of effects on output 
and inputs is attributed by the authors to the time lag that separates long-term crop 
investment and productivity gains. Finally, the authors find that female-managed 
landholdings in demarcated villages are more likely to be left fallow, which they regard as an 
important soil fertility investment. Women, but not men, thus respond to an exogenous 
tenure security improvement.  
A follow-up survey was conducted in 2015, four years after the initial impact year (see 
Goldstein et al., 2019). Households in the demarcated villages which benefitted from a PFR 
continued to report significantly higher rates of perennial crop cultivation and, moreover, they 
increased their demand for hired labour to support their agricultural production. Despite the 
observed increases in investment, however, no average effects on output or farm yields 
were observed in 2015, casting doubt on the explanation adduced by the authors for a 
similar lack of effect in 2011. Also challenging is the finding that selection into the PFR 
villages widens the gender gap in agricultural yields. Yet there is no significant gender 
difference in impact on self-reported land size, cultivation use, farm labour input intensity, or 
fertiliser/improved seed use in either 2011 or 2015. 
Another impact study is more specifically focused on the situation of widows (Boteal et al., 
2019). It shows that improved tenure security following land demarcation acts as a defence 
against expropriation and enables widows to better retain their homes and landholding 
several years after their husband’s death. Moreover, their ability to stay on is no longer 
contingent on having male children. Finally, the land intervention led to a change in planned 
inheritance patterns, reducing gender gaps. 
A last study deserves to be mentioned in brief (Becera-Valbuena et al., non-dated). It 
concludes that there is no evidence of anticipatory deforestation or negative spill-overs to 
other, non-demarcated areas. The delimitation of land parcels reduced farmers’ incentives to 
extend agricultural activities through slash and burn activities.  
It bears emphasis that all the above effects were obtained in the absence of titles, as a result 
of an innovative policy experiment that relies on a highly decentralised system of land 
registry services. This system, it seems, is able to provide legally sufficient proof of 
landholding rights, thus enhancing tenure security. Yet there is evidence that community-
based demarcation interventions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for either fast 
delivery of land use certificates to landholders (progress on this level has actually been 
slow), or significant increases in farm yields and production. Regarding the former aspect, 
we need to better understand the extent to which demand or supply factors are behind the 
slow pace of certificate delivery. It is indeed possible that there is less demand than 
expected for the new proposed certificates, perhaps because a large number of households 
feel that they have enough tenure security in the prevailing conditions, or because they do 
not find that obtaining the certificate is cost-effective (although the nominal price of a 
certificate is low, 2-3 €). But it is equally possible that supply bottlenecks at the level of the 
municipal administration are the most constraining factor. Regarding the latter aspect, the 
absence of effects on output and inputs after four years calls into question the initial 
explanation given by Goldstein et al. (2019) to explain the absence of the same effects after 
a single year, namely the time lag separating long-term crop investment and productivity 
gains. A more plausible explanation seems to be that suitable production and investment 
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incentives depend not only on adequate tenure security but also on a variety of 
complementary factors, including the profitability of feasible crops, technical progress, the 
existence of good marketing outlets and effective input delivery channels, and the availability 
of credit (Platteau, 2000, Chapter 4).9  
1.2.5 Benin’s informal trading with Nigeria 
Cross-border trade with Nigeria, Benin’s large and oil-rich neighbour, has developed into an 
important segment of Benin’s economy. As developed in the chapter by Stephen Golub and 
Amahdou Aly Mbaye, it has two facets: i) Benin has a huge unofficial re-export activity to 
Nigeria; ii) it fraudulently imports a sizeable share of key imports from Nigeria. A common 
characteristic of cross-border trade with Nigeria is its illegal nature. Goods re-exported to 
Nigeria face stiff tariffs there, or are banned from import. They are imported into Benin in a 
legal way. However, the destination of these goods that is declared at customs is that of 
neighbouring landlocked countries, for which import taxes and custom duties are low, or else 
the domestic market. Once customs have been cleared, the goods are diverted to Nigeria 
via a network of informal intermediaries who organise their transportation and smuggle them 
over the border. Similarly, the large flow of goods imported by Benin from Nigeria, like 
petroleum products, which are heavily subsidised there, or other consumer, intermediate or 
capital goods, are smuggled into the country, thus escaping tariff duties, and sold on the 
domestic market through informal channels similar to those operating in the re-export sector. 
It is the illegality of this trade which implies its informality. Because this illegal trade is carried 
out on a large scale, bribery and corruption are pervasive at each stage of the process.  
S. Golub and A. Mbaye provide a thorough and detailed analysis of the nature, the extent, 
and the institutional and logistic organisation of this informal cross-border trade (ICBT), as 
well as an assessment of its implications for Benin’s development strategy. They report that, 
at peak times of the trade, Benin’s estimated gross value of imports of products typically 
destined to be re-exported to Nigeria has represented more than 25 times the gross value of 
Benin’s official exports to Nigeria. Still more strikingly, the authors estimate the contribution 
of ICBT to Benin’s GDP at about 20%, including customs and other tax revenues (6% of 
GDP). The largest part of this total contribution comes from the unofficial re-export activity 
(18% of GDP). Direct data being unavailable, their calculations are based on a series of 
apparently reasonable assumptions. A tentative approach sketched out in Chapter 2 
assesses the implications of this estimate for employment in the sectors most likely affected 
by ICBT. Based on respective productivity levels, it suggests that the 20% estimate for the 
effect of ICBT on GDP stands at the upper level of a plausible range. Whatever the precise 
estimates, one cannot avoid the conclusion that ICBT is a major sector of activity and 
provider of informal jobs in Benin. 
Nigeria’s heavy protectionist import substitution policy for cars, rice, poultry, and textiles, as 
well as the low efficiency of its ports and the porosity of its land borders, have set the stage 
and provided the incentives for the deployment of a profitable network of unofficial re-export 
trade on the Beninese side of the border. Nigeria’s subsidy policy for the price of fuel has 
had the same effect for the largest part of the import side of ICBT. In effect, it is Nigeria’s oil 
                                               
9 If these complementary conditions were well measured and distributed in the same way in the treatment and the 
control communities, one should find that better tenure security stimulates production and yields conditional on the 
presence of these conditions. 
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rent which feeds ICBT: Benin’s re-exports are driven by Nigerian demand, which is heavily 
dependent on oil revenues. On the other hand, Benin’s cross-border imports are partly 
driven by the share of the oil rent that Nigeria decides to allocate to the subsidising of its 
domestic oil prices. Thus, Benin shares the oil rent with Nigeria, including through low gas 
prices.  
The importance of ICBT is the result of a two-way game, played out between two unequal 
partners, Benin and Nigeria. Each country could stop ICBT by deciding to enforce strict 
border control: Nigeria on goods smuggled from Benin and Nigeria on goods smuggled from 
Nigeria. Yet, neither does so, either because controlling their lengthy border would be too 
costly or because decisive actors find that their interests are served in this ICBT equilibrium.    
Given the unequal size of the two players, it can be said that Benin, the smallest player, has 
decided to adopt the follower strategy in this game. Starting soon after the first oil shock in 
the 1970s, it embarked on exploiting the opportunities offered by Nigeria’s domestic policies. 
Benin has also developed its institutions in such a way that they can accommodate its 
‘entrepôt state’ strategy. Re-export activities benefit from specific tax rates and customs 
procedures, from large public and private infrastructure, and from easy access to import 
financing. All of this would be consistent with a development project focused on the 
transformation of the country into a regional trading hub centred on the Cotonou port. 
However, the ultimate target of the strategy is Nigeria. And it is an open secret that goods 
imported into Benin in a fully official and legal way will be de facto diverted to Nigeria in 
fraudulent ways. Benin’s strategy is thus clearly not only to tolerate, but also to encourage, 
this informal and fraudulent re-export trade. Things are different on the import side of the 
trade, however. There, a Dutch disease phenomenon is at work. Importing Nigerian gas and 
other products duty free may be detrimental to Benin's development, by crowding out some 
domestic activity. In his comments on the chapter, John Igué mentions formal gas 
distribution, cement factories and breweries as sectors that have been partly driven out of 
business in Benin. It must be also mentioned that the tax loss on account of the informality of 
the trade based on imports from Nigeria and the ensuing loss suffered by outcompeted 
Beninese formal activities are to be subtracted from the revenue gain generated by the re-
export activity.   
In the aggregate, Benin is clearly a net gainer in this game, at least in the short- and 
medium-run. Buying goods and reselling them at a higher price leaves a net profit even 
when taking into account the operational cost of handling those goods and smuggling them 
across the border. Because these operations are labour-intensive, they benefit a large 
number of people and undoubtedly contribute to reducing poverty. At the same time, 
because they also require financial facilities, they also benefit the business elite. Owing to 
the essentially informal nature of that activity, however, it is difficult to guess how much is 
accruing to each side. In the longer run, the Dutch disease effects of illegal imports may 
have to be taken into account.  
On the Nigerian side, ICBT benefits consumers, who get goods at lower prices, at the cost of 
less revenue for the government and a crowding out of domestic production. Firms, on the 
other hand, may benefit from some extension of their market to Beninese customers. It is not 
clear that the net gain is positive, but illegal importers are probably able to convince the state 
to keep its eyes shut. Moreover, the respective size of the two economies is such that the 
impact of Benin's re-exports on Nigeria is probably very small.   
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An important drawback for Benin is the vulnerability ICBT creates to changes in the 
economic conditions of Nigeria, since a decrease in the oil rent and the accompanying 
depreciation of the currency directly reduce Nigerian demand for Benin’s re-exports. John 
Igué documents the impact that the current oil-based crisis in Nigeria has on Benin. The 
long-term sustainability of the strategy is also questionable. Nigeria could quickly reverse its 
distortionary protectionist policies or put an end to the highly profitable illegal cross-border 
trade through a better control of its border. Such a scenario is, however, downplayed by 
Golub and Mbaye, on the grounds that earlier announcements by both Benin and Nigeria 
that they will combat smuggling have never had lasting effects on the trade. This suggests a 
low credibility of repressive policies. It also reflects a high reactiveness of the informal trade 
network, the strength of which derives from close ethnic and cultural ties between Beninese 
and Nigerian participants. In addition, powerful interest groups in Nigeria have strong 
incentives to maintain the status quo. This could nevertheless change in the more distant 
future if the longer-term inefficiencies of these import protection and price subsidy policies 
were finally recognised by Nigerian authorities and acted upon. In other words, the oil rent 
Benin extracts from Nigeria should be considered as a non-renewable resource. Hence, 
preparations for its ultimate exhaustion should be seriously considered.10Besides the likely 
crowding out of domestic activities in tradeable sectors, ICBT may bias trade flows and 
deprive Benin of its comparative advantages at a regional level. More subtly, but as 
importantly, the informality implied by ICBT nurtures tax evasion in the rest of the economy, 
and undermines any reform designed to incite firms to become formal. Corruption can also 
be identified as a major cost: it is an indispensable attribute of ICBT and it involves civil 
servants and government officials, as well as big players with contacts at high political levels 
and who are active in other sectors of the economy. The ensuing erosion of norms and 
neglect of the rule of law have contagious effects across the whole economy, its institutions, 
its business climate, and its attractiveness to foreign investors. 
For Golub and Mbaye, the way forward for Benin is to progressively move away from 
smuggling and towards formal trade. Benin could aim to become a competitive, efficient 
regional centre for legal trade and services to its hinterland countries, as well as to Nigeria. 
Once Benin has definitely opted to privilege formal trade above smuggling, political 
relationships with Nigeria might become more serene and new avenues of cooperation could 
then be explored. To achieve this transition Benin needs to adopt an ambitious agenda to 
upgrade the quality of its port logistics and communication infrastructure, to significantly 
enhance accountability and transparency within customs and the civil service, and to 
improve its business climate. Such a move towards increased formality and a more attractive 
business environment has an important precondition: it requires from the legislative, 
executive, and judicial spheres a strong and sustained determination to fight corruption and 
to enforce full respect for Benin’s institutions and the rule of law. These tasks currently 
present a huge challenge. Full control of the border with Nigeria is practically impossible and 
the main ICBT actors would have too much to lose for them not to exert a heavy pressure on 
the executive to prevent the adoption of such a policy.  
                                               
10 It is worth stressing that at the time of writing this chapter, Nigeria unexpectedly closed its main border with 
Benin.    
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Yet the main obstacle to ending ICBT with Nigeria on the Beninese side lies in the fact that 
re-exports to Nigeria are a net and practically riskless gain, as long as the difference 
between tariffs in Nigeria and in Benin remains large enough. It has drawbacks in the sense 
that, being necessarily informal, it cannot be taxed and thus used by the state for 
development purposes. It also has some negative spill-over effects on the rest of the 
economy. Alternatives are riskier, however. They require investments with uncertain return 
and long gestation delays: a bad substitute for a quick, riskless gain.  
1.3 The main overall institutional weaknesses that affect Benin's 
development 
Ex-post, it is somewhat remarkable that the in-depth analysis of critical areas for the 
economic development of Benin fully confirms the rough institutional diagnostic derived from 
the synthetic indicators, and the results of the opinion survey discussed in Chapter 3 and 
summarised above. Overall, four general weaknesses appear throughout the preceding 
thematic studies that affect the efficiency of Benin's economy under different forms 
depending on the area being considered. They are corruption, weak public management, 
opacity of public decision making and its results, and excessive informality. Of course, these 
weaknesses are not independent of each other, and more will be said below on the deep 
factors behind them. Also, they take different forms depending on the area one is looking at.  
Corruption is really ubiquitous, even though it does not always appear as such when 
diagnosing institutional failures. Corruption is evidently as much behind the domination that 
big business exerts over politicians and policymaking as it is behind the inefficiency of public 
management, the lack of independence of magistrates or tax collectors, or the 
pervasiveness of informality. How corruption should be fought depends on which of those 
channels is being considered. A key point, however, is that they are strongly tied to each 
other. For instance, it might be difficult for the government to impose order on tax collection 
if, at the same time, a public procurement scandal breaks out that involves top public 
management.  
To be sure, corruption per se does not necessarily hinder development. Several fast-
developing countries are known to be very corrupt, e.g. Bangladesh, China, Vietnam, and it 
was seen in chapter 3 that Benin was found to be less corrupt than countries that grew much 
faster from the same base in several international databases on governance. The real 
question is whether a sustainable and vigorous growth engine is available or not. In the 
former case, corruption is very much a way of appropriating a larger share of an increasing 
pie. It may slow down growth but does not turn off the engine. In the latter case, however, 
the same corrupt behaviour may make the economy inefficient and prevent growth 
opportunities to be seized. The analysis in this volume, as summarized in the preceding 
sections, unfortunately suggests that Benin better fits this scenario.   
The weakness of public management appears in many different forms in the thematic 
studies presented above. The weak enforcement of the law, possibly due in some cases to 
the complexity or ambiguity of the law, appears very clearly in the case of land rights. The 
absent or ill-adapted regulation of key sectors is patent in the cotton sector but also in the 
ICBT with Nigeria. If direct regulation of an informal and illegal activity is difficult, something 
is likely to be achieved, indirectly, through controlling import duties and taxes, for re-export. 
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State coordination, i.e. the capacity of various government ministers or agencies to act 
together, is shown to be poor again in the administration of land issues. State capacity is 
notoriously low in the management of land issues and in tax collection. Given the importance 
of that particular state function, this suggests that the same may hold in other public 
departments. Finally, the very low quality of education and the deficient management of the 
power sector are signs that priorities in the delivery of public services are inadequate. All of 
these deficiencies of public management are strong and are likely to weigh heavily on the 
efficiency of the whole economy. 
Opacity may be considered as one of the weaknesses of public management, or possibly a 
consequence of them. The unaccountability of the governing bodies entails the lack of 
evaluation of policies and hence prevents the correction of inefficiencies and accentuates 
the mistrust of the public with respect to government action. Be it land laws, the 
management structure of cotton, or the educational system, no rigorous evaluation is 
available that could suggest effective directions of reform. 
Informality is the last main weakness stressed repeatedly in the preceding analyses. Benin is 
one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa where informality is most widespread. It is the 
huge size of the illegal cross-border trade between Benin and Nigeria that generates that 
high level of informality. Even though this activity brings easy gains to Benin, it has negative 
spill-over effects on the rest of the economy. These spill-over effects disincentivise firms to 
formalise, they reduce tax revenues, and they encourage corruption. They also prevent 
Benin to seek more sustainable and dynamic development alternatives.  
We now turn to the factors that are ultimately responsible for these weaknesses. Together 
with the preceding list, this constitutes the core of our institutional diagnostic of Benin. 
Reform directions that might partly correct these weaknesses or neutralise some of their 
effects will be suggested afterwards.  
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2 Institutional diagnostic of Benin: a compact view 
In light of the above list of institutional weaknesses impeding Benin’s long-term 
development, we are now in a position to present a compact view of the institutional 
diagnostic of Benin. This is done in two steps. We first devise a synthetic ordering of the 
institutional factors impeding long-run development, where identified institutional 
weaknesses are traced back to proximate and ultimate (deep) causes, while in the other 
direction we unfold the economic consequences of these weaknesses (see Table 1). In the 
second step, we emphasise the critical role of political economy factors, around which we 
articulate many of the elements of the compact diagnostic. We are then ready to move on to 
the last section of this chapter where we consider the most important policy implications of 
our institutional analysis: that is, we highlight what seems to be the best ways to help 
overcome or circumvent the institutional barriers to development in Benin.  
2.1 An ordering of the institutional barriers and their economic 
consequences 
The main results of our comprehensive approach to Benin’s institutional weaknesses are 
summarised in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: A synthetic ordering of the institutional factors impeding Benin’s long-term 
development 
Deep factors Proximate causes 
Basic institutional 
weaknesses 
Economic 
consequences 
- Political game (neo-
patrimonialism, with 
multiple oligarchs) 
- Multiple ethnic 
groups and regional 
divide 
- Geography (small 
country with a big 
resource-rich overly 
protectionist 
neighbour) 
- Colonial legacy of 
top-down 
management of key 
economic sectors 
(cotton, in 
particular)- Colonial 
legacy of top-down 
management of key 
economic sectors 
(cotton, in 
particular) 
- Role of donors 
- Policy instability (1): 
frequent changes in 
law  
- Policy instability (2): 
frequent changes in 
the organisation of 
key economic sectors 
(e.g. cotton sector)  
- Lack of long-term 
development planning  
- Elite capture of key 
state functions 
- Weakness of state, 
reflected in its inability 
to exert control over 
all its administrations, 
and in the insufficient 
amount of resources 
(skills, equipment, 
etc.) for efficient 
management of the 
public sector  
- Existence of rent 
opportunities in illegal 
trade with big 
neighbour 
- Widespread 
corruption (e.g. 
business and politics, 
lack of independence 
of tax collectors and 
magistrates) 
- Weak enforcement 
(and complexity) of 
laws 
- Weak regulation 
(domination by big 
business of key 
sectors) 
- Lack of state 
coordination (e.g. 
fierce competition 
between ministries) 
- Low state capacity 
(e.g. understaffing of 
key administrations, 
low quality of 
education)) 
- Low prioritising of 
critical public goods 
(e.g. education or 
power generation) 
- Low quality of 
education 
- Weak sustainability of 
the growth pattern: 
- Low productivity 
growth  
- Low diversification  
- Low level and pace 
of industrialisation 
- Poor investment 
climate  
- Lopsided spatial 
development 
- Increasing inequality 
and slow reduction of 
poverty 
- Chronic aid 
dependence 
- Lack of citizens’ trust 
in key institutions 
- Vulnerability to 
external shocks 
The Benin Institutional Diagnostic 
© Economic Development & Institutions  29 
 
It is thus evident that four deep factors ultimately help to account for the key institutional 
weaknesses detected in Benin: (i) a political system that is characterised by a neo-
patrimonial logic and where there are multiple contenders; (ii) a social landscape in which 
multiple ethnic groups have coexisted for a long time; (iii) a geographical/neighbourhood 
landscape in which Benin appears as a small country that possesses a long border with a 
big neighbour (Nigeria);  (iv) a legacy of centralised management of key economic sectors 
(the cotton export sector, in particular) dating back to the French colonial period; and (v) the 
heavy presence of aid agencies which evince a rather lenient attitude towards the 
dysfunctional aspects of the political system. Factor (i), the way the political system 
influences the institutional setup of Benin, is complex and deserves a more detailed analysis, 
to which we will soon turn. Factor (ii), which points to a legacy of multiple ethnic groups 
combined with a strong regional (north–south) divide, provides an important source of 
identity around which competing factions and divided loyalties are formed. Factor (iii) 
determines the existence of considerable rent opportunities or profits from informal, illegal 
trade with Nigeria – opportunities which have actually been seized by entrepreneurs, Big 
Men in particular. Factor (iv) is a legacy of centralised management of key economic sectors 
(the cotton export sector, in particular) dating back to the French colonial period. Finally, 
factor (v) explains the low level of external disciplining pressures exerted on the country’s 
public actors. 
A series of proximate institutional problems generated by neo-patrimonialism and ethno-
regional fragmentation can be regrouped around the syndrome of policy instability. They are 
manifested in frequent changes of law (e.g. land laws) and the unenforceability of some legal 
provisions (see, for example, the land law of 2017), as well as in frequent changes in the 
organisation of key economic sectors (the cotton sector, in particular). The lack of long-term 
economic planning is also a consequence of a political system in which competition among 
Big Men who are uncertain about their future political standing is not governed by clear rules. 
Competition is especially fierce, and uncertainty especially great, because of the division of 
the Beninese society into multiple ethno-regional groupings. Beside policy instability, there is 
the problem that key state functions are captured by the dominating faction(s), resulting in a 
weak state that is unable to exert control over all its administrations, a difficulty that is 
compounded by a lack of administrative resources (skills, staff, and equipment). This 
situation of low effectiveness in the management of the public sector and unfair distribution 
of the country’s rents is not adequately mitigated by the pressures emanating from external 
donor agencies or international (African) institutions. It is not mitigated either by pressures 
for opening up key economic sectors (the cotton sector, in particular) to competition, owing 
to a long tradition of public monopoly that is easily transformed into private monopoly. As for 
- Lack of genuine 
competition in the 
cotton sector  
 
- Opacity of 
policymaking and 
economic 
management; 
unaccountability of 
public agencies in key 
sectors 
- Pervasive informal 
practices, magnified 
by illegal cross-border 
trade 
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geography, the presence of Nigeria at the border of Benin gives rise to considerable 
opportunities for rent that can be earned through illegal trade. 
The basic institutional weaknesses which the proximate factors have created are essentially 
those mentioned in the preceding section. Frequent changes of law and the unenforceability 
of some legal provisions make for weak implementation of the law, while frequent changes in 
the organisation of key economic sectors make for the weak regulation of big business. Elite 
capture of key functions of the state gives rise to opaque policymaking and economic 
management, as well as to the unaccountability of the agencies in charge of key economic 
sectors. It also gives free rein to widespread corruption and, in particular, makes tax 
collectors and magistrates susceptible to political pressures. In addition, the weakness of the 
Beninese state causes low state coordination, as reflected in its inability to discipline the 
sometimes fierce competition that opposes certain ministries (think of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Agriculture in matters related to the formalisation or semi-formalisation of 
land rights). The same weakness also means a low state capacity, such as is manifested in 
the understaffing of key administrations (the tax collection department, in particular). It is 
moreover evident that the lack of long-term planning and development perspectives that give 
sufficient weight to sustainability considerations implies that sectors such as education and 
power generation do not receive the priority they deserve. Finally, pervasive informal 
practices, magnified by illegal cross-border trade, directly result from the existence of vast 
rent opportunities in illegal trade with Nigeria, the big neighbour. 
The last column of Table 1 depicts the main economic consequences of these institutional 
failures. The growth pattern, centred on a product (cotton) the future prospects of which are 
uncertain and on a cross-border trade which narrowly depends on Nigerian policies, is not 
sustainable in the long run. In addition, the slow productivity growth and the slow pace of 
industrialisation, combined with pervasive inefficiencies in the running of the state, make 
Benin chronically dependent on foreign resources. At the same time, a bad investment 
climate results from poor governance, widespread corruption, and confusing and loosely 
enforced laws and regulations. Since foreign direct investment is therefore deterred, foreign 
aid is the buoy that keeps the country’s finance afloat. All these effects, as well as other 
effects that include lopsided spatial development, increasing inequality, slow reduction of 
poverty, and lack of citizens’ trust in key institutions, can be traced back to Benin’s political 
economy. We now elaborate on this point in some detail.  
2.2 The key role of political economy factors 
The neo-patrimonial system at work in the country has numerous effects that bear upon 
almost all of the institutional weaknesses detected in our diagnostic. It is true that some 
weaknesses cannot be uniquely explained by the prevailing political economy of Benin, as 
attested by the aforementioned roles of geography, ethno-regional fragmentation, and 
donors’ behaviour. Yet a central lesson from our whole analysis is the following: it is 
impossible to reach a correct understanding of the institutional barriers to Benin’s long-term 
development without bringing political economic factors to the foreground and placing them 
at the heart of the diagnostic.  
Behind the façade of an apparently well-functioning democracy, Benin has a fundamentally 
unstable policymaking machine, which goes a long way towards explaining why its 
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government announces and enacts many reforms while being unable to carry them out. Let 
us look at the underlying political system more carefully. The post-independence period was 
chaotic, characterised by successive coups and counter-coups. These abrupt shifts of power 
were the outcome of an all-out war between strong personalities representing different 
regions and ethnic groups. Then came the authoritarian Marxist regime of Mathieu Kérékou, 
a man from the Northern region. He was obviously incapable of bringing order and political 
stability in spite of the relative long duration of his rule. This is attested by the numerous 
attempts to overthrow him that punctuated his regime, including attempts from the same 
quarter of the army from which he emanated. In spite of the official ideology of socialism, 
Kérékou’s regime was deeply prebendary and anchored in factional clientelism. It was 
marred by numerous scandals that reflected the lust for private wealth accumulation among 
his inner circle. After its demise came the Renouveau Démocratique (Democratic Renewal), 
and its promise of a more transparent and competitive political game that would put an end 
to kleptocratic practices and blatant favouritism. Unfortunately, these hopes were soon 
shattered as the old game continued to be played by new actors. In essence, the political 
system remained patrimonial, in the sense that wealth and power were narrowly intertwined. 
At this stage, it is useful to remember the definition of (neo-) patrimonialism proposed by 
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997): 
‘In neo-patrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal 
patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classical patrimonialism, the 
right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office. In contemporary neo-
patrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political 
and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform 
public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between 
private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neo-patrimonialism 
is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public 
sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts and projects). In return 
for material reward, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward 
as a mark of deference to patrons.’ (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 458) 
Célestin Monga (1997) has rightly pointed out that this form of patrimonialism has evolved in 
sub-Saharan Africa: ‘Even the most extreme forms of African patrimonialism have 
undergone revision. Far from being a system of mere privilege trafficking and influence 
peddling, patrimonialism is attuned to the social exigencies of the times and seeks to craft a 
type of power that is less direct and primitive, more equilibrated, and in a certain sense, 
interactive.’ (Monga, 1997, p. 56). The fact remains that the basic feature of the system, 
namely the lack of separation between political power and private wealth accumulation, is 
enduring. 
The above excerpts deal with the functioning of the (neo-) patrimonial rule once it is in place. 
But we also need to understand how power is accessed. In the absence of a well-enforced 
rule governing electoral campaigning, or in the absence of a strong man who dictates the 
rules to make sure he is ‘elected’, competition for state power is rather wild. Adopting a 
Coasian framework in which bargaining with compensatory transfers is feasible among the 
contenders yields the following conclusion: a stable agreement may be reached between 
two contenders provided that a certain number of critical conditions are satisfied. Among 
these are the absence of negotiation costs, the credibility of promises or threats, and perfect 
information about the net gains associated with the exercise of power. It is evident that in 
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many circumstances at least some of these conditions are violated. Lack of trust between 
the Big Men jeopardises their ability to strike a sustainable agreement while (too much) 
divergence regarding the benefit of holding power prevents them from conceiving of a 
mutually agreeable way of sharing the spoils of power. For instance, the Big Man who would 
hold central power finds the compensation required by his rival excessive given his own 
assessment of the cost of remaining out of power. As a result, agreements are difficult to 
reach or, if they are reached, they are difficult to maintain. To illustrate the latter situation, 
consider the case where two Big Men have enough mutual trust and sufficiently converging 
information to make a deal. After the deal is made new elements of information come out 
that lead one of the parties to revise his evaluation of the worthiness of the deal from his own 
standpoint, or to call into question the trust he has placed in the rival contender. The deal 
may then swiftly collapse.  
When there are more than two contenders, the situation is worse in the sense that, even 
assuming that trust is well-established and information about the benefits of an agreement is 
common to everybody, a stable agreement may be impossible to conclude (see Chapter 
1).11 Theory shows that an endless series of such coalitions and counter-coalitions may 
unfold, thereby creating a situation of continuous instability (Shapley and Shubick, 1969). If 
we define a Big Man or an oligarch as a faction leader deeply involved in business while 
being tightly connected to the high spheres of politics, whether or not business involvement 
preceded or followed engagement in politics, the description of a political game with more 
than two players is a good fit for the political stage of Benin. We should therefore not be 
surprised that policy instability has characterised the country for most of its post-
independence period, as epitomised by the dance between the private and the public status 
of the firms or agencies in charge of the cotton sector since 2000.  
There is another feature of Benin that needs to be emphasised at this point. Although it does 
not possess abundant natural (mineral and non-mineral) resources that typically give rise to 
the well-known resource curse problem, two sectors of its economy are potential sources of 
huge rents and practically make Benin akin to a resource-rich country: the cotton sector, 
which represents a sizeable part of the economy and where vast rents can be reaped in a  
monopoly situations, and illegal trading with Nigeria, where high profits can be made by big 
operators, especially those in control of the customs system. In a world where state power 
confers considerable economic privileges on its holder and his clique, the existence of these 
huge potential rents makes it immensely attractive, thereby justifying fierce struggles for its 
conquest. In this logic, the oligarchs acting behind the screen of formally democratic 
institutions make key decisions in, and appear to be the effective owners of, parastatals and 
formally independent private corporations. This is especially patent in the case of the 
privatised cotton sector but it also holds true for the large unofficial sector organised around 
cross-border trade, and for external trade organisations (customs, regulatory bodies for the 
issuing of import licences, etc.). 
Benin’s neo-patrimonial political system with multiple oligarchs (Big Men) produces a 
number of important adverse effects, static and dynamic, that reduce economic efficiency. 
They are detailed below. Overall, they suggest a picture of a country that is weakly 
                                               
11 Thus, in the case of a political contest between three Big Men, A, B, and C, a triangular game is involved and a 
coalition between two of them (say, A and B) may soon be defeated by a counter-coalition initiated by the excluded 
contender (C proposes to B an agreement that is more profitable for B than his previous agreement with A). Yet A 
will not remain passive and may bargain with C in order to exclude the ‘traitor’ B. 
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governed, structurally stagnant, ill-adapted to the challenges of long-term development, aid-
dependent, and vulnerable to external shocks. 
2.2.1 Lack of attention to general public goods 
A first negative consequence of the political system at work in Benin is directly associated 
with widespread clientelistic practices. Particularised privileges and the prioritising of public 
goods targeted at specific groups means that general public goods, such as education, 
nationwide communication, and power infrastructure, as well as key administrative 
departments, have not received the attention that they deserve. It is true that efforts have 
recently been made to fill up some of these gaps, yet they still do not reflect sufficient 
awareness of the critical role these factors play in sustained growth and development. Thus, 
while the construction of roads is essentially financed by external aid, the expansion of 
education has largely been conceived in quantitative terms, implying that its quality has 
probably even deteriorated. This is worrisome because, since it is deprived of mineral and 
non-mineral resources, Benin’s long-term growth path will have to rest on the emergence 
and rapid development of sectors that create substantial added value, whether in the 
processing of agricultural goods, in the production of manufactured goods, or in services. On 
the other hand, the understaffing of the tax collection administration has not been remedied 
and, combined with the low efficiency of its mode of operation, this probably explains the 
disappointing performance of Benin in matters of tax collection.  
2.2.2 Allocative inefficiencies 
A second negative upshot of Benin’s political economy system lies in significant distortions in 
the allocation of resources. This is especially evident in the case of the two sectors that 
dominate the national economy: the cotton sector and illegal trading with Nigeria. In the 
former distortions are the result of a deliberate suppression of competition, and the gradual 
takeover of the whole sector by a single private actor controlling the various stages of the 
value chain, from input supply to marketing through processing (ginneries). Unregulated 
private monopolies are rarely economically efficient, and, in any case, they have unfair 
distributional consequences.12 This evolution has taken place through various successive 
transformations of the sector’s organisational structure during the last 25 years. Such 
transformations were chaotic and largely reflected a cut-throat struggle for the control of this 
vital sector, rather than a continuous search and experimentation aimed at greater efficiency. 
So far, the outcome has proven disastrous for the country. Organisational instability over 
those years made production lag behind competitors and growth be under potential.  
Regarding the second key sector of the Beninese economy, the ICBT with Nigeria, there are 
potential distortions arising from both the illegal import side and the re-export side of this 
trade. For the former, illegal imports thrive on artificial price differences – in fact, the 
equivalent of the WAEMU import duty rates to which Benin is committed and which are 
foregone. There is also the possibility of a crowding out of private and public resources 
which could have been put to better use in the agricultural value chain or the manufacturing 
sector. As far as re-export activities are concerned, the price difference consists of the 
difference between prevailing duty rates in Nigeria and Benin (the WAEMU common tariff). 
                                               
12 It is not sure that the public monopoly system that prevailed before was more efficient if managed so as to 
provide rents to the political elite.  
The Benin Institutional Diagnostic 
© Economic Development & Institutions  34 
The numerous advantages enjoyed by re-export activities (specific tax rates and customs 
procedures, large public and private infrastructures, and an easy access to import financing) 
are likely to create further distortions, with the consequence that trade flows are biased away 
from the pattern that would result from the official protection regime. The same advantages 
granted to, or invested in other activities could have produced a more sustainable and 
possibly faster regime of growth.   
All this being said, there cannot be any doubt that, in the aggregate, Benin benefits from the 
ICBT: it buys from abroad at 100 and resell at 120! But three issues arise: (1) this is not 
sustainable, as Nigeria at any moment may align its tariffs with those of the WAEMU; (2) 
even though it may lift numerous workers out of poverty, the gain may be badly distributed, 
accruing mostly to a few tycoons; and (3) illegal trade and informality spill over to other 
sectors. In fact, Benin is exactly in the situation of the resource-rich countries extracting 
minerals and selling them at low cost, except for the fact that this activity creates a lot of 
informal jobs. The alternative development strategy is uncertain, however, and it would be 
difficult to do without this rent. The main issue here is that, as in resource-rich countries, the 
rent should be used to prepare for the future, which is not the case. 
2.2.3 A lopsided spatial development 
If faction leaders were only Big Men benevolently representing the interests of their region or 
ethnic group, the balanced rotation of high political positions (presidency, members of the 
executive and the parliament) between various regions and ethnicities in Benin could create 
a situation in which interregional inequalities are moderated. As the above point illustrates, 
however, political factions tend to be articulated around the business interests of their 
leaders and their clique. Since business opportunities are concentrated in essentially two 
regions that benefit from the presence of two growth poles, in the form of the two biggest 
commercial cities of the country (Cotonou and Porto Nuovo), it is not surprising that 
economic growth, inequality, and poverty reduction tend to primarily occur in a few privileged 
regions. The other regions – remote regions in particular – are bypassed or do not receive 
the special efforts that they require. The result is a lopsided spatial development, economic 
inequality, and a concentration of poverty in the neglected areas of the country. Alternative 
strategies might yield a more balanced development.  
2.2.4 Vulnerability to external shocks 
A fourth negative effect of the country’s political system is vulnerability to external shocks, 
and the consequent unpredictability of the environment on which the sustainable growth of 
its key sectors depends. For the cotton sector, unpredictability takes the form of both natural 
hazards at a time of rapid climatic change, and the quick development of substitute products 
(synthetic fibres). More generally, the economy remains heavily dependent on the export of 
a few raw agricultural products (among which cotton stands foremost), which are highly 
vulnerable to swings in international commodity prices. As far as cross-border trade with 
Nigeria is concerned, it is obviously at the mercy of the giant neighbour’s policies since it is 
its oil rent and the way its government decides to use it that determine the scope of the gains 
achievable by Benin. While Benin’s re-exports respond to Nigerian demand, which is heavily 
dependent on oil revenues, cross-border imports are driven by the share of the oil rent that 
Nigeria decides to allocate to the subsidising of its domestic oil prices and the protection it 
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wants to provide to its manufacturing industry. Alternatively, given the peg of Benin's 
currency – the CFA franc – to the euro, they also depend on the fluctuations of Nigeria's own 
currency – the Naira – with respect to the euro or hard currencies in general.   
2.2.5 Vulnerability to political changes and lack of structural transformation 
To these strictly external sources of unpredictability, one must add a source that is only 
partly external to economic agents, namely political instability in a context where rulers tend 
to follow a winner-takes-all approach. The intense struggle for state power and the attached 
economic privileges implies that long-term development strategies are hard to devise and 
enforce. Those who suffer are not only ordinary economic agents who need the support of 
such strategies, but also the big business leaders who fear the consequences of abrupt 
changes of personnel at the highest levels of state power. In the case of the Big Men 
themselves, this uncertainty typically encourages the adoption of short-term behaviour that 
involves the quick accumulation of wealth at the expense of long-term profitability. Lack of 
structural transformation of the Beninese economy, which is the expected consequence of 
this short-sightedness, is acutely reflected in the following: the significant decrease in the 
share of agriculture in domestic value-added has not been associated with a corresponding 
increase in the share of tradeable manufactured goods but with a rapid increase in the share 
of non-tradeable services, which often act as a last-resort employer. Note that smuggling in 
and out of Nigeria is a ‘tradeable service’, but the snag is that it may be unsustainable and 
that it generates negative externalities.  
2.2.6 Poor business environment and perverse ‘morale effects’ 
We must also consider all the adverse consequences of a general climate of weak 
governance involving huge elite capture and corruption. A first aspect is the poor business 
environment it creates, with all the attendant implications for investment incentives. In 
particular, weak governance and corruption deter foreign investment,13 thus causing a lack 
of capital and low productivity growth. Combined with stagnant yields in agriculture, low 
productivity growth in the manufacturing and tertiary sectors makes for slow progress in per 
capita income. A second aspect is the ‘morale effect’: when rent capture is blatant and 
corruption is widespread and involves civil servants and government officials, the citizens of 
the country have low trust in their elites and in national institutions. They then try to escape 
their grip and, if this is impossible, they nurture a feeling of anger and powerlessness that 
may one day be vented in open and violent demonstrations. Lack of trust is especially 
evident in the case of judicial and tax collection institutions. Regarding the former, courts are 
the place where executive authorities and their cronies intervene to distort settlements in 
their own favour, using corrupt magistrates to obtain the verdict they want. As for the latter, 
they are a privileged source of discriminatory treatment and undue privileges that directly 
translate into economic inequality: rich people are easily exempted from paying the taxes 
rightfully due whereas ordinary people like farmers and small traders are illegally taxed by 
unscrupulous officials whenever the opportunity arises (like when they transport goods to the 
market). These illegal taxes are imposed in spite of the fact that special notices displayed at 
local police offices explicitly forbid them. Finally, a third aspect is the fragmentation of 
                                               
13 Over the 2009-2017 period, i.e. after the global financial crisis, Benin ranked in the bottom third of Sub-
Saharan countries in terms of the FDI/GDP ratio, behind countries like Togo, Mali, Ghana or Rwanda, but close 
to Burkina, or Senegal.  
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loyalties and ethno-regional divisiveness that elite capture and corruption encourage when 
they obviously promote particular, faction-based interests. 
Note that in the illegal cross-border trade with Nigeria, bribing and corruption are pervasive 
at each stage of the process, and this is especially noxious because the trade is carried out 
on a large scale. Moreover, this sector of activity encourages a tax evasion habit, which is 
the direct result of its outright illegality, and its actors are therefore inclined to resist and 
undermine any attempt to formalise their operations.  
2.2.7 Chronic aid dependence 
Turning now to the seventh effect, the approach to statehood in Benin means that two 
options are precluded: (i) state capitalism or socialism whereby state resources are 
mobilised in a big way to meet the challenges of modernisation and development; and (ii) a 
(competitive) market-based strategy involving the taming of the state so that the dynamism 
inherent in private entrepreneurship and risk-taking can be unleashed. When none of these 
options is available, and elite capture of state power dominates, a third option becomes very 
attractive because it helps absorb and conceal the effects of the ensuing inefficiencies: 
dependence on foreign aid. Benin has no doubt entered into such dependence, on external 
financial flows and official development assistance in particular. A disturbing sign of 
excessive external dependence is the growth of external debt as a percentage of GDP after 
the major debt write-off that took place in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, the prospects of the 
Beninese economy as they have been highlighted above do not hold out the promise of a 
foreseeable change in this situation. Strong dependence on external financing seems to be 
accepted as an unavoidable consequence of maintaining the prevailing political system. 
Long-term effects are thereby ignored. 
2.2.8 Confusing and changing laws and policies 
When state power is unstable, in the sense that the current holders of the high offices in the 
executive, legislative, judiciary, and administrative spheres are uncertain about the duration 
of their mandate, they tend to be vulnerable to the pressures of various groups on whose 
cooperation they rely. This creates a fertile ground for policies and laws that betray a 
clientelistic approach to the resolution of national problems. However, in the presence of 
supporting groups that are in conflict on a particular issue, a tempting strategy for the 
political elite consists of trying to please all or most of them at the same time. This has the 
frequent effect of producing policies and laws that are inconsistent and so complex as to 
create confusion, unintelligibility, and unenforceability. Moreover, a direct effect of changes 
of personnel at the highest levels of the state system is that policies and laws are often 
rescinded or amended over successive periods of time, with the same consequence of 
creating confusion and unpredictability. Land laws offer a striking illustration of this 
predicament. To add further complexity, and as seen above, they are also the outcomes of 
fierce struggles among rival administrative entities which are eager to appropriate to 
themselves the various gains and advantages of managing land issues. 
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3 Policy implications 
We now present a number of policy implications that follow from our institutional diagnostic. 
In so doing we draw attention to potential ways of overcoming or circumventing the 
prevailing institutional barriers to long-term development. The points are grouped around two 
major themes: overcoming Benin’s political ills, overcoming its economic ills. 
3.1 Overcoming the political and governance ills: internal 
regulation and external pressures  
Since our diagnostic has highlighted the key role of political economy factors, it is logical to 
think of means of countering their noxious influence. Several mechanisms come to mind. 
One obvious mechanism consists of regulations regarding the financing of electoral 
campaigns. These include the effective capping of the amount allowed for the purpose, and 
obligations of transparency with respect to not only the amount of the donations received but 
also their sources. The problem with such rules is that in weakly governed countries, they 
tend to be ignored whenever they are enacted. This is illustrated by Benin, where they 
indeed exist but are not strictly enforced. The same restriction probably applies to all rules 
prescribing rigorous impact evaluations of public sector actions in order to achieve greater 
accountability of major actors at the state level. And it also applies to many laws, decrees, 
and regulations that ban day-to-day malpractices, such as the taking of bribes or petty 
corruption and money extortion by local officials.  
The conditionality mechanism that external aid providers can put into place offers still 
another (theoretical) solution to political dysfunction. Here, what bears noticing is that this 
mechanism has not been effectively used in the case of Benin, in spite of all the scandals 
revealed by the press attesting to large-scale corruption, frequent fund embezzlements, and 
widespread cronyism. To our knowledge, there are only a few exceptions to this rule, namely 
the (temporary) suspension of aid delivery by the Dutch government following clear evidence 
of embezzlement in a water infrastructure project, and the (temporary) suspension of the 
MCAII funding on the ground that the Doing Business indicator for Benin fell below a 
predetermined threshold.  
The question as to why big international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have so far abstained from sanctioning state-level malpractices 
therefore arises. A plausible explanation lies in the appearance of democracy that the 
country presents, which seems to receive a disproportionately positive weighting in the 
evaluation of the country’s performances by the international donor community. This may 
itself be due to two different causes: either the governance indicators are excessively based 
on measures of formal aspects of institutions, thereby overlooking their real functioning, or 
the donors are well aware of this functioning, yet deliberately decide not to pay too much 
attention to it. Evidence in support of the first interpretation is the fact that the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) World Bank measure on the control of corruption works 
out at 3.5 for Benin, slightly above the mean among low-income countries. . It is hard to 
believe that Benin can enjoy such a good relative ranking in light of the numerous scandals 
that have taken place in recent decades. As for the second interpretation, donors who 
decide to ignore disturbing evidence of ill-governance may be driven by considerations of 
political expediency, including geo-political considerations. Or they may consider that if they 
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sanction a country like Benin, by refusing to release budgeted aid tranches, they would have 
to mete out the same treatment to many other poor countries, in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, and their mission would thus be seriously jeopardised. This can be linked to a 
general budget pressure problem, understood as the need to spend money allocated to aid, 
regardless of the effects generated. This interpretation is supported by the exceptional 
character of permanent aid disruption: the main impression we are left with is that threats of 
aid cancellation in the event of serious malpractices are not generally credible – warnings 
may be issued, sanctions may (rarely) be imposed but, ultimately, the objective of both the 
donor and the beneficiary is to restore the aid relation, through superficial or perfunctory 
accommodating measures if necessary. 
If over-emphasis on the formal aspects of institutions in the indicators of governance used is 
the most important problem, then a rethink of these indicators is the logical conclusion of the 
above discussion. If this is not the only problem, a key implication is that donors must avoid 
giving aid for budget support14 and concentrate on project and programme aid. This does not 
relieve them of the need to carefully monitor the actual use of the aid and to act upon the 
conclusion reached in any monitoring exercise. At the same time, it remains essential that 
donors are guarded against the danger of imposing their own development agenda on a 
weakly governed country that is prompted to accept any aid proposed, whatever its 
compatibility with the priorities, needs, and constraints as perceived by local actors. This is 
particularly evident in the case of programmes aimed at formalising land rights.  
3.2 Overcoming the economic ills: towards greater economic 
diversification and upgrading 
To get out of underdevelopment and to increase average income per head the Beninese 
economy must be drastically transformed. This implies a sectoral transformation of its 
structure and determined efforts to improve labour productivity in key sectors.  
Regarding the first dimension, a realistic strategy consists of promoting agro-processing 
industries outside the cotton sector. This involves (1) the identification of agricultural 
products for which the country’s natural conditions are appropriate and which can generate 
enough added value; and (2) the integration of their producers and intermediaries into a 
value chain that includes input and credit supply; collection of the produce; and its 
transportation, storage, processing, packaging, and marketing up to the final consumer 
points in rich countries if needed. In a country like Benin, where there are many experienced 
traders and middlemen (including those of Indian or Pakistani origin who crisscross the 
country) this is best done through a great deal of market activation or facilitation. On the part 
of the state, the main tasks required are the construction and maintenance of rural feeder 
roads which can be branched off into the main grid, and the effective suppression of all the 
money-extorting posts placed on the routes used by producers and traders. 
Valuable efforts have actually started to be made in this direction. Thus, for example, 
schemes for the production and export of pineapples and pineapple products (like juice) 
have recently been launched under the impulse of the present government and with the 
financial and logistical support of several aid agencies and development cooperation 
                                               
14 Budget support aid is actually provided by the European Union and by a few programs of the World Bank 
(macro-economic reform or the PRSG (Poverty Reduction Support Grant)). 
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programmes (French, Belgian, Canadian, etc.). The running of the value chain up to a big 
European supermarket company (Carrefour in France) and the top quality of the product 
augur well for the success of this initiative. One of the trickiest problems that arises in such a 
scheme is typical of many outgrower schemes: when several traders compete among 
themselves for access to the producers, and when they provide the latter with inputs and 
credit, there is a high risk that contracts will be violated by opportunistic producers. In most 
cases, this moral hazard problem takes the following form: a producer receives inputs on 
credit from a trader-cum-lender against the promise to deliver his/her harvest to him/her at a 
predetermined price; if the former is approached by a competing trader who offers him/her a 
higher price, the temptation is great to ignore the original contract and accept the new deal. 
This clearly points to a market failure that needs to be carefully monitored. The alternative is 
to have a monopsonistic produce buyer, whether public or private, but then abuses of the 
monopsonistic power are to be feared. We are thus confronted with the same trade-off as 
the one encountered in the cotton sector.  
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the pineapple scheme is being implemented in one 
of the richest parts of the country, not far from the two main commercial cities in the south. A 
big challenge is how to encourage the same type of initiative in the northern part, lest the 
north–south income gap should widen, and interregional tensions should increase. 
Admittedly, some initiatives have taken place in the north as well, for example around rice 
production in the region of Natitingou. But these efforts need to be extended and pursued 
with the same determination as in the south, especially so because two south–north 
highways will soon be available. Moreover, one central lesson from the analysis of land 
reforms is that the issuing of land certificates is not sufficient to ensure significant production 
increases in agriculture: the profitability of land investments must be demonstrated, and this 
precisely necessitates that new crops with higher added value and new production 
techniques are disseminated throughout the countryside.  
Increasing labour productivity in industrial ventures is another pressing challenge for Benin. 
This requires not only that more efficient production techniques and capital equipment are 
used but also that better management systems are put in place. The most effective way to 
attain this objective is to mobilise foreign direct investment, but that requires, in turn, that 
governance conditions are improved in the country so as to reassure potential investors. 
This takes us back to the first aspect of our policy implications. 
It must also be stressed that the development of these new activities may compete with old 
activities, in particular the two major ones, cotton and ICBT. Land is apparently still available 
in the North of the country and transport infrastructure may encourage investment in new 
agricultural productions there, provided rural roads are available. As for other inputs, trade-
offs do exist and decisions must be taken, something particularly difficult in the presence of a 
huge informal sector like ICBT. Regulating it may thus prove a necessary condition for the 
unavoidable diversification of the Beninese economy.  Membership in the WAEMU may be 
another constraint since the fixity of the exchange rate with hard currencies may in some 
cases weaken foreign competitiveness. 
Finally, the second biggest challenge that Benin must meet in the future lies in the field of 
education. If significant efforts have been made to increase enrolment, much remains to be 
done to improve educational quality in order to reach decent standards, even at the primary 
school level. In the absence of significant improvements in educational quality, it is difficult to 
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see how Benin could gradually move to a knowledge-intensive economy, as befits a country 
that is deprived of mineral and non-mineral resources.  
A positive approach to Benin is to see it as a promising country endowed with 
entrepreneurial people and well-experienced traders and merchants, as well as good climate 
and fertile agricultural lands in certain parts of its territory. It has a comparative advantage 
not only in traditional products such as cotton, but also in new agricultural products that can 
be processes and sold at remunerative prices in the international, regional, and domestic 
markets. In other words, Benin has potential for development that could be unleashed if only 
the right institutional and policy environment could be established. No deep constraint 
condemns it to stagnation. What is needed is first and foremost that a country that has 
succeeded in laying down and enforcing rules regarding democratic elections and the 
duration of political mandates also succeeds in breaking the link between business and 
politics that has poisoned its political life since independence. Relatedly, the state must 
reinforce its tax-collecting capacity, create attractive conditions for foreign direct investment, 
and enhance its ability to coordinate the actions of its various administrative departments. 
The public money should be used in the pursuit of long-term objectives, which means that a 
significant part of it should be devoted to the development of high quality human capital and 
the construction and proper maintenance of physical infrastructure. Finally, the state should 
aim at more sustainable or autonomous development in the sense of reducing the country’s 
vulnerability to external shocks and foreign aid. These are formidable challenges but, given 
the stake involved, they deserve utmost attention and determined actions. 
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